Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[Hindsight was 2020]

Really amazing they’d waste armor like this for essentially a border raid over supporting the Donbas push
https://twitter.com/osinttechnical/status/1788940862094741837?s=12

It's stretching the Ukrainian forces thinner like I said previously.

Tatarigami_UA - who runs the Frontelligence Substack site:

Overnight, Russian infrantry, backed by armored vehicles, entered Kharkiv oblast from Belgorod area, using small tactical units. Frontelligence Insight had previously cautioned about this scenario. Here's what we know about it:

The capture of border villages like Strilecha, Krasne, Pylne, and Borysivka isn't unexpected. It's an anticipated maeuver to divert Ukrainian resources from the main Russian offensive in Donbas. Considering manpower shortages, Ukraine will be forced to redeploy some personnel.

...

Russians anticipate a significant social backlash, inducing panic and demands for resolution. This pressure aims to compel the redeployment  of units from critical areas of Russian advances in Donbas. Meanwhile, Russian forces deploy infantry units incapable of deep strikes.

The situation is expected to evolve, with Russian forces deploying more units to penetrate additional border areas or to reinforce initial successes. With our estimate of their force equivalent to two Russian corps, they can sustain this operation.

Thus far, the Russian forces have not breached the main Ukrainian defense. Given the time required for Ukrainian units to deploy to the area, it is premature to assess the overall success or failure of this incursion. We will continue to provide updates.

Rob Lee agrees, says it's designed to take units away from defending Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk.

If I'm Russian leadership considering Ukrainian manpower shortages, just play a game of 15-on-13 rugby along the frontline, find where they don't have men or their presence is light and attack the gainline on that day.

Yeah I know this is there thinking but it could just as easily bite them in the ass as it’s wasting equipment on fortified areas when they are facing stock depletion issues by next year

One of his posts I did not copy is these areas are not fortified because the border is a gray zone. The fortifications are further inland.

If they want to actually draw Ukrainian forces away they have to push towards the fortified areas that hold strategic importance the areas they raised today aren’t going to get that desired effect

[Woody]

DeepstateUA: "The enemy's offensive continues near Gatyshche, Lukyantsi and Hlyboke."

The gray zone expands

https://deepstatemap.live/en#10/50.2267/36.8262

[Hnv1]

I feel like the AFU high command decided they are willing to sacrifice some swath of land in Kharkov to maintain the front in Donetsk. Which is reasonable considering the Russians can't take Kharkov city, and the Donetsk urban sprawl is the best blockage to stop a Russian offensive

[Hindsight was 2020]

https://twitter.com/defencehq/status/1789249276314276291?s=46
Wow the UK coming out of the blue with this

[Woody]

https://twitter.com/naalsio26/status/1789106880733712696

[Woody]

I feel like the AFU high command decided they are willing to sacrifice some swath of land in Kharkov to maintain the front in Donetsk. Which is reasonable considering the Russians can't take Kharkov city, and the Donetsk urban sprawl is the best blockage to stop a Russian offensive

The consensus is that Russia wants to advance far enough that Kharkov City is within artillery range, and at the same time maintain a buffer zone.

https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/1789125542819549394

[Hindsight was 2020]

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1789267539282850280
😬 🔥

[Woody]

Deepstate now shows the border settlements as fully occupied by Russia/non-grey zone and the Russian bridgehead widening in the directions of Liptsy & Vovchansk. First time the Russians are occupying these lands ever since they had to flee back to Russia initially after the 2022 Kharkiv offensive. Only this time, I think they are staying there for good.

https://deepstatemap.live/en#11/50.2703/36.6717

[Woody]

Kharkiv:

https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1789401983830438358

[It’s so Joever]

Watch the “anti genocide” protestors ignore the upcoming holodomor.

[Woody]

Last time Russians took so much swaths of land in under a day was during the initial stages of the invasion (Feb-March 2022):

[It’s so Joever]

Last time Russians took so much swaths of land in under a day was during the initial stages of the invasion (Feb-March 2022):

I hope you are happy.

[Hindsight was 2020]

Speaks to how much the war has changed that we’ve gone from fighting for Kyiv to our biggest vatnik cheerleader flexing over Russia going into greyzone on the Kharkiv border

[DaleCooper]

Speaks to how much the war has changed that we’ve gone from fighting for Kyiv to our biggest vatnik cheerleader flexing over Russia going into greyzone on the Kharkiv border

It is really bizarre how much Russia's mentally ill supporters have moved the goalposts over the years. This mess is obviously an endless stalemate and a tremendous waste of resources and human life (something Russians historically have never seemed to value). But the cheerleading kind of reminds me of how in the late 2000s and 2010s, the Dubya cheerleaders or US military fans would post about how some random terrorist (not a big name bin Laden or Saddam) got killed by a US drone strike, as though that was going to mean anything. It's the same here. Big deal, the Russians advanced through another empty field. Weeks worth of effort for that.

[Hindsight was 2020]

Speaks to how much the war has changed that we’ve gone from fighting for Kyiv to our biggest vatnik cheerleader flexing over Russia going into greyzone on the Kharkiv border

It is really bizarre how much Russia's mentally ill supporters have moved the goalposts over the years. This mess is obviously an endless stalemate and a tremendous waste of resources and human life (something Russians historically have never seemed to value). But the cheerleading kind of reminds me of how in the late 2000s and 2010s, the Dubya cheerleaders or US military fans would post about how some random terrorist (not a big name bin Laden or Saddam) got killed by a US drone strike, as though that was going to mean anything. It's the same here. Big deal, the Russians advanced through another empty field. Weeks worth of effort for that.

At least Dubya achieved his initial war goals 😬

[Woody]

Russian Ministry of Defense claims control over Hatysche, Krasne, Morokhovets and Oliiynykove villages of Kharkiv region of Ukraine

https://t.me/bbbreaking/181483

[Woody]

Yurii Butusov:

https://twitter.com/DevanaUkraine/status/1789567446082367640

The situation following the Russian offensive in the Kharkiv region at 1:00 a.m. on May 12

Russian troops formed two bridgeheads in the Kharkiv region along the border. The depth of the enemy's advance is small, up to 5-6 km, but the Russians have expanded the offensive front. In total, in two days, the enemy captured about 100 square kilometers of the border strip along the border.

The first direction of the enemy's advance near Kharkiv is the ridge of heights in the area of the villages of Liptsi, Ternove, and Staritsa.

The second direction of the enemy's advance is the city of Vovchansk. The enemy went directly to the outskirts of Vovchansk, which is approximately 5 km from the state border.

The intention of the Russian command is obvious:

1. Shackle our troops and withdraw reserves to localize the offensive.

2. Go to the ridge of dominant heights along the border to create a buffer zone to create a bridgehead for further offensive actions in the Kharkiv area.

3. In case of a successful advance and consolidation - to create bridgeheads for an attack in depth, first of all in the direction of Vovchansk, to cover our Kupyan group.

The enemy shifts reserves and uses significant infantry and armored forces, a significant number of drones.

Nevertheless, the Russian troops advance slowly, and do not try to break through with large forces in some narrow area. They create pressure on a wide front and point-concentrate forces to attack individual nodes of the defense, where it is organized.

Ukrainian troops also operate dispersedly on a wide front. The situation is difficult, the enemy has the tactical initiative.

But our front is getting stronger. There are problems in management, in the organization at the level of the higher command, because far from everything was properly prepared and checked to repel the expected enemy attack. They are trying to fix everything now.

There is currently no threat of an attack on Kharkiv, the enemy is far enough away, his forces are limited, and there is no rapid advance. The further advance of the enemy depends on how heavy the losses will be inflicted on the Russians in this border battle.

But the enemy checks the density of our defense and has the ability to maneuver reserves, and the threat cannot be underestimated in any case.

-Yurii Butusov

[SnowLabrador]

Ukraine has until January 2029 to expel Russian forces from its entire territory if we're lucky. More likely, only until January 2025. That's why I'm deeply pessimistic on their chances - time is not on their side. They need a major breakthrough, and they need it at a time when Russia seems to be having most of the breakthroughs.

[Woody]

David Cameron: Situation in Kharkiv 'extremely dangerous'

https://kyivindependent.com/david-cameron-situation-in-kharkiv-extremely-dangerous/

[Hindsight was 2020]

Ukraine has until January 2029 to expel Russian forces from its entire territory if we're lucky. More likely, only until January 2025. That's why I'm deeply pessimistic on their chances - time is not on their side. They need a major breakthrough, and they need it at a time when Russia seems to be having most of the breakthroughs.

Neither side has the resources to keep the war going that long unless it big time freezes at some point

[Open Source Intelligence]

ISW's grand strategic take in yesterday's update:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command may be evaluating the risks, prospects, and timeline of offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast based on the assumption that Ukraine cannot and will not be able to liberate territory seized by Russian forces. Putin's and the Russian military command's calculus about the threat of Ukrainian territorial gains is likely shaping Russia's overall operational approach to seizing territory in Ukraine. The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence's (ODNI) 2024 Annual Threat Assessment reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin "probably believes" that Russian forces have blunted Ukrainian efforts to retake significant territory and that US and Western support for Ukraine is "finite."[22] Russia's intended timeline for its ongoing offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast remains unclear, but Russian forces may intend for their offensive operations in northern and northeastern Kharkiv Oblast to achieve their operational objectives long after summer 2024. The Russian military command may assume that Russian forces will be able to hold any limited gains they make in northern Kharkiv Oblast and other oblasts in perpetuity because they think that Ukrainian forces will be unable to launch successful counteroffensive efforts at any point in the future. Russian forces have made a series of tactically significant advances in Donetsk Oblast, particularly near Avdiivka, in recent months without Ukrainian counterattacks even momentarily pushing back Russian forces, and these recent unchallenged gains may be contributing to Putin's and the Russian military command's calculus.[23] Putin may believe that Russian forces can continue to make opportunistic and unchallenged advances throughout the frontline over the next months, or even years, and ultimately force Ukraine to submit to total Russian subjugation. Ukrainian materiel constraints due to delays in Western security assistance have prevented Ukrainian forces from launching significant counterattacks against Russian offensive operations, but the arrival of US security assistance to the front at scale will likely allow Ukrainian forces to resume counterattacks that threaten Russian forces' ability to hold tactical gains.[24]

The limited Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast suggest that the resumption of US security assistance has not changed Putin's calculus or that he launched the Kharkiv effort without reassessing the operation's fundamental assumptions about Ukrainian capabilities in light of the resumption of aid. Russian forces are currently attacking with a force grouping well below its reported intended end strength, a risky decision if Putin and the Russian military command believed that there was a threat for Ukrainian forces to roll back any tactical gains that this understrength force could make before Russian forces staffed it to end strength. Russian forces are currently advancing in several areas that do not provide immediate avenues of advance toward Kharkiv City or other immediate operationally significant objectives. Russian forces may be advancing in these areas because they believe that they can hold any seized ground indefinitely and use that ground to launch subsequent operations to more operationally significant goals. Russian forces may also believe that they can pursue gradual creeping advances across a wide swath of territory in northern and northeastern Kharkiv Oblast for an extended period of time without achieving relatively rapid operationally significant advances but in a way that would disadvantage any future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the area.

It is imperative for Ukrainian forces to disrupt any such Russian calculations as soon as possible through both limited and large-scale counteroffensive operations that liberate Russian-occupied territory as soon as conditions permit. ISW has routinely argued that Ukrainian forces should contest the theater-wide initiative as soon as possible because ceding the theater-wide initiative to Russia into 2025 affords Russian forces the ability to determine the timing, location, and intensity of Russian attacks and control the resources that Ukrainian forces expend during this protracted period.[25] Ukrainian forces will not have a chance to liberate territory if they remain on the defensive for the foreseeable future, and remaining entirely on the defensive will only encourage Putin to continue grinding offensive operations indefinitely seeking complete victory over time. ISW has repeatedly assessed that the consistent provision of key Western systems to Ukraine will play a critical role in Russia's prospects in 2024 and Ukraine's ability to conduct future counteroffensive operations and liberate Ukrainian territory from Russian occupation.[26] The West must proactively and preemptively provide Ukrainian forces with the necessary equipment and weapons for their future counteroffensive operations if Ukrainian forces are to liberate significant swaths of occupied Ukraine and challenge Putin's belief that Ukraine is and will remain unable to do so.

[Hindsight was 2020]

Snip

That type of arrogant thinking is what bite Putin in the ass in 22 so good to see the Kremlin refusing to learn from their biggest mistakes

[Hindsight was 2020]

https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1789723287565562087
Putin has replaced Shoigu. Noooooo he was Ukraine’s most valuable asset 😭

[President Johnson]

https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1789723287565562087
Putin has replaced Shoigu. Noooooo he was Ukraine’s most valuable asset 😭

I thought they were buddies, but Putin probably trusts only himself.

[Woody]

Ukrainian commander: "The Russians simply walked in" (Kharkiv)

Denys Yaroslavskyi is angry.

As the Commander of a Ukrainian Special Reconnaissance Unit, he fought in Ukraine’s surprise offensive in Kharkiv in the autumn of 2022, which pushed back an initial Russian invasion all the way back to the border.

But now Denys and his men are facing the prospect of doing the same all over again.

Their advances are only a few miles deep but have swallowed up around 100km (62 miles) of Ukrainian territory. In the more heavily defended east of Ukraine, it’s taken Russia months to achieve the same.

Denys wants to know what happened to Ukraine’s defences.

“There was no first line of defence. We saw it. The Russians just walked in. They just walked in, without any mined fields” he says.

He says officials had claimed that defences were being built at huge cost, but in his view, those defences simply weren’t there. “Either it was an act of negligence, or corruption. It wasn’t a failure. It was a betrayal”.

But Ukraine appears to have been ill-prepared - despite official denials.

Denys, speaking from a park in Kharkiv, says within an hour he’ll be back on the front line with his men close to the town of Vovchansk, just 5km (3 miles) from the Russian border.

Russian troops are already reported to have entered the edge of the town. Denys tells me he fears it could soon be back in Russian hands.

“Of course I’m angry,” Denys says. “When we were fighting back for this territory in 2022, we lost thousands of people. We risked our lives.

"And now because someone didn’t build fortifications, we’re losing people again.”

Source: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c72p0xx410xo