Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[CumbrianLefty]

This is not, unfortunately, inconsistent with a damned cold actual winter.

[Yeahsayyeah]

Bloomberg:  "UK Winter Is More Likely to Be Colder Than Normal"

There is a 25% chance the season will be cold, 60% chance of it being near average and 15% it will be mild, according to the Met Office’s three-month outlook. “The likelihood of a colder three-month period overall is slightly greater than normal,” according to the outlook.

Ok, there is a slightly higher chance that it could be colder than average than that it will be warmer than average, but the most likely scenario is that it will be about average. So the right headline would have bin "UK Winter most likely about average".

[Woody]

Major strikes today across the country

https://twitter.com/USATODAY/status/1587079098999767040
https://twitter.com/am_misfit/status/1586967292902080513
https://twitter.com/SprinterMonitor/status/1587004276437651456
https://twitter.com/Faytuks/status/1586984333272928257
https://twitter.com/Hromadske/status/1587032885785030656
https://twitter.com/Russiaconflict/status/1586982775856431107

[Woody]

https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1587037551906390016
https://twitter.com/SprinterMonitor/status/1587005254784221185
https://twitter.com/SprinterMonitor/status/1587005007446085635

[Person Man]

Here is a really good thread using geo-location from the multiple video sources available on the attacks on Russian Naval vessels in the Sevastopol Port area...

I believe there are still some debates among the gurus as to if the Admiral Makarov was the frigate in question...

Still regardless of the conclusions, it is really worth checking this thread out.

I'll just post a link to one of the twitter posts on the thread, and then I believe you will need to navigate to the main page to see all of the (31) back to back posts from the thread author...

https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1586460379697348608?s=20&t=p2bQ7Nddx...

It was God again.

[Woody]

From yesterday, Pavlivka might already be under RU control. Vuhledar direction.

https://twitter.com/War_Mapper/status/1586888938588889092?cxt=HHwWiICzqZ_F4YUsAA...

[Person Man]

Major strikes today across the country

https://twitter.com/USATODAY/status/1587079098999767040
https://twitter.com/am_misfit/status/1586967292902080513
https://twitter.com/SprinterMonitor/status/1587004276437651456
https://twitter.com/Faytuks/status/1586984333272928257
https://twitter.com/Hromadske/status/1587032885785030656
https://twitter.com/Russiaconflict/status/1586982775856431107

Dead people don’t need power or water. By that, I’m referencing the results of a potential Ukrainian defeat. They’re all gonna die if they don’t pull through.

[Torie]

What is the timetable again for NATO air defense systems to be in place to protect Ukraine's essential infrastructure?

Behind the doomed to fail effort to terrorize and demoralize the Ukrainian population, does anyone have an opinion on just how effective Russia's attack on Ukraine's power sources is from a military standpoint?

[jaichind]

What is the timetable again for NATO air defense systems to be in place to protect Ukraine's essential infrastructure?

Behind the doomed to fail effort to terrorize and demoralize the Ukrainian population, does anyone have an opinion on just how effective Russia's attack on Ukraine's power sources is from a military standpoint?

My opinion is that Russia has not really started to attack the Ukraine energy system.  These attacks seems to be more about learning how Ukraine repairs the damage to attacks to understand where Ukraine energy system have single points of failure.  I also think Ukraine is exaggerating the impact of these attacks to try to get more collective West military and economic aid.

As for NATO missile defense systems, having them in place might be, from a Russia point of view, a feature and not a bug.  These kamikaze drones cost only $20K each. If Russia can exhaust NATO anti missile systems trying to shoot these drones down it is a net economic gain for Russia in this war of attrition.   

[GeneralMacArthur]

What is the timetable again for NATO air defense systems to be in place to protect Ukraine's essential infrastructure?

Behind the doomed to fail effort to terrorize and demoralize the Ukrainian population, does anyone have an opinion on just how effective Russia's attack on Ukraine's power sources is from a military standpoint?

My opinion is that Russia has not really started to attack the Ukraine energy system.  These attacks seems to be more about learning how Ukraine repairs the damage to attacks to understand where Ukraine energy system have single points of failure.  I also think Ukraine is exaggerating the impact of these attacks to try to get more collective West military and economic aid.

As for NATO missile defense systems, having them in place might be, from a Russia point of view, a feature and not a bug.  These kamikaze drones cost only $20K each. If Russia can exhaust NATO anti missile systems trying to shoot these drones down it is a net economic gain for Russia in this war of attrition.   

Russia will not be able to win a spending war with the west.  America's military budget alone is 50% of the entire Russian GDP.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Russia isn't in a spending war with the west, no air defence system is a silver bullet and a few are already in place.

The strikes on power infrastructure don't seem to be dramatically disrupting activities at the front (although that's hard to discern through the fog of war) and are probably less important than the work of other aircraft. Ukraine may be more concerned by the Russian Lancet drones, for instance, which have shorter range but have managed to score several hits on expensive air defence systems.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

In more significant news: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63458641

Turkey, Ukraine and the UN have said they're proceeding with the grain/shipping deal anyway, and today a number of ships are reported to have left Ukraine without being attacked.

I didn't bother reporting Russia's statement that they'd pulled out of the grain deal because their words only mean so much: they fired on Odesa right after the initial implementation of the deal anyway, and it's gotten harder (over the last few months) to attack civilian ships without expending missiles which could be used on military targets instead.

[Virginiá]

My opinion is that Russia has not really started to attack the Ukraine energy system.  These attacks seems to be more about learning how Ukraine repairs the damage to attacks to understand where Ukraine energy system have single points of failure.  I also think Ukraine is exaggerating the impact of these attacks to try to get more collective West military and economic aid.

As for NATO missile defense systems, having them in place might be, from a Russia point of view, a feature and not a bug.  These kamikaze drones cost only $20K each. If Russia can exhaust NATO anti missile systems trying to shoot these drones down it is a net economic gain for Russia in this war of attrition.   

The thing is, Russia doesn't have a never-ending supply of missiles nor the ability to produce them in large quantities due to sanctions. They've used a considerable amount of these missiles already on targeting the Ukrainian power grid. It doesn't make sense to say they haven't even started yet when you actually consider the amount of missiles and drones they have expended even over the last 60 days. So if they haven't even really 'started' to attack the grid yet used up so much of their missile stockpiles in these alleged probing missions, that does beg the question of what they intend to use when they decide to actually start hitting the grid?

A counter-point is that they have been using what they have to go after everything they can, and we are seeing the results of that. This isn't any sort of preliminary op meant to prepare for the main event. It is the main event, and they are procuring Iranian ballistic missiles to continue it both because they are running out of their own missiles and because Ukrainian air defenses are less effective against ballistic missiles.

[Virginiá]

On a side note, I really do hate this ongoing argument that Russia isn't "really" trying yet, usually suggested when they experience major failures or losses. This implication that Russia is actually much more capable and is just holding back or probing for weaknesses right now is, at this point, ridiculous. They've been throwing nearly everything they have short of NBCs into this war. They aren't holding back at all. It just looks like that to some because they were puffed up into this powerful military force for decades when in reality they have a poorly trained military, led by incompetent leaders, all of which are plagued by corruption and rock-bottom morale, and use equipment that is either extremely old, broken, or both.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

On a side note, I really do hate this ongoing argument that Russia isn't "really" trying yet, usually suggested when they experience major failures or losses. This implication that Russia is actually much more capable and is just holding back or probing for weaknesses right now is, at this point, ridiculous. They've been throwing nearly everything they have short of NBCs into this war. They aren't holding back at all. It just looks like that to some because they were puffed up into this powerful military force for decades when in reality they have a poorly trained military, led by incompetent leaders, all of which are plagued by corruption and rock-bottom morale, and use equipment that is either extremely old, broken, or both.

This is broadly true, but there's some fairly important nuance: since their war effort first stumbled, Russian leadership has pursued short-term solutions at the expense of long-term ones in ways that have left them unable to realise their "full" potential.

The very continuation of the conflict is arguably the prime example at the strategic level (it's not clear that taking control of the rest of the Donbas would benefit Russia or solve its war-related problems), but clearer instances include:
- Not mobilising early into the conflict
- Deploying trainer units to the field, which hampered mobilisation
- Wasting PGMs on "flashy" targets/terror bombing for political gains instead of using them against airbases etc. or conserving them until intelligence indicated better targets were available
- Deploying LDNR and other mobilised troops with mere days of training in some cases, squandering soldiers' potential and damaging morale (Ukraine arguably had this problem too, but to a lesser extent)
- Deploying the mobilised with 1890s rifles instead of waiting for logistics to deliver appropriate weapons
- Failing to rotate troops and thereby increasing the risk of psychological casualties
- Constantly attacking Bakhmut "because we got paid to attack Bakhmut and Putin needs a W" instead of preventing far greater collapses and going on the offensive later

The de facto full mobilisation will take months to completely come into effect. "Russia isn't really trying" is beyond copium, but their army is likely to become more capable as the new troops come online.

[I spent the winter writing songs about getting better]

Protest in Prague right now in support of continued backing for Ukraine. It's a counter protest to one a few days ago against the pro-Western/pro-Ukraine government and needless to say absolutely dwarfs that one in size. Czechs are clearly good people!

[Hindsight was 2020]

On a side note, I really do hate this ongoing argument that Russia isn't "really" trying yet, usually suggested when they experience major failures or losses. This implication that Russia is actually much more capable and is just holding back or probing for weaknesses right now is, at this point, ridiculous. They've been throwing nearly everything they have short of NBCs into this war. They aren't holding back at all. It just looks like that to some because they were puffed up into this powerful military force for decades when in reality they have a poorly trained military, led by incompetent leaders, all of which are plagued by corruption and rock-bottom morale, and use equipment that is either extremely old, broken, or both.

Ironically jaichind attempts to defend Russia’s military from accusations of incompetence by saying they have been holding back this whole time ends up becoming a catch-22 that does show incompetence. What military/government would hold back in a war that has seen military embarrassments to the tune of losing the battles of Kviv and Kharkiv along with losing 70k+ in causalities lost which has been more men in less than a year then were lost in a decade in Afghanistan. In addition to the thousands of their best tanks and mechanized vehicles that have been destroyed or are now in Ukrainian hands as well as hundreds of airplanes, helicopters and drones lost. Oh and not to forget their Black Sea fleet losing their flagship and their new flagship badly damaged at the hands of a country with no navy of its own.

That’s just the military embarrassments let’s not forget they have seen geopolitical embarrassments in the form of causing Finland and Sweden going from neutrality to joining NATO, said NATO being reenergized and recommitted to opposing Russian interest. Right wing anti democratic forces in the west who were once bemoaning as on the verge of seizing power and ushering a new era aligned with Russian interests are either completely discredited like in France or felt domestic pressure to recommit to the West and support Ukraine like Italy or Poland. In addition Russia has lost it’s standing with China who now view them as a burdensome junior partner.

So to argue that Russia has been holding back and let all of this happen does show Russian incompetence just not in the way jaichind meant

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

There've been a lot of rumours about Kherson posted here without much substance. It is true that Russia claimed to evacuate tens of thousands of people from the west side of the river recently, but this hasn't immediately led to a military evacuation.

Now that we are at the end of October, I'd urge people here to treat similar rumours with a bit more skepticism. Here is Kofman's (brief) analysis:

https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1587178480537665539
On War of the Rocks today, he said his impression (having just been to Ukraine) was that the Ukrainian army was optimistic about taking the city by the year's end, but that it wouldn't be easy.

Igor Strelkov said earlier that the Dnieper freezes in winter, which could cause supply issues. Let's watch this space, but do so carefully.

[Kahane's Grave Is A Gender-Neutral Bathroom]

https://twitter.com/squatsons/status/1585560472807305217

The fact that you Vatniks think the Russians being surrounded in a cement plant is good news is indicative of the situation.

[Blue3]

Forgive me, but I need a recap summary update…

What in the Russia/Ukraine situation changed, during the month of October 2022?

[Torie]

Help is on the way as to air defense systems.

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/11/01/world/ukraine-war-news-russia-updates#advanced-defensive-weapons-systems-could-be-delivered-to-ukraine-in-coming-days-us-officials-say

[CumbrianLefty]

Forgive me, but I need a recap summary update…

What in the Russia/Ukraine situation changed, during the month of October 2022?

Overall, there was a significant net gain by Ukraine in terms of controlled territory - the proportion in Russian hands is now at its lowest since early March this year (though still around 17% if you count in this the areas, Crimea included, that were taken in 2014)

[Absentee Voting Ghost of Ruin]

On a side note, I really do hate this ongoing argument that Russia isn't "really" trying yet, usually suggested when they experience major failures or losses. This implication that Russia is actually much more capable and is just holding back or probing for weaknesses right now is, at this point, ridiculous. They've been throwing nearly everything they have short of NBCs into this war. They aren't holding back at all. It just looks like that to some because they were puffed up into this powerful military force for decades when in reality they have a poorly trained military, led by incompetent leaders, all of which are plagued by corruption and rock-bottom morale, and use equipment that is either extremely old, broken, or both.

This is broadly true, but there's some fairly important nuance: since their war effort first stumbled, Russian leadership has pursued short-term solutions at the expense of long-term ones in ways that have left them unable to realise their "full" potential.

The very continuation of the conflict is arguably the prime example at the strategic level (it's not clear that taking control of the rest of the Donbas would benefit Russia or solve its war-related problems), but clearer instances include:
- Not mobilising early into the conflict
- Deploying trainer units to the field, which hampered mobilisation
- Wasting PGMs on "flashy" targets/terror bombing for political gains instead of using them against airbases etc. or conserving them until intelligence indicated better targets were available
- Deploying LDNR and other mobilised troops with mere days of training in some cases, squandering soldiers' potential and damaging morale (Ukraine arguably had this problem too, but to a lesser extent)
- Deploying the mobilised with 1890s rifles instead of waiting for logistics to deliver appropriate weapons
- Failing to rotate troops and thereby increasing the risk of psychological casualties
- Constantly attacking Bakhmut "because we got paid to attack Bakhmut and Putin needs a W" instead of preventing far greater collapses and going on the offensive later

The de facto full mobilisation will take months to completely come into effect. "Russia isn't really trying" is beyond copium, but their army is likely to become more capable as the new troops come online.

The catch with bringing in more troops online is that all available evidence suggests their logistics in Ukraine are already maxed out and that their logistics capabilities are likely to degrade rather than increase. So no matter how many they mobilize, they cannot bring more forces to bear in Ukraine.

They can still use the newly mobilized forces to replace losses, or to rotate forces out (how effective replacing exhausted experienced forces with fresh green ones will be I don't know).

I suppose they could try to invade from Belarus again. I've no idea how that would go.

[jaichind]

https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-is-ready-supply-up-500000-t-grain-poorest-countries-tass-2022-10-29/

"Russia is ready to supply up to 500,000 tonnes of grain to poorest countries, TASS reports"

I guess this is in conjunction with the Ukraine grain corridor deal being shutdown

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-is-ready-supply-up-500000-t-grain-poorest-countries-tass-2022-10-29/

"Russia is ready to supply up to 500,000 tonnes of grain to poorest countries, TASS reports"

I guess this is in conjunction with the Ukraine grain corridor deal being shutdown

It was not shut down. In response to Ukraine and Turkey simply continuing to implement the deal without them, Russia clarified yesterday that their participation in the deal was “merely suspended, not cancelled,” because they couldn’t or wouldn’t stop it.