🇩🇪 German elections (federal & EU level)

[Agafin]

I am also very critical of vote by mail though for different reasons. It sacrifices a lot of core tenets of free elections. It's one advantage is that it is extremely convenient and makes voting very easy. But at what cost?

Voter secrecy is not a thing anymore, nothing prevents an abusive husband/father from forcing everyone under his roof from voting a certain way. This is even worse in places where so called "vote harvesting" is legal. He can pretty much fill their ballots and drop them himself, only needing them to place their signatures (or forge them if need be).

I feel like once exclusive communities will start to adopt mail voting en masse, bloc voting will get worse. Previously, orthodox Jews or muslims could disregard their rabbis' or imams' endorsements and make their own choices but will it be possible now to resist the peer pressure if you are asked to show your ballot before putting it in the envelop?

There are cases where I can support it (for the military, in 2020 elections because of covid pandemic with no vaccine available at the time etc..) but other than that, I see it the same way as I see internet voting, highly convenient but not worth it.

[Yeahsayyeah]

Some months ago, there was an AfD representative in some state parliament that propelled the "theory" that corona was a hoax to promote vote by mail and through this machination rig the Bundestag election. So, yeah, they definitely took some inspiration from the US Republican playbook. Nonetheless, the notion in far-right circles, that elections in Germany are rigged and right-wing votes, be it NPD, AfD or whatever is the fad of the day, are thrown out en masse by corrupt left wing and/or establishment poll workers isn't new.

Btw, showing your marked ballot to anyone is actually not legal in Germany.

[Blair]

How will Election Day play out for those of us following for the first time?

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

We should note, however, that the AfD has fueled election fraud conspiracies for years now and that there is not always a need to make everything about the United States.

[Yeahsayyeah]

How will Election Day play out for those of us following for the first time?

Polls open at 8 o'cock and close at six in the evening. About noon there will be the first reports about turnout so far. Some cities and state sites will have more detailed reports. At six, the exit polls will be published, though record vote-by-mail could throw them off. With more and more precincts incoming, the prognosis of the big tv stations will be altered.

Some cities publish live precinct results, when the votes are counted, some state sites publish live muncipality results, some only do publish results, when the constituency/district is complete. Bundeswahlleiter.de only does constituency results, but you can also follow those on the website of the public broadcast ARD.

The first full constitutency results will probably not be in before eight o'clock. Some could stand out until about midnight. If there are no glitches, the result could be in by then, but here also record vote-by-mail could throw this off. In 2017, one district was only fully-counted at four o'clock in the morning, which is probably without precedent. 

The seat prognosis will vary much in the procetions because of and unprecendented number of overhang and compensation seats, of which many will rely on quite small margins in the particular districts.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

How will Election Day play out for those of us following for the first time?

Exit polls will be out at 6 pm local time. They are usually quite good and give you a rough idea about what's going on. Over the course of the evening, the actual results will be merged with the projection. If the results are not super close, you can with good conscience turn your TV off at 8 pm.

[President Johnson]

Two more polls out, with almost no movement anymore.

Ipsos:
SPD: 26%
Union: 22%
GRÜNE: 16%
FDP: 12%
AfD: 11%
LINKE: 7%
Others: 6%

Forsa:
SPD: 25%
Union: 22%
GRÜNE: 17%
FDP: 12%
AfD: 10%
LINKE: 6%
Others: 8%

https://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/index.htm


Christian Lindner now openly saying he'd prefer a Jamica coalition "if possible". While Green co-leader Habeck responded with skepticism and Baerbock yesterday dodging the coalition question, it's abundantly clear: Anyone who wants to send CDU/CSU packing and into opposition must vote SPD. Only if the SPD clearly comes in first, the Union is out of power and Olaf Scholz will be chancellor. I hope a few Green voters switch to SPD now as it's clear a progressive government can only be headed by a strong SPD and a leader who knows how to get stuff done.

[Astatine]

It's Allensbach with a strong CDU/CSU house effect, but this poll isn't really good news for Linke:

https://twitter.com/Wahlrecht_de/status/1441408743401410562?s=19

[Anzeigenhauptmeister]

Anyone wanting to mention the cyber attack on the Federal Bureau of Statistics?

[President Johnson]

It's Allensbach with a strong CDU/CSU house effect, but this poll isn't really good news for Linke:

https://twitter.com/Wahlrecht_de/status/1441408743401410562?s=19

It's would be so hilarious for Die Linke to be out and SPD-Greens having a majority. Still doubt that will happen though.

[brucejoel99]

Shameless lack-of-an-answer-induced repost:

Having not paid as much attention to this election as I would've liked to, would it be right to state that the only mathematically possible coalitions that'd also be politically possible (i.e., not including AfD) can be traffic-light (SPD/Green/FDP), Jamaica (Union/Green/FDP), GroKo but with the SPD heading it, & R2G (SPD/Green/Linke), with traffic-light at about a 2/3rds chance, R2G at about a 1/3rd chance, & reverse-GroKo & Jamaica being extremely unlikely?

Likewise, would it be right to state that any coalition negotiations - but especially if they potentially result in failure & another GroKo a-la 2017 - will likely drag into 2022 & thus entail that Merkel remains caretaker Chancellor in the meantime?

[Astatine]

Shameless lack-of-an-answer-induced repost:

Having not paid as much attention to this election as I would've liked to, would it be right to state that the only mathematically possible coalitions that'd also be politically possible (i.e., not including AfD) can be traffic-light (SPD/Green/FDP), Jamaica (Union/Green/FDP), GroKo but with the SPD heading it, & R2G (SPD/Green/Linke), with traffic-light at about a 2/3rds chance, R2G at about a 1/3rd chance, & reverse-GroKo & Jamaica being extremely unlikely?

Likewise, would it be right to state that any coalition negotiations - but especially if they potentially result in failure & another GroKo a-la 2017 - will likely drag into 2022 & thus entail that Merkel remains caretaker Chancellor in the meantime?

Regarding the latter question: Yes, Merkel will be caretaker Chancellor until a successor is elected. Depending on the result and the duration of coalition negotiations, her Chancellorship could very well last until 2022, which would allow her to hold one last New Year's speech. If she remains Chancellor beyond 16th of December, she would break Helmut Kohl's record of 16 years and 26 days as head of government of the Federal Republic.

I wouldn't rate Jamaica as completely impossible, although it is not the likeliest option at the moment of course. The INTM forecast (https://www.wer-gewinnt-die-wahl.de/en), which is kind of comparable to FiveThirtyEight, projects Jamaica to be the most likely coalition option actually, based on surveying scholars. Yet, that evaluation should be taken with a grain of salt.

If CDU/CSU becomes largest force, the likelihood of Jamaica would be increased by a lot. FDP leader Christian Lindner stated in yesterdays' debate that he prefers Jamaica over a traffic light coalition, although he doesn't exclude the latter. Scholz meanwhile was clearly flirting with the red-green-yellow option, knowing that this variant is way less polarizing and more popular than R2G.

[Sozialliberal]

Shameless lack-of-an-answer-induced repost:

Having not paid as much attention to this election as I would've liked to, would it be right to state that the only mathematically possible coalitions that'd also be politically possible (i.e., not including AfD) can be traffic-light (SPD/Green/FDP), Jamaica (Union/Green/FDP), GroKo but with the SPD heading it, & R2G (SPD/Green/Linke), with traffic-light at about a 2/3rds chance, R2G at about a 1/3rd chance, & reverse-GroKo & Jamaica being extremely unlikely?

If the SPD is the strongest party on election day, traffic light or R2G are the likeliest options. If CDU/CSU are strongest, Jamaica is likeliest. Another GroKo would be an emergency solution if no other coalition is mathematically possible.

It's Allensbach with a strong CDU/CSU house effect, but this poll isn't really good news for Linke:

https://twitter.com/Wahlrecht_de/status/1441408743401410562?s=19

It's would be so hilarious for Die Linke to be out and SPD-Greens having a majority. Still doubt that will happen though.

Die Linke definitely has its place in the political spectrum, but they should get rid of the Maduro apologists on their left fringe. Maybe it would help if they dropped out of parliament. There are reasonable people in the reformist wing of the party.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Shameless lack-of-an-answer-induced repost:

Having not paid as much attention to this election as I would've liked to, would it be right to state that the only mathematically possible coalitions that'd also be politically possible (i.e., not including AfD) can be traffic-light (SPD/Green/FDP), Jamaica (Union/Green/FDP), GroKo but with the SPD heading it, & R2G (SPD/Green/Linke), with traffic-light at about a 2/3rds chance, R2G at about a 1/3rd chance, & reverse-GroKo & Jamaica being extremely unlikely?

Likewise, would it be right to state that any coalition negotiations - but especially if they potentially result in failure & another GroKo a-la 2017 - will likely drag into 2022 & thus entail that Merkel remains caretaker Chancellor in the meantime?

Regarding the latter question: Yes, Merkel will be caretaker Chancellor until a successor is elected. Depending on the result and the duration of coalition negotiations, her Chancellorship could very well last until 2022, which would allow her to hold one last New Year's speech. If she remains Chancellor beyond 16th of December, she would break Helmut Kohl's record of 16 years and 26 days as head of government of the Federal Republic.

I wouldn't rate Jamaica as completely impossible, although it is not the likeliest option at the moment of course. The INTM forecast (https://www.wer-gewinnt-die-wahl.de/en), which is kind of comparable to FiveThirtyEight, projects Jamaica to be the most likely coalition option actually, based on surveying scholars. Yet, that evaluation should be taken with a grain of salt.

If CDU/CSU becomes largest force, the likelihood of Jamaica would be increased by a lot. FDP leader Christian Lindner stated in yesterdays' debate that he prefers Jamaica over a traffic light coalition, although he doesn't exclude the latter. Scholz meanwhile was clearly flirting with the red-green-yellow option, knowing that this variant is way less polarizing and more popular than R2G.

Why does it rate traffic light as less likely than R2G?

[President Johnson]

Shameless lack-of-an-answer-induced repost:

Having not paid as much attention to this election as I would've liked to, would it be right to state that the only mathematically possible coalitions that'd also be politically possible (i.e., not including AfD) can be traffic-light (SPD/Green/FDP), Jamaica (Union/Green/FDP), GroKo but with the SPD heading it, & R2G (SPD/Green/Linke), with traffic-light at about a 2/3rds chance, R2G at about a 1/3rd chance, & reverse-GroKo & Jamaica being extremely unlikely?

Likewise, would it be right to state that any coalition negotiations - but especially if they potentially result in failure & another GroKo a-la 2017 - will likely drag into 2022 & thus entail that Merkel remains caretaker Chancellor in the meantime?

Regarding the latter question: Yes, Merkel will be caretaker Chancellor until a successor is elected. Depending on the result and the duration of coalition negotiations, her Chancellorship could very well last until 2022, which would allow her to hold one last New Year's speech. If she remains Chancellor beyond 16th of December, she would break Helmut Kohl's record of 16 years and 26 days as head of government of the Federal Republic.

I wouldn't rate Jamaica as completely impossible, although it is not the likeliest option at the moment of course. The INTM forecast (https://www.wer-gewinnt-die-wahl.de/en), which is kind of comparable to FiveThirtyEight, projects Jamaica to be the most likely coalition option actually, based on surveying scholars. Yet, that evaluation should be taken with a grain of salt.

If CDU/CSU becomes largest force, the likelihood of Jamaica would be increased by a lot. FDP leader Christian Lindner stated in yesterdays' debate that he prefers Jamaica over a traffic light coalition, although he doesn't exclude the latter. Scholz meanwhile was clearly flirting with the red-green-yellow option, knowing that this variant is way less polarizing and more popular than R2G.

I'd more agree with political scientist and publisher Albrecht von Lucke than said model; he stated that in case the SPD finishes ahead of the Union, a trafficlight coalition is extremely likely. He also added the result for the Union will be a debacle no matter what since they're going to lose at least seven or eight points.

Small specification: Merkel will remain regular chancellor until October 26, when the new Bundestag assembles. Then President Steinmeier will formally relief the chancellor and ministers from their posts, but entrust them to remain in office on an acting basis (called "acting federal government"; "geschäftsführende Bundesregierung") until a new chancellor is elected. There's no deadline specified in any law and an acting cabinet has the same powers as a regular one. Only difference is that ministers can't be replaced anymore, and if one leaves the post early, another one has to take over that ministry on an acting basis as well.

[Astatine]

Why does it rate traffic light as less likely than R2G?

This forecaster asked scholars in political science about how likely they would evaluate certain coalition options. I don't know how the methodology exactly works (I think they might have in their Q&A - in English too btw - and explained thoroughly how they got to the result), but I assume that at least based on their manifestos, R2G has many more political similarities than a traffic light coalition.

Then again, the scholar survey might be somewhat older, and considering that Die Linke is a party with lots of internal struggle, I could easily some parts of the party opposing R2G and rather want the party to recover as left-wing force in opposition to any government involving the Greens. If R2G achieves a narrow majority only, that might be a crucial factor.

I'm still not too convinced that a traffic light coalition is all but certain, since - as some posters had stated before - the FDP base is more conservative than the party leadership and a potential coalition treaty might be up for a vote among the membership base (that was planned with Jamaica in 2017). The sole prospect of governing with the Greens would be a reason for some parts of the base to reject a coalition treaty, although the FDP might just opt for a convention, where an approval would be very likely.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Why does it rate traffic light as less likely than R2G?

This forecaster asked scholars in political science about how likely they would evaluate certain coalition options. I don't know how the methodology exactly works (I think they might have in their Q&A - in English too btw - and explained thoroughly how they got to the result), but I assume that at least based on their manifestos, R2G has many more political similarities than a traffic light coalition.

Then again, the scholar survey might be somewhat older, and considering that Die Linke is a party with lots of internal struggle, I could easily some parts of the party opposing R2G and rather want the party to recover as left-wing force in opposition to any government involving the Greens. If R2G achieves a narrow majority only, that might be a crucial factor.

I'm still not too convinced that a traffic light coalition is all but certain, since - as some posters had stated before - the FDP base is more conservative than the party leadership and a potential coalition treaty might be up for a vote among the membership base (that was planned with Jamaica in 2017). The sole prospect of governing with the Greens would be a reason for some parts of the base to reject a coalition treaty, although the FDP might just opt for a convention, where an approval would be very likely.

My (admittedly not very well informed) opinion is that if the FDP leadership is sure enough that it wants traffic light they will just go for a convention, to ensure it passes.

[Хahar 🤔]

Die Linke definitely has its place in the political spectrum, but they should get rid of the Maduro apologists on their left fringe. Maybe it would help if they dropped out of parliament. There are reasonable people in the reformist wing of the party.

Something I've noticed is that a lot of polls have had Die Linke near the threshold, but I haven't seen any that have had them at or below the threshold. Is there any real sense that they're in danger of missing out? I'm guessing that they're not going to win enough direct seats for the threshold not to matter.

[Astatine]

Die Linke definitely has its place in the political spectrum, but they should get rid of the Maduro apologists on their left fringe. Maybe it would help if they dropped out of parliament. There are reasonable people in the reformist wing of the party.

Something I've noticed is that a lot of polls have had Die Linke near the threshold, but I haven't seen any that have had them at or below the threshold. Is there any real sense that they're in danger of missing out? I'm guessing that they're not going to win enough direct seats for the threshold not to matter.

Die Linke has 3 seats in Berlin almost safe, and some additional territory in the East where it could hold/gain seats. Overall, it is likely to assume the party will win the 3 districts necessary to be exempt from the 5 % threshold - One of the current district representatives, Gregor Gysi, had the strongest personal overperformance of all parties/candidates in the 2017 elections.

Die Linke has a core of die-hard supporters, especially in the East, but well, they're dying off. Beyond that, Die Linke performs strongly in urban areas, especially among younger voters, but is in competition with the Greens.

If Die Linke were to fail the threshold but get the 3 seats, the party would still face harder times. In that case, the party would only form a "Gruppe" instead of a "Fraktion", basically a parliamentary caucus with less rights and reduced funding, meaning not only lots of its MPs would become unemployed, but also large parts of the party's parliamentary staff.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Die Linke definitely has its place in the political spectrum, but they should get rid of the Maduro apologists on their left fringe. Maybe it would help if they dropped out of parliament. There are reasonable people in the reformist wing of the party.

Something I've noticed is that a lot of polls have had Die Linke near the threshold, but I haven't seen any that have had them at or below the threshold. Is there any real sense that they're in danger of missing out? I'm guessing that they're not going to win enough direct seats for the threshold not to matter.

Iirc all they need is one direct seat to get a share of seats in the Bundestag in line with their vote share, but the laws might have changed.

[Astatine]

Die Linke definitely has its place in the political spectrum, but they should get rid of the Maduro apologists on their left fringe. Maybe it would help if they dropped out of parliament. There are reasonable people in the reformist wing of the party.

Something I've noticed is that a lot of polls have had Die Linke near the threshold, but I haven't seen any that have had them at or below the threshold. Is there any real sense that they're in danger of missing out? I'm guessing that they're not going to win enough direct seats for the threshold not to matter.

Iirc all they need is one direct seat to get a share of seats in the Bundestag in line with their vote share, but the laws might have changed.

The law has changed some time ago: Until 1956 just one direct seat was needed, but ever since, three.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Die Linke definitely has its place in the political spectrum, but they should get rid of the Maduro apologists on their left fringe. Maybe it would help if they dropped out of parliament. There are reasonable people in the reformist wing of the party.

Something I've noticed is that a lot of polls have had Die Linke near the threshold, but I haven't seen any that have had them at or below the threshold. Is there any real sense that they're in danger of missing out? I'm guessing that they're not going to win enough direct seats for the threshold not to matter.

Iirc all they need is one direct seat to get a share of seats in the Bundestag in line with their vote share, but the laws might have changed.

The law has changed some time ago: Until 1956 just one direct seat was needed, but ever since, three.

I'm surprised to learn the current law is that old.
I remember reading that in 2002 the SPD redrew the lines in Berlin in order to bring the PDS under the threshold they needed, but checking Wikipedia now, I wasn't aware that they actually won direct seats there.
The more you know...

[buritobr]

Due to this danger, it is better for leftists between SPD and Linke vote for die Linke in order to hold seats in the Bundestag. It is not good to throw 4.9% of left-wing vote in the garbage can.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

Die Linke has 3 seats in Berlin almost safe...

Well, they were safe. Trouble is, if they were to lose close to half of their list support from last time (which is what dropping below the threshold would entail) there's little chance that this wouldn't be at least partially reflected in constituency vote performance, and there's no reason at all to assume that things would magically be more solid in the constituencies that they hold. Marzhan-Hellersdorf was won with a vote share of 34% last time and Lichtenberg with one of 35%: lop, say, a third off that and the seats are potentially at risk. Of course they've never lost either, but things can change. Gysi's 40% gives him a little more wriggle-room, at least so long as his personal vote holds. Most likely they're all right either way (if perhaps a little more uncomfortably than is dignified), but...

[Astatine]

Die Linke has 3 seats in Berlin almost safe...

Well, they were safe. Trouble is, if they were to lose close to half of their list support from last time (which is what dropping below the threshold would entail) there's little chance that this wouldn't be at least partially reflected in constituency vote performance, and there's no reason at all to assume that things would magically be more solid in the constituencies that they hold. Marzhan-Hellersdorf was won with a vote share of 34% last time and Lichtenberg with one of 35%: lop, say, a third off that and the seats are potentially at risk. Of course they've never lost either, but things can change. Gysi's 40% gives him a little more wriggle-room, at least so long as his personal vote holds. Most likely they're all right either way (if perhaps a little more uncomfortably than is dignified), but...

Although their ratings have to be taken with a grain of salt, election.de has Die Linke winning with high probability in all 3 Berlin seats (Gysi 100 %, Pau 92 %, Lötzsch 97 %). I don't put any confidence into INSA's seat projection, since I was part of INSA polls on which their district forecasts were made and they didn't even bother to ask the district voting intention.

I agree that it is all but certain that all of the three will lose ground, potentially falling into single digit margins, but as of now I'd still say the races are in almost safe or likely territory. I feel that the issues Die Linke focuses on, such as expropriation/the housing crisis, resonate quite well in Berlin, way more so than in other places, also because Berlin will have a non-binding referendum on Sunday on whether some housing companies should be expropriated. In polls for the state elections Die Linke seemed to be relatively stable in comparison to their nationwide standing right now.

When looking at the results of the 2017 elections, it can be noted that the modest gains Die Linke made nationwide (9.1 %, +0.5) were all caused by improving the result in the West overall (7.4 %, +1.8), while their vote share in the East plummeted strongly (17.8 %, -4.9). Most of Die Linke's losses right now can be attributed to the party falling back to 2013/2005 (5.6, 4.9 % respectively) level in the West, while the party's vote share in the East that had always saved them before might not be enough to offset a potential debacle.