Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[Woody]

Air raid/another bombardment and drone wave currently happening:

https://twitter.com/WarMonitors/status/1609683423253397505
https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1609680397239042050
https://mobile.twitter.com/WarMonitors/status/1609684519807815680
https://twitter.com/AZgeopolitics/status/1609682068081893377?cxt=HHwWgoCz1f_T3tY...
https://twitter.com/DrazaM33/status/1609681384360103936

[jaichind]

https://mobile.twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1609539414312591360

Reminds me of

https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-03-24/russia-running-out-of-precision-munitions-in-ukraine-war-pentagon-official?src=usn_tw

"Russia Running Out of Precision Munitions in Ukraine War Pentagon Official"

from March 24th.

[Virginiá]

I've been reading headlines along the lines of "Russia only has enough missiles for 3-4 mass strikes" for months now, and it's going up to as many as 8. Obviously if these predictions were accurate, Russia would have run out of strike options a while ago.

I think the general issue here is some combination of everyone under-counting Russian stocks of missiles, even if some are older and not widely in use anymore, and also the rate at which Russia can produce new missiles.

Granted we are also talking mostly about cruise missiles, which are relatively easy to take down with enough air defenses. Ballistic missiles are much more of a problem and why potential deals with Iran are such a major threat.

[Virginiá]

Really vibing with this article (not new)

Cut the Baloney Realism
Russia’s war on Ukraine need not end in negotiation.

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/11/russia-ukraine-negotations-mark-milley/672198/

There is a large dose of what one might call “baloney realism” in the judicious declarations by those—most of them tepid at best in their support of Ukraine’s cause to begin with—who say that all wars must end in negotiations. No, they do not have to. These self-styled foreign-policy adults evidently failed to notice that America’s protracted negotiations with the Taliban had nothing to do with the Biden administration’s ending of that war with a skedaddle rather than a deal.

Russia’s Afghan war ended the same way, although it executed its withdrawal more brutally and more skillfully than America’s. The 1991 Iraq War ended with a cease-fire negotiated (badly, on the American part) at gunpoint; the 2003 war in surrender. One need not reach for Winston Churchill’s refusal to negotiate with Adolf Hitler or Abraham Lincoln’s refusal to negotiate with Jefferson Davis to realize that not all wars end in a diplomatically arranged peace. Ukraine is fighting for its survival as a state and as a distinct people. In some sense, for that matter, this is a similarly existential conflict for the Putin regime, whose survival (though not Russia’s) requires victory.

The calls for negotiations, like the strategically inane revelations of our fears of escalation—inane because they practically invite the Russians to get inside our head and rattle us—are dangerous. It is the nature of a small, embattled ally to look over its shoulder at those who support it today but may lack the grit required to do so over a long period of time. These calls telegraph a lack of strategic patience and staying power that only encourages Russia. Moreover, an official, understated discussion of talks can take a particularly disingenuous form: The decision to negotiate is yours, but we won’t give you the weapons to go any further than you have gone.

More important is our goal, and our theory of victory. The West cannot intend merely to “help Ukraine defend itself”—a mushy phrase for a mushy idea. We must help Ukraine defeat Russian aggression and expel Russian forces from within Ukraine’s recognized international borders. How does this lead to success? Ukrainian tank armies will not roll into Moscow to dictate peace, of course. But throughout Russian history, defeat on the periphery—Crimea in the 1850s, the Russo-Japanese War in the early 20th century, and Afghanistan in the 1980s—has led to political change domestically. It is perfectly reasonable to see that as our objective.

The one part where I would have something to add is that I think the push to negotiate is not just because they feel that is what has to be done with Russia, but because Ukraine is so dependent on foreign aid to keep up their fight, that a negotiated settlement is just a reality that NATO powers are preparing for as there is at least some belief that the west just doesn't have the will to ramp up production and support in ways Ukraine will likely need if they can't win this war more quickly. Granted there are some of the opinion that Ukraine can't be allowed to win outright as that could force Russia to use nuclear weapons. I disagree here but it's still an opinion I've seen at numerous levels of discourse.

Overall I think the US needs to cut the bullsh**t and get more aggressive. There is no realistic nuclear threat against NATO, it's Ukraine's risk to take, and Russia lacks the conventional military capacity to take on NATO, so any decision-making based around this is born out of fear and this fear may prevent us from realizing a safer world with a weakened, neutered Russia. Defeat may even be exactly what Russia needs to undergo actual societal change for the better. Exactly what we shouldn't want is any situation that lets Russia bail out of this war with their leadership safely in control both at home and of large parts of currently occupied territory, all but vindicating at least some of the imperialists and their bottomless ambitions.

[Hollywood]

https://mobile.twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1609539414312591360

Reminds me of

https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-03-24/russia-running-out-of-precision-munitions-in-ukraine-war-pentagon-official?src=usn_tw

"Russia Running Out of Precision Munitions in Ukraine War Pentagon Official"

from March 24th.

I've found it pretty ironic how there are so many stories describing the outlandishly fast rate that the Ukrainian Army is going through these weapons, or merely bemoaning the lack of resources continuously replenish their empty stockpiles.  I'm 100% the Ukrainians will be out of weapons in a short amount of time without dipping into critically low NATO stockpile, and I've seen enough video over the course of multiple months to verify the reasonable estimates that Russia has provided in respect to enemy vehicles destroyed.  Just like the Russians early last year, the Ukrainians are losing some of their vehicles in the muddy and slushy terrain of Luhansk. They are so depleted at the moment that they are losing anywhere from 30-120 soldiers trying to push Russian positions in the leaf-less forests near Kreminna.  They really need to slow down!   https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/16/ukraine-weapons-military-aid-stockpiles-nato-low-industry/

Unrelated to your point, I think SirWoodbury's post with the twitter illustration of Russian advance into Dorozhnyanka is extremely interesting.  I disagree with his conclusion that Ukraine currently holds this small settlement given that Ukraine merely had recon forces that were probing the Russian defenses in Polohy while Russia alway retained fire control from higher terrain.  In Polohy, Russia has dug some big trenches, built fortified positions, secured supply lines from the rail station in Tokmak (Ukraine just launched missiles at it today), and even created underground bunkers.  Both Russian and Ukrainian sources seem to believe that Russia will launch an offensive through the lower elevated areas of the Dneiper River Valley in Zaporizhzhia and Southern Donetsk in order to cut-off supplies to Ukrainian positions on the Eastern Front, particularly the positions of artillery shelling Donetsk City.  Place like Huliapole and Veylka Novasilka might be the jumping off points given their fortified positions along some important railroad tracks.  The area plays to the Russian military's advantage of aerial location of enemies and artillery strikes, because they will traversing mostly fields, farming communities, and small settlements.  

[CanadianDemocrat]

I've been reading headlines along the lines of "Russia only has enough missiles for 3-4 mass strikes" for months now, and it's going up to as many as 8. Obviously if these predictions were accurate, Russia would have run out of strike options a while ago.

I think the general issue here is some combination of everyone under-counting Russian stocks of missiles, even if some are older and not widely in use anymore, and also the rate at which Russia can produce new missiles.

Granted we are also talking mostly about cruise missiles, which are relatively easy to take down with enough air defenses. Ballistic missiles are much more of a problem and why potential deals with Iran are such a major threat.

After the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the West kept selling microchips and other high tech military equipment. Russia still has a lot of Western microchips in stockpile for it's missile production. If the West had tougher sanctions in 2014, then Russia would be running low today.

The West had a chance to take a tougher stand in 2014, but they wasted 9 years.

[jaichind]

https://mobile.twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1609539414312591360

Reminds me of

https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-03-24/russia-running-out-of-precision-munitions-in-ukraine-war-pentagon-official?src=usn_tw

"Russia Running Out of Precision Munitions in Ukraine War Pentagon Official"

from March 24th.

I've found it pretty ironic how there are so many stories describing the outlandishly fast rate that the Ukrainian Army is going through these weapons, or merely bemoaning the lack of resources continuously replenish their empty stockpiles.  I'm 100% the Ukrainians will be out of weapons in a short amount of time without dipping into critically low NATO stockpile, and I've seen enough video over the course of multiple months to verify the reasonable estimates that Russia has provided in respect to enemy vehicles destroyed.  Just like the Russians early last year, the Ukrainians are losing some of their vehicles in the muddy and slushy terrain of Luhansk. They are so depleted at the moment that they are losing anywhere from 30-120 soldiers trying to push Russian positions in the leaf-less forests near Kreminna.  They really need to slow down!   https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/16/ukraine-weapons-military-aid-stockpiles-nato-low-industry/

Unrelated to your point, I think SirWoodbury's post with the twitter illustration of Russian advance into Dorozhnyanka is extremely interesting.  I disagree with his conclusion that Ukraine currently holds this small settlement given that Ukraine merely had recon forces that were probing the Russian defenses in Polohy while Russia alway retained fire control from higher terrain.  In Polohy, Russia has dug some big trenches, built fortified positions, secured supply lines from the rail station in Tokmak (Ukraine just launched missiles at it today), and even created underground bunkers.  Both Russian and Ukrainian sources seem to believe that Russia will launch an offensive through the lower elevated areas of the Dneiper River Valley in Zaporizhzhia and Southern Donetsk in order to cut-off supplies to Ukrainian positions on the Eastern Front, particularly the positions of artillery shelling Donetsk City.  Place like Huliapole and Veylka Novasilka might be the jumping off points given their fortified positions along some important railroad tracks.  The area plays to the Russian military's advantage of aerial location of enemies and artillery strikes, because they will traversing mostly fields, farming communities, and small settlements.  

Just to be clear, while I think many collective West commentaries about Russia running out of A or B are just wishful thinking I also think Russia's narratives of Ukraine running out of munitions, trained officers, recruits etc etc are also wishful thinking.  There are no real material constraints on this war going on for a couple of more years.  The result of this war will be decided by relative political will on both sides and not either side running out of A or B.  The constraints are psychological and not material.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

I've been reading headlines along the lines of "Russia only has enough missiles for 3-4 mass strikes" for months now, and it's going up to as many as 8. Obviously if these predictions were accurate, Russia would have run out of strike options a while ago.

I think the general issue here is some combination of everyone under-counting Russian stocks of missiles, even if some are older and not widely in use anymore, and also the rate at which Russia can produce new missiles.

Granted we are also talking mostly about cruise missiles, which are relatively easy to take down with enough air defenses. Ballistic missiles are much more of a problem and why potential deals with Iran are such a major threat.

After the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the West kept selling microchips and other high tech military equipment. Russia still has a lot of Western microchips in stockpile for it's missile production. If the West had tougher sanctions in 2014, then Russia would be running low today.

The West had a chance to take a tougher stand in 2014, but they wasted 9 years.

It feels like the narrative the US govt has been selling tends to underestimate Russia, while their actions reflect more realistic assessments of their strength.

[Woody]

https://mobile.twitter.com/JulianRoepcke/status/1609855131893334016
https://twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1609641962478370825?cxt=HHwWkoCw0cW1zN...
https://mobile.twitter.com/Suriyakmaps/status/1609882944641941507

[Woody]

Soledar - Bakhmut front

https://mobile.twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1609781213216079873?cxt=HHwWgoC8v...

[No War, but the War on Christmas]

Ukraine Launches Deadly Attack on Russian Soldiers in the East, Kills 63 and wounds hundreds
A Russian proxy official called the attack in Donetsk a ‘massive blow.’

Ukrainian missiles struck a building that housed Russian soldiers in an occupied city in Donetsk early on New Year’s Day, according to Russian proxy officials and the Ukrainian military. The Russian Defense Ministry said that 63 service members died in the attack, a toll that would make it one of the deadliest single strikes against Russian forces in Ukraine since the war began.

A spokesman for the Russian-installed proxy government in the Donetsk region called the strike in the city of Makiivka “a massive blow.”

Igor Strelkov, a Russian former intelligence officer also known as Igor Girkin, said in a post on Telegram, the social messaging app, that the casualties included “many hundreds” of dead and wounded. But he added that it was difficult to know the true figure because many people “remained under the rubble.”

Huzzah! Sometimes it still feels wrong to hail the death of anyone; but then I remember that these are murderous bastards who invaded a country that was absolutely no threat to them and destroyed the lives of many millions of innocent Ukrainian men, women and children who will feel the effects of this war for generations to come. Hopefully Ukraine is able to repeat this and limit its own losses to quickly destroy Russian morale and bring an end to this conflict for the good of civilians and the 'innocent' on both sides.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

I've been reading headlines along the lines of "Russia only has enough missiles for 3-4 mass strikes" for months now, and it's going up to as many as 8. Obviously if these predictions were accurate, Russia would have run out of strike options a while ago.

I think the general issue here is some combination of everyone under-counting Russian stocks of missiles, even if some are older and not widely in use anymore, and also the rate at which Russia can produce new missiles.

Granted we are also talking mostly about cruise missiles, which are relatively easy to take down with enough air defenses. Ballistic missiles are much more of a problem and why potential deals with Iran are such a major threat.

After the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the West kept selling microchips and other high tech military equipment. Russia still has a lot of Western microchips in stockpile for it's missile production. If the West had tougher sanctions in 2014, then Russia would be running low today.

The West had a chance to take a tougher stand in 2014, but they wasted 9 years.

Russia's military absolutely benefits from modern microchips, but these aren't required for most of the long-range missiles it is attacking Ukraine with. Some of them have been dismantled by the likes of RUSI and contain (IIRC) consumer-grade chips from the 1990s-2010s.

Sanctions will restrict the supply of these, but they can be sourced relatively easily from non-sanctioning countries. If Russia prioritises missile manufacture over other uses for these chips, it will become more expensive - but it is very hard to see it becoming impossible even in the best case scenario.

[Torie]

Really vibing with this article (not new)

Cut the Baloney Realism
Russia’s war on Ukraine need not end in negotiation.

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/11/russia-ukraine-negotations-mark-milley/672198/

i agree of course with it all, but it still seems to me job one is to provide Ukraine with better air defenses, with no excuses as to why that is not possible because the weapons have too far a reach, they are needed to defend Ft. Dodge, Kansas, and so forth. I wonder just how sustainable the mass trashing of civilian infrastructure is within Ukraine for an additional substantial period of time.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Let this kill any remaining speculation as to Israel adopting a more pro-Ukrainian stance. It doesn't surprise me for reasons I've previously gone into here - at least humanitarian aid will, allegedly, continue.

https://twitter.com/BarakRavid/status/1609886512694595584
Policy inertia in the US and European states means this is a smart move for Netanyahu. Our governments will not reassess and change our Iran/Israel policies for the better, even though this is long overdue.

[jaichind]

Let this kill any remaining speculation as to Israel adopting a more pro-Ukrainian stance. It doesn't surprise me for reasons I've previously gone into here - at least humanitarian aid will, allegedly, continue.

https://twitter.com/BarakRavid/status/1609886512694595584
Policy inertia in the US and European states means this is a smart move for Netanyahu. Our governments will not reassess and change our Iran/Israel policies for the better, even though this is long overdue.

I wonder if that is because of

https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/netanyahu-asks-for-ukraine-vote-zelensky-says-not-without-we

"Netanyahu asks for Ukraine vote, Zelensky says not without weapons"

[Virginiá]

[...]

Unrelated to your point, I think SirWoodbury's post with the twitter illustration of Russian advance into Dorozhnyanka is extremely interesting.  I disagree with his conclusion that Ukraine currently holds this small settlement given that Ukraine merely had recon forces that were probing the Russian defenses in Polohy while Russia alway retained fire control from higher terrain.  In Polohy, Russia has dug some big trenches, built fortified positions, secured supply lines from the rail station in Tokmak (Ukraine just launched missiles at it today), and even created underground bunkers.  Both Russian and Ukrainian sources seem to believe that Russia will launch an offensive through the lower elevated areas of the Dneiper River Valley in Zaporizhzhia and Southern Donetsk in order to cut-off supplies to Ukrainian positions on the Eastern Front, particularly the positions of artillery shelling Donetsk City.  Place like Huliapole and Veylka Novasilka might be the jumping off points given their fortified positions along some important railroad tracks.  The area plays to the Russian military's advantage of aerial location of enemies and artillery strikes, because they will traversing mostly fields, farming communities, and small settlements.   

Just to be clear, while I think many collective West commentaries about Russia running out of A or B are just wishful thinking I also think Russia's narratives of Ukraine running out of munitions, trained officers, recruits etc etc are also wishful thinking.  There are no real material constraints on this war going on for a couple of more years.  The result of this war will be decided by relative political will on both sides and not either side running out of A or B.  The constraints are psychological and not material.

There's a difference between a side running out of materiel and munitions entirely, and simply having their position encircled and thus cut off from re-supply that is otherwise readily available.

Granted I find the idea of this hypothetical Zaporizhzhia offensive succeeding laughable, mostly because Russia had better options to encircle large Ukrainian front line positions months ago when their combat power was stronger, better supplied and more competent (albeit less numerous) and they completely blew it - notably in the Donbas region. Virtually every aspect of the Russian military is worse off right now, in some cases by far, except for maybe their raw numbers (due to mobilization). Strategic success on this level would require a level of success they haven't seen in nearly 6 months.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Let this kill any remaining speculation as to Israel adopting a more pro-Ukrainian stance. It doesn't surprise me for reasons I've previously gone into here - at least humanitarian aid will, allegedly, continue.

https://twitter.com/BarakRavid/status/1609886512694595584
Policy inertia in the US and European states means this is a smart move for Netanyahu. Our governments will not reassess and change our Iran/Israel policies for the better, even though this is long overdue.

I wonder if that is because of

https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/netanyahu-asks-for-ukraine-vote-zelensky-says-not-without-we

"Netanyahu asks for Ukraine vote, Zelensky says not without weapons"

One UN vote is unlikely to be a major factor. This has much more to do with the Russo-Israeli relationship over the past two decades, especially since the Syrian Civil War and worsening tensions between Iran and Israel.

At the personal and ideological levels (likely less important than my next paragraph, but worth mentioning), Netanyahu and Putin have long been reported to have enjoyed a good working relationship. Netanyahu has clear ideological reasons to support Russia’s annexation policies and the further normalisation of similar policies.

The heart of the matter is that Israeli leadership understands that it is much easier to keep Western nations on side than Russia - and to protect its interests, it seeks to do both. Therefore, its policies will lean towards Russia so long as Western nations continue to ignore their own interests in deference to Israel’s.

In this regard, the political responses to the war are instructive. From February onwards, Israel defended its Russia policy on the grounds that it did not wish to antagonise Iran (even going so far as to freeze, but not refund, delivery of ammunition which Ukraine had already paid for). Israel continued to receive and request high levels of Western support in its decidedly colder war with Iran.

When Iran helped Russia strike Ukraine in ways Israel had not been struck since Saddam, Israel maintained its stance - and neither Europe nor the US adopted the mirror of the Israeli stance (which would have been to treat Iran a bit more fairly to prevent the use of Iranian weapons by Russia). Indeed, Biden went so far as to declare the Iranian nuclear deal “dead” even though the case for it was arguably stronger than ever before, and Western countries talked up Israeli support that might have materialised in secret or indirectly (it most likely didn’t). We’ve heard plenty about Western components in Russian weapons, but diplomats have been very careful to avoid mentioning the Israeli drones Russia was using long before the first Shahed reached their arsenal.

Netanyahu’s calculus is a simple one. A pro-Russian policy may shift Russian policy in favour of Israel. A pro-Ukrainian policy will change almost nothing in Western policies towards Israel. Iran will get some newer jets from Russia in exchange for the kamikaze drones, but Israel can easily handle these - and they’re likely to demand (and receive) more unconditional Western support to do so. Until politicians in Whitehall/Washington/Brussels etc. object to this, the Israeli approach makes a good deal of sense.

[No War, but the War on Christmas]

BP, Unilever, and HSBC have failed to properly exit Russia, new report warns

Three FTSE 100 companies – HSBC Holdings, Unilever, and BP – have been named as members of a “dirty dozen” of high-profile multinationals still heavily involved in Russia.
The three UK headquartered companies have failed to properly exit Russia in the wake of Putin’s invasion, according to a new report by the Moral Rating Agency (MRA).
Instead, the British firms have used “loopholes” in the international sanctions regime to continue operating inside the Russian Federation, the MRA report says.

There really needs to be more stringent sanctions enforcement, cause I've seen a number of reports saying the same thing that there are a multitude of loopholes big international business are using to remain in the Russian market... Sometimes in all but name.

[Logical]

This map of Russian advance towards Bakhmut could almost be taken out of a WWI history book.

[CumbrianLefty]

I've been reading headlines along the lines of "Russia only has enough missiles for 3-4 mass strikes" for months now, and it's going up to as many as 8. Obviously if these predictions were accurate, Russia would have run out of strike options a while ago.

I think the general issue here is some combination of everyone under-counting Russian stocks of missiles, even if some are older and not widely in use anymore, and also the rate at which Russia can produce new missiles.

Granted we are also talking mostly about cruise missiles, which are relatively easy to take down with enough air defenses. Ballistic missiles are much more of a problem and why potential deals with Iran are such a major threat.

After the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the West kept selling microchips and other high tech military equipment. Russia still has a lot of Western microchips in stockpile for it's missile production. If the West had tougher sanctions in 2014, then Russia would be running low today.

The West had a chance to take a tougher stand in 2014, but they wasted 9 years.

It feels like the narrative the US govt has been selling tends to underestimate Russia, while their actions reflect more realistic assessments of their strength.

Which is pretty much what you would expect, I would have thought.

[Torie]

Reading this should keep one occupied for awhile.

https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/american-defense-priorities-after-ukraine/

Towards the end, the essay focuses on air defense systems. The author thinks offensive drones are overblown. It seems that Ukraine's skies could be sealed up better.

[Woody]

https://twitter.com/BarakRavid/status/1609886893403181057
https://twitter.com/BarakRavid/status/1609888102906056705

[Woody]

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1609917030861504512

[Hollywood]

Today, I've seen some of the most intense fighting since the Lysychansk Offensive, and I can't imagine the death toll on both sides might will be substantial.  Absolutely horrifying videos are accumulating, particularly the Ukrainian strike on a Russian compound in Makiivka.  Preliminary estimates suggest the death toll is 63 and casualties (injuries) over 200, but reports from journalists on the ground suggest the death toll should increase.  https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-shells-donetsks-makiivka-hitting-military-quarters-officials-2023-01-01/

In potentially related news, the U.S. military base near the al-Omar oil field in Syria's Deir ez-Zor governorate was attacked with missiles on Friday night, Syrian media has reported.  Some ME outlets have suggested that American soldiers have been killed, and no one has claimed responsibility.  This news follows reports that Turkey intends to invade Russian-aligned Syria in order to create a buffer zone from the Kurdish Nationalist Groups.  https://en.mehrnews.com/news/195539/US-base-in-Syria-s-Deir-ez-Zor-comes-under-missile-attack

[Isaak]

The SPD's Michael Müller – once the Governing Mayor of Berlin, now an influential Member of the Bundestag – has spoken out in favor of facilitating negotiations between Russia and Ukraine rather than further escalating the conflict:

"We need to keep our lines of communication open. We must be open for dialogue. It is very sad that the Greens and the FDP don't understand this."

Seems as if intra-SPD support for the Ukrainian cause is increasingly eroding. Scholz is not to be envied.