Japan 2022 Upper House elections July 10

[jaichind]

Latest NHK poll

Kishida cabinet approval/disapproval 46(-13)/28(+7)




Abe state funeral support/not support 36/50
Have politicians come clean on their links to Unification Church yes/no  4/82

The big drop in support and growing negatively toward Abe's state funeral clearly is the work of the festering Unification Church issue.

[jaichind]

Japan political blogger Miraisyakai came up with a way to estimate the "Unification Church" vote.

It seems in the 2022 Upper House elections Abe arranged for the "Unification Church" vote to go to 井上義行 (Inoue Yoshiyuki) on the PR slate who was duely elected.

井上義行 (Inoue Yoshiyuki) first ran in 2013 on the PR slate of YP and was elected with 47,757 votes coming in 4th for YP candidates which were good for him as YP won 4 PR seats.

After YP fell apart and after joining various post-YP micro parties 井上義行 (Inoue Yoshiyuki) joined LDP and ran for re-election on the LDP PR slate in 2019.   In 2019 he won 87,946 votes but came in 25th which was not good enough as LDP won 19 seats that year.  In 2022 with Abe's shifting of the Unification Church votes 井上義行 (Inoue Yoshiyuki) won 165,062 votes which were 13th on the LDP PR list and was elected since LDP won 18 seats.

What miraisyakai  was to look at 井上義行 (Inoue Yoshiyuki) performance in 2019 vs 2022

2019


2022


And then map the shifts


Then Miraisyakai points out that in some townships 井上義行 (Inoue Yoshiyuki) vote actually dropped.    If you throw out those townships and only focus on the townships where the 井上義行 (Inoue Yoshiyuki) vote gained the gain is 81,973 votes which matches pretty well the estimate that the Unification Church vote is around 100K.

From this Miraisyakai can then construct the map of where the Unification votes are located which shows a high concentration in 鳥取(Tottori) and 島根(Shimane) but also high in Abe's home prefecture of 山口(Yamaguchi) and Kishida's home prefecture of 広島(Hiroshima).  In the East, it seems 群馬(Gunma) and 長野(Nagano) has a cluster of Unification Church votes.  All in all the Unification Church has a clear rural lean.

[jaichind]

A chart on cabinet reshuffle including top LDP party spots

Abe faction gets 6 (4+2), Kishda faction gets 3 (plus the PM Kishida himself), Aso faction gets 4, Motegi faction gets 5 (3+2).  The Motegi faction which is really the old Tanaka faction is the ancestral enemy of the Abe faction and with Abe being gone and the Abe faction losing some influence its power is growing.

[jaichind]

It seems Kishida did not really carry out his threat of purging MPs with Unification Church links from his cabinet.  One funny one is the new cabinet member 山際大志郎(Yamagiwa Daishirō) of the Aso faction.  He did not disclose his Unification Church links until AFTER he was selected to be in the cabinet.

[jaichind]

Latest JX PR vote poll (change from the same poll in late June)

LDP     27.4 (-4.4)
KP         5.2 (-3.4)
DIY       2.1 (+0.9)
PNHK    0.7 (+0.1)
JRP     13.1 (+0.6)
DPP      2.9 (+0.2)
CDP    17.4 (+0.2)
RS       3.7 (+1.4)
SDP     1.5 (+0.1)
JCP      8.4 (-1.1)

LDP-KP loses a lot of ground to non-JCP opposition and is undecided.  JCP also loses ground.  This last election cycle JX was pretty accurate for LDP-KP but overestimated CDP so I would not put too much weight on the fact that CDP is ahead of JRP in this poll.  What is essential is that LDP-KP is losing ground mostly due to the fact that the election is over and the Unification Church issue.  If there is one party that gained in a significant way since June it is RS.

[jaichind]

Kishida's cabinet approval/disapproval curve continues to move against Kishida.  The Ukraine crisis and Upper House election victory bumps have faded and despite a cabinet reshuffle the Unification Church issue continues to dog Kishida approval numbers.  The good news is he is still in positive territory. The bad news is his disapproval numbers just hit a record high.

[jaichind]

JX poll support/oppose Abe state funeral 33.8/58.5.  The sentiment is getting more and more negative on Abe state funeral

[jaichind]

I did a bunch of research into the Japanese elections of the "System of 1955" and since I have nowhere to post them I will write down my analysis here in several sections.

First, the "System of 1955" refers to the system after the election of 1955 where all the SPJ factions reunited which provoked Conservative rival parties of LP and DP to merge in reaction to form LDP.  So in theory the "System of 1955" should be the elections of 1958 to 1990 where the election of 1993 represented the breakdown of the "System of 1995".  

I plan to give an numerical overview of the elections in the "System of 1955"  including 1955 followed by several ways to look at the 1990 to 1993 election transition.

I define different electoral blocs as the following

Conservative: LDP, pro-LDP independents/rebels, LDP splinters like NLC, and Far Right candidates
Centrist: SPJ right wing splinter DSP, KP and candidates supported by these two parties
Reform: SPJ, SPJ splinter like SDF and candidates supported by SPJ or SPJ rebels
Left: JCP and far left candidates

For 1955 Conservative are LP and DP and other smaller center-right parties that merged into LDP plus rebels from those parties, Reform are the various SPJ factions rebels that reunited after 1955

                             Vote share                                                   Seat share
         Conservative    Centrist    Reform     Left       Conservative    Centrist    Reform       Left
1955     66.50%                      31.14%    2.03%       64.88%                       34.69%     0.43%
1958     63.59%                      33.60%    2.58%       63.81%                       35.97%     0.21%
1960     60.42%         8.77%    27.69%    2.94%       64.67%         3.64%    31.05%     0.64%
1963     59.04%         7.45%    29.29%    4.06%       63.17%         4.93%    30.84%     1.07%
1967     53.54%        12.96%   28.46%    4.85%       58.64%        11.32%    29.01%     1.03%
1969     52.31%        18.95%   21.74%    6.83%       62.35%        16.26%    18.52%     2.88%
1972     51.20%        15.62%   22.12%  10.91%       57.84%          9.78%    24.24%     8.15%
1976     50.56%        17.59%   21.00%  10.69%       55.38%         16.83%   24.07%     3.72%
1979     51.50%        17.05%   20.55%  10.79%       52.25%         18.40%   21.33%     8.02%
1980     53.42%        16.10%   20.20%  10.21%       59.69%         13.11%   21.53%     5.68%
1983     51.78%        17.82%   20.74%    9.60%       52.64%         19.18%   22.90%     5.28%
1986     55.93%        16.28%   18.67%    9.03%       60.94%         16.21%   17.58%     5.27%
1990     51.80%        13.40%   26.62%    8.01%       56.84%         11.72%   28.32%     3.13%

A summer on what each election was about

1955: Battle to the death between LP led by 緒方竹虎(Ogata Taketora)/吉田茂(Yoshida Shigeru)and LP splinter DP led by 鳩山 一郎(Hatoyama Ichirō) on who will emerge as the bigger party as the various SPJ factions had tactical alliance with each other and in some cases JCP to ensure the Reformist bloc gets its rightful share of seats.  DP emerged as the larger party and 鳩山 一郎(Hatoyama Ichirō) became PM but soon after the election the various SPJ factions reunited which pushed the USA and Japanese business community to force a merger between LP and DP to form the LDP and leading to the "System of 1955".   All things equal the Conservative bloc was strong in rural areas while JCP was strong in urban areas with the Reform bloc somewhat stronger in urban areas especially in Western Japan.

1958: The point of LP-DP merger into LDP is to ensure coordinated nomination of LDP candidates in the various multi-member districts to avoid over-nomination.  There were a bunch of former LP and DP candidates that were not nominated and ran anyway but the overall goal was achieved with the LDP keeping seat losses from 1955 to a minimum despite a fall in vote share.  LDP rebels that ran and won were accepted back into LDP starting the tradition "if you win you are LDP" as a way to manage the clear Conservative voting majority in Japan but allow evolution of the party in a "survival of the fittest" model where if you are pro-LDP and win over the official LDP candidates then you are made part of LDP again.  The reunited SPJ did not do as well as LDP to avoid over-nomination and did not make seat gains they wanted.

1960: Due to a disappointing 1958 result some on the SPJ Left promoted the idea of tactical alliance with JCP to take on LDP.  This provoked a split on the SPJ Right to form DSP (it was later discovered decades later that this split was funded by the CIA to ensure a LDP majority in upcoming election).  DSP which was economically center to center-left but anti-Communist started the Centrist bloc and was strong in urban area especially in Western Japan.  All things equal DSP ate up a lot of the LDP and SPJ urban vote, especially in Western Japan and was a lot impactful in rural areas.

1963: DSP over nominated in 1960 but this time around knowing where its strength area made some seat gains even as it lost some votes by nominating less candidates and focusing their resources in seats they can win.  Other than that 1963 looks a lot like 1960.

1967: KP arrived on the scene as an anti-LDP populist Centrist party that was economically more left than DSP has appeal in urban and suburban areas.  KP was conservative in its nomination strategy and formed de facto tactical alliance with DSP to eat into the LDP vote in urban and suburban areas.  LDP vote share and seat count falls although its majority was not under threat.

1969:  This election ended up being a JCP breakout election. JCP vote share has been slowing rising each election but this election it reached a point where it can win a bunch of seats, especially in urban areas.  KP also had a breakout election now it is more clear about how it can appeal to urban and suburban votes it nominated more candidates.  Both JCP and KP ate into the SPJ while LDP managed a recovery by reacting to the KP surge and gaining at the expense of SPJ due to JCP and KP taking vote from SPJ.

1972: The LDP campaign was led by the controversial LDP PM 田中角榮(Tanaka Kakuei) and as a result LDP lost ground while SPJ managed to react to the KP surge and regain ground lost to KP.  The JCP surge continues.

1976: Tanaka had to resign in disgrace due to corruption allegations between the election but continued to be a powerful LDP faction leader.  This led to some anti-Tanaka LDP elements to "party-ize" their faction and formed anti-corruption (read Tanaka) LDP splinter NLC.  NLC actually ate into anti-LDP centrist voters and helped to prevent significant losses for the Conservative bloc.  As other parties react to and adjust the JCP surge the JCP lost ground.

1979: Economic turmoil and continued chaos within LDP due to pro- and anti- Tanaka battles led to large LDP losses to the Centrist parties and JCP.  LDP loses majority but is able to form government with pro-LDP independents most of which merely joined the LDP after the election.  

1980: Snap election due to internal LDP civil war leading to the fall of the government.  Ironically the LDP gained seats as voters of other blocs started to choose sides in the LDP civil war and voted for the LDP candidates of the faction they preferred.  This is part of a tradition that LDP civil wars tend to produce vote share GAINS against other parties and not losses.  All things equal a lot of the Centrist parties and JCP gains of 1979 were reversed.

1983: Economic slowdown hurt the LDP which lost a lot of ground once again to the Centrist parties and JCP.  LDP actually lost its majority and this time formed government with NLC since pro-LDP independents did not win enough seat to ensure a working majority.

1986: Economic boom related to the stronger Yen and interest rates cuts boasted the LDP win to the largest win since 1963.  This time SPJ took the brunch of the losses especially in urban areas.

1990: 1989 Upper House election was a landslide defeat for LDP as the bubble begins to push up cost of living.  LDP was able to organize itself in time to avoid defeat in 1990. SPJ makes large gains at the expense of LDP and the Centrist parties to its best result since 1967.

1990 in many ways look at like the elections of the 1960s and in theory is a sign of the continuity o the "System of 1955".  In reality the end of the Cold War and the bursting of the economic bubble and a host of other factions mean that a storm is coming that would end the "System of 1955" in 1993.

[jaichind]

The 1990-1993 transition.

The 1990-1993 transition has to do with the powerful Tanaka faction of LDP.  After Tanaka himself was forced to retire by a coup of his own faction members in 1987 the Tanaka faction became a duopoly of 竹下登(Takesh**ta Noboru) (PM 1987-1989) and 金丸信(Kanemaru Shin).  As for the next generation of Tanaka faction leaders 竹下登(Takesh**ta Noboru) wanted 橋本 龍太郎(Hashimoto Ryūtarō) to be his successor while 金丸信(Kanemaru Shin) wanted 小沢一郎(Ozawa Ichirō) to be his successor.  It was always understood that by the mid to late 1990s there will be a battle between these two for leadership of the old Tanaka faction and most likely PM.   What broke this balance of power was that in late 1992 金丸信(Kanemaru Shin) was arrested for corruption and pretty much pushed out of politics.  As a result power within the old Tanaka faction shifted toward 竹下登(Takesh**ta Noboru).  

By mid-1993 this situation become intolerable to 小沢一郎(Ozawa Ichirō) when then organized a mass defection of LDP MPs from the old Tanaka faction as well as other LDP MPs that feel that the end of the Cold War should lead to a realignment of politics.   This group of LDP MPs joined the opposition to bring down the LDP government and trigger the election of 1993.  These LDP rebel MPs "party-ized" their rebellion into 3 new parties JRP (Ozawa's party), JNP (to be fair was formed in 1992), and NPS.  This group of new parties and independents that backed them formed a bloc which I call the "Third Pole" which means Center-Right  Opposition to LDP that has most ruled out joining the LDP in a coalition government (unlike NLC in the 1970s and 1980s).

The 1990 and 1993 election results are the following

                             Vote share                                                   Seat share
           Con    Third Pole Centrist  Reform    Left        Con   Third Pole Centrist  Reform     Left
1990  51.80%               13.40%   26.62% 8.01%  56.84%               11.72%  28.32%   3.13%
1993  39.24% 23.02%   12.59%   17.29% 7.76%  45.21% 22.50%  13.89%  15.46%    2.94%

With the LDP losing their majority and a coalition government formed by all Third Pole, Centrist, and Reform parties.  On paper, this election looks like a severe blow to the LDP electorally.  But that is the wrong way to look at it.  We must understand elections as mostly voting about each candidate having their own vote bank that is ideologically aligned to their views and party.  The fact is almost all Third Pole candidates in 1993 ran in 1990 as Conservative bloc candidates (except for 1 who ran in 1990 as SPJ splinter SDF party.)  If we do a retroactive assignment of all 1990 candidates with the bloc they ended up with in 1993 we can the following chart of 1990-1993 results

                             Vote share                                                   Seat share
           Con    Third Pole Centrist  Reform    Left        Con   Third Pole Centrist  Reform     Left
1990  42.15%   9.73%   13.40%  26.54% 8.01%   46.29% 10.55%  11.72%   28.32%  3.13%
1993  39.24% 23.02%   12.59%  17.29% 7.76%   45.21% 22.50%  13.89%   15.46%  2.94%

Looking at the 1990 and 1993 elections in this way of looking at it shows it was mostly a status quo election for LDP which lost some ground but Third Pole ate a lot into the Reformist bloc votes and with Centrist bloc tactical voting gained a lot of seats for both blocs.

In many ways, the 1993 election was the basis of politics over the next few decades.  Key people that ran in 1993 are

鳩山由紀夫(Hatoyama Yukio) - won as LDP in 1990, defected to NPS.  Later became DPJ PM in 2009-2010.
小沢一郎(Ozawa Ichirō) - won as LDP in 1990, and formed JRP.  Play a key role in Japanese opposition politics in the coming decades and almost become PM several times
上田清司(Ueda Kiyoshi) - won as LDP in 1990, defected to JRP.  Later become governor of Saitama and in 2021 tried to form a new Centrist party
枝野幸男(Edano Yukio) - ran for the first time as JNP.  Later formed CDP in 2017 which is now the main Center-Left opposition party
野田佳彦(Noda Yoshihiko) - ran for the first time as JNP.  Later became DPJ PM in 2012
松沢成文(Matsuzawa Shigefumi) - ran for the first time as JRP.  Later became governor of Kanagawa and for a while was in contention for leadership of Japan's Far Right PFG.
海江田万里(Kaieda Banri) - ran for the first time as JNP.  Was the leader of DPJ from 2012-2014
鳩山邦夫(Hatoyama Kunio) - won in 1990 as LDP. Defected to a pro-Third Pole independent in 1993. Was a top DPJ leader in the early 2000s along with his brother 鳩山由紀夫(Hatoyama Yukio)  before going back to LDP
羽田 孜(Hata Tsutomu) - won in 1990 as LDP defected to the JRP and was PM in 1994.
岡田克也(Okada Katsuya) - ran for first time in 1993 as JRP.  Became leader of DPJ in 2004-2005 and DPJ/DP in 2014-2016
小池 百合子(Koike Yuriko) - ran for the first time in 1993 for JNP.  Later returned to LDP and became governor of Tokyo before leading HP in 2017 against LDP
高市早苗(Takaichi Sanae) - ran for the first time in 1993 as a pro-third pole independent in 1993.  Later returned to LDP and ran in 2021 LDP Prez election as the leader of the LDP far right with Abe's support
二階 俊博(Nikai Toshihiro) - won in 1990 as LDP, defect to JRP.  Later returned to LDP to become the leader of the Nikai faction
石破茂(Ishiba Shigeru) - ran for the first time in 1993 as a pro-Third Pole independent.  Later returned to LDP and formed the Ishiba faction.  Almost beat Abe in 2012 as the leader of LDP.
安倍 晋三(Abe Shinzō) - ran for the first time in 1993 as LDP. Went on to become PM in 2006-2007 and 2012-2020
細川護煕(Hosokawa Morihiro) - was LDP MP before becoming governor of Kumamoto and then founded JNP and become PM in 1993-1994.
園田 博之(Sonoda Hiroyuki- won in 1990 as LDP but defected to NPS in 1993.  Later returned to LDP and became the leader of various LDP Far right splinters parties in the 2007-2015 period.

In many ways the 1993 election activated a lot of new talent and reshuffled the political deck and paved the way for a totally different type of opposition to LDP in the decades to come.

[jaichind]

Japanese political developments from 1990-1994 are quite interesting.

In 1990 海部俊樹(Kaifu Toshiki) who was PM since 1989 led LDP to victory in the lower house elections and won re-election.

In 1991 LDP leadership race 海部俊樹(Kaifu Toshiki) was going to be shoved aside by the old Tanaka faction and 海部俊樹(Kaifu Toshiki) tried to move to hold a mid-term election to escape his fate and was overruled leading to a LDP leadership race that installed 宮澤喜一(Miyazawa Kiichi) as PM with the old Tanaka faction acting in the background to install him.

In 1993 the Tanaka faction civil war finally led to a split in the LDP and fresh elections which led to JNP 細川護煕(Hosokawa Morihiro) leading a Third pole-Centrist-Reformist bloc coalition government. 

In 1994 coalition partners had enough of 小沢一郎(Ozawa Ichirō) controlling things from behind the scenes and threatened to bolt.  This crisis was papered over by installing JRP's 羽田孜(Hata Tsutomu) but that only lasted for a few months before NPS and SPJ bolted from the coalition and joined up with the LDP to form a LDP-SPJ-NPS government with SPJ's leader 村山富市(Murayama Tomiichi) as PM.  海部俊樹(Kaifu Toshiki) rejected this arrangement of aligning with LDP's old enemy SPJ and left with a few of his followers to form a micro party and joined the anti-LDP bloc and 小沢一郎(Ozawa Ichirō) made the call to have him be their candidate for PM hoping to lure other LDP MPs over to his side.  In the 1994 vote for PM, it was LDP-SPJ-NPS backing 村山富市(Murayama Tomiichi) versus anti-LDP bloc's 海部俊樹(Kaifu Toshiki).  The vote had to be decided in the second round since neither was able to win a majority of the MPs and ended in the victory of the LDP-SPJ-NPS bloc.

Had someone in 1994 went back in time to late 1992 and told an astute political observer "In 1994 there will be a parliamentary vote for PM between 海部俊樹(Kaifu Toshiki) and 村山富市(Murayama Tomiichi) and it was very close with 村山富市(Murayama Tomiichi) winning on the second round"  The response would be: "I know what happened.  In the 1994 Lower House elections LDP did badly leading to a hung parliament while SPJ under 村山富市(Murayama Tomiichi) overperformed.  The LDP decided to bring back 海部俊樹(Kaifu Toshiki) as their leader since he led LDP to victory in 1990 hoping he can rally some non-LDP non-SPJ MPs to vote for him but in the end, it failed."  This guess is totally logical based on the facts in 1992 but totally wrong as in 1994 it was 村山富市(Murayama Tomiichi)  that was the LDP candidate for PM and 海部俊樹(Kaifu Toshiki) that is the anti-LDP candidate for PM which would have boggled the minds of someone in late 1992.

[jaichind]

Another way to break down the elections of the "System of 1955" is to break out the election districts by 6 types (East Urban, East Suburban, East Rural, West Urban, West Suburban and West Rural).

Where
East Urban - Tokyo, Nagoya, Yokohama
West Urban - Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, Kitakyushu

These cities represented what the traditional dense urbanized area of Japan in the 1950s

Note that during this period the relative population for urban areas maxed out in the 1960s and started a relative decline as high land prices pushed population to the surging suburban satellite cities.  Rural areas was declining in relative terms throughout this period.

% of total VAP by type in 1960 1976 and 1990

                               1960           1976            1990
Urban East              11.64%        12.03%      11.43%
Suburban East         16.17%        22.52%      25.40%
Rural East               30.84%        26.31%      25.23%
Urban West              7.61%          6.29%        5.61%
Suburban West        10.27%        13.97%      14.65%
Rural West              23.46%        18.89%       17.67%

The trend is clear.  Rural areas lost ground to Suburban areas.  Western Japan lost ground to Eastern Japan.

Now we can look at each type and look at vote share and seat share by bloc

East Urban
                             Vote share                                                   Seat share
         Conservative    Centrist    Reform     Left       Conservative    Centrist    Reform       Left
1955      54.96%                      38.50%   5.79%       48.39%                       51.61%     0.00%
1958      51.49%                      43.07%   5.14%       41.94%                       58.06%     0.00%
1960      46.55%       12.08%    36.29%   4.79%       51.61%          9.68%   38.71%     0.00%
1963      44.01%       13.04%    35.86%   6.83%       41.94%         12.90%   41.94%     3.23%
1967      36.35%       26.76%    27.19%   9.35%       37.78%         28.89%   31.11%     2.22%
1969      35.39%       31.47%    18.69% 14.13%       42.22%         35.56%   11.11%    11.11%
1972      33.53%       26.27%    20.06% 19.89%       33.33%         22.22%   20.00%    24.44%
1976      39.41%       28.15%    16.93% 15.39%       39.22%         33.33%   17.65%      9.80%
1979      33.53%       32.09%    17.01% 17.22%       29.41%         37.25%   17.65%    15.69%
1980      40.78%       27.80%    16.08% 15.16%       41.18%         29.41%   15.69%    13.73%
1983      38.96%       29.78%    16.28% 14.91%       31.37%         39.22%   17.65%    11.76%
1986      41.07%       28.02%    15.91% 15.00%       43.14%         29.41%   11.76%    15.69%
1990      38.81%       21.83%    27.11% 11.95%       43.14%         23.53%   27.45%     5.88%

This bloc of seats were and continue to be an area of LDP weakness.  The LP vs DP battles in 1955 that led to over-nomination and the Reform bloc walking away with a majority of the seats is an example why LP and DP were pushed to unify into LDP.   But in 1958 the LDP over-nomination problem continued to the benefit of SPJ.  What changed was the arrival of DSP in 1960 and KP in 1967 which ate into LDP and SPJ votes equally but seem to have hurt SPJ seat count more.   By the late 1960s and 1970s, the Centrist bloc has rivaled the Conservative bloc in terms of support while the JCP surge here in the mid to late 1960s has it pulling even with the Reform bloc.  The anger over LDP money politics here was somewhat mitigated by LDP splinter NLC that ate up the anti-money politics vote instead of that vote going to the Centrist or Reform blocs.  Over time as the anti-money politics issue abated in the early 1980s, the LDP recovered but the Reform bloc continue to be very weak here in the 1980s where JCP is stronger than SPJ.  SPJ did end on a high note in 1990 as it was able to eat into LDP Centrist and JCP votes and make large seat gains against the Centrist bloc and JCP.

1990-1993 transition using my retroactive Third pole approach

                             Vote share                                                   Seat share
           Con    Third Pole Centrist  Reform    Left        Con   Third Pole Centrist  Reform     Left
1990  32.16%  7.42%   21.83%  26.34% 11.95%  37.25%    5.88%  23.53% 27.45%   5.88%
1993  24.37% 31.05%  18.35%  14.31% 11.72%  29.41%   35.29% 19.61%   7.84%   7.84%

The LDP MPs that defected in 1993 to the Third Pole bloc were not concentrated in this set of seats.  But in the 1993 election, inspired by the Third Pole message of political reform, a lot of Center and Center Right political newbies ran for the Third Pole bloc and ate into the LDP and SPJ vote in a big way.  As a result, the LDP lost some seats but the SPJ completely collapsed here in terms of it kept its 1990 gains from JCP but lost gains from the Centrist bloc in 1990 to the Third Pole and more.   Overall the Third pole bloc gained a large number of seats and overtook the LDP here.   The Third Pole vote in 1993 here clearly is a lot more than just the personal vote of the 1990 LDP candidates that have defected to the Third Pole bloc.

[jaichind]

East Suburban
                             Vote share                                                   Seat share
         Conservative    Centrist    Reform     Left       Conservative    Centrist    Reform       Left
1955      69.05%                      29.19%    1.54%       67.57%                       32.43%    0.00%
1958      65.30%                      32.13%    2.28%       63.51%                       36.49%    0.00%
1960      62.97%         8.16%   26.52%     2.32%      67.57%         2.70%     29.73%    0.00%
1963      57.71%         8.10%   30.73%     3.27%      63.51%         4.05%     32.43%    0.00%
1967      52.63%       14.09%   28.65%     4.49%      58.11%         9.46%     32.43%    0.00%
1969      49.98%       21.92%   21.17%     6.78%      62.16%       17.57%     18.92%    1.35%
1972      46.94%       19.02%   21.93%    11.97%     56.76%        9.46%      22.97%   10.81%
1976      48.88%       19.22%   20.39%    11.33%     53.57%       19.05%     25.00%    2.38%
1979      48.09%       20.54%   19.31%    11.95%     50.00%       25.00%     15.48%    9.52%
1980      51.00%       18.30%   19.70%    10.92%     60.71%       15.48%     19.05%    4.76%
1983      48.02%       21.71%   19.80%    10.43%     50.00%       26.19%     21.43%    2.38%
1986      52.30%       19.71%   17.73%    10.07%     58.24%       20.88%     14.29%    6.59%
1990      47.78%       15.14%   28.36%      8.42%     56.04%       13.19%     29.67%    1.10%

Somewhat similar pattern as East Urban seats with the LDP over-nomination being a problem until the coming of DSP and KP that ate into both LDP and SPJ votes but hurt SPJ more.  JCP surge also came in the 1960s but a couple of election later than East Urban seats.   Centrist bloc never came close to equaling the Conservative bloc especially when NLC in the late 1970s and early 1980s ate up a lot of potential Centrist bloc votes and instead the Centrist bloc was mostly equal to the Reform bloc during the late 1960s to 1980s.  In 1990 SPJ had surge that ate into all other blocs but really hurt JCP in terms of seats.

1990-1993 transition using my retroactive Third pole approach

                             Vote share                                                   Seat share
           Con    Third Pole Centrist  Reform    Left        Con   Third Pole Centrist  Reform     Left
1990  37.41%  10.37%  15.14%  28.36%  8.42%  43.96%  12.09%  13.19%  29.67%  1.10%
1993  32.98%  25.73%  15.55%  17.44%  8.16%  33.33%  30.21%  18.75%  14.58%  3.13%

The number of LDP rebels that joined Third Pole is more here than East Urban seats.  SPJ kept the gains in made from JCP in 1986 but gave back all the gains it made from LDP and Centrist bloc in 1986 to Third Pole bloc and a bit more but nowhere as much as it lost in East Urban seats.  LDP also lost a bunch of support to Third Pole on top of the personal vote the Third Pole candidates took with them from 1990 but not as much as East Urban seats.  Centrist bloc had a bunch of tactical alliances with Third Pole here in 1993 and actually gained seats for itself as a result.  All things equal Third Pole vote here are more than the personal vote the LDP rebels took with them from their 1990 vote and ate into LDP and SPJ votes in 1990.  But this amount is not as much as East Urban seats showing the salience of political reform is not as strong here as East Urban seats.

[jaichind]

East Rural
                             Vote share                                                   Seat share
         Conservative    Centrist    Reform     Left       Conservative    Centrist    Reform       Left
1955     67.29%                       31.20%   1.16%        70.06%                     29.94%      0.00%
1958     64.87%                       33.07%   1.70%        64.07%                     35.93%      0.00%
1960     62.50%          5.87%   29.42%   2.03%        65.87%        1.20%    32.93%      0.00%
1963     64.82%          2.81%   29.55%   2.68%        68.86%        1.20%    29.34%      0.60%
1967     60.71%          3.93%   32.22%   3.04%        65.87%        2.40%    31.14%      0.60%
1969     60.74%          9.56%   25.41%   4.12%        69.46%        4.19%    25.15%      1.20%
1972     61.79%          6.46%   24.62%   6.98%        67.07%        2.40%    28.74%      1.80%
1976     59.05%          8.36%   24.32%   8.19%        63.47%        6.59%    28.74%      1.20%
1979     62.36%          7.28%   23.26%   7.05%        65.27%        5.39%    26.95%      2.40%
1980     62.64%          7.21%   23.11%   6.98%        69.46%        2.99%    26.35%      1.20%
1983     63.31%          6.98%   23.51%   6.07%        62.87%        7.19%    27.54%      2.40%
1986     67.36%          6.03%   21.57%   5.00%        73.46%        4.94%    21.60%      0.00%
1990     61.64%          4.88%   28.53%   4.85%        65.43%        3.70%    30.25%      0.62%

One technical point.  The Centrist bloc vote share 1963 and after is somewhat underestimated since in many districts DSP and/or KP failed to put up or back a candidate.  The seat share for Centrist and Left blocs are overestimated since most of the winners from those blocs seem to have won based on their personal vote if they do not run again the party they represented vote share collapse.

This set of seats has LDP and SPJ being relatively strong and the Centrist bloc and JCP being very weak.  The anger against money politics in the late 1960s did not seem to have impacted LDP at all.  In the late 1960s to early 1980s period, the Centrist bloc, in terms of vote share, was dueling the Conservative bloc in East Urban seats and was dueling the Reform bloc in East Suburban seats are now dueling the Left bloc here in East Rural seats.   Throughout the 1960s to early 1980s the Centrist bloc and Left bloc were slowly eating away at SPJ but in a limited way and most of that was taken back by SPJ in 1990 in addition to reversing the LDP 1986 vote share surge here.

1990-1993 transition using my retroactive Third pole approach

                             Vote share                                                   Seat share
           Con    Third Pole Centrist  Reform    Left        Con   Third Pole Centrist  Reform     Left
1990  50.71%  10.92%  4.88%    28.53%  4.85%  53.09%  12.35%  3.70%   30.25%   0.62%
1993  51.18%  20.08%  4.44%    19.40%  4.86%  58.86%  18.35%  5.06%   17.72%   0.00%

Here unlike East Urban and East Suburban seats, political reform does not have as much salience.  The Third Pole bloc gained a bit from LDP on top of the personal votes Third Pole candidates got in 1990 and gained some from SPJ.  The SPJ also gave back to LDP the gains it made in 1990 relative to 1986 but was mostly able to maintain its 1986 level of support other than losing some support to the Third Pole bloc.  Just like in East Suburban seats the Centrist bloc had some tactical alliances with Third Pole which helped them a bit in terms of seats.  But it was not much since the Centrist bloc was so weak here.  Overall other than some reversion of the mean from the 1990 SPJ surge and Third Pole candidates gaining some political reform votes from LDP the 1993 election was much more of a status quo election when compared to the churn in East Suburban seats and especially East Urban seats.

[jaichind]

West Urban
                             Vote share                                                   Seat share
         Conservative    Centrist    Reform     Left       Conservative    Centrist    Reform       Left
1955       46.37%                      46.02%   7.21%      32.00%                        60.00%    8.00%
1958       48.27%                      43.49%   8.14%      48.00%                        48.00%    4.00%
1960       42.67%       15.88%   30.08%  10.95%      32.00%         16.00%   40.00%   12.00%
1963       39.16%       16.41%   30.10%  13.83%      40.00%         12.00%   36.00%   12.00%
1967       31.68%       31.03%   24.77%  12.02%      31.03%         37.93%   20.69%   10.34%
1969       29.28%       35.87%   19.44%  15.25%      34.48%         44.83%     6.90%   13.79%
1972       30.89%       29.47%   19.02%  20.45%      27.59%         27.59%   17.24%   27.59%
1976       32.15%       31.98%   17.75%  18.04%      40.00%         33.33%   13.33%   13.33%
1979       33.57%       29.94%   16.24%  20.22%      26.67%         36.67%   13.33%   23.33%
1980       37.70%       27.87%   15.68%  18.75%      36.67%         33.33%   10.00%   20.00%
1983       33.73%       33.08%   13.90%  19.26%      33.33%         33.33%   13.33%   20.00%
1986       38.79%       30.28%   11.92%  19.01%      36.67%         33.33%   13.33%   16.67%
1990       35.18%       28.92%   19.16%  16.57%      40.00%         26.67%   20.00%   13.33%

The LDP is even weaker here than East Urban seats and like East Urban seats in 1955 LP-DP battles lead to over-nomination which spoke to the need for LD and DP to merge into LDP.  1958 saw LDP actually making gains here but when DSP was formed it was very strong in this set of seats as DSP ate deeply into LDP and SPJ votes and seats.  KP in 1967 added to the Centrist bloc surge here and from 1967-1983 the Centrist bloc was the strongest bloc here versus LDP.    JCP is strong in urban areas and even stronger here than in East Urban seats.  As the JCP surged in the late 1960s it further cut into the Reform bloc which was mostly driven into fourth place.  1990 did see SPJ gain ground against all blocs although the votes it took from the Centrist and Left blocs seem to also have helped LDP gain seat here in 1990.

1990-1993 transition using my retroactive Third pole approach

                             Vote share                                                   Seat share
           Con    Third Pole Centrist  Reform    Left        Con   Third Pole Centrist  Reform     Left
1990  24.48%  10.70%  28.92%  19.16% 16.57% 30.00%  10.00%  26.67%  20.00%   13.33%
1993  23.89%  20.18%  26.82%  13.40% 15.60% 20.00%  20.00%  33.33%  16.67%   10.00%

Similar to East Urban seats the number of 1990 LDP candidates that rebelled in 1993 was not numerous but unlike East Urban seats the political reform message was not as salient here and Third Pole took some votes from LDP and SPJ and SPJ gave back to LDP its gains from the 1990 surge.  The 1993 election was much more status quo than East Urban seats.  Here Third Pole and Centrist blocs did form tactical alliances which allowed them to scoop up more seats from LDP and SPJ than their vote share would suggest.

[jaichind]

West Suburban
                             Vote share                                                   Seat share
         Conservative    Centrist    Reform     Left       Conservative    Centrist    Reform       Left
1955     64.89%                       32.50%   2.16%       60.87%                        39.13%    0.00%
1958     60.71%                       36.24%   3.01%       65.22%                        34.78%    0.00%
1960     56.10%        12.23%    28.17%   3.33%       58.70%          4.35%    36.96%    0.00%
1963     52.60%        13.49%    28.62%   5.16%       52.17%         10.87%   36.96%    0.00%
1967     44.34%        22.49%    27.00%   6.06%       46.81%         23.40%   29.79%    0.00%
1969     41.58%        27.80%    20.48% 10.05%       48.94%         29.79%   19.15%    2.13%
1972     41.11%        21.48%    21.62% 15.59%       46.15%         15.38%   23.08%   15.38%
1976     38.59%        26.26%    20.21% 14.79%       41.82%         29.09%   20.00%     9.09%
1979     38.30%        25.60%    19.53% 16.52%       32.73%         30.91%   20.00%   16.36%
1980     40.82%        24.38%    19.76% 15.02%       41.82%         23.64%   20.00%   14.55%
1983     38.70%        27.06%    20.04% 14.20%       32.73%         32.73%   23.64%   10.91%
1986     42.77%        24.16%    19.66% 13.37%       42.86%         26.79%   19.64%   10.71%
1990     41.12%        20.75%    25.78% 12.27%       42.86%         19.64%   26.79%   10.71%

In 1955 LP and DP battle clearly lead to Conservative bloc over-nomination which was addressed by the LD-DP merger into LDP for the 1958 election.   The arrival of DSP in 1960 and KP in 1967 seems to have hurt the LDP more here than in other districts.   The Centrist bloc became more powerful here than East Suburban area mostly at the expense of the Conservative bloc.  The anti-money politics agenda is not as strong here so NLC was not as strong and was not able to gain votes from the Centrist bloc as much as it did in East Suburban areas in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  The JCP started slow but really surged in the early 1970s and continues to gain a good number of seats.   Because the LDP already got hurt by the Centrist bloc the 1990 SPJ surge seems to have hit mostly the Centrist bloc and not the LDP.

1990-1993 transition using my retroactive Third pole approach

                             Vote share                                                   Seat share
           Con    Third Pole Centrist  Reform    Left        Con   Third Pole Centrist  Reform     Left
1990 32.54%   8.59%    20.75%  25.78% 12.27% 32.14%  10.71%  19.64%  26.79%  10.71%
1993 27.41% 24.62%    19.98%  16.58% 11.29% 28.81%  23.73%  22.03%  18.64%    6.78%

In this bloc of seats the less 1990 Conservative bloc candidates defected to Third Pole in 1993 as other districts.  Since the 1990 SPJ surge mostly hit the Centrist bloc, the reversion to the mean in 1993 mostly went to Third Pole candidates.  The salience of political reform is no as strong here as East Suburban seats so the LDP loss less ground here as East Suburban seats.  But like East Suburban seat tactical alliances between Third Pole bloc and Centrist bloc led to the Centrist bloc outperforming in terms of seats given its vote share.

[jaichind]

West Rural
                             Vote share                                                   Seat share
         Conservative    Centrist    Reform     Left       Conservative    Centrist    Reform       Left
1955       73.48%                     25.54%   0.86%        68.55%                        31.45%   0.00%
1958       70.62%                     27.90%   1.34%        71.77%                        28.23%   0.00%
1960       67.70%        8.53%    21.97%  1.64%        73.39%         3.23%      23.39%   0.00%
1963       66.70%        5.84%    25.19%  2.19%        69.35%         4.84%      25.81%   0.00%
1967       64.89%        6.74%    25.73%  2.47%        67.74%         7.26%      25.00%   0.00%
1969       63.13%      13.78%    20.02%  2.95%        71.77%        12.90%     14.52%    0.81%
1972       61.49%      12.14%    21.06%  5.21%        66.94%         8.87%      22.58%    1.61%
1976       59.11%      13.71%    20.55%  6.41%        62.10%        12.90%     24.19%    0.81%
1979       60.81%      11.72%    21.39%  5.90%        60.48%        13.71%     21.77%    4.03%
1980       62.92%      10.97%    20.40%  5.68%        66.94%          8.87%     22.58%    1.61%
1983       59.64%      12.56%    22.28%  5.39%        62.90%        12.90%     21.77%    2.42%
1986       65.21%      11.72%    18.12%  4.86%        68.03%        13.11%     17.21%    1.64%
1990       62.14%        9.28%    24.06%  4.47%        62.30%          9.02%     27.87%    0.82%

This bloc of districts starts out as the strongest of LDP seats.  There was LP and DP over-nomination in 1955 just like in West Suburban seats and the LD-DP merger into LDP for sure helped in 1958.  The arrival of DSP in 1960 and KP in 1967 was nowhere as strong as other districts and took equally from the Conservative and Reform blocs.  Just like East Rural seats the vote share of the Centrist bloc 1963 and after is underestimated since in many districts either DSP or KP or both choose not to run candidates.  And just like East Rural seats the seat share of Centrist and Left blocs are overestimated since many seats won by these two blocs are based on the personal vote of their candidates and not the party brand.  Since since the Conservative bloc was so strong this result had the Centrist and Reform bloc often at the boundary of winning seats which served to maintain LDP domination in terms of seats.  The JCP really never became viable here and is their weakest set of seats.  By the same logic the weakness of the Centrist and Left bloc here means that this set of seats is a source of relative strength for the Reform bloc.  In 1990 there was a SPJ surge which came equally at the expense of LDP and the Centrist bloc.

1990-1993 transition using my retroactive Third pole approach

                             Vote share                                                   Seat share
           Con    Third Pole Centrist  Reform    Left        Con   Third Pole Centrist  Reform     Left
1990  53.10%   9.03%    9.28%  24.06%  4.47%   53.28%   9.02%   9.02%   27.87%   0.82%
1993  51.49%  18.97%   7.79%  17.27%   4.45%  58.12%  16.24% 10.26%   14.53%   0.85%

The vote share shift is fairly similar East Rural areas where SPJ gave back its 1990 gains from LDP and some more.  The salience of political reform is weaker here so the Third Pole candidates gained less vote share on top of the personal votes of the Third pole candidates from 1990 when they were part of the Conservative bloc.

[jaichind]

The strength of anti-money politics political reform in 1993 by region can be viewed by the increase of the Third Pole vote share relative to what their personal vote was in 1990 since that was the issue the Third Pole ran on

                          1990-1993 Third pole swing
East Urban                 +23.63%
East Suburban            +15.36%
East Rural                   +9.15%
West Urban                 +9.48%
West Suburban          +16.03%
West Rural                   +9.94%

This chart seems to show that the middle-class-oriented suburban area is where anti-money politics issues played well as well as East Urban areas.  In the rest of Japan, this was less of an issue.

One way to think about it is: If a region feels it will need government subsidies due to economic stagnation then money politics is not an issue since money politics and government subsidies are two sides of the same coin.  If a region is growing economically and it feels it does not need government subsidies then money politics is an issue since that just means more taxes for them to pay other non-productive people/regions.

[jaichind]

The elections during the "System of 1955" were based on a series of 3-5 member districts.  Looking through the results I discovered that outside of urban areas the voting is very much based on personal vote and a combination of personal and party mobilization based on tactical factors.

There are some "rules" I discovered looking through non-urban election results over time.

1) The 1st place winner of any election district is the MOST likely to lose out of all the winners.  This is mostly due to complacency of the candidate and his (note that in over 90% the cases the candidate will be a he) supporters in the next election where they think they will win again for sure.   Where the 1st place candidate is a member of LDP or SPJ where they will run multiple candidates the party organization will focus less on the 1st place winner the next election.

2) The best loser of any election is very likely to be a winner in the next election and in fact will end up 1st or 2nd.  This is the inverse of rule #1.  The shock of defeat galvanize the candidate, his supporters, party origination and tactical voters  from the same or friendly blocs to shift over to vote for him in the next election.

3) Due to 1) and 2), if a non-JCP viable candidate (in all the 3-5 member districts there are usually 4-7 viable candidates) loses 2 elections in a row, it is the kiss of death since the second loss would mean rule #2 is not enough for him to win and most likely the next election his party would not re-nominate him and sometimes not even nominate a candidate in the district (for DSP and KP in rural districts). This does not apply to JCP which runs everywhere where winning often is not their goal but name recognition is their goal.

Elections in non-urban Japan in this period is based on personal rivalries between competing candidates (often from the same party) and "we will get them next time" if the candidate loses.  It is based on the desire of the candidate and his supporters to "get revenge" on their rivals if they lose and working extra hard between elections to win next time.  This dynamic tends to help LDP since as the ruling party this means many local political talent will gravitate toward LDP and this endless battles every election tend to lead to a "survival of the fitting" within LDP candidates especially when paired with "if you win you are LDP" where LDP rebels are let back into the party and re-nominated next election if you show your fitness by beating the official LDP candidate(s).

[jaichind]

The elections of the "System of 1955" in urban areas it is mostly about voting for the fad party (LDP and SPJ are all fuddy duddies) and voting for personality candidates (versus the personal vote in rural areas.)   In 1960 and 1963 the "cool" party was DSP, in 1967 and 1969 the "cool" party was KP, in 1972 the "cool" party was JCP, and in 1976 the "cool" party was NLC.

I think NLC most likely saved the "System of 1955" from falling apart by a decade.  Had NLC not bolted in 1976 the anti-money politics energy would have completed shifted to the Centrist bloc with 1976 results being similar to 1979.  A midterm 1977 election would have mirrored 1980 with a LDP comeback based on non-LDP voters picking sides in the LDP civil war and voting for pro- and anti- Tanaka LDP candidates.  But that would not last long and in a 1979 or 1980 elections a LDP that has a greater rural lean would face the wrath of suburban and urban voters in the middle of an economic crisis and the Conservative bloc would have lost its majority.  By drawing anti-money politics votes to NLC which remained in the Conservative bloc the Conservative bloc survived the 1976-1983 crisis and was able to claim credit for the economic boom of the mid 1980s which prolong the "System of 1955"

[jaichind]

More Abe state funeral fiascos

It seems the bureaucrat responsible for organizing the Abe state funeral has been outed for being a part of some 2007 orgy which involved 7 women escorts.  His person was going to get into politics and run for LDP when this story broke that he was involved in this big orgy which included other LDP bigwigs.   He then gave up his plans to enter politics.  Now that he got put in charge of the Abe state funeral it is all coming back.

Just to show how big this this I actually first read this story in the Chinese language media.

There is a Chinese saying 人怕出名豬怕壯 or "People fear getting famous, pigs fear getting fat".  This seems applicable in this case.  The person in question thought that episode was all over back in 2007 but now it is back.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Thanks for these analysis posts.

[jaichind]

Google helping LDP and Unification Church to cover up their connection?

Japanese blogger posts a google maps picture of a Unification Church branch from 8/7 where there is a campaign poster of a LDP candidate 森雅子(Mori Masako) who was the Minister of Justice with her face blurred out but not her name



But by 8/17 the name got blurred out on google maps.  Most likely at the request of 森雅子(Mori Masako)

[jaichind]

More endless Japanese media analysis of LDP-Unification Church connections.  This time Asahi chart which is a repeat of the old TBS analysis of various games Abe was playing to shift the Unification Church vote to a candidate he favored on the PR slate in the Upper House elections.

[jaichind]

Who the LDP will run for Abe's seat 山口(Yamaguchi) 4th will be tricky.  Given redistricting the next Lower House election will see the LDP winner of the by-election pitted against the Minister of Foreign Affairs and #2 in the Kishida faction 林芳正(Hayashi Yoshimasa).  林芳正(Hayashi Yoshimasa) was always a rival of the Abe clan in 山口(Yamaguchi) so who to pick is now a difficult problem for LDP.

[jaichind]

The latest Mainichi Kishida cabinet approval/disapproval poll 36(-16)/54(+17) sees a collapse in support for the Kishida cabinet.  It is clear that the Unification Church issue and Abe's state funeral issue will not go away and now it is hitting him hard.