Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[Yoda]

https://twitter.com/AFP/status/1498196443865452545

Mind that air superiority is not air supremacy.

CNN is reporting it as supremacy.

Ukraine did just receive 6 mig-29's from Poland yesterday (supposedly with pilots as well) so hopefully this is just temporary supremacy until these jets start hunting. The Ghost of Kyiv was flying the same jet so hopefully these pilots are just as good and make a difference.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Russia moment



^{Stolen from r/noncredibledefense}

What do the Zs mean again? I think this one is my favorite meme so far.

Z means Russian vehicles. O means Ukrainian vehicles. The Russians and Ukrainians have the same vehicles and uniforms, so there exists a need to distinguish between the two.

Incorrect. Here's the National Guard of Ukraine's explanation for these markings. Ukrainian vehicles are not marked.
https://twitter.com/ng_ukraine/status/1497905325499981825

Z - the eastern forces of the Russian federation (Kharkiv/Sumy axis)
Z squared - forces from the Crimea (Crimea/Kherson axis)
O - forces from Belarus (Kiev axis)
V - Marines
X - Chechens
A - Special Forces (SOBR, ALPHA, SSO)

Ah. Thanks for correcting me.
I was recollecting from when the topic last came up in the thread.
Good to see that's cleared up now.

[BlueSwan]

I just read that Belarusian military is expected to join the fight (on Russia's side) if "peace talks" go badly today. Now I consider that a threat.

Terrible.

To me it is high time for NATO to react properly and kick the russians out of Ukraine.

[Logical]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-10

Key Takeaways February 27

• Russian President Vladimir Putin put Russia’s nuclear and strategic missile forces, described as “deterrence forces,” on their highest alert status in response to “aggressive statements in the West” on February 27.
• Russian forces likely conducted an operational pause on the Kyiv axis on February 26-27 to deploy additional supplies and forces forward. Russian forces will likely resume offensive operations against Kyiv in the next 24 hours.
• Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on their current broad front of advance between Chernihiv and Kharkiv. Ukrainian forces continue to delay and inflict losses on the Russian advance but will likely not be able to halt further advances if the Kremlin commits additional reserves.
• Russian forces entered the city of Kharkiv for the first time on February 27 but remain unlikely to take the city without the use of heavier firepower.
• Russian forces have encircled Mariupol from the west and began initial assaults on the city. Russian forces have not made any major territorial gains from the east in Donbas after four days of fighting. Russian forces likely intend to pin Ukrainian forces in place on the line of contact to enable Russian forces breaking out of Crimea to isolate them.
  
• Russian forces continued to advance north from Crimea towards Zaprozhia and, in conjunction with Russian advances on Mariupol, threaten to isolate Ukrainian forces on the line of contact in Donbas if they do not withdraw.
  
• Russian forces failed to seize Kherson after Ukrainian counterattacks reclaimed it on February 26. An unknown concentration of Russian forces remains on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River and threatens Mikolayiv, however.
• Russian successes in southern Ukraine are the most dangerous and threaten to unhinge Ukraine’s successful defenses and rearguard actions to the north and northeast.
  
• The Belarusian government is setting information and legal conditions to justify a Belarusian offensive against Ukraine and the imminent deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus as of February 27.
• US and allied sanctions against Russian banking will likely crush Russian foreign currency reserves, depleting the value of the ruble and risking Russian hyperinflation.
• The European Union announced direct military aid to Ukraine for the first time in EU history on February 27.
• Germany announced a dramatic reorientation of its foreign policy to mitigate the threat that Russia poses to Germany and its allies. Germany will prioritize military spending and energy independence despite short-term economic costs.

[Storr]

I just read that Belarusian military is expected to join the fight (on Russia's side) if "peace talks" go badly today. Now I consider that a threat.

Terrible.

To me it is high time for NATO to react properly and kick the russians out of Ukraine.

I wonder what the Russians are planning to offer at the "peace talks".

[jaichind]

Russia's countermeasures

1) Foreigners banned from selling Russian assets
2) Massive increase of bank rates to 20% to secure the banking system but of course crush credit
3) 80% of foreign earnings has to be traded to the Russian central bank to give them enough foreign currency to deal with the crisis

The RUB which was at 115 has now strengthened to 104.

The key fact right now is Russia is still able to sell energy to the West and get paid for it.  If so they are able to get their hands on enough earnings to service debt and deal with KTLO stuff.  Their internal credit system is going to take a big hit to sustain this with much higher inflation and much higher interest rates.  So far it looks like rerun of late 2014 hit.

[jaichind]

Moscow Stock exchange halted trading.  There are a bunch of US-based Russian ETFs which will be good proxies to the Russian market which will be fun to look at when US markets open.  There is a small LSE-based Russian ETF and it is about half of what it was Friday which turned down a bunch from earlier last week.  A good estimate of Russian equities is that is around 40% of pre-invasion levels and around where it was in 2016.  Of course, once you factor in inflation it is down from 2016 a bunch as well.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

I just read that Belarusian military is expected to join the fight (on Russia's side) if "peace talks" go badly today. Now I consider that a threat.

Terrible.

To me it is high time for NATO to react properly and kick the russians out of Ukraine.

I wonder what the Russians are planning to offer at the "peace talks".

I don't have much hope for these talks. From a purely win-or-lose perspective: Ukraine sees itself as having winds in its sails, but Russia can expect to see the war move in its favor if the conflict lasts longer.
Most major way these really amount to anything is if Ukraine concedes more than it's willing to give up, or  Russia gives up a lot relative to what it can reasonably expect in a long conflict, or both.
Any compromise that could actually work probably has to be have major points of dissatisfaction for both sides.

[jaichind]

One clear Russian workaround for the targeted SWIFT sanctions beyond using the banks they have with limited access to SWIFT as hubs is to use the PRC's CIPS system.  CIPS transactions are significant and around 1/6 the size of SWIFT already.  The main risk then would be the USA might sanction some of the PRC node banks which would be another "nuclear option" that will blow up PRC and USA economies.  So far it seems the Russians are going to avoid this option since I suspect they think the workaround they have will work for now.  They need to preserve their political capital with PRC.

[jaichind]

I don't have much hope for these talks. From a purely win-or-lose perspective: Ukraine sees itself as having winds in its sails, but Russia can expect to see the war move in its favor if the conflict lasts longer.
Most major way these really amount to anything is if Ukraine concedes more than it's willing to give up, or  Russia gives up a lot relative to what it can reasonably expect in a long conflict, or both.
Any compromise that could actually work probably has to be have major points of dissatisfaction for both sides.

I think Ukraine's timing on talks is very good.  It is not at all clear that Russia can survive the current sanctions without a massive economic crisis.  The Russians think they can but they cannot be sure.  It will be more clear in a few weeks if the Russians are right.  So having talks now would benefit Ukraine since that economic threat is out there with a huge downside for Russia.  The fact the Russians are willing to talk also shows they are concerned about how things are working out and are willing to try to get out of this if they can get enough concessions.

[Meclazine for Israel]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-10

Great post.

Russia needs to get in and under both sides and attack from the SW.

That will cut off Ukraine's resupply chances from Poland, and allow the noose starting to form in the South to form 360 deg.

Belarus could simply drive that Western edge straight south and let refugee traffic go to the West, but no traffic goes through to the East.

[jaichind]

Moscow Stock exchange halted trading.  There are a bunch of US-based Russian ETFs which will be good proxies to the Russian market which will be fun to look at when US markets open.  There is a small LSE-based Russian ETF and it is about half of what it was Friday which turned down a bunch from earlier last week.  A good estimate of Russian equities is that is around 40% of pre-invasion levels and around where it was in 2016.  Of course, once you factor in inflation it is down from 2016 a bunch as well.

I actually take back what I said about inflation adjustment.  This LSE-based Russian ETF is actually traded in USD so if the "real" price for this ETF is a bit 2016 levels it is roughly around 2016 levels taking into account USD inflation since 2016.  So the conclusion is for now Russian equities losses are massive but not historically massive.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

I don't have much hope for these talks. From a purely win-or-lose perspective: Ukraine sees itself as having winds in its sails, but Russia can expect to see the war move in its favor if the conflict lasts longer.
Most major way these really amount to anything is if Ukraine concedes more than it's willing to give up, or  Russia gives up a lot relative to what it can reasonably expect in a long conflict, or both.
Any compromise that could actually work probably has to be have major points of dissatisfaction for both sides.

I think Ukraine's timing on talks is very good.  It is not at all clear that Russia can survive the current sanctions without a massive economic crisis.  The Russians think they can but they cannot be sure.  It will be more clear in a few weeks if the Russians are right.  So having talks now would benefit Ukraine since that economic threat is out there with a huge downside for Russia.  The fact the Russians are willing to talk also shows they are concerned about how things are working out and are willing to try to get out of this if they can get enough concessions.

Yes, that's the bright side for the talks, from the Ukrainian POV.
The big question is if this downside for Russia is enough to make them decide to role the dice.
Biggest problem for Russia is that, as you said, they have to wait a few weeks to know if they can weather these economic conditions, and in the event they can't, there is no undo button.
So, does Russia risk it by going ahead, or do they stop and possibly leave chips on the table?
It's up to the Russian leadership to decide.

[jaichind]

Energy prices are up but not as much as it was on Thursday.  I think part of this is the hope that peace talks are ongoing.  If peace talks collapse then the true cost of the sanctions and Russian blowback will become more clear.

[jaichind]

Another problem for Russians.  Rasputitsa is coming up which means by late March the roads will be a lot worse which would be very bad for Russian mechanized forces. Russia has to wind up major operations in Eastern Ukraine in the next 3 weeks.

[Storr]

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1498234139551715329?s=20&t=NtDBr7E...

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1498235126312022016?s=20&t=NtDBr7E...

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Another problem for Russians.  Rasputitsa is coming up which means by late March the roads will be a lot worse which would be very bad for Russian mechanized forces. Russia has to wind up major operations in Eastern Ukraine in the next 3 weeks.

TIL about Rasputitsa.
War is educational!

TIL=today I learned

[Storr]

they have to wait a few weeks to know if they can weather these economic conditions, and in t

I don't have much hope for these talks. From a purely win-or-lose perspective: Ukraine sees itself as having winds in its sails, but Russia can expect to see the war move in its favor if the conflict lasts longer.
Most major way these really amount to anything is if Ukraine concedes more than it's willing to give up, or  Russia gives up a lot relative to what it can reasonably expect in a long conflict, or both.
Any compromise that could actually work probably has to be have major points of dissatisfaction for both sides.

I think Ukraine's timing on talks is very good.  It is not at all clear that Russia can survive the current sanctions without a massive economic crisis.  The Russians think they can but they cannot be sure.  It will be more clear in a few weeks if the Russians are right.  So having talks now would benefit Ukraine since that economic threat is out there with a huge downside for Russia.  The fact the Russians are willing to talk also shows they are concerned about how things are working out and are willing to try to get out of this if they can get enough concessions.

Yes, that's the bright side for the talks, from the Ukrainian POV.
The big question is if this downside for Russia is enough to make them decide to role the dice.
Biggest problem for Russia is that, as you said, he event they can't, there is no undo button.
So, does Russia risk it by going ahead, or do they stop and possibly leave chips on the table?
It's up to the Russian leadership to decide.

This is my worry, and that the talks were a ploy to give Russian/Belarusian forces additional time to prepare for offensive action in the likely outcome that Ukraine doesn't accept the Russian favorable demands.
https://twitter.com/OAlexanderDK/status/1498227013102063628?s=20&t=YMqB00CTx...

[Aurelius]

https://twitter.com/ragipsoylu/status/1498241669166252033

Talks have begun.

https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1498242274756550665

Putin to call cabinet meeting to discuss economic impact of sanctions.

[CumbrianLefty]

Retired Gen. Philip Breedlove on a no-fly zone. He supports it, but finds it unlikely to happen. Breedlove was Supreme Allied Commander Europe 2013-2016.

https://twitter.com/ak_mack/status/1498081883149807621

Wouldn’t an NFZ mean conventional fighting between NATO and Russian forces?
I want to do everything for Ukraine, but the risk of nuclear escalation from that is too great.

I’m open to calling the nuclear bluff.

Bruh:

https://twitter.com/McFaul/status/1498065915665022983

What is the worst he will do, nuke DC? GO ahead Putin, do your worst!

Uhh? Literally start a nuclear holocaust? That he doesn't care about? Because he's going to die soon anyways and no longer gives a you know what about his country anyways.

If he's "going to die soon" and doesn't care about what happens after he's gone he wouldn't be trying so hard to bring Ukraine under Russian control. He dreams of a reunified USSR, not of his country burning in nuclear hell fire. The nuclear threats are a bluff and a sign of weakness; he knows if just a single democratic power got directly, militarily involved Russia would get it's ass kicked.

I agree. Putin may be a psycho, but he's not dumb. There is no scenario with a nuclear holocaust in which Russia is spared.  Even Trump wasn't that dumb to nuke another country during the standoffs with North Korea or Iran, because he himself would be dead in a day.

Didn't he reportedly propose nukes on at least one occasion?

(as did Nixon during the 1973 Middle East crisis, if you believe some accounts)

[Middle-aged Europe]

https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1498242274756550665

Putin to call cabinet meeting to discuss economic impact of sanctions.

Well, at least he's distracted from the war planning sessions now.

[Torrain]

Another problem for Russians.  Rasputitsa is coming up which means by late March the roads will be a lot worse which would be very bad for Russian mechanized forces. Russia has to wind up major operations in Eastern Ukraine in the next 3 weeks.

The Economist ran an article on rasputitsa back in the first week of February, which concluded that the mud would raise the difficulty of Russian advancement, but would not be enough to prevent a (then still theoretical) invasion.

That was before the slightly shoddy nature of some Russian tactics and equipment was shown on the battlefield though, so it definitely won’t help matters.

As with a lot of things, I wonder whether rasputitsa serves almost as much value as a morale tool as an actual impediment. If there’s only a three week window, that gives Ukraine a potential end-date to fight towards (good for morale), and puts more pressure on Moscow to make a decision about what can (and now can’t) be achieved in the next 3 weeks.

[FEMA Camp Administrator]

https://twitter.com/TheInsiderPaper/status/1498063410189250563

Freedom fries all over again.

Gahddamnit. It was only a matter of time.

[Yoda]

https://twitter.com/ragipsoylu/status/1498241669166252033

Talks have begun.

https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1498242274756550665

Putin to call cabinet meeting to discuss economic impact of sanctions.

Just think....all it would take to end this is one brave cabinet member with a letter opener.

[jaichind]

Another problem for Russians.  Rasputitsa is coming up which means by late March the roads will be a lot worse which would be very bad for Russian mechanized forces. Russia has to wind up major operations in Eastern Ukraine in the next 3 weeks.

The Economist ran an article on rasputitsa back in the first week of February, which concluded that the mud would raise the difficulty of Russian advancement, but would not be enough to prevent a (then still theoretical) invasion.

That was before the slightly shoddy nature of some Russian tactics and equipment was shown on the battlefield though, so it definitely won’t help matters.

As with a lot of things, I wonder whether rasputitsa serves almost as much value as a morale tool as an actual impediment. If there’s only a three week window, that gives Ukraine a potential end-date to fight towards (good for morale), and puts more pressure on Moscow to make a decision about what can (and now can’t) be achieved in the next 3 weeks.

The good news for Russia is that rasputitsa is mostly about Eastern Ukraine where there are lot of rivers and not as applicable in Western Ukraine.  So a Russian focus on getting major operations in the next 2-3 weeks is a must.  I think if the Russians can encircle Ukraine field forces and cut off key cities in Eastern Ukraine in the next 2-3 weeks they mostly have mitigated the rasputitsa risk.  Easier said than done of course.