Spanish elections and politics

[Velasco]

a) would be lethal for PSOE, methinks. I mean, this is not the "normal" left/right relationship, where the two traditional parties may join to fight off the upstarts. For many ancestral PSOE people a government with PP would by High Treason.

b) would be too dangerous.

My bet would be on c) or d).

If the PSOE chooses c), it will have to deal with the stigma of allowing a rightwing government. The credibility of socialists as opposition force will be questioned. Podemos, that is a more dynamic force and the only one that (like it or not, with all its defects and inconsistencies) represents a real change, will take advantage of that.

Option d) would be terrible for the credibility of the democratic system as a whole, in my opinion. Technocratic cabinets in Italy and Greece proved to be a fiasco.

Option b) is risky and requires courage. That is a quality that I fail to see in the PSOE leadership and, in any case, the 'barons' and the 'senate' will hardly allow a coalition with UP. If you take a look at the MyWord poll, you'll see that a leftwing coalition is the preferred option of more than a half of PSOE voters. However, Podemos generates rejection in more than a third of them. It's very difficult to reconcile both tendencies.

Wouldn't PSOE have the opportunity to just play hardball by basically repeating what they have done this time: make a deal with C's and then try to pressure PP or Podemos into letting them govern?

I don't think so. Neither PP nor Podemos will allow to be sidelined. The PSOE-C's agreement was a product of the circumstances. Once Mariano Rajoy renounced to the investiture, Pedro Sánchez (highly contested in the PSOE's federal commission after the bad election results) tried to seize his chance to survive as party leader... and with luck to be elected PM. His main burdens where internal opposition and the menace represented to PSOE's hegemony in the left by the arrogant upstarts of Podemos... not to mention that Catalan separatists would hold the balance of power in case of a leftwing agreement. Given that the federal commission banned in practice the possibility of a deal with Podemos and associates, Sánchez turned his eye to Ciudadanos. The agreement was beneficial for the orange upstarts, because it allowed Albert Rivera to be on the centre of the stage after a disappointing result in the elections which placed C's in a no man's land, without the possibility of becoming in kingmaker. While Pedro Sánchez tried to attract C's to a deal with Podemos (an unlikely 'Cross Coalition'), Albert Rivera stated explicitly that his aim was to add PP to the deal (that is to say, the 'Grand Coalition' disguised as 'reformist pact'). At the end, those manoeuvrings ended in nothing but posturing. PSOE and C's have an implicit nonaggression pact for the upcoming campaign, but their agreement is dead letter.

[jaichind]

Maybe its me but I think I saw this movie before

PP                          = ND
PSOE                     = PASOK
Podemos                = SYRIZA
C                            = DIMAR
IU                          = ANEL ? KKE ? I guess neither fits
May 12 election      = Dec 15 election
June 12 election     = June 16 election

What is similar is not just the parties but the political calculations each actor has seems to be similar as well.

[Nanwe]

C's is ideologically closer to To Potami tbh.

[Velasco]

Don't try to make analogies between Spanish and Greek parties. Spain and Greece are different countries and have a very different political culture. Also, in spite of a huge institutional crisis, by no means Spain is a disfunctional state and we're not in a pre-revolutionary phase.

To begin with: there is not a counterpart for the Golden Shower; PSOE is far more resilient than PASOK; IU is not as regressive as KKE or ANEL; and Podemos is not Syriza, although they have certain affinity.

A campaign video launched by Ciudadanos caricatures Pablo Iglesias and Podemos supporters as idle people who don't want to make an effort to get Spain back on its feet. A bar client makes an emotional speech criticizing the worthless and egoist elites and praising the heroic common people, then Albert Rivera appears in TV. The video has raised some criticism ("populist", "anti-political rhetoric").

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hXZLUrsIda4

The C's video has provoked a lot of jokes in social networks. For those who can understand Spanish, here's the 'Bolivarian' reply to the C's campaign spot made by La Tuerka News.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pgrX8J0qXQY

[Zinneke]

Don't try to make analogies between Spanish and Greek parties. Spain and Greece are different countries and have a very different political culture. Also, in spite of a huge institutional crisis, by no means Spain is a disfunctional state and we're not in a pre-revolutionary phase.

In fairness To Potami and C's are both the same electoral phenomenon : a party filling a void in the electoral market for a pro-European, pro-liberal, anti-nationalist moderate center in the context of polarization.

You are going to see similar movements in France (Macron's movement), Belgium (Défi), Germany (FDP back in the polls), Austria (NEOS),  and Italy (in power). These Blairite/Tapie social-liberals are a European phenomenon.

If you don't think Spain is in at least a political crisis and at best a constitutional crisis with part of its country unilaterally separating, and as such is incomparable to Greece's economic and political crisis, then I question your authority on the matter. I'd leave it up to political scientists though.

[Velasco]

The success of xenophobic far right is an European phenomenon that has particularities in every country affected by that disease, right? Are you going to say that FN and AfD are the same thing?  There are affinities and resemblances,  but they are different parties whose differential characteristics are the products of a particular national context.

Of course there is a resemblance between To Potami and Ciudadanos, Syriza and Unidos Podemos. Even admitting there's a wave of 'Blairite/Tapie social-liberals' across Europe: Do the origins of C's in Catalonia and its emergence in the Spanish political scene years later tell you anything about the particularity of the 'orange phenomenon' in Spain? Obviously the insurgent parties (Podemos and C's in Spain) have appeared in a context of crisis of representativity and came to fill a void. You could say there's a general phenomenon of crisis of representativity that affects western democracies. Would you say that the response has been the same in all countries? 

I said in my previous post that the Spanish State functions despite it's facing a huge institutional crisis. I don't deny the gravity of the situation in Spain. There is a crisis with multiple faces: economic, constitutional, moral,  existential... What I meant is that, at a basic level of functionality, the state is working: healthcare, education, justice, payment of pensions and so on... Sadly,  in Greece such functionality is on the verge of collapse. Also, Greece has no problems with secessionist regions. To compare crises of different nature (separatism vs economic collapse) sounds to me like apples and oranges. They are different problems, even though there's a connection between the rise of Catalan separatism and economic crisis in Spain, that is not to say that economy is the only causation of separatist feelings. Of course, I never claimed to be an authority. I'm only a person posting in Atlas Forum.

[Zinneke]

The success of xenophobic far right is an European phenomenon that has particularities in every country affected by that disease, right? Are you going to say that FN and AfD are the same thing?  There are affinities and resemblances,  but they are different parties whose differential characteristics are the products of a particular national context.

Their origins are different, but their vote is the same, in terms of demographics and politics. I think this is where we are misunderstood. You are saying that Podemos and Syriza, or FN and AfD, are two different entities because you are defining them according to their origins, national particularities (in terms of policy) and party structure. But I am talking about their voters, which will ultimately determine where they end up as a political force. As an electoral phenomenon, these parties' and their rise have to be put in a European political context, and are therefore comparable.

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The origins of C's in Catalonia have little to do with their rise overall, apart from their amazing result in the 2015 regional election (due to the particular context). C's were nowhere in the rest of Spain (where they presented lists), a minor party in Catalonia, and on the brink of dissolving or ditching Rivera until they did what all the other social liberal parties did - fill the pro-Europe social liberal void. Their breakthrough came in a European election at the heart of a decade of European decay, on a pro-European, anti-extremist/nationalist platform.

Parties like FDF, D66, and even the FDP were not social liberal parties either, but they all did what C's eventually did, and fill an electoral market void. It just goes to show how the vote defines the party and not the other way round. That's the new democracy we are headed for.

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It has a similar effect in terms of emergence of populist parties or, in the case of multi-ethnic states, seperatist ones. I understand your point regarding Spain and Greece's different crisis, but I fail to see how that difference is reflected electorally, apart from the rise of Golden Dawn. And I do believe both Spaniards and Greeks externalise their crisees in a European context. The comparison between Greece and Spain, and To Potami and Ciudadanos, is perfectly valid in a European political context.

[Velasco]

Their origins are different, but their vote is the same, in terms of demographics and politics.

Really? Probably there's people on this forum with knowledge enough to confirm or refute your assertion. It seems to me that, in terms of demographics, there's nothing in France comparable to the AfD's voter base in former DDR. It'd be a fascinating subject to discuss in another thread.

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I'm afraid you are mistaken here. In my opinion, it's impossible to explain Ciudadanos (or UPyD, for that matter) without knowing anything about the historical conflicts between the centre and the periphery that are a particular characteristic of Spain. The breakthrough of C's in Catalonia, from a minor single-issue party to become in the first opposition party, is associated with the vicissitudes of the "independence process". In the context of Catalonia, Ciutadans is not a moderate party that fills a void between two extreme poles. The party succeed in the 2015 regional election, whose focal point was the "process" rather than the ideological confrontation, because it was perceived by many voters as the best champion of the "unionist" cause. As for the rest of Spain, Ciudadanos came to fill a void to voters on the centre and the centre-right side of the political spectrum, disillusioned with the political and economic situation as well by corruption scandals in the mainstream parties. Ciudadanos also connects with a segment of the population with more "centralist" leanings, opposed to further regional devolution and/or separatism. The anti-separatist record of C's in Catalonia for sure helped to its rise nationwide. Some elements of the C's discourse may suggest that it has certain characteristics of a "populist" or "catch-all-party". In the graphs posted in the previous page you can see that a majority of the C's voters is ideologically moderate. However, the party has support amongst voters placed in more extreme positions. Maybe that's saying something.

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I think that the rise of Golden Dawn in Greece and the absence of a similar phenomenon in Spain is of quite some significance. On the other hand, talking about an "emergence of populist parties" in a generic context says little about the nature of the different "populisms". For instance, Podemos cannot be explained without the emergence of the Indignados movement (that was a Spanish phenomenon, although it had influence in 'Occupy Wall Street' and other similar movements), other civic platforms like the anti-eviction movement led by Ada Colau and certain young professors influenced by sophisticated political theories redefining "populism". I mean, it's a singular phenomenon that can be seen within a wider context but it's not totally comparable or assimilable. The Spanish, the Greek and the rest of Europeans externalise their different crises in multiple ways.

[Velasco]

Metroscopia / El País

PP 28.5%, UP 25.6%, PSOE 20.2%, C's 16.6%, Others 9.1%

Harsh editorial in El País: "A great sham: the centre-left draws back before the grip of populism and catastrophism"

[jaichind]

CIS poll

PP                29.2%         118-121
PSOE            21.2%           78-80
Podemos-IU  25.6%           88-92
C                  14.6%           38-39

[Velasco]

CIS poll

PP                29.2%         118-121
PSOE            21.2%           78-80
Podemos-IU  25.6%           88-92
C                  14.6%           38-39

According to CIS, 32.4% is undecided.

http://ep00.epimg.net/descargables/2016/06/09/d36c29f5ed3cf9bfae0f6f5cb8fdee7b.pdf

[Zinneke]

Really? Probably there's people on this forum with knowledge enough to confirm or refute your assertion. It seems to me that, in terms of demographics, there's nothing in France comparable to the AfD's voter base in former DDR. It'd be a fascinating subject to discuss in another thread.

Sticking to Spain in order to not remain off-topic, I wonder if their lack of right-wing populist emergence in industrial declining zones such as East Gemany and Northern France (the FN vote there is different to the Southern FN vote) stems from industrial zones in Spain like Basque Country and Catalonia having left-wing nationalist movements to ''counter'' globalisation in a different way. Wallonia is another region without a far right and this is due to a more effective brand of leftism/alter-globalism.

Does Asturias, a region with historically few nationalist parties apart from Foro (allied to PP), have a right-wing populist turn?

[Velasco]

Really? Probably there's people on this forum with knowledge enough to confirm or refute your assertion. It seems to me that, in terms of demographics, there's nothing in France comparable to the AfD's voter base in former DDR. It'd be a fascinating subject to discuss in another thread.

Sticking to Spain in order to not remain off-topic, I wonder if their lack of right-wing populist emergence in industrial declining zones such as East Gemany and Northern France (the FN vote there is different to the Southern FN vote) stems from industrial zones in Spain like Basque Country and Catalonia having left-wing nationalist movements to ''counter'' globalisation in a different way. Wallonia is another region without a far right and this is due to a more effective brand of leftism/alter-globalism.

Yes it's a good point, the North of France and the East of Germany share in common industrial decline. As for Basque Country and Catalonia, Bildu and the CUP represent another type of response to globalization. Plataforma per Catalunya, that is an anti-islamic and xenophobic party, had some support in Metropolitan Barcelona and other municipalities of Catalonia. It's the party more similar to FN and others in the like.

Does Asturias, a region with historically few nationalist parties apart from Foro (allied to PP), have a right-wing populist turn?

Actually the Foro has elements of rightwing populism, as well of caudillismo. It was the personal vehicle of a PP dissident called Francisco Álvarez Cascos. Anyway, the Foro support has declined and there's not a turn in that direction right now.

[jaichind]

Would not the relative strength of Podemos-IU provoke C -> PP tactical voting?

[Vosem]

I've always thought the reason that right-wing populism is yet to emerge in Spain is simply that the PP is descended from forces that were outright fascist, is further to the right than a typical European right-wing party, and is better positioned to absorb that sort of anger into itself rather than having a separate party take root.

[Zinneke]

I've always thought the reason that right-wing populism is yet to emerge in Spain is simply that the PP is descended from forces that were outright fascist, is further to the right than a typical European right-wing party, and is better positioned to absorb that sort of anger into itself rather than having a separate party take root.

PP seems to be what we call in French a ''decomplexed'' Right. Its true that Allianza Popular was a party born out of a think-tank that wanted to pursue Francoism (or, more precisely its ideological tenets) through democratic means, and Aznar was a No supporter in the 1977 referendum. But now PP appears to be a catch all Right party from the centre to the extreme.

Sarkozy was also billed as the decomplexed Right in France. In 2007 he managed to destroy the FN vote. So your theory might hold up if we applied this to Spain too. Certainly PP do their best to appeal to that section of society while remaining in the European People's Party framework of a good centre-right conservative.  

Last right-wing populist party in Spain that I heard of was Vox. I think it was a breakaway from PP due to personal disagreements, and didn't gain much traction.

[🦀🎂🦀🎂]

Well a lot of that could be applied to the LDP in Japan or ND in Greece, and right-wing populism still exists outside those parties.

[Velasco]

Would not the relative strength of Podemos-IU provoke C -> PP tactical voting?

That's the aim of the PP campaign: appealing to moderate voters to counter the "populist menace". I guess it would depend on the level of polarization in the following two weeks of electoral campaign, which now is officially open. By the moment polls say that PP and C's retain their shares with little variation.

I've always thought the reason that right-wing populism is yet to emerge in Spain is simply that the PP is descended from forces that were outright fascist, is further to the right than a typical European right-wing party, and is better positioned to absorb that sort of anger into itself rather than having a separate party take root.

PP seems to be what we call in French a ''decomplexed'' Right. Its true that Allianza Popular was a party born out of a think-tank that wanted to pursue Francoism (or, more precisely its ideological tenets) through democratic means, and Aznar was a No supporter in the 1977 referendum. But now PP appears to be a catch all Right party from the centre to the extreme.

Sarkozy was also billed as the decomplexed Right in France. In 2007 he managed to destroy the FN vote. So your theory might hold up if we applied this to Spain too. Certainly PP do their best to appeal to that section of society while remaining in the European People's Party framework of a good centre-right conservative. 

Last right-wing populist party in Spain that I heard of was Vox. I think it was a breakaway from PP due to personal disagreements, and didn't gain much traction.

Well, the concept of a right "without complexes" was used by PP in the 90s (if I'm not wrong). However, there wasn't a FN to destroy. By that time José María Aznar had replaced Manuel Fraga in the leadership of the Spanish Right. Fraga was the leader of the former Alianza Popular (AP), which was founded by him together with other members of late Franco cabinets whom where known as Los Siete Magníficos ("The Magnificent Seven"). Initially AP represented a certain attempt of preservation of the Francoist essences by democratic means. The more reformist faction of late Francoism assembled in the UCD alongside with moderate opposition factions. Further to the right the 'true defenders' of the Franco regime's essences gathered in Fuerza Nueva ("New Force", FN), which had a very limited support. So perhaps we could say that FN was the 'outright fascist' party and AP a very conservative one. Between 1977 and 1982 AP was a minor party that represented what was called the "Sociological Francoism". From that year on, AP took advantage of the UCD collapse to expand its base to the centre. However, AP was unable to counter PSOE's hegemony in the 80s. The past of Manuel Fraga, who had styled himself to stances more comparable to classic European conservatism, was always considered a burden. It was said that AP had a glass ceiling or, to be more precise, the expression used was "Fraga's ceiling". Fraga was replaced in 1987 by a certain Antonio Hernández Mancha, who was quite unsuccessful. After a period of internal crisis, Fraga came back provisionally to refund the party in 1989, which was renamed Partido Popular. The Spanish Wikipedia says that the new PP strengthened its neoliberal traits, cutting to some extent its conservative ones. Maybe. In any case, new leader José María Aznar (1990-2004) had the advantage of being younger than Fraga. Despite being a very conservative individual with certain authoritarian tendencies, Aznar was finally successful in giving a more moderate image of PP in the 90s, expanding the party's base more to the centre while the remainders of Spanish Centrism (the Adolfo Suárez's CDS) vanished. In that period PP became in a party that encompassed all the political spectrum from the centre to the far right. The drive of PP between 1996 and 2011 would require a longer explanation. In any case, the recent period of crisis has eroded much of the PP centrist base.

On a brief note, Vox was a rightwing splinter of PP founded by party dissidents whom considered that it was way too centrist in matters like anti-terrorist (ETA) and social policies (abortion, homosexuality, etc). The party was pro-EU and had neoliberal stances on economy, so it's not fully comparable to other European rightwing populist parties. In the Andalusian campaign of 2015 Vox played the anti-islamic card, proclaiming that the left wanted to reestablish the Califate in Córdoba. As for the attempts to assemble a rightwing populist force in Spain, we could continue later.   

[Angel of Death]

Aznar was a No supporter in the 1977 referendum.

There was a referendum in 1976 and one in 1978, but none in 1977.

[Zinneke]

Aznar was a No supporter in the 1977 referendum.

There was a referendum in 1976 and one in 1978, but none in 1977.

78

[Velasco]

General election poll for Catalonia (Total: 47 seats)

GESOP / El Periódico

En Comú Podem 27% (13 seats), PSC 16% (8 seats), ERC 15.7% (8-9 seats), C's 14.7% (7 seats), CDC 11.4% (5-6 seats), PP 10.9% (4-5 seats)

The CIS survey estimates: ECP 14-15 seats, ERC 8-9 seats, PSC 8 seats, CDC 6-7 seats, C's 5 seats, PP 4-5 seats

[Velasco]

Podemos wanted its manifesto to be the "the most-ever read ever" and has chosen the Ikea catalogue format. "Flat-pack policies", says The Grauniad

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/09/podemos-manifesto-ikea-catalogue-flat-pack-policies

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Past week it was launched a documentary film telling the story of Podemos from the foundational assembly in October 2014 to the general elections in December 2015 called Política, Manual de Instrucciones ("Politics, Operating Manual"). Director Fernando León de Aranoa was permitted to film behind the scenes, and the documentary shows lively discussions in party leadership as well more relaxed moments in what El Confidencial calls "organic dissection". Film reviews remark the appearances of second-in-command Ïñigo Errejón, who shows himself an agile and acute analyst.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BJ_yv2bqqGo

[Velasco]

More polls

Metroscopia / El País

PP 28.9%, UP 25.4%, PSOE 20.8%, C's 15.9%, Others 9%

Netquest / El Español

PP 28.8%, UP 24.7%, PSOE 21%, C's 15.8%, Others 9.7%

Seats (projection): PP 117, UP 87, PSOE 78, C's 45, Others 23

GAD3/ La Vanguardia

PP 29.8%, UP 24.3%, PSOE 21.4%, C's 14.9%, ERC 2.4%, CDC 1.8%, EAJ-PNV 1.2%, EH Bildu 0.9%, CC 0.3%

Seats: PP 119-122, UP 85-87, PSOE 80-82, C's 40-41, ERC 8-9, CDC 6-7, EAJ-PNV 5, EH Bildu 2, CC 0-1

[Velasco]

Given that this is a key aspect in the present political situation, I made an attempt to translate an Enric Juliana article entitled "the generational gap feeds political uncertainty in Spain" 

Spain lives as no other European country through a strong generational split, fed by the way how the economic crisis has been managed. The strongest duality on the labor market and scanty opportunities for new university licentiates. Continuity of a youth unemployment above 40 %. Precarious employment situation is feeding a strong political mobilization of electors educated and trained after the death of the general Franco: more than twelve million persons, 36 % of the electoral census. The pit is of impressive dimensions and its depth goes in increase. If next June 26 only there were voting the younger than 40, Unidos Podemos would win the elections.

The generational matter is very present today in almost all European countries. The victory of  Brexit in June 23 referendum there is in the hands of the older generations isolationist impulse, still brushed by the echoes of the Second World War. They believe they will age better in an encapsulated country and are very sensitive to anti-German arguments. " Our parents did not wage a war to end in a Germanized Europe ". If it was depending on the younger, the continuity of the United Kingdom in the European Union would be guaranteed. British young people want to have the opportunity to be employed freely in Frankfurt or Paris.

In France young people is shifting again to the left and can torn PS to pieces before the push of the FN, which clots the disaffected of older age. In Italy the generational matter explains Matteo Renzi's meteoric ascent and also his present problems. The PM overcame the PD's old guard under the motto of rottamazione (scrapping). Renzi was promising to dismantle the old ruling class making way for the new generations in a country considerably gerontocratic. Reforms always are difficult and the more dissatisfied young people vote now for the 5 Stars Movement. The Grillini are on the verge of winning the mayoralty of Rome with the support of the young vote. In Portugal youth anger precipitated in October the misfortune of the Pedro Passos Coelho conservative government. Intergenerational tension is a constant in Europe, but Spain is the only country that has seen to emerge, with vigour, two new parties with a strong generational bias.

PP is the undisputed leader among the older than 65, people without studies or only with primary education, as well among small town residents. (With the exception of Andalusia, where people with these profiles vote mainly for the PSOE). Unidos Podemos has a clear lead among voters between 18 and 34, with higher studies and residence in cities over 500k inhabitants. The PSOE comes behind PP as the preferred party for pensioners and electors with poor education. Ciudadanos is not the first party among the younger, but is the favourite one for people between 35 and 44. It scores well among university graduates and workers who had completed vocational training. That say the CIS statistic tables.

PP is the party of pensioners, followed by PSOE. Unidos Podemos spearheads the young tide, flanked by Ciudadanos. The camps are defined and the demographic weight of people above 45 wins (60% of the electoral census).

With serious problems to connect with the older, Podemos has made its first campaign video with elderly people who say not being afraid of a drastic change. The argument put forward is that "the same of always don't win". Mariano Rajoy counts with Andrea Levy and Pablo Casado to address the younger. The PSOE tries to look after female public, its main strong point in the last decade. Ciudadanos keeps the veto to Rajoy, thinking in its older youths that want change.

http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20160613/402463316281/la-escision-generacional-alimenta-la-incertidumbre-politica-de-espana.html

[Velasco]

A televised debate takes place tonight (22:00 CET) between candidates Mariano Rajoy (PP), Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), Pablo Iglesias (UP) and Albert Rivera (C's).

Live coverage in Spanish

http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/06/13/actualidad/1465805590_848142.html

Yesterday took place an economy debate between acting minister Luis de Guindos (PP), Jordi Sevilla (PSOE), Alberto Garzón (UP) and Luis Garicano (C's)

https://www.thespainreport.com/articles/762-160613002015-spanish-parties-clash-on-pensions-unemployment-and-taxes-in-election-economy-debate

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Other sources say that De Guindos and Garzón were slightly better than Sevilla and Garicano, although without a clear winner.

A "women's debate" (I think it's a tad sexist treating women as a minority when they are more than a half of humankind) took place on June 9 between Andrea Levy (PP), Margarita Robles (PSOE), Carolina Bescansa (UP) and Inés Arrimadas (C's). In this debate the mutual accusations between Levy and Robles would have benefitted Bescansa and Arrimadas, according to media reports. Levy is a promising young politician and member of the Parliament of Catalonia who was promoted by Rajoy to the PP national executive committee; Robles is a veteran judge and former secretary of state who runs in second place for Madrid in the PSOE list; Bescansa is the number 2 in the UP list for Madrid as well she's sociologist, electoral analyst and Pablo Iglesias' top aide; Arrimadas was the C's candidate in the Catalan elections of 2015 is the leader of the opposition in Catalonia.