🇩🇪 German elections (federal & EU level)

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

After a couple of CDU officials had more or less accused Friedrich Merz.of being a spreader of conspiracy theories (due to Merz' accusation that the CDU convention wasn't postponed because of COVID but to prevent him from becoming party leader) the convention is now set for a new date in mid-January... for now anyway. Media has commented on recent events as the moment when the CDU leadership race turned "ugly".

What's your opinion on the issue?

Friedrich Merz has a big ego and a big mouth and sometimes he speaks before he thinks. I (and probably also a lot of people in the CDU as well) dread him becoming CDU chairman let alone Chancellor, because then everything would become about him and not the public good or something. Unfortunately, Merz has taken a page from the textbook of Trump and other populists by claiming that his own ego trips are ultimatly about fighting the corrupt elites and the establishment (says the guy who has been a senior executive at BlackRock for the past couple of years).

Word is that some state chapters are eager to prevent a CDU-Leader Merz before the crucial state elections in Baden-Wurttemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz in the spring next year.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

What is the profile of a CDU-Greens swing voter?

Stereotypically spoken - suburban; 35-50 years old; high-middle class; somewhat educated and interested in politics; generally liberal on social issues; moderate on fiscal issues; concerned about climate change; liked Merkel. However, I don't know if there is any empirical data on that question.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

I like how the placeholder Latin gibberish is still on them.

Of course, Germans are way too stupid to understand that these are just model drafts and far from finalized and that no one actually suggested to print and distribute these, but of course, it is more fun to laugh at the SPD.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

If the current polls hold, and the next election yields a 26-22-16-12-12-6 type scenario, would a black green coalition be the most likely outcome? Would the CDU prefer that over a Germany coalition? And if the votes were there, would the FDP prefer a Germany or a traffic light coalition? How do  FDP and SPD feel about a Germany coalition?

I think the SPD will avoid a coalition with the Union at all costs, and if not, it would prove that it has well earned its downfall.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

What are the chances of Green-SPD-FDP getting together to form a majority ?

It works smoothly in Rhineland-Palatine, but I think the SPD would be the biggest loser. They all could unite under the argument of moving on from the CDU-era/bureaucracy reform. I also think that the FDP would even be willing to give in on the issue of state intervention regarding climate change. It would not agree to raise taxes for the rich, which is an SPD demand. All in all, this would be a progressive neoliberal government - something that the SPD wants to avoid being part of.

It may be the first time FDP have polled level with the SPD, but pretty sure they have scored above 14% in the past - what is their highest ever figure?

14.6% in 2009, but they had even higher polling numbers prior.

Is there a good chance SSW wins a seat out of Schleswig-Holstein? Just learned today they were contesting the federal election

No, this will not happen. The SSW has a statewide support of what, 3 to 4 percent? They did not even win a district in the state election. Federal election districts are much larger, so it would be even harder for the SSW to win a seat.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

It may be the first time FDP have polled level with the SPD, but pretty sure they have scored above 14% in the past - what is their highest ever figure?

Their absolute peak result was 18 % at the beginning of 2009. If their polling numbers remain as good as currently, they might get a record result in November, but I doubt that their polling record will be broken.

Is there a good chance SSW wins a seat out of Schleswig-Holstein? Just learned today they were contesting the federal election

No, this will not happen. The SSW has a statewide support of what, 3 to 4 percent? They did not even win a district in the state election. Federal election districts are much larger, so it would be even harder for the SSW to win a seat.

It could very well happen, because SSW is excepted from the five percent threshold at federal level and would just need to cross the "natural" threshold that comes with the Sainte-Lague seat calculation. The natural threshold according to the D'Hondt method would be 1/598, so 0.167 % (with that percentage, they would be absolutely safe to get a seat). As Sainte-Lague is calculated with divisors of 0.5, 1.5, etc., half of the D'Hondt divisor - 0.083 % - could be enough to get a seat.

Assuming 47 million people go to the polls this year (last time it was 46.5 million), about 40,000 votes are needed to have a realistic shot at winning a seat (and 80,000 to have a seat definitely safe).
SSW got 32,000 votes in the last state elections. Assuming SSW gets 3 % in Schleswig-Holstein with a raw turnout of 1.7 million people (it was 1.73 million in 2017), the party would have 51,000 raw votes, which would probably be enough. Plus, due to an increased size of the Bundestag, the natural threshold might actually be lower.

So as of now, I'd say it's more likely than not that the SSW will get a seat in the Bundestag. I think we need some federal Schleswig-Holstein state polls, it could very well be the case that the fact SSW is running and is excepted from the threshold simply fell under the pollsters' radar.

Ah, didn't know that they were also exempt from the federal threshold. Thanks.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

Haven't the German Greens moderated so much that they are actually to the right of the SPD in economic policy these days? Then again I guess the SPD has sold out quite a bit too.

The SPD's platform has moved considerably leftwards in recent years on economic issues. They are basically saying, "This is what we would like to do, but the Union is blocking us". Party leadership tries to make a distinction between the SPD's action in the grand coalition and the SPD's platform - the heart and soul of the party.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

Haven't the German Greens moderated so much that they are actually to the right of the SPD in economic policy these days? Then again I guess the SPD has sold out quite a bit too.

The SPD's platform has moved considerably leftwards in recent years on economic issues. They are basically saying, "This is what we would like to do, but the Union is blocking us". Party leadership tries to make a distinction between the SPD's action in the grand coalition and the SPD's platform - the heart and soul of the party.

Though given how they are polling, maybe not totally successfully?

Oh, of course not, as expected.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

It is just so frustrating that serious corruption scandals just bounce off the CDU while any minor scandal seems to stick to the opposition.

Baerbock wants to come off like a smart, competent policy expert which makes plagiarism a no-go. Laschet has the advantage that no one seriously believed that he is competent in anything in the first place.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

Very interesting. I have seen larger swings in polling this year than what's between CDU, Grüne and SPD.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

The federal election committee granted the AfD's appeal to their exclusion from the ballot in Bremen (same with Free Voters in Bremen btw, both were initially barred from running for formal reasons), while the Greens are officially out in Saarland.

The Greens cannot appeal this decision until after the election. In theory, the whole federal election could be overruled if the appeal to the Constitutional Court were to be successful, but it is neither granted the Greens want to go that far nor is there a legitimate chance the appeal would succeed.

My home state is really... special.

Saarland's election results could surely be very interesting this year. I'd very much like to see whether Green voters will even bother going to the polls--which I think is likely because the Greens have probably the most educated electorate--and what their second preferences are.

CDU ending up in 3rd place behind SPD and Greens (or vise versa) would be hilarious. While they're one of the lesser bad conservative parties, they've ruled way too long in Germany.

The CDU has somehow managed to resist this rightward shift which conservative parties have seen in the last years and it has not talked too much about cultural issues (yet). But they have basically no political goals and are the major roadblock for any necessary political change in Germany.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

New Forsa Poll!

Union: 23% (-3% since the last poll)
Greens: 20% (no change)
SPD: 19% (+3%)
FDP: 12% (-1%)
AfD: 10% (no change)
The LEFT: 7% (+1%)

Forsa is usually harsh with the SPD, so this is a very good result. Might be a fluke, but its central message is in line with all the other polls: When Baerbock announced her candidacy, it became a two-way race for #1, when the Greens plummeted, it became a two-way race for #2, and now we are, surprisingly, headed for a three way race for #1. I'd still rather be Baerbock than Scholz right now, but it's time we have to admit something that seemed laughable for the last few years: The SPD might actually win this election.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

Yeah, maybe the people who actually witnessed the 2013 and 2017 election can chime in on this, but it feels like the SPD is running a much more focused  and high-energy campaign (five key points they relentlessly hammer), a compelling candidate who doesn't flame out too soon (cough Schulz coughcough), and campaigning like an actual labor party.

Obviously they are helped by lackluster/scandal-ridden opposition candidates and Merkel stepping down, but how does this compare to the past three election campaigns? Does this feel different?

I was looking at ad spots from previous campaigns (because what else do Atlas nerds do after work), and the SPD media campaign also seems quite slick this year too. Is that right? The SPD website is actually super cool and intuitive

Edit - maybe i am getting lost in the language translation, but does the SPD proposal for collective bargaining mean they want Nordc-style sector-wide collective bargaining? Because if so, that rules

It's totally different than in 2013 and in 2017.

In 2013, people generally liked the SPD's platform and specific concepts. However, they also wanted to keep Merkel. The SPD's candidate for chancellor was pretty uninviting and a majority of voters preferred a grand coalition under Merkel anyway. So they got a grand coalition under Merkel.

In 2017, the SPD had a good candidate but no platform. Really, no platform. I really don't remember what they campaigned on. I think their tax proposal was received quite well, but that's it. They started off so well but they lost support pretty quickly. They were never able to shake of the "loser"-image, which demoralized the party and the campaign. Their campaign was also pretty tame and boring. It also did not help the SPD that the political right had a hegemony on the political discourse at the time. In the end, I think many people really wanted to like Schulz, especially because many were tired of Merkel by then, but the SPD gave them no reason why they should.

2021 is different insofar as there had never been a time in the last years and pretty far into the campaign in which people gave Scholz and the SPD any chance to win. I think that encouraged the SPD to wage a bolder and more creative campaign. Their social media game, which they largely ignored in 2013 and 2017, is quite good. Their whole campaign design is better, more catchy. Just compare the election posters of 2017 with the posters of 2021. It also helps that Scholz is the candidate, of course.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

New Forsa Poll!

Union: 23% (-3% since the last poll)
Greens: 20% (no change)
SPD: 19% (+3%)
FDP: 12% (-1%)
AfD: 10% (no change)
The LEFT: 7% (+1%)

By the way, that could result in a coalition of

Union + Greens + FDP ('Jamaica'): 55% to 36%
Union + SPD + FDP ('Germany'): 54% to 37%
Green + SPD + FDP ('traffic light'): 51% to 40%
Greens + SPD + LINKE ('Red-Red-Green' or 'R2G'): 46% to 45%

That is the only poll that I know of in which there would be a left majority in the Bundestag, but this still shows that this election is going to produce some really close results and might result in some interesting and possibly very narrow majorities.
Another takeaway is that there are different majorities for a coalition without the Union and that should worry Laschet very much. There is a good chance that he might not become chancellor after all.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

If the Union-SPD-Greens are polling around each other around 20% does this mean the overhang seats could go crazy?

It could, but I wouln't count on it.
The reason why overhang and compensatory seats went crazy in 2017 because the Union had a steady lead of at least 10%. That's the reason for their absolute dominance in the electoral districts. Now that the Union's lead has shrunken, there is a possibility that SPD and Greens pick up a number of seats, making the proportion of directly-won seats more proportional to the share of list votes.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

What makes Laschet so unpopular that he's apparently tanking that much? I thought he was kind of a Merkel clone and therefore popular?

He might be a clone of Merkel concerning his political stances but while Merkel has an almost Queen-Elizabethan aura surrounding her and she carefully chooses her words and what message she wants to convey, Laschet comes off like a nervous gnome who just talks in platitudes, has never said a thoughtful thing in his career and generally does not really think before he opens his mouth. Or, to quote Michael Scott from the office: "Sometimes I start a sentence and I don't even know where it's going. I just hope I find it along the way."

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

It's actually happening. Or at least there's a real chance. I remember how the SPD and Scholz got laughed off last year when they nominated him. It seemed like a joke a party polling at 15% or below was nominating a "chancellor candidate".

Both the Union and Greens nominated poor candidates; in Baerbock's case it's also the press giving her bad headlines for smaller errors. I think that's a bit unfair to her, though her lack of experience is probably an equal or larger factor here. Scholz has a lot of experience and comes off as a pragmatic and thoughtful leader, who can get things done. At the same time, I never have seen my party this united and disciplined. We just need to keep it going and maybe Laschet and his party give us more ammunition in the weeks to come. I definitely like this timeline so far.

Are German voters thinking of him as more of a natural successor to Merkel than Laschet?

It's not that voters don't know what the parties stand for (or want to stand for), voters have a good idea of that. So I don't know whether they specifically seek resemblance to Merkel. It's just that according to polling, Scholz has pretty much always stood out as the most popular minister in Merkel's government. It might very well have something to do with Merkel and Scholz being very similiar in style.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

FDP leaving the government formation process in 2017 put party survival ahead of government stability, why would it be different in 2021?

Because it really wasn't a popular move. Most people found it kind of weird.
The FDP is in a better position now, yes. But these are different times. I get the feeling that most people believe that the FDP has outgrown the 2017-version of itself--that the mishap of 2017 will not occur again because the FDP has learned. Lindner is very keen on conveying this exact message. The high polling numbers for the FDP are kind of a new phenomenon. In fact, the party was not well until early 2021.
Also, the general sentiment of the public is different, and supporting a government that would get rid of the Union could be a very popular move.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

FDP leaving the government formation process in 2017 put party survival ahead of government stability, why would it be different in 2021?

Because it really wasn't a popular move. Most people found it kind of weird.
The FDP is in a better position now, yes. But these are different times. I get the feeling that most people believe that the FDP has outgrown the 2017-version of itself--that the mishap of 2017 will not occur again because the FDP has learned. Lindner is very keen on conveying this exact message. The high polling numbers for the FDP are kind of a new phenomenon. In fact, the party was not well until early 2021.
Also, the general sentiment of the public is different, and supporting a government that would get rid of the Union could be a very popular move.

That's a take that I hear quite often but I think that it's slightly besides the point.

The FDP is the only "major" German party whose structural floor is below 5%. (For the CSU the 5% threshold doesn't matter because of the FPTP seats and the Left's reliable base is eroding, but still at slightly above 5%.) Since Westerwelle's times the FDP has been in opposition for all but four years and has drawn a lot of its electoral success from catering to people from center-left to right-wing who think that the other parties tend not to emphasize individual freedom enough when governing. The four years in government where not a success at all for the FDP. In 2017 the FDP got the impression that its intended role was just to prop up the long-desired Black-Green coalition without getting the chance to significantly influence government policy. On a personal level the problems seem to have occurred less with the Greens (differently from what one might have expected), but with the CSU. The FDP's decision was then to not take the risk and remain in its opposition role.

That's the FDP's problem. Now I think that we agree that the FDP should at some time break out of its current role and find a way to become an active, successful partner in federal governing coalitions. But I equally think that the FDP would be ill-advised to care too much about what is popular among people that would never consider voting for the FDP. I admit that a sizeable number of FDP sympathizers would have preferred to enter a Jamaica coalition in 2017, but there is a good argument that this would have been politically and electorally very risky. Staying in opposition at ca. 8-9% until COVID-19 came was the safer option, although on the long run maybe not.

Ah well, you're probably right about that. It's certainly true that the majority does not really care about the electoral prospects of the FDP, and that the FDP doesn't have to care about the majority.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

What's totally crazy is the idea of the SPD winning the Chancellorship with just 21% of the vote.

Thanks Laschet.

Wouldn't even 31% be unprecedentedly low?

That was the floor until now, Adenauer was elected with 31 percent in 1949.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

How many people in the CSU will regret not going for Soder?

It struck me at the time as one of those baffling decisions that parties make for purely internal/petty/factional reasons- even back in March Laschet was hardly a strong choice.

There are always elections that in hindsight seem to be worth losing, but that can only be determined in the future. As of right now, we know that many Union MPs are very disappointed and that the mood among Union party activists is very bad.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

Would the Grüne be polling better if the Spitzenkandidat were Robert Habeck?

That has been suggested a number of times now, though I don't necessarily agree with that. There is a reason why the Greens chose Baerbock as chancellor candidate in April, and it is not just because she is a woman. Habeck was always seen as more charismatic, but many Greens did not trust him to take up the role as chancellor candidate because he has some chaotic energy surrounding himself. I remember reading an article which quoted an anonymous member of the Greens' party executive committee stating that they could expect a result of 19-17% with Bearbock and a result of 24-14% with Habeck.
He is and talks differently than other politicians, which can be a pro but also a heavy con. His speeches give off the impression of having enormous gravitas but they are often philosophical and, policy-wise, not very concrete. I think in April, there was a general impression among the Greens that Habeck would not stand the job because he proved a number of times that he is not very confident on policy details when pressured (In fact, there were a few interviews of Habeck that some Greens found outright embarrassing). There is a very telling thing Baerbock said in a joint interview about the duo: "We're just different in some aspects. He knows ... chicken, pigs, milking cows. I know international law."
Also, I think I remember that Habeck was criticized by some for being very attentive with his public image, which some interpreted as arrogance. All said, I think it is very easy to shift the blame to Baerbock and to make the assumption that anyone else could have done better, but I think that there  is a real possibility that Habeck could do worse. Scholz could easily spin the match Laschet - Habeck - Scholz in his favor as a policy expert running against two clowns. Habeck would have to undergo tedious prep sessions before the televised debate with Scholz. For all of his flaws, Scholz knows what the has to know.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

Armin Laschet declined to run in his home district but instead opted to only get on the NRW list - As CDU/CSU will still pick up a large chunk of districts with an abysmal proportional result, he might be shunned out of Bundestag.

That would be hilarious.

Philipp Amthor, CDU "youth" hopeful in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, is losing his district according to INSA, and probably wouldn't get saved over the list.

One crook less in Berlin.

In Saarland, it seems likely that at least one out of the three somewhat prominent CDU faces will not make it - AKK (Defense Minister, list #1, running in Saarbrücken), Peter Altmaier (Economy Minister, list #2, running in Saarlouis) or Nadine Schön (deputy parliamentary group leader, list #3, running in St. Wendel).

Also: In 297 (Saarlouis), in a rematch of 2017, we have a battle of ministers: Altmaier vs. Maas. In 2017, Altmaier won this race by 6. Applying uniform swing, Maas would end up as the winner this time. Not quite as exciting as the Wahlkreis 61 (Potsdam), which is Scholz vs. Baerbock, but still an interesting fact. Also, this shows how overrepresented the small Saarland is in the cabinet.

Also interesting is 196 (Suhl – Schmalkalden-Meiningen – Hildburghausen – Sonneberg), which is currently held by the CDU (won by 11, AfD second in 2017). This is the district Maaßen runs in. Maaßen is not on the list but was considered to be a shoo-in in the next Bundestag because the Wahlkreis is usually safe for the CDU. This time, however, the SPD has a really good recruit who even led Maaßen in one poll. One of the more interesting races this year.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

Do we know much about the political pedigree of AFD voters? Who did most of them vote for before the AFD existed? are they people who used to be CDU voters or are they more ex-SPD or even ex-Linke voters?

Yes to all three of your assumptions, this is from an exit poll in 2017.


https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article168989573/Welche-Parteien-die-meisten-Stimmen-an-die-AfD-verloren.html

Nichtwähler = non-voters
Sonstige = others (I assume a good deal of NPD voters fall into this category)

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

I think some people confuse the blockade around the AfD as a self imposed challenge by CDU politicians, while it's more that the CDU base really despise the AfD and tend to react very badly when politicians broach the subject. In a decade or so, if the AfD is still around and both parties have been through generational turnover, things might be different (similar to how Linke has slowly been redeemed for alliances with SPD and Greens, even as its brand of generational turnover is also leading to the party's slow death).

Indeed. We should not forget that there is an outright hatred for the AfD among German voters. I've seen a poll in which 70% of voters state that they think that the AfD might be unconstitutional. In a recent poll, 70% of voters stated that they would never, in any case, vote for the AfD. As you said, it might be a generational thing, but given that the AfD shows no efforts to moderate--the developments since 2015 display quite the contrary--it will take a long time to reach when cooperating with the AfD would not necessarily have negative effects on the opinion of voters.