French presidential election, 2022

[Sweet kiss of liquid modernity]

Dédiabolisation means Le Pen is now subject to the Poher '69 threshold, below which you don't even get to walk away with a shred of dignity.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Here's another map - one I've been meaning to make since I saw the final results. I noticed you could break the electorate up in to three broad ideological blocs of almost equal size. Of course those categorizations are eminently contestable, but I think they still reveal some interesting things.

Left (Arthaud-Poutou-Mélenchon-Roussel-Hidalgo-Jadot): 31.95%
Liberal Right (Macron-Pécresse): 32.62%
Nationalist Right (Dupont-Aignan-Le Pen-Zemmour): 32.29%

That leaves out the unclassifiable Lassalle's 3.13%, but otherwise splits French voters into almost perfect thirds.

So, what does this 3-way divide look like mapped out? I finally took the time to find out:


For France, a genuinely shocking degree of geographic bias. The far-right bloc came out ahead in a solid majority of departments, and if France had an "Electoral College" it would be solidly ahead of it too. It of course wins overwhelmingly in the traditionally right-wing Mediterranean France, and in France's vast postindustrial Northeast, but also in large swathes of the country that don't have such a strong political identity, like the Centre region and even much of the traditionally left-wing Southwest. This is only partially explained by the nationalist bloc's weakness in IdF: even if you look at the non-IdF continental France only, the bloc only wins with a plurality of 34.66%, not that far from the liberals' 31.88%.

However, it is clear that the nationalist bloc is much weaker across France's globalized metropoles, and Departments anchored by one such tends to be strongholds for either the left or liberal bloc. On the liberal side, the Grand Ouest also really stands out as its last redoubt, along with the traditionally posh West side of IdF. Other areas of support includes also upscale areas like Haute-Savoie and Rhône, as well as a little redoubt of what might have once been Hollande Country in the Massif Central and Bayrou Country in the Pyrénées-Atlantiques. As well as the expats and Pacific territories, where support for continued unionism with France usually translates into support for the center-right establishment.

As for the left, it (and this really cannot be stressed enough) dominated Ile-de-France, winning 39.99% in the region. Also in most non-Pacific DTOMs, where Mélenchon's scores were pretty staggering. Aside from that, its areas of support in non-Idf continental France tend to be anchored around metropoles like Nantes, Bordeaux, Toulouse and Grenoble. A few redoubts of rural leftism survived, like Ariège, Lot, Haute-Vienne and Hautes-Alpes, but those are just the remnants of once-vast swathes of leftist support across the South.

[Hash]

Here's a shaded map of the leading candidate by constituency (shaded by margin/majority)



The map which I was most eager to complete was Zemmour's map which is hilarious



His best constituencies were Paris-4 (16.8%) which includes extremely wealthy parts of the 16e and 17e, Paris-14 (16.4%) which has the rest of the 16e, Alpes-Maritimes-8 (16.6%) which includes Cannes and Alpes-Maritimes-6 (14.5%) which includes Cagnes-sur-Mer and Saint-Laurent-du-Var. Most of his other top results (over 10%) were in the Alpes-Maritimes, Var, Bouches-du-Rhône and Vaucluse. In general, it's a very retro 1980s FN map - similar to the FN's first map, in the 1984 EP elections (with some notable exceptions, like the Seine-Saint-Denis, 'too diverse' now to vote for any far-right candidate), which had patterns which didn't hold for that long (particularly the strong support in affluent areas).

I will make similar maps at the constituency level for all relevant candidates as well as various other 'thematic' maps of interest.

[Oryxslayer]

https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1517467333454876674?s=20&t=XHaWp9qRB...


Also a 53/47 odaxa poll, which is no change from their last numbers, seven days ago. Their projected abstention is much lower than anyone else.

Final Yougov. No nice voter movement chart like last time, but the transfer percentages are similar:

https://twitter.com/YouGov/status/1517458617095569408?s=20&t=rqO1oqGxIDE9Ikv...

[Dr Oz Lost Party!]

Had a dream last night where the exit poll showed Le Pen winning 61-39% lol.

[Person Man]

https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1517467333454876674?s=20&t=XHaWp9qRB...


Also a 53/47 odaxa poll, which is no change from their last numbers, seven days ago. Their projected abstention is much lower than anyone else.

Final Yougov. No nice voter movement chart like last time, but the transfer percentages are similar:

https://twitter.com/YouGov/status/1517458617095569408?s=20&t=rqO1oqGxIDE9Ikv...

Macron is basically two touchdowns ahead with a two minute warning. They just need to not fumble the ball twice over the course of 4 downs.

[Storr]

Have a debate meme:

https://twitter.com/NotWoofers/status/1517489459171844097?s=20&t=Ob2qbwz_Xch...

[Antonio the Sixth]

https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1517467333454876674?s=20&t=XHaWp9qRB...


Also a 53/47 odaxa poll, which is no change from their last numbers, seven days ago. Their projected abstention is much lower than anyone else.

Final Yougov. No nice voter movement chart like last time, but the transfer percentages are similar:

https://twitter.com/YouGov/status/1517458617095569408?s=20&t=rqO1oqGxIDE9Ikv...

Macron is basically two touchdowns ahead with a two minute warning. They just need to not fumble the ball twice over the course of 4 downs.

Good job finding a metaphor no French person would understand.

[Middle-aged Europe]

https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1517467333454876674?s=20&t=XHaWp9qRB...


Also a 53/47 odaxa poll, which is no change from their last numbers, seven days ago. Their projected abstention is much lower than anyone else.

Final Yougov. No nice voter movement chart like last time, but the transfer percentages are similar:

https://twitter.com/YouGov/status/1517458617095569408?s=20&t=rqO1oqGxIDE9Ikv...

Macron is basically two touchdowns ahead with a two minute warning. They just need to not fumble the ball twice over the course of 4 downs.

Elmo is in awe of these numbers

[Antonio the Sixth]

Took me long enough to update it, but here's the new bar chart summarizing the breakdown of the electorate in every Presidential first round:



The combined left is almost back to its level from 1969. Hurray, I guess?

And with Le Pen and Zemmour combined, the far right is higher than ever. Oh well. At least with the collapse of Pécresse there isn't much of anything else to the right of Macron.

[Sir Mohamed]

Very much looks like my bold 55-45% prediction was even an underestatement as this race is unfolding. I don't think Macron will break 60% again, though 58-42% seems very much possible as we speak.

Although she's not that old, I guess this is Le Pen's last stand for the presidency. It's already her third bid.

[Zinneke]

As Al has already alluded to, you shouldn't underestimate the persistence of candidates throughout their political careers. I firmly expect both Le Pen and Méluche to claim that they are passing on the baton but to return next election.

[Middle-aged Europe]

AtlasIntel, the only polling firm to have ever shown a lead for Le Pen in the run-off, is back. But even they have Macron improving his numbers:

https://mobile.twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1517522363310505984

[parochial boy]

Here's another map - one I've been meaning to make since I saw the final results. I noticed you could break the electorate up in to three broad ideological blocs of almost equal size. Of course those categorizations are eminently contestable, but I think they still reveal some interesting things.

Left (Arthaud-Poutou-Mélenchon-Roussel-Hidalgo-Jadot): 31.95%
Liberal Right (Macron-Pécresse): 32.62%
Nationalist Right (Dupont-Aignan-Le Pen-Zemmour): 32.29%

I was looking at these a bit too, and the department that most closely reflects the national average (less than 1% for each block) is... Savoie.

As in, I know the focus in terms of the left wing vote is rightly on the metro areas, but I have my own biases in terms of being interested in what the neighbours are doing and it is quite striking the degree to which the two Savoies have gone from being rock solid Conservative heartlands - Haute-Savoie was one of Sarkozy's top 5 departments - to actually being both close to the national average and giving relatively ok scores to the left, even in the Haute. All the more so that, Geneva suburbs aside, neither department has any noticeable urban areas.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Here's another map - one I've been meaning to make since I saw the final results. I noticed you could break the electorate up in to three broad ideological blocs of almost equal size. Of course those categorizations are eminently contestable, but I think they still reveal some interesting things.

Left (Arthaud-Poutou-Mélenchon-Roussel-Hidalgo-Jadot): 31.95%
Liberal Right (Macron-Pécresse): 32.62%
Nationalist Right (Dupont-Aignan-Le Pen-Zemmour): 32.29%

I was looking at these a bit too, and the department that most closely reflects the national average (less than 1% for each block) is... Savoie.

As in, I know the focus in terms of the left wing vote is rightly on the metro areas, but I have my own biases in terms of being interested in what the neighbours are doing and it is quite striking the degree to which the two Savoies have gone from being rock solid Conservative heartlands - Haute-Savoie was one of Sarkozy's top 5 departments - to actually being both close to the national average and giving relatively ok scores to the left, even in the Haute. All the more so that, Geneva suburbs aside, neither department has any noticeable urban areas.

Chambéry isn't noticeable?!? Excuse me??

Like, if you mean that it's not a capital-M Metropole in the Guilluy sense, then fair, but an urban area of 200k inhabitants isn't nothing, and it certainly has a major influence on Savoie's politics. Without it, Savoie would certainly not so closely match France as a whole - which I agree makes it fascinating. I was actually telling Nathan just yesterday about how Savoie a fascinating microcosm. It has a trendy, economically dynamic and boboifying capital in Chambéry, various stipes of suburbs around it, a lot of very upscale resort areas around the Alps, old industrial and postindustrial centers in the Maurienne, and a lot of quaint rural towns. It has a bit of everything and that's probably why it matches France so well. Of course, anything that could be said about Savoie was said almost a decade ago in this post in Gaël's sadly defunct blog. Definitely worth a read.

[Oryxslayer]

More polls.

https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1517554605353312257?s=20&t=4w19PAT8j...

https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1517550030919512064?s=20&t=4w19PAT8j...

https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1517546066417262593?s=20&t=4w19PAT8j...

https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1517544633508798466?s=20&t=4w19PAT8j...

[President Johnson]

At this point, I'd be surprised by single digit margin. Macron should win this by double digits.

[parochial boy]

Chambéry isn't noticeable?!? Excuse me??

Like, if you mean that it's not a capital-M Metropole in the Guilluy sense, then fair, but an urban area of 200k inhabitants isn't nothing, and it certainly has a major influence on Savoie's politics. Without it, Savoie would certainly not so closely match France as a whole - which I agree makes it fascinating. I was actually telling Nathan just yesterday about how Savoie a fascinating microcosm. It has a trendy, economically dynamic and boboifying capital in Chambéry, various stipes of suburbs around it, a lot of very upscale resort areas around the Alps, old industrial and postindustrial centers in the Maurienne, and a lot of quaint rural towns. It has a bit of everything and that's probably why it matches France so well. Of course, anything that could be said about Savoie was said almost a decade ago in this post in Gaël's sadly defunct blog. Definitely worth a read.

Ah the world's great metropolises. Paris, London, Aix-les-Bains

That was a fascinating read, and yeah I'd never really seen Savoie in that light - always tended to think of them as being raging catholics and mountain bbumpkins like the Haute-savoyards/the villagers from les bronzés font du ski. But definitely explains why it is now voting the way it does, especially as Chabéry seems to have a fashionable-outdoorsy appeal though that I can see drawing in a certain kind of left oriented voter.

Haute-Savoie's trend is a little more surprising though. As you have posh ski resorts, a posh mid-sized town and returement destination in Annecy, wealthy Geneva suburbs, and one of the few relatively thriving industrial regions of the country in the Arve valley. Which explain the Macron love and why Le Pen is weaker there not than her father was in 2002, but not so much the increasing openness to voting for the left.

I guess the real change there is that it is quite diverse and that there has been enough demographic change and internal migration for it's own specificities to no longer really apply.

[President Johnson]

Another Ipsos poll out:

https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1517623614840971264

[Antonio the Sixth]

Here's another map - one I've been meaning to make since I saw the final results. I noticed you could break the electorate up in to three broad ideological blocs of almost equal size. Of course those categorizations are eminently contestable, but I think they still reveal some interesting things.

Left (Arthaud-Poutou-Mélenchon-Roussel-Hidalgo-Jadot): 31.95%
Liberal Right (Macron-Pécresse): 32.62%
Nationalist Right (Dupont-Aignan-Le Pen-Zemmour): 32.29%

That leaves out the unclassifiable Lassalle's 3.13%, but otherwise splits French voters into almost perfect thirds.

So, what does this 3-way divide look like mapped out? I finally took the time to find out:


For France, a genuinely shocking degree of geographic bias. The far-right bloc came out ahead in a solid majority of departments, and if France had an "Electoral College" it would be solidly ahead of it too. It of course wins overwhelmingly in the traditionally right-wing Mediterranean France, and in France's vast postindustrial Northeast, but also in large swathes of the country that don't have such a strong political identity, like the Centre region and even much of the traditionally left-wing Southwest. This is only partially explained by the nationalist bloc's weakness in IdF: even if you look at the non-IdF continental France only, the bloc only wins with a plurality of 34.66%, not that far from the liberals' 31.88%.

However, it is clear that the nationalist bloc is much weaker across France's globalized metropoles, and Departments anchored by one such tends to be strongholds for either the left or liberal bloc. On the liberal side, the Grand Ouest also really stands out as its last redoubt, along with the traditionally posh West side of IdF. Other areas of support includes also upscale areas like Haute-Savoie and Rhône, as well as a little redoubt of what might have once been Hollande Country in the Massif Central and Bayrou Country in the Pyrénées-Atlantiques. As well as the expats and Pacific territories, where support for continued unionism with France usually translates into support for the center-right establishment.

As for the left, it (and this really cannot be stressed enough) dominated Ile-de-France, winning 39.99% in the region. Also in most non-Pacific DTOMs, where Mélenchon's scores were pretty staggering. Aside from that, its areas of support in non-Idf continental France tend to be anchored around metropoles like Nantes, Bordeaux, Toulouse and Grenoble. A few redoubts of rural leftism survived, like Ariège, Lot, Haute-Vienne and Hautes-Alpes, but those are just the remnants of once-vast swathes of leftist support across the South.

Following up on this, I decided to make a map of the top 2 blocs in each department. In other words, this tells you which bloc finished last.



Actually a bit more variety here than in the map for top 2 candidates. We see a substantial part of France would have placed the left bloc in at least second place. Fascinatingly, this part of France is highly concentrated in (aside from IdF, which we've already talked about at length) Southern France. This North-South divide is also a bit of an oddity in France: in a way, you could almost see it as a return to the maps from the 60s and 70s, when the left's strength was concentrated in a C-shaped arc stretching from the Massif Cental to the Southern Alps. Since these days however, the left collapsed on the Mediterranean Coast, while gaining in areas like the Grand Ouest. We still see some of the effects of that in Brittany, which largely went Lib > Left > Nat. But the most fascinating thing is this relatively resilient Left bloc around the Mediterranean arc. Of course, in this areas the nationalist right came far ahead, as you could see in the previous map. Still, the fact that the left came in second here is interesting. By contrast, it is striking how little you can see the old left strongholds in the North and East. Coming third in Seine-Maritime, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Ardennes, and even Nievre and Pas-de-Calais(!!!) is absolutely pathetic, and a stunning indictment of the French left's decline in it old post-industrial bases. This is a whole new political geography of France.

[Oryxslayer]

Some various models for what might happen tomorrow. All do not consider the overseas departments. This is because there are some huge swings between past and recent election data for these areas, largely the product of local electoral factors separate from the Hexagon. All models are geographic estimates of the polled estimate of a Macron win by 55 or 56%.

Simple Swing model. This model takes solely the vote from two weeks ago, and then uses the projected vote percentages and abstentions from the polls to apportion out those voters whose candidates did not advance. Example: if the polling average says Melenchon's voters break 40/20/40 between Macron/Le Pen/Abstention, then they are apportioned universally based on that ratio.



Historically Weighted model. Uses additional data from the past two times that LREM/Macron faced RN/Le Pen to get a additional estimates of the inclinations of those voters whose candidates did not advance. Compared to the previous model, the swing is not longer universal but adjusted.



Additional Round 1 Weighted model. Uses additional data (presented previously by other users) on the change and stability in coalitions between past contests and round 1 of 2022 to get further estimates of where second round loyalties might lie. Essentially, this model uses the polled preferences of voters for the second round and then adds on weights in reaction to swing. For example, the areas where Melenchon pulled large numbers of voters from Macron in 2017 - mainly urban areas - are treated differently from those where his coalition remained similar.



This matters mainly in regards to the Commune model. Communes have high MOE, so don't treat this as a hard prediction. However after incorporating all the previous weights we arrive at a geographic distribution that could be very similar to the final result. We see some geographic polarization, though it's ferocity is exaggerated by the voluntary withdrawal of specific round 1 voters from the round 2 electorate, expanding margins of victory that may have been closer when there were more voters in the electoral pool.

[rob in cal]

Do we have the class/income support levels for the first round vote? I'd be intrested in seeing it in the three political camps of right center and left.

[Hash]

I've finished my candidate maps by constituency (not doing the two Trots because that's statistical noise)

Macron:


I'll soon do a map comparing his 2017 vote to his 2022 vote to reveal the expected patterns, but it's already obvious that he has a more traditional centre-right map than in 2017 - quite obvious in the western Parisian bassin and the inner west (40.2% in Cholet's constituency in Maine-et-Loire, which was solidly right-wing in the increasingly distant past, 41.9% in northeastern Vendée, Philippe de Villiers' old stomping grounds in the bocage, 37.7% in the Vitré constituency in Ille-et-Vilaine which was the most right-wing seat in Brittany not too long ago). His best constituency with 46.7% in Paris-14th (south of the 16e), followed by 46.6% in Hauts-de-Seine-9th (Boulogne-Billancourt) and 45.9% in Paris-4th (north of 16e and parts of 17e). His centre-right patterns are also quite obvious in the Lyonnais, Haute-Savoie, Gironde, Massif Central (though with poorer results in Haute-Loire, Lozère, Corrèze and Creuse). His map is also basically a map of which parts of France are doing well or are more optimistic, or 'France Triple A' to use a term used in a recent Ifop analysis.

Panzergirl:


With stiff competition from Zemmour along the Mediterranean in the southeast, Panzergirl's map is even more northeast/east focused. The vast majority of her best results are concentrated in this northeast quadrant in the Pas-de-Calais, Aisne, Somme, Nord, Marne, Haute-Marne etc.. Amusingly, her own seat (Pas-de-Calais-11th), where she won 45.2%, isn't her best constituency - that 'honour' goes to Pas-de-Calais-10th  (Bruay-la-Buissière, which has a RN mayor, councillors and deputy) with 47.8% followed by 46.2% in Pas-de-Calais-12th, held by RN deputy Bruno Bilde. Her weakness in nearly every major metropolitan centre of importance, even those in the northeast quadrant where she is strongest, is obvious. I'll have more data to share later on the Le Pen vote in relation to major metropolitan centres.

Mélenchon:


As we've discussed before, Mélenchon's 2022 map is strikingly a very urban-focused map - not much in common with the 'radical left' map (or old Communist map) that he still kind of had the influences of in 2012 and 2017. Nearly all but a handful of his 120 or so best constituencies are in urban areas (either cities or inner suburbs), the only exceptions being the Ariège and the Drôme (3rd constituency specifically). In the details, I find it quite telling that in the Somme, his best constituency (with 24.6%) is the 2nd constituency rather than Ruffin's 1st constituency (22.1%) - simplifying things a lot, the former is the wealthier/middle-class urban seat of Amiens (south and northeast parts) while the 1st constituency is a gerrymandered seat drawn by Marleix in the last redistricting as a leftist vote sink. Mélenchon's support was so strong (and concentrated) in certain urban areas that he won over 50% of the vote (!) - something which no other candidate did in metro France - in no less than 12 constituencies, all in Seine-Saint-Denis (his top 5 seats are all there), Bouches-du-Rhône (including 'his' seat, a leftist vote sink which still works), Hauts-de-Seine, Val-d'Oise and Paris. Those who know about the historic political 'reputations' of certain cities will find it quite striking (bizarre in a sense?) that a 'radical left' candidate does so well in Lyon, Strasbourg, Caen, Rouen, Bordeaux etc. On the other hand, Mélenchon's results keep getting worse and worse in old left-wing working-class/industrial basins - he did face PCF competition this time but even that shouldn't be overstated too much.

Jumping to the 'losers', we begin with Pécresse:


This map does a good job at showing that her support is fairly evenly concentrated at low levels throughout the country (many in a range of 3.3%-5%). The map doesn't do that great of a job at showing that Pécresse's vote did spike in a few places over 8%, even 10% - Corrèze, Cantal's 2nd constituency and traditional right-wing strongholds in Yvelines, Paris and Hauts-de-Seine (her best result was 14.2% in Paris-14th... but that's obviously a pathetic result for the right there, given that Fillon still got 57% there in 2017). With the exception of the usual old wealthy right-wing spots, she's quite weak in urban areas but a bit stronger in some, though by no means all, more rural regions - a reflection of her old retiree electorate.

Jadot:


Not an unusual map for the Greens, with their usual strongholds and dead zones, although obviously at lower levels of support than in 2019. Jadot broke 10% in three constituencies, two in Paris and one in Nantes.

Lassalle:


As in 2017, Lassalle has a favourite son effect radiating out of his constituency, where he won 20.8% and finished in second, with other results over 10% in Pyrénées-Atlantiques, Hautes-Pyrénées, Landes, Haute-Garonne, Lozère and Corsica. His vote is both heavily concentrated in rural areas and in the southeast, and there is a strong correlation with the Occitan language, except along the Mediterranean and in Provence.

Roussel:


With Roussel, we find a more traditional Communist map - with the very notable absence of most old PCF strongholds in urban areas, which is quite obvious in Seine-Saint-Denis but also in Marseille and suburban Lyon. He won by far his best result in his constituency, Nord-20th (12.4%), an old Communist stronghold in the Nord's industrial and coal mining basin, and his four other top results were also in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais mining basin. He also did 'well' in old rural communist heartlands like the Allier, Limousin, Dordogne as well as smaller old industrial regions where the PCF did well (Gard's mining area, parts of the Somme and Seine-Maritime etc.). On the other hand, it's quite striking how poorly he did in urban areas, particularly in the Paris region: Roussel's support was concentrated (as Al's nice maps at the commune level in the Petite Couronne show very well) in the last remaining Red Belt suburbs which have PCF mayors. Obviously Mélenchon took a lot of the left-wing vote, and the PCF federation in the 93 was the only one which was in favour of the party supporting Mélenchon and there was likely an 'ethnic factor' in these places too: Mélenchon won the immigrant vote in a landslide, and Roussel didn't do well there (neither did Jadot or Hidalgo).

NDA:


A pretty rural and eastern map for Dupont-Aignan (at fairly low levels everywhere: even in his own seat, Essonne-8th, he got just 6.4%) with strong results, outside of his favourite son vote, in Alsace, Moselle and Haute-Savoie.

Hidalgo:


Behold Hidalgo's pathetic map! She didn't even break 5% anywhere, coming closest with 4.6% in Landes-3rd, an old PS stronghold. Some slightly less pathetic results in the old PS strongholds in the southwest and Limousin, as well as in Brittany. Compared to results elsewhere, she didn't do too poorly in Paris (still a very bad result for the place she's mayor of) but did extremely poorly basically everywhere else in IDF and the broader Parisian basin. Obviously Mélenchon cannibalized a huge chunk of the leftist vote in urban areas, but perhaps Hidalgo as the city-centre mayor was a particularly poor fit, even for the left, outside of Paris but within proximity of it? Also, congratulations to the dying PS for doing just as 'well' (poorly) in rural Alsace than in Marseille and the NPDC mining basin. Good job guys.

[parochial boy]

Do we have the class/income support levels for the first round vote? I'd be intrested in seeing it in the three political camps of right center and left.

Somewhat related, but an interesting post that came up on Twitter was this one that was mapping candidates scores by the wealth of the commues. Which has its flaws, but is also a more complete data set than polling is.

https://twitter.com/r_deolm/status/1515376423963344903

Basically, the liberal right is clearly stronger the richer somewhere is. Both the left and nationalist right have Mélenchon and Le Pen doing better the poorer somewhere is, which is partially - but not fully - offset by the reverse being true with Jadot and Zemmour.

I'm a little bit too lazy to pull out numbers but generally polling was suggesting a pretty clear trend that Macron/Pécresse were stronger the richer people were; Mélenchon was stronger with low income but highly educated or urban people and Le Pen was strongest with low education and low income residents. The results by commune completely seem to back this up.

And staying with interesting Twitter stuff. From this thread, here is each score mapped across city centre/banlieue/periphery comparing the Paris metro with different sized provincial metros and non-urban areas. Basically affirming the point Tony has already made but interesting to compare Paris, where Mélenchon was stronger in the banlieues; to the other metro areas where he tended to be stronger in the villes-centres themselves.

[Storr]

In case anyone was unsure who the Kremlin wants to win:

https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1517713474062794756?s=20&t=y5x7dp5...

https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1517714773772750849?s=20&t=y5x7dp5...