Argentina 2023 election

[Lexii, harbinger of chaos and sexual anarchy]

Why is PO running their own list for president instead of competing in the FIT primary?

The real PO is indeed running on the FIT primsry, sharing a ballog with MST, Política Obrera is Ramal and Jorge Altamira's offshoot of the PO after they were expelled or resigned (there are conflicting versions) from PO/FIT

[PSOL]

Why is PO running their own list for president instead of competing in the FIT primary?

The real PO is indeed running on the FIT primsry, sharing a ballog with MST, Política Obrera is Ramal and Jorge Altamira's offshoot of the PO after they were expelled or resigned (there are conflicting versions) from PO/FIT

May you give details on each version?

[Lexii, harbinger of chaos and sexual anarchy]

Why is PO running their own list for president instead of competing in the FIT primary?

The real PO is indeed running on the FIT primsry, sharing a ballog with MST, Política Obrera is Ramal and Jorge Altamira's offshoot of the PO after they were expelled or resigned (there are conflicting versions) from PO/FIT

May you give details on each version?

I stopped paying much attention yo internal FIT disputes before the breakup (and I was only deeply into the the issue for a couple of years in the early-to-mid 2010s, when I was very close to the MST youth) and  most sources are infuriatingly vague, but in recent years Altamira has leaned more towards a pro-Russian left-wing nationalist rhetoric, accusing everyone else of being pro-NATO traitors and stuff like that, and MST, the PO's internal ally was at least on my days a very anti-Putin party even of they've moderated a bit over the years ln this

[PSOL]

The PTS is not pro-Putin at all and they have not warmed up to him from my knowledge. What I do know is that IST split over Ukraine a while back and they get along within the coalition just fine. Oh well, this excuse can’t dampen the success of FIT

[Lexii, harbinger of chaos and sexual anarchy]

The national government's allies are having yet another weak performance in one of their stronghold provinces, this time in San Juan, which has been ran by the peronistas José Luis Gioja and later by Sergio Uñac since 2003, who got around 55% of the votes in recent elections

The province doesn't have PASO primaries, but they do use a system close to the so-called Ley de Lemas, where the biggest sub-lema, or list, within a coalition gets all of the coalition's votes, in a sort of single round primary so to speak

Rubén Uñac ran in the PJ "primary" as a stand-in for his brother Sergio, the incumbent governor,, who has been barred from running by the Supreme Court, against Gioja. The opposition ran with Marcelo Orrego (national congressman and former mayor of San Juan) of the local opposition peronist Producción y Trabajo party, which has led the anti Gioja/Uñac block in gubernatorial elections for 20 years, either under Orrego or Roberto Basualdo
With 92.5% of the votes counted:
Unidos por San Juan (JxC): 50.96%
 -Marcelo Orrego: 49.19 (PyT)
San Juan para Todos: 44.45%
 -J.L. Gioja: 27.42%
 -Rubén Uñac: 17.03%

[Ⓐnarchy in the ☭☭☭P!]

The national government's allies are having yet another weak performance in one of their stronghold provinces, this time in San Juan, which has been ran by the peronistas José Luis Gioja and later by Sergio Uñac since 2003, who got around 55% of the votes in recent elections

The province doesn't have PASO primaries, but they do use a system close to the so-called Ley de Lemas, where the biggest sub-lema, or list, within a coalition gets all of the coalition's votes, in a sort of single round primary so to speak

Rubén Uñac ran in the PJ "primary" as a stand-in for his brother Sergio, the incumbent governor,, who has been barred from running by the Supreme Court, against Gioja. The opposition ran with Marcelo Orrego (national congressman and former mayor of San Juan) of the local opposition peronist Producción y Trabajo party, which has led the anti Gioja/Uñac block in gubernatorial elections for 20 years, either under Orrego or Roberto Basualdo
With 92.5% of the votes counted:
Unidos por San Juan (JxC): 50.96%
 -Marcelo Orrego: 49.19 (PyT)
San Juan para Todos: 44.45%
 -J.L. Gioja: 27.42%
 -Rubén Uñac: 17.03%

Separating the legislative and local elections from the gubernatorial election turned out to have an enormous impact. One core strength of the provincial Peronist parties is that local "neighbourhood parties" and leaders will compete for lower positions and thereby drive turnout, but this time around those positions were won a month ago. Without that the key local kingpins couldn't be bothered to put in the same amount of effort winning the top of the ticket. Naturally a very bad sign for the government and a good one for the opposition, though Orrego will have a tough time since the legislature is overwhelmingly against him.

[Ⓐnarchy in the ☭☭☭P!]

The Presidential election in 2023 will consist of up to three rounds.

The first is the PASO (Primarias, Abiertas, Simultáneas y Obligatorias), a kind of giant pre-election primary held on August 13th, two months before the "real" first round. For the parties with internal competition the PASO is quite important, because it determines the final candidate list order and Presidential tickets. For those whose candidates are resolved it's basically just a giant poll, though they need at least 1.5% of the vote to qualify for the general election.

The PASO is followed by the first round on October 22nd, where all qualifying fronts and parties  can compete. If any formula wins over 45% of the vote, or if they win over 40% of the vote with a difference of 10% or more over the next highest candidate (eg. 43.00% Candidate 1, 33.00% Candidate 2), then they win outright. Otherwise, a runoff occurs between the top two forces to determine the Presidency. Voting is technically mandatory for voters above the age of 18, though the penalty for abstentation is low. A Kirchner era law also granted the voluntary right to vote for voters aged 16 or 17, resulting in a typical turnout around 80%.

Between the PASO and the potential second round a lot of votes can move from one candidate to another, so even candidates with zero possibility of victory can hold some sway by making their votes essential to the victory of one side or the other. With that in mind, I'll start by summarizing the weakest contenders (excluding the ones that won't get past the PASO) and work my way up.

THE CANDIDATES:

Hacemos por Nuestro País

Juan Schiaretti (former governor of Córdoba) and Florencio Randazzo (Peronist gadfly) announced that they would be running together as the obligatory representatives of Federal Peronism. On the surface there are a few factors that look favourable: Fernández and Kirchner are wildly unpopular, many interior governors and officials are reportedly holding out for a Moderate Hero and Schiaretti is at least popular enough to have once again secured victory in his home province.

But the problem is that non-core Federal Peronist support in the past came from two directions: "moderate" voters who found the two major fronts too extreme and "angry" voters who were more broadly opposed to the system. The former have largely migrated over to Juntos while the latter are more likely to go with the libertarians or Leftists over Federal Peronism, leaving slim pickings outside of a few idiosyncratic provinces. They aren't exactly the strongest candidates either; Schiarreti's allies only narrowly held on in Córdoba while Randazzo barely passed the threshold to win a deputy position under the most favourable circumstances. To add insult to injury they can't even count on the apparatus Lavagna used in 2019 because many of the parties involved have since jumped ship to join Milei.

OBJECTIVE: Survive.

BEST CASE SCENARIO: A highly chaotic campaign with weakness from everyone but especially Massa letting them do about as well as Lavagna did last time, maybe slightly better. Victory in Córdoba

WORST CASE SCENARIO: Falling below FIT, total political irrelevancy

Frente de Izquierda y de Trabajadores - Unidad

After a strong performance in 2021 the leading non-Peronist Leftist front is (theoretically) in a position to make further gains at the expense of the governing Peronists. Since that election they've lead countless protests, forcing the government to react in kind and demonstrating their influence. However, while the Left possesses a decent floor and outsized influence thanks to their (relatively) strong organization, they also have demonstrated little ability to break through their ceiling. The Left is dominant among certain unions and public university students but totally incapable of winning support from the bulk of society. The one exception was in Jujuy, where they achieved a surprisingly good result, but one they've demonstrated zero capability of replicating anywhere else. In this election it seems like despite the weakness of their rivals they won't have an easy time capitalizing, because the Peronists  still dominate the "leftist" lane and now Milei is the major choice for protest voters.

Nevertheless, I have to rate them above the Federal Peronists because they seem to have at least some forward momentum from their good result in Jujuy. If all that happens plus Peronism collapses in the face of a right wing victory then they might be in a position to seriously capitalize in 2027.

OBJECTIVE: Win more legislative seats, increase vote share to at least 5% and try to create a foundation to expand on in the coming elections.

BEST CASE SCENARIO: Kirchnerism collapses, the performance in Jujuy is replicated elsewhere gaining the Left several deputies plus a Senator with a national result of nearly 10%

WORST CASE SCENARIO: A result similar to 2019.

Unidos por la Patria

After some internal politicking the governing coalition has settled on a single major candidate Economic "Superminister" Sergio Massa.

I'll start with the positives. Unlike nearly everyone else in government, Massa is actually trying to do his job rather than getting in fights with other officials and even managed to temporarily delay the debt crisis triggered by the Guzmán-Batakis regime. He doesn't pick fights with his creditors and (at least until recently) was able to project enough of an image of stability to prevent a hyperinflationary deathspiral. Of all the prospective "major candidates" in the coalition he has the highest ceiling and doesn't have quite as many haters as Cristina. For a time some even suggested that he could lower inflation and win just enough support to become President after all.

But mere competency isn't enough. While Massa's pragmatism has helped in cultivating foreign investors and have left him a better reputation than the rest of the government, he's also widely distrusted by the PASO voters for his mercenary nature. Overcoming this hurdle relied on a sudden improvement in Argentine economic fortunes to create an imagine of a competent manager who avoids political bickering. When instead annual inflation broke triple digits, the blue dollar broke 400 pesos and government bonds resumed their collapse in value that possibility was firmly closed. The best Massa can hope for is a dignified defeat, which to be fair is better than Scioli and Wado running separately would have managed. He doesn't stand to benefit much from interround transfers so he needs a strong performance early to hang on.

Oh, and Juan Grabois is running too as a vacuum for all the left-Kirchnerist types who have too much self respect to campaign for the guy they were calling a neoliberal traitor puppet of Washington just a few years ago, but not enough to vote outside of the Official Peronist Front. He doesn't realistically have any shot at victory but if he really catches on he could do just well enough to prevent Massa from winning the PASO. This would be a serious problem regardless of who he lost to: a loss to either JxC candidate would presage a crushing first round defeat, while a defeat to Milei would be a sign of a third place finish.

Also by a weird coincidence Grabois and Milei are the only pro-life candidates.

OBJECTIVE: Win PASO convincingly (at least 30%), force runoff, lose with dignity (at least 38%)

BEST CASE SCENARIO: Juntos and Milei split the vote almost evenly, the Peronist candidate manages a respectable first round win (I struggle to see them getting any better than 36% even if the stars align) and an acceptably close second round loss, leaving them in a decent position to mount a comeback in 2027.

WORST CASE SCENARIO: A crushing third place defeat with major legislative losses in the interior followed by the coalition blowing up in a storm of infighting. Getting completely discredited and squeezed out of relevancy like the post-DLR Radicals or the Brazillian PSDB.

Juntos por el Cambio

As the undeniable winners of the 2021 legislative elections and composing the broadest and oldest opposition to the government, by conventional thinking Juntos should be well positioned for an easy victory, even in the first round. Horacio Larreta seemed unstoppable: with a moderate platform, overwhelming support from all Argentine bigshots and control over the City of Buenos Aires, the second richest and most powerful subnational entity in the country, it went, he would easily win the PASO and then crush his opposition in the second round. Yet over time cracks started to form in this unstoppable coalition. The Radicals (among others) started posturing to get better placements on the lists. The hawks constantly push to cooperate with Milei even as their "allies" denounced him as Hitler. Worst of all, Larreta's personal weaknesses started to become apparent: while his support from officials and businessmen is overwhelming, his support from actual regular people is far lower. His organization is unmatched but his charisma is nonexistent. The public mood also shifted rapidly away from the conciliatory rhetoric popular during the pandemic, forcing him to change his messaging and to fight on uncomfortable ground. Recent open disputes with Macri have also shattered his aura of inevitability.

Initially, Larreta's mayorship was a huge strength because it was contrasted against the disastrous state of the conurbana. But over time it's become an albatross: every time a street is blocked by piqueteros, or someone gets shot in Villa Soldati, or the garbage pickup is late, it gets hanged on the neck of Larreta. His advisors seem to have no idea how to respond to the current situation, resulting in a candidate flailing wildly both tonally and ideologically, someone who tries to win over everyone and instead wins nobody. His list is a perfect illustration of this issue: his first senate seat in Buenos Aires is going to Jose Luis Espert, Milei's former partner while the second is going to pro-life activist Cynthia Hotton, both of whom ran against Juntos in 2021. There are people of basically every ideological background which raises the obvious questions of how they would come together to govern if Larreta wins, or why they'd bother to stick around if he lost.

As a result, the star of the primary alternative to Larreta, former Security Minister Patricia "Pato" Bullrich, has risen. Rising public anger has broadly favoured her hardline positions against the government and the recent rise in crime has made her mano dura policies more palatable than ever before. Since the legislative elections her stature has definitively risen from "token hawk protest candidate" to a serious contender for the nomination. Milei's strength has also given rise to the argument that Bullrich is the stronger candidate, since she's more likely to appeal to his voters in the event of a runoff. On the flipside, in the event she ends up in a runoff against Milei the math changes completely; her ultimate victory would rely on winning over Peronist hardliners who absolutely despise her for her tenure under Macri against someone she's scrupulously avoided directly criticizing for the entire campaign. It would be maybe the most chaotic plausible outcome and yet as things stand still can't be ruled out. On the other hand, Bullrich up to this point has also generally evaded heavy attacks by appearing as the lesser candidate until recently, raising questions as to how well her support will hold up under pressure. Her lists are also somewhat lacking, and she drew the short straw vis-a-vis Larreta when it comes to provincial support (for example, Santilli in Buenos Aires is far stronger than Grindetti). Her lack of an endorsement from Macri is also a weak point from a candidate who needs every hawk on deck to overcome Larreta's institutional advantages, particularly in the interior where he cemented a strategic alliance with the Radical governor of Jujuy Gerardo Morales.

Perhaps most fundamentally of all, JxC was founded as a coalition designed to defeat Kirchnerism at any cost, but now that Kirchnerism is on the verge of defeat the alliance doesn't have a clear reason to exist. At the moment they're hoping Milei falls off hard in the PASO and looks more like a spoiler than a serious contender. If he receives a decent result in the PASO, let alone actually makes the runoff, it'll be hard to craft a coherent message between those who consider him an ally and those who think he's worse than Cristina.  Nevertheless, so long as whoever wins picks up most of the votes of whoever loses they should be the overwhelming favourite in the subsequent rounds.

OBJECTIVE: Avoid bitter infighting, win the most votes by space (at least 32% between both candidates) and knock Massa or Milei down to third in the PASO. After uniting behind the winner (who ideally wins convincingly and not by a razor thin margin) aim to win the first round and avoid a runoff, else win the runoff overwhelmingly (over 60%)

BEST CASE SCENARIO: Larreta or Bullrich win the PASO decisively (either winning outright would be a sign of a 1st round win), the loser falls in line and then Juntos wins in the first round, ideally with Milei doing just well enough to bring in a bunch of deputies to push through their economic agenda but not well enough to break the bipartisan system

WORST CASE SCENARIO: An acrimonious PASO where Larreta wins narrowly, Bullrich voters defect to Milei in significant numbers, leaving them out of the runoff.

La Libertad Avanza

Which brings us to the last major candidate, TV economist turned deputy Javier Milei. When he first announced his candidacy nearly everyone thought he'd burn out or, at best, get a 2015 Massa-like result that left him as kingmaker, but not a serious contender. His flaws were obvious: no national apparatus, extreme unpalatable views he shared without reservation and a giant ego that left him with few allies. Yet the impressive turnout created by his campaign stops in Patagonia, an idiosyncratic and sparsely populated region where even the major coalitions struggle to bring out support, combined with steadily rising poll numbers caused some to reconsider whether he might be able to displace one of the major coalitions and reach the runoff. Even Macri has suggested that Kirchnerism could lose its position in the runoff, an unimaginable situation not long ago.

I'm working on a whole post about the wacky alliance Milei is creating so I won't go into it too much now but while some of his local affiliates are dubious he's nevertheless managed to recruit tens of thousands of poll watchers and has representatives in every province (except Santa Cruz). Even open support for organ selling only served as a speed bump to his growth. He's the only candidate who can show up and attract a crowd of supporters in any neighbourhood, from the upscale streets of Recoleta to the most impoverished villas of the suburbs. Between the rapidly deteriorating economic situation, the infighting of the opposition and global populist headwinds Milei stands as the best positioned individual candidate. That's not to say LLA is the best positioned coalition, though; Bullrich and Larreta combined are stronger than Milei. They could win the first round outright, an unimaginable result for Milei, and as long as they come out of the PASO united they'll be the clear favourites against anyone in the second round. But of course it isn't clear that the votes of the loser will all go with the winner in the first round, and even a small loss between rounds could leave them out of the runoff entirely.

While Milei's opponents aren't a huge threat he nevertheless has several obstacles in the way of victory. One is his previously mentioned tendency to blurt out what he thinks regardless of popularity or practicality and another is the menace of all independent Argentine politicians: the political entrepreneurs. As soon as it became clear that he was going to try to mount a presidential run outside the major parties every politically savvy small time crook got to work trying to legally register their local Libertarian Party or branch of "La Libertad Avanza" before Milei could and then try to extort him for positions on his list. While these attempts have mostly failed they've had the side effect of producing a parade of municipal and provincial failures that lazy journalists ascribed to Milei himself (plus a few legitimate failures, like Bussi in Tucumán).

Another caveat is that his initial growth at least partially came because everyone thought a strong Milei was good for them: Larreta because he takes Bullrich's votes, Bullrich because his deputies would back her agenda and Massa because he takes opposition votes. When it began to dawn on his opponents that he could actually win their tone changed dramatically and the shots started to fly. While his pro-market rhetoric was initially welcomed by the so-called "Circulo Rojo" of Argentina's top businessmen and industrialists, his plan to eliminate public works and to unilaterally remove trade barriers represents a serious threat to their very existence. He previously received a relatively warm reception from Argentine media thanks to the ratings he generated but now they've switched to doing everything in their power to destroy him before the PASO. If he's to make it with his support intact he'll have to demonstrate that his growth is as durable as that of Trump or Bolsonaro and not a pure creation of the "hegemonic media" as his critics claim.

OBJECTIVES: Get around 25% to win the PASO (2nd behind Massa is acceptable if the difference is small and Bullrich loses), at least 30% in the first round to make the runoff and then aim to pick up enough orphaned votes to win the runoff.

BEST CASE SCENARIO: Infighting within the major coalitions pushes the undecided his way at the last minute, Milei wins the presidency plus dozens of deputies and several senators, maybe even a governorship.

WORST CASE SCENARIO: Milei's support is punctured and he ends up like the UceDé, a junior partner to hawks like Macri and Bullrich.

I'll cover the legislative elections after the primaries.

EDIT 07/07: minor formatting fixes

[Red Velvet]

Looking like both FdT (former, they apparently changed names?) and JxC could finish with around 40%, going to a runoff where JxC will easily win by getting the Milei vote tbh.

https://twitter.com/AmericaElige/status/1679270932278398976
It’s currently a trend of Milei falling down in the polls, thank god. I believe that even if Argentina is currently more susceptible to stuff like rise of extremism because of economic hardships, as a country it’s less susceptible to outsiders. You either have the Peronists or the main opposition to Peronists.

But also, the far-right rise also seems to have cooled down somewhat, at least in LatAm. Europe is a different thing.

Massa finishing above 40%, maybe even close to 45% in a runoff would be a victory in my eyes considering everyone’s early expectations. 21% null or undecided will probably drop as the elections nears though.

[PSOL]

Ok, I am dooming for FIT

[Lexii, harbinger of chaos and sexual anarchy]

As everyone was already expecting, the incumbent Santa Fe PJ couldn't get anywhere close to their 2019 results and got an even worse result than what the polls were giving them on the province's which is the country's third largest with a population of 3.5M) local elections, including the gubernatorial election

As such, the JxC primary became the real election so to speak, with Larreta backing the winner Maxi Pullaro, an old ally of the Socialist former governor Lifschitz and Bullrich throwing her support behind national senator Carolina Losada (both of them being pretty weak candates, tbh), with the formerly ruling Socialist Party being completely absent from the national conversation

98.7% of the votes counted
Unidos para cambiar SF (JxC): 63.1%
 -Maxi Pullaro (UCR): 32.6
 -Carolina Losada (UCR): 21.6
 -Mónica Fein (PS): 8.9
Juntos Avancemos (PJ/UxP): 27.9%
 -Marcelo Lewandowski: 17.9
 -3 other candidates for the rest of that 10%, with none getting over 4.2%
Edelvino Bodoira (Viva La Libertad, unofficially aligned with Milei): 3%
Frente de Izquierda: 2.7% (split between two candidates)
Eduardo Maradona (CC-ARI): 2%


Unless something truly extraordinary happens between now and Sept. 10, Pullaro is the new governor of Santa Fe

[Ⓐnarchy in the ☭☭☭P!]

The pre-PASO polling is all over the place so I'll hold back on a major update for now.

So far as provincial elections go, Chubut seems to be trending favourably for Juntos thanks to a combination of perceived momentum and minimal challenge from Treffinger (a result of prioritizing the national election where he leads the deputy list). Nevertheless it would take an enormous swing to actually flip the province outright considering that CST has the full backing of the national Peronists. Likely CST -> Tilt CST

In other news, apparently Bukele's PR machine has even reached Argentina, where Cuneo's campaign slogan is literally "just like Bukele"

Spoiler alert! Click Show to show the content.

Show

https://twitter.com/BowTiedMara/status/1680213088274874370

Milei, meanwhile, sent his top guys on a "diplomatic mission" to El Salvador

Spoiler alert! Click Show to show the content.

Show

https://twitter.com/TejidoSocialSv/status/1656117590761119750

[Bilardista]

The pre-PASO polling is all over the place so I'll hold back on a major update for now.

So far as provincial elections go, Chubut seems to be trending favourably for Juntos thanks to a combination of perceived momentum and minimal challenge from Treffinger (a result of prioritizing the national election where he leads the deputy list). Nevertheless it would take an enormous swing to actually flip the province outright considering that CST has the full backing of the national Peronists. Likely CST -> Tilt CST

What's CST?

[Lexii, harbinger of chaos and sexual anarchy]

The pre-PASO polling is all over the place so I'll hold back on a major update for now.

So far as provincial elections go, Chubut seems to be trending favourably for Juntos thanks to a combination of perceived momentum and minimal challenge from Treffinger (a result of prioritizing the national election where he leads the deputy list). Nevertheless it would take an enormous swing to actually flip the province outright considering that CST has the full backing of the national Peronists. Likely CST -> Tilt CST

What's CST?

Chubut Somos Todos, the province's PJ split led by former and current governors Das Neves and Arcioni, a pretty generic independent peronista group

[Bilardista]

The pre-PASO polling is all over the place so I'll hold back on a major update for now.

So far as provincial elections go, Chubut seems to be trending favourably for Juntos thanks to a combination of perceived momentum and minimal challenge from Treffinger (a result of prioritizing the national election where he leads the deputy list). Nevertheless it would take an enormous swing to actually flip the province outright considering that CST has the full backing of the national Peronists. Likely CST -> Tilt CST

What's CST?

Chubut Somos Todos, the province's PJ split led by former and current governors Das Neves and Arcioni, a pretty generic independent peronista group

Right, i remember now. They changed their name to "Chubut al frente" after Das Neves died in 2017 and this year they runited with the PJ to form "Arriba Chubut". With Das Neves gone the division didn't have much reason to continue and Arcioni being friends with Massa helped reconcile the two factions.

[jman123]

Who has the momentum and advantage in the PRO PASO with Horacio Rodriguez Larreta and Patricia Bullrich?

[Senator Incitatus]

Who has the momentum and advantage in the PRO PASO with Horacio Rodriguez Larreta and Patricia Bullrich?

Coverage I've seen gives the edge to Bullrich, but I'm not literate enough in the biases of Argentine media to know whether I'm looking at reliable sources. She leads in most of the July polls (after trailing most June polls by a wide margin) and seems likelier to pick up votes from Millei (both strategic votes in the primary and in an eventual run-off with Massa); I have seen electability cited as a factor in her favor.

[H.E. VOLODYMYR ZELENKSYY]

Who has the momentum and advantage in the PRO PASO with Horacio Rodriguez Larreta and Patricia Bullrich?

Coverage I've seen gives the edge to Bullrich, but I'm not literate enough in the biases of Argentine media to know whether I'm looking at reliable sources. She leads in most of the July polls (after trailing most June polls by a wide margin) and seems likelier to pick up votes from Millei (both strategic votes in the primary and in an eventual run-off with Massa); I have seen electability cited as a factor in her favor.

Yeah, the vibes I’ve seen have been that Larreta has heretofore been coasting on being the JxC establishment candidate and that his lack of charisma or policy or coherence is starting to catch up to him. Bullrich excites the base but may turn off some moderate voters (though certainly not enough to lose in this environment), Larreta excites nobody.

[Ⓐnarchy in the ☭☭☭P!]

CHUBUT (39% counted):

JUNTOS POR EL CAMBIO: 37%
ARRIBA CHUBUT: 31%
POR LA LIBERTAD INDEPENDIENTE CHUBUTENSE: 15%
BLANK: 10%
FIT-U: 5%

The outstanding vote is definitely going to narrow the margin but even if the government somehow pulled off a razor thin victory it would represent a calamitous collapse for Peronism in Chubut. Since the dawn of Kirchnerism in 2007 the combined forces of Chubut Somos Todos and the Justicialistas have won over 75% of the vote in every election. A grim sign for Massa.

Also an unexpectedly strong result for Treffinger despite apparent polarization.

Who has the momentum and advantage in the PRO PASO with Horacio Rodriguez Larreta and Patricia Bullrich?

The recent polling definitely favours Bullrich, but she also ticks almost every box for being the sort of candidate that's likely to be overestimated by polls. I strongly suspect Larreta is going to do measurably better vis-a-vis Bullrich than the polls predict.

[Lexii, harbinger of chaos and sexual anarchy]

With 80% counted, JxC's Ignacio Torres is leading the election by a very small margin

Ignacio Torres (Juntos por el Cambio): 35.7%
Juan Pablo Luque (Frente Arriba Chubut): 33.79%
César Treffinger (PLICH) 13.38%
Emilse Saavedra (FIT): 4.37%
Oscar Carlos Petersen (GEN): 2.28%

[PSOL]

FIT seems to be overperforming their usual support at around 3% for regional elections we have seen so far. Any reason as to why?

[Lexii, harbinger of chaos and sexual anarchy]

FIT seems to be overperforming their usual support at around 3% for regional elections we have seen so far. Any reason as to why?

They actually had a worse performance than in 2019 in most provinces so far, while only barely making improvements in a few others

The only elections where they had significantly better results than last time was in Jujuy, where did really grow, going from 3% to 13% (largely due to the self-destruction of the local PJ), La Pampa, where they went from 0.75% to 1.39%, and in TDF where they hadn't even ran

With 96.7% counted, Ignacio Torres is winning in Chubut by a margin of slightly under 2 points  (ie 6,000 votes)

[Ⓐnarchy in the ☭☭☭P!]

For elections up to this point the legislative results of 2021 have had very little correlation with the provincial results but this time there's an almost uncanny resemblance.

In 2021, JxC won 111,000 votes, FdT and CST combined won 112,000 votes, PICh won 44,000 votes and FIT-U won 25,000 votes.

With 98% counted JxC has 114,000, AC has 109,000, PLICh 43,000 and FIT-U 14,000.

My understanding is that the 2021 results were in large part driven by a controversy over the development of a megamine in the province. Argentine Patagonia is extremely dry thanks to the Andes and Chubut is the driest province of them all, suffering from intermittent water shortages despite being a relatively wealthy province. Mining is fairly water intensive and thus threatens to strain the limited supply out of the Chubut River, so the issue provoked a pretty serious backlash.

Despite this, both Peronist fronts were initially in favour of the mine, and Juntos (who tend to receive support from the mining industry) was as well. This left the hardline anti-mine vote to be monopolized by the Left, who naturally opposed it from the start, and PICh, a previously irrelevant neighbourhood party that became the "anti-megamine but not Communist" party by default. Arcioni eventually realized that the issue was wildly unpopular and was costing his front votes and backtracked but the two parties still won nearly 25% between them, the highest percentage going to "outsiders" of any province.

It would seem Treffinger pivoting to become Milei's local representative worked out better for his front than whatever the Left did.

[Peeperkorn]

FIT seems to be overperforming their usual support at around 3% for regional elections we have seen so far. Any reason as to why?

It's what you want to see, that could be a reason. It's not actually happening though.

[Estrella]

I regret to tell you that Guillermo Moreno is at it again.

https://twitter.com/therealbuni/status/1685005425266049025

Catchiness of the Peronist March + general insanity of Vamos Menem. 10/10.

[H.E. VOLODYMYR ZELENKSYY]

I regret to tell you that Guillermo Moreno is at it again.

https://twitter.com/therealbuni/status/1685005425266049025

Catchiness of the Peronist March + general insanity of Vamos Menem. 10/10.

Love the shot that just says DOCTRINA. Truly making Juan and Evita proud.