Japan 2022 Upper House elections July 10

[jaichind]

Raw PR vote 2021 to 2022

            2021        2022
LDP     19.91M     18.26M      -1.65M
KP         7.11M       6.18M     -0.93M
PP                         1.77M     +1.77M
PNHK     0.80M       1.25M     +0.45M
JRP        8.05M       7.85M      -0.20M
DPP       2.59M       3.16M      +0.57M
CDP     11.49M       6.77M      -4.72M
RS         2.22M       2.32M      +0.10M
SDP       1.02M       1.26M      +0.24M
JCP        4.17M       3.62M      -0.55M

Despite a JRP vote share increase JRP actually lost some votes since 2021.  CDP lost a bunch of votes to other parties but most likely a bunch to non-voters.

[warandwar]

Does Komeito do well among Burakamin?

Burakumin are actually an interest group for Heisei Kenkyūkai, one of the relatively moderate LDP factions. Komeito probably does okay with them as well, but not as well as it might otherwise.

Regarding the questions about the JCP, it is no longer classically "commie" but is still focused on material issues. Shii Kazuo waving around a rainbow flag or talking about Japan somehow needing more abortion of all things would come across as transparently absurd to just about everyone (although my understanding is the JCP does support LGBT rights). Policy-wise they're basically old-ish-school social democrats right now.

They are the party school teachers vote for, essentially.

[Okay, maybe Mike Johnson is a competent parliamentarian.]

Does Komeito do well among Burakamin?

Burakumin are actually an interest group for Heisei Kenkyūkai, one of the relatively moderate LDP factions. Komeito probably does okay with them as well, but not as well as it might otherwise.

Regarding the questions about the JCP, it is no longer classically "commie" but is still focused on material issues. Shii Kazuo waving around a rainbow flag or talking about Japan somehow needing more abortion of all things would come across as transparently absurd to just about everyone (although my understanding is the JCP does support LGBT rights). Policy-wise they're basically old-ish-school social democrats right now.

They are the party school teachers vote for, essentially.

Basically, although in the US even that would imply somewhat more of a cultural-issues mindset than it does in Japan.

[Logical]

Seat changes after the election. Only LDP, JRP, RS and NP will see their caucuses increase.

[Logical]

https://www.nhk.or.jp/senkyo/database/sangiin/00/hmb12_229.html
Fake Yamamoto Taro got 53 351 votes. A clever and successful stunt by the NHK party.

[jaichind]

The JRP-DPP tactical alliance was mostly a flop.  JRP-DPP made a deal with DPP supported JRP in 京都(Kyoto) while JRP supported a DPP-backed independent in 静岡(Shizuoka).

Result:
a) In 京都(Kyoto) JRP lost to CDP for the second seat.  JRP vote share in 京都(Kyoto) was 24.8% while the sum of JRP and DPP PR votes in 京都(Kyoto) was 28.8%.  Had the JRP and DPP PR votes all voted for the JRP candidate she would have defeated the CDP incumbent for the second spot.  In fact, JRP would have beaten LDP for the first spot in such a scenario.

b) In 静岡(Shizuoka) the DPP-backed independent incumbent (he won via by-election) only won 15.9% and came in third in a 2-seat district while the sum of the JRP and DPP PR votes in 静岡(Shizuoka) was 18.5%.  To be fair even if the DPP-backed independent won 18.5% of the vote he would have still lost but he was expecting to win some CDP votes as well which I am sure he did so the vote share he received showed the flop that was the DPP-JRP alliance here.

[jaichind]

https://www.nhk.or.jp/senkyo/database/sangiin/00/hmb12_229.html
Fake Yamamoto Taro got 53 351 votes. A clever and successful stunt by the NHK party.

Yes, but his vote was crushed by YouTuber 東谷義和(Higashiya Yoshikazu) 288K to 53K, and was duly elected as PNHK PR MP.  His channel now has 391K subscribers vs 384K before the election.  So his core base was and is his core base.  It seems a good part of his subscriber base voted for him.  His strike rate among his subscribers is pretty impressive and shows how wise PNHK got him on their party list.  

If PNHK does win a PR seat then it is for sure going to be youtuber 東谷義和(Higashiya Yoshikazu).  He used to run a retailer and then had to resign due to some scandal I do not quite understand.  But due to his name recognition, he switched to being a youtuber that just has all sorts of commentary.

His youtube channel https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC1vYgHei6CvL1IzRyuOZ_-w has 384K subscribers.

[crals]

What's the reason for CDP's collapse?

[jaichind]

Unification Church's Japan banch confirmed Abe assasination suspect's mother is a member. 

[jaichind]

What's the reason for CDP's collapse?

I think mostly because CDP started in 2017 as a party with a difference and principles but its attempts to eat up DPP and SDP in 2019-2021 shows that it is just another political party.  LDP is the same but LDP is seen as competent.  The last time opposition party merger actually was viewed in a positive way was Ozawa's LP merging into DPJ in 2002.  Since then the the YP split where YP splinter UP merged into JRP in 2014 did not help JRP even as YP then end up imploding.  Then the 2015 JRP split where JIP merged with DPJ to form DP did not pay any dividends.  Then CDP's attempt to merge DPP and SDP into CDP in 2019-2021 did not pay dividends while the rump SDP and DPP after their mainstream versions merged into CDP went from strength to strength.

This plus the Russia-Ukraine war has provoked fear of a rising PRC which could become a military threat to Japan.  CDP's dogmatic position on constitutional revision seems to dismiss these concerns AND CDP's behavior in trying to annex DPP and SDP shows that it is totally capable of being pragmatic when the situation suits it.  So the CDP in the end is see as a hypocritical party that is dogmatic even in the face of concerns of the Japanese population but can be flexible when it might mean they can gain more power.

[jaichind]

I was able to map out the PR vote by prefecture.  I will do a deeper dive into the data but my initial reaction is that the reason why the KP vote went down is because in rural areas the KP vote went down to the benefit of LDP.  It seems what took place was due to the Abe assassination marginal LDP PR voters that used to vote KP due to LDP-KP alliance went back to vote LDP in rural areas.  This seems to have taken place across the board but was more intense in rural areas.  The LDP, separately, did lose a bunch of support to PP which meant that the LDP in this election became an even more rural party than it was in 2021.

[Keep Calm and ...]

Election results map found on twitter:
https://twitter.com/EricssenWen/status/1546397025641541632

[jaichind]

With all PR results in we can update my Japan PR history chart to include 2022

We can now update our PR vote history chart

              LDP            KP          LDP-KP    Center-Left  Third Pole   JCP    Anti-System  Anti-System
                                                                                                              Right            Left
2000      28.31%     12.97%    41.28%     34.71%     12.78%   11.23%    
2001      38.57%     14.96%    53.53%     24.60%     13.86%     7.91%      0.11%  
2003      34.96%     14.78%    49.73%     42.51%                     7.76%    
2004      30.03%     15.41%    45.45%     46.52%                     7.80%      0.23%  
2005      38.18%     13.25%    51.43%     36.51%       4.81%     7.25%    
2007      28.08%     13.18%    41.26%     45.80%       5.16%     7.48%      0.29%  
2009      26.73%     11.45%    38.18%     46.68%       7.46%     7.03%      0.65%  
2010      24.07%     13.07%    37.14%     36.11%     20.26%     6.10%      0.39%  
2012      27.62%     11.83%    39.45%     24.05%     30.01%     6.13%      0.36%  
2013      34.68%     14.22%    48.90%     19.20%     21.86%     9.68%      0.36%  
2014      33.11%     13.71%    46.82%     22.72%     18.40%   11.37%      0.49%          0.20%
2016      35.91%     13.52%    49.44%     26.46%     11.55%   10.74%      0.65%          1.16%
2017      33.28%     12.51%    45.79%     38.93%       6.63%     7.90%      0.52%          0.22%
2019      35.37%     13.05%    48.43%     29.74%       9.80%     8.95%      2.38%          0.70%
2021      34.66%     12.40%    47.05%     30.10%     14.03%     7.25%      1.44%          0.12%
2022      34.43%     11.66%    46.09%     25.47%     14.80%     6.82%      6.45%          0.37%

The main headline here is marginal gains for the Third pole (JRP) and some marginal losses for KP and JCP but a big drop for Center-Left parties and a massive surge in anti-system Right parties.

In theory, the Center-Left parties are not that different from 2016. But in 2016 the JCP was very strong which gave the Center-Left district candidates a source of tactical or alliance voting where JCP is not running.  With the JCP weak this election plus a weak and divided Center-Left the district election was a trouncing for the Center-Left.

It would be interesting to think about what the election result would have been like after a couple of more months of inflation surge and without the Abe assassination.

[jaichind]

LDP begins call for regulating online information on how to build weapons.

[jaichind]

A chart on the number of prefectures (47 in all) that each party has ranked in on the PR vote

             1        2        3        4        5        6        7          8         9         10
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
LDP      45       2
JRP        2      12       10      18        4        1
CDP               20       13      10        4
KP                 11       22      13        1
JCP                 1                   6       19      19       1           1
DPP                1          1                18      20        5           1         1
RS                                                          4       28         14         1
PP                                                  1       2       11         26         6        1
SDP                            1                           1        2           5        15      23
PNHK                                                                                       24      23


JRP is 1st in 2 prefectures: 大阪(Osaka), 兵庫(Hyōgo) (both JRP stronghold)
JRP is 6th in 1 prefecture: 沖縄(Okinawa) (KP SDP CDP JCP are all strong here pushing JRP to 6th place)
KP is 5th in 1 prefecture: 京都(Kyoto) (JRP CDP and JCP are all strong here pushing KP to 5th place)
JCP is 2nd in 1 prefecture: 高知(Kōchi) (old JCP stronghold)
JCP is 7th in 1 prefecture: 大分(Ōita) (old SDP stronghold, DPP incumbent is running pushing up DPP PR vote)
JCP is 8th in 1 prefecture: 佐賀(Saga) (JCP is very weak in this rural prefecture plus the PP surge pushed JCP to 8th)
DPP is 2nd in 1 prefecture: 香川(Kagawa) (DPP leader from this prefecture)
DPP is 3rd in 1 prefecture: 山形(Yamagata) (popular DPP incumbent is running for re-election)
DPP is 8th in 1 prefecture: 熊本(Kumamoto) (PP is very strong here and RS pushes DPP to 8th)
DPP is 9th in 1 prefecture: 沖縄(Okinawa) (SDP stronghold, RS strong, plus PP pushing DPP to 9th)
SDP is 3rd in 1 prefecture: 沖縄(Okinawa) (old SDP stronghold)
RS is 9th in 1 prefecture: 宮崎(Miyazaki) (SDP strong here as well as DPP and PP pushes RS to 9th)
PP is 5th in 1 prefecture: 熊本(Kumamoto) (the PP candidate district candidate here, a local dentist, had a blowout election and won 11.4% of the vote)
PP is 6th in 2 prefectures: 石川(Ishikawa) (very rural and conservative), 奈良(Nara) (DPP and RS weak here)

The JRP support is much more concentrated (mostly Kinki region and other urban centers) than CDP which is more evenly distributed, like KP.

[jaichind]

Newszeo exit poll on PP vote share by age group:

18-19   8%
20-29   6%
30-39   6%
40-49   6%
50-59   5%
60-69   4%
70+      2%

PP's vote share would be even higher if it was not for the 70+ age group higher turnout.

[PSOL]

1) What parties are you counting as “anti-system” left and what are their profiles

2) which areas of Japan are they strong in

3) what happened in 2016 that led to such a discrepancy of them cracking over 1%

[jaichind]

Lower House PR seat allocation of 2022 PR vote was replicated compared to 2021 results

             2022         2021
LDP         78             72
KP           22             23
PP             1
JRP          28             25
DPP           8               5
CDP         23             39
RS             6              3
JCP          10              9

Both LDP and JCP gained seats even though their vote share fell due to increases in the vote share of parties that are below the threshold in most zones (PP PNHK SDP) plus the fall of CDP opens up chances of everyone else.  KP's loses is more limited for the same reason.

[jaichind]

The JRP PR vote continued its urban lean.  Taking into account the Osaka element of the JRP vote by stripping out 大阪(Osaka)/兵庫(Hyōgo) and then looking at the JRP PR vote by urban suburban and rural prefectures gets you

              Urban      Suburban    Rural          大阪(Osaka)/兵庫(Hyōgo)
2012      15.58%    18.51%      18.40%                 33.06%
2013      11.41%    10.50%        9.29%                 25.15%
2014      15.43%    13.95%      13.42%                 29.06%
2016       7.85%       6.94%       5.96%                  28.81%
2017       4.20%       4.63%       3.97%                  21.73%
2019       8.85%       7.40%       6.00%                  29.94%
2021      14.02%    11.03%       8.70%                  38.59%
2022      15.40%    12.20%     10.09%                   34.56%


2021 saw a dramatic shift toward the JRP in urban areas making it a much more urban party than the 2014-2019 era.  JRP started in 2012 as an Osaka-based party that also ate up a large number of DPJ and some LDP defectors in the rest of Japan.   In 2012 YP was the urban Third Pole party so JRP had a rural lean.  After the LDP victory of 2012, a lot of the support JRP had gone to LDP or became non-voters, especially in rural areas leaving JRP with a slight urban lean in 2013.  YP imploded in 2014 and a lot of YP urban supporters went over to JRP 2014 giving it a more urban lean which persisted until 2021 when the surge for JRP (looks like from mostly former CDP voters) in urban areas made it a much more urban party a trend which continued in 2022.

JRP's non 大阪(Osaka)/兵庫(Hyōgo) urban vote is now at par with 2014 (and amazingly 2012) although it still lags 2014 in suburban and rural prefectures, especially in the North and deep South.

As for 大阪(Osaka)/兵庫(Hyōgo) JRP continues to be strong there even in 2016 when most of its old DPJ defectors merged back into DPJ to form DP leaving JRP with its Osaka core.  2017 saw a drop due to HP taking some of their votes but with the implosion of HP, that vote came back in 2019.  2021 saw a mega surge for JRP which pushed JRP vote share here even above 2012 levels but this surge abated in 2022 to a still high level (and above 2012.)

So in 2022 urban JRP looks a lot like the 2012 JRP with the difference the DPJ defectors of 2012 in suburban and rural areas clearly are no longer with JRP in 2022 although in 2022 JRP clearly has a less of a 大阪(Osaka)/兵庫(Hyōgo) lean versus 2021.

[jaichind]

PR Vote share change by party from 2021 to 2022

Hard to believe that there is an election result where LDP KP CDP (as the main center-left party) and JCP all lost vote share.  This is mainly due to PP surge and to some extent DPP overperformance.


 

[jaichind]

I have to imagine all the chatter/discussion on the role of the Unification Church in Japan and how it should be viewed as a cult must be making KP feel very uncomfortable.

[jaichind]

With the election over and Abe buried things will heat up for the battle over control of the Abe faction which is the largest in the LDP.  Contenders are the former Secretary-General of the faction 西村康稔(Nishimura Yasutoshi) from 兵庫(Hyōgo) who is clearly going to run and faction elder 塩谷立(Shionoya Ryū) from 静岡(Shizuoka) could end up running.  In theory 下村博文(Shimomura Hakubun) from Tokyo who tried to run for LDP Prez last year before his campaigned petered out could also try to run but his poor reception on the idea of running for LDP Prez last year could have fatally weakened his brand.  There is also talk of 萩生田 光一(Hagiuda Kōichi) from Tokyo running.

[jaichind]

1) What parties are you counting as “anti-system” left and what are their profiles

2) which areas of Japan are they strong in

3) what happened in 2016 that led to such a discrepancy of them cracking over 1%

Anti-system Left I count as

2016: 支持政党なし or No Support party
2019:  No Support party renamed Euthanasia Party plus Workers Party aiming for the liberation of labor.

The Workers Party aiming for the liberation of labor is really a rerun of 1960s extreme left radicals in their late 70s and 80s doing one last campaign for old times' sake.  The No Support party/Euthanasia Party is pretty much "if you are against all vote for us."  I did some regression analysis of their 2016 and 2019 PR vote and concluded that their PR voters mostly voted for Left in-district seats so I label them as Left Anti system.

As for why they did well in 2016 it is the same reason why PNHK did well in 2019 and PP/PNHK did well in 2022 which is built up frustration at economic stagnation and LDP and Center-Left Opposition not being viewed as having viable solutions.

[jaichind]

Note that anti-system parties will always do better in Upper House elections.  The reasons are

1) Upper House has less power and is viewed as less serious so it is a good way for people to vent anger without really rocking the boat
2) The Upper House PR threshold is de facto 1.8% to get a seat whereas in Lower House elections gave PR seats are allocated by each regional segment the de facto threshold to get PR seats is a lot higher than 1.8% making it likely that supporters of small anti-system parties would tactically vote for a mainstream party that has as the chance of actually getting PR seats.

[jaichind]

http://tokuou.s500.xrea.com/cgi/senkyo/2022/saninsen.cgi?mode=ichiran

Site of election prediction competition.  The median guess was actually not that far apart from the real results which is a victory of The Wisdom of Crowds.  My district-level prediction was one of the best but I flopped on the PR section, especially on which candidates exactly would get elected, and ended up in 17th place out of 130 entries.