Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[Storr]

"I'm so done. My nerves are done. I want to go home, [but] I can't! It's so f**ked here. Children, everyone hates us."

It's good to see morale is high at the front:

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1572346470136676352?s=20&t=x6JBoXtl...

[Frodo]

Even mass conscription won't save the Russian war effort in Ukraine:

https://twitter.com/daxe/status/1572343200534171648

Mobilization could make military service compulsory for millions of Russians who, at present, easily can avoid the armed forces’ twice-a-year draft. In theory, mobilization could swell the Russian army’s ranks by millions.

In practice, those throngs of new troops would lack instructors to train them, units to absorb them, commanders to lead them, noncommissioned officers to mentor them and equipment to give them useful combat power.

The main effects of mobilization would be to clog up the army’s fragile home garrisons, undermine the legitimacy of Putin and his regime, deplete the federal treasury and—in the best case—feed into Ukraine a lot of untrained, under-equipped and poorly led men who, more likely that not, quickly would surrender, desert or die.

[Darthpi – Anti-Florida Activist]

Even mass conscription won't save the Russian war effort in Ukraine:

https://twitter.com/daxe/status/1572343200534171648

Mobilization could make military service compulsory for millions of Russians who, at present, easily can avoid the armed forces’ twice-a-year draft. In theory, mobilization could swell the Russian army’s ranks by millions.

In practice, those throngs of new troops would lack instructors to train them, units to absorb them, commanders to lead them, noncommissioned officers to mentor them and equipment to give them useful combat power.

The main effects of mobilization would be to clog up the army’s fragile home garrisons, undermine the legitimacy of Putin and his regime, deplete the federal treasury and—in the best case—feed into Ukraine a lot of untrained, under-equipped and poorly led men who, more likely that not, quickly would surrender, desert or die.

"We have reserves" has basically been the Russian military motto for as long as Russia has existed, and if we've reached the point where that is no longer viable, well, that definitely changes what kind of military power they can be.

[Badger]

Even mass conscription won't save the Russian war effort in Ukraine:

https://twitter.com/daxe/status/1572343200534171648

Mobilization could make military service compulsory for millions of Russians who, at present, easily can avoid the armed forces’ twice-a-year draft. In theory, mobilization could swell the Russian army’s ranks by millions.

In practice, those throngs of new troops would lack instructors to train them, units to absorb them, commanders to lead them, noncommissioned officers to mentor them and equipment to give them useful combat power.

The main effects of mobilization would be to clog up the army’s fragile home garrisons, undermine the legitimacy of Putin and his regime, deplete the federal treasury and—in the best case—feed into Ukraine a lot of untrained, under-equipped and poorly led men who, more likely that not, quickly would surrender, desert or die.

"We have reserves" has basically been the Russian military motto for as long as Russia has existed, and if we've reached the point where that is no longer viable, well, that definitely changes what kind of military power they can be.

Beat me to it. Human wave assaults and just putting more boots on the ground has always been the Russian military Way.

[Hindsight was 2020]

Beyond the political issues the mobilization will case there is also the issue of who the hell would train the new recruits as all of Russia’s best officers are in Ukraine already

[nicholas.slaydon]

Beyond the political issues the mobilization will case there is also the issue of who the hell would train the new recruits as all of Russia’s best officers are in Ukraine already

Also who would supply them, and what would they be supplied with should they ever reach the front lines?

[DINGO Joe]

A few random details from today without links cuz I'm tired

--Moscow Stock Exchange fell 9%

--Airfare to places like Istanbul skyrocketed

--Turkey's two largest banks will no longer accept the Russian Mir card.  Other countries that will no longer accept it are Kazakhstan, Vietnam and Armenia.  Yep Armenia.  Saw the head of Kazakhstan having a lovely chat and photo op with the head of the EU too.

[DINGO Joe]

Oh, and McDonald's has reopened in Ukraine
https://mobile.twitter.com/uamemesforces/status/1526241533770465280

[No War, but the War on Christmas]

https://twitter.com/AlexKokcharov/status/1572244681899249666?s=20&t=lm5vVnZ7...

North Korea margins.

[HillGoose]

disappointed its not swan lake, what an idiot though fr.

NATO should send even more weapons to Ukraine now just to annoy this demonic mf.

[Logical]

Putin announces partial mobilization. 300 thousand men will be conscripted for a period until the end of the operation (indefinitely). Makes the usual nuclear threats. Both Putin and Shoygu acknowledged that Russia is being defeated in the battlefield.

[Woody]

Putin name dropped "Novorossiya" during his mobilization announcement. Think it's safe to say he has likely more ambitions than just Kherson, Zaporozhye, DPR & LPR.

[Woody]

https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1572480138079502338?cxt=HHwWhICw6dWWydIrAAA...
https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1572473916056117249?cxt=HHwWgoC9kcCsxtIrAAA...

[jaichind]

Shoigu says Russia lost around 6K KIA and said that Ukraine lost 61K KIA.  Note that Shoigu's number does not include various auxiliary unit losses (Donsesk republics militias, Wagner group, and other various nonformal Russian military units).  It seems reasonable if you take Shoigu at his word, the total KIA on the Russian side should be tripled since the Donsesk republics militias are taking the brunt of a lot of the fighting and losses and man-for-man are just less effective than formal Russian units.

Shoigu's number on Ukraine KIA of 61K looks funny since he also claims Ukraine lost 40K wounded.  I would expect the ratio of these two numbers (wounded vs KIA) to be more like 2 to 1 or 3 to 1 and not .66 to 1.

My sense is that Shoigu's estimates of Russian KIA are most likely accurate (if you triple the number to take into account other auxiliary unit losses) but his Ukraine numbers are most likely bogus and would overesimate Ukraine KIA.

[Middle-aged Europe]

"We lost 6,000 men, the other side lost 60,000 men. Yet, for some reason, we still haven't managed to win the war special military operation six months after it began and we now need to initiate a partial mobilization of our reserves."

Yeah, sure, whatever.

[afleitch]

"We lost 6,000 men, the other side lost 60,000 men. Yet, for some reason, we still haven't managed to win the war special military operation six months after it began and we now need to initiate a partial mobilization of our reserves."

Yeah, sure, whatever.

The 60k could, ghoulishly, be counting civilians.

Their own 6k in losses is clearly bs.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

The partial mobilisation (which seems pretty close to a full mobilisation) vindicates what I postulated months ago with regards to escalatory concerns: most “escalation” would be contingent on the extent of Ukrainian success rather than the specific tools they were given to achieve it. Consequently, many of the restrictions and delays in the supply of materiel, training etc. to the Ukrainian Army only served to draw out the conflict and cause more Ukrainian casualties prior to Russia being forced to raise or fold in the face of Ukrainian success.

This should be kept in mind when supplying future aid. Either we prefer to see Ukraine lose rather than risk further Russian escalation against it, or we reduce the restrictions on what we supply to help it win. I’d rather let Ukraine judge the risk, as it’s their country - but the global ramifications of potential Russian nuclear use in anger may mean total Ukrainian loss is preferable. I don’t think we can fine-tune aid to keep front lines stable forever.

[Antonio the Sixth]

The partial mobilisation (which seems pretty close to a full mobilisation) vindicates what I postulated months ago with regards to escalatory concerns: most “escalation” would be contingent on the extent of Ukrainian success rather than the specific tools they were given to achieve it. Consequently, many of the restrictions and delays in the supply of materiel, training etc. to the Ukrainian Army only served to draw out the conflict and cause more Ukrainian casualties prior to Russia being forced to raise or fold in the face of Ukrainian success.

This should be kept in mind when supplying future aid. Either we prefer to see Ukraine lose rather than risk further Russian escalation against it, or we reduce the restrictions on what we supply to help it win. I’d rather let Ukraine judge the risk, as it’s their country - but the global ramifications of potential Russian nuclear use in anger may mean total Ukrainian loss is preferable. I don’t think we can fine-tune aid to keep front lines stable forever.

The global ramifications of ceding to nuclear blackmail fundamentally guarantee nuclear war in the long run. The only way to maybe avoid it is to consistently call Putin's bluff and never give any signal that we're cowed by his threats.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

The partial mobilisation (which seems pretty close to a full mobilisation) vindicates what I postulated months ago with regards to escalatory concerns: most “escalation” would be contingent on the extent of Ukrainian success rather than the specific tools they were given to achieve it. Consequently, many of the restrictions and delays in the supply of materiel, training etc. to the Ukrainian Army only served to draw out the conflict and cause more Ukrainian casualties prior to Russia being forced to raise or fold in the face of Ukrainian success.

This should be kept in mind when supplying future aid. Either we prefer to see Ukraine lose rather than risk further Russian escalation against it, or we reduce the restrictions on what we supply to help it win. I’d rather let Ukraine judge the risk, as it’s their country - but the global ramifications of potential Russian nuclear use in anger may mean total Ukrainian loss is preferable. I don’t think we can fine-tune aid to keep front lines stable forever.

The consequences of ceding to nuclear blackmail fundamentally guarantee nuclear war in the long run. The only way to maybe avoid it is to consistently call Putin's bluff and not give any sense that we're cowed by his threats.

You’re probably right, but if Russia wins thanks to mobilisation + lack of Western aid, that may cause a slower nuclear arms race than if Russia wins thanks to using nuclear weapons. There are alternative reasons (besides escalation) as to why things like fighter jets aren’t being transferred (sensitive tech, cost, etc.). However, there is also the risk of Ukraine developing its own nuclear weapons or dirty bombs if it doesn’t get more Western aid, so neither option is a safe choice.

I’m in favour of giving Ukraine more conventional arms, but there’s room for alternative viewpoints. What I can’t defend is the failure to at least train Ukraine to use weapons that have long lead (training/logistical/production) times, as it pushes back the earliest date at which we have the option to give them these weapons.

It’s now likely Russia will get its mobilised troops in order before F-16s arrive, even if the US agrees to send them today. This was probably avoidable.

[CumbrianLefty]

This should be kept in mind when supplying future aid. Either we prefer to see Ukraine lose rather than risk further Russian escalation against it, or we reduce the restrictions on what we supply to help it win. I’d rather let Ukraine judge the risk, as it’s their country - but the global ramifications of potential Russian nuclear use in anger may mean total Ukrainian loss is preferable. I don’t think we can fine-tune aid to keep front lines stable forever.

The thing for me has always been - if Russia is humiliatingly losing the war to the extent Putin sees using nukes as his only option, would he still have the authority to carry it out anyway?

It more and more looks like back in February, it was either a quick win for Russia or bust.

He gambled and lost.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

This should be kept in mind when supplying future aid. Either we prefer to see Ukraine lose rather than risk further Russian escalation against it, or we reduce the restrictions on what we supply to help it win. I’d rather let Ukraine judge the risk, as it’s their country - but the global ramifications of potential Russian nuclear use in anger may mean total Ukrainian loss is preferable. I don’t think we can fine-tune aid to keep front lines stable forever.

The thing for me has always been - if Russia is humiliatingly losing the war to the extent Putin sees using nukes as his only option, would he still have the authority to carry it out anyway?

It more and more looks like back in February, it was either a quick win for Russia or bust.

He gambled and lost.

I agree, but you’ve phrased that as a question for good reason. We cannot be completely sure Russia won’t strike Ukraine, although we can be reasonably sure it won’t strike us.

After the first phase failed, I was confident he’d mobilise. The active deployment of trainer units and volunteer battalions led me to believe this was less likely - partly because he did not want to deal with the political and military risks of conscription, but also because it meant that (in the event of a negotiated settlement) many of the worst warmongers would be dead and unable to challenge him by the conflict’s end. Yet, he seems to have bowed to the warmongers anyway. Even if he doesn’t have the authority to launch a nuke, his successor might be compelled to.

[rc18]

I see a lot of people talking about 'partial mobilisation' and bandying around the 300k figure. This is just playing into Putin's hands by regurgitating his rhetoric.

The text of the decree (at least the bit that hasn't been redacted) does not limit the mobilisation, either by location or by who can be mobilised, apart from the usual age and health requirements. It is not a partial mobilisation, it is a general mobilisation.

Putin just has the choice of who to send to the meat grinder first.

[Middle-aged Europe]

Russians scramble to get the f**k out of their country. One could say that they are now... mobilized.


https://mobile.twitter.com/Reuters/status/1572541527037022210


https://mobile.twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1572531586649960448

[CumbrianLefty]

Which shows another thing, its easier to "support" the war when it won't be you or those close to you fighting it. Full mobilisation has the potential, at least, to be a fiasco.

[Torie]

Well this makes me feel better after the cold shower above. And yeah, one would think it would incentivize the allies to do more in the meantime. Putin has made it clear that he is not prepared to limit what he does in response to "restraint" by the allies.


https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/09/21/world/europe/ukraine-maps-momentum.html

... Russia’s central issue — a lack of trained, motivated fighters — is not easily solved. Mr. Putin’s announcement on Wednesday of a “partial mobilization” of people with military experience that would see roughly 300,000 soldiers called up could help supplement Russian forces. But the quality of the new recruits is unclear, and it could take time to organize and deploy them, limiting the immediate effect on the battlefield.

Although it is still considered unlikely, it is now possible to imagine that continued Ukrainian successes could lead to the collapse of Russian morale and ability to fight, Mr. Muzyka, the Rochan Consulting analyst, wrote on Monday.

“It is no longer science fiction to think that the war will end in a matter of weeks, months, and not years,” Mr. Musyka wrote.


As to nukes, in my opinion, Putin using nukes means the end of the Ukraine war in a matter of weeks, months days. I will leave it at that.