Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[Torie]

Ukraine is winning the war.  Why should they give up anything?

Ukraine can join NATO if it damn well pleases.  Why should Russia get a say in the foreign affairs of Ukraine?  NATO is a purely defensive alliance and poses no aggressive threat to Russia.  It is not a reasonable ask for Ukraine to create a constitutional amendment saying they will only ever join alliances that Russia allows them to join.

All the Russian-conquered territories are part of Ukraine.  Donbas is part of Ukraine.  Crimea is part of Ukraine.  Russia took all these territories by illegal military force, committed ethnic cleansing and population transfers on a massive scale, and held phony referendums to try and justify their annexation.  None of this deserves to be given an ounce of credibility by the international community.  Ukraine has the absolute right to re-conquer and re-annex all of those territories under the doctrine of self-defense.

It is ridiculous for Russia to make any sort of demands from their current position of weakness but especially for them do demand spoils of war from a war that they have lost.  If Russia wants to end the war, then complete withdrawal and surrender of all illegally-occupied territory and a guarantee of Ukrainian sovereignty are the bare minimal baseline.  What Russia should be negotiating is whether or not sanctions get lifted and whether or not their leaders and soldiers are granted immunity from war crimes, not whether or not they get to keep the territory they stole.

And even if Russia does keep Crimea in the end, it's utterly ridiculous to suggest that Ukraine should completely cut itself off from the Sea of Azov, as well as major port cities such as Meriupol, Melitopol and Berdyansk, by granting Russia a contiguous land-link between Crimea and Russia.  

This. Crimea is the only place Russia holds that Ukraine would have a difficult time retaking. Why should Russia get a inch of soil to territory that Ukraine is likely to retake by next summer?

To be honest, I think Ukraine may try to retake Crimea before some of the pre-February 24 parts of the Donbas. From what I understand, Ukrainian leadership sees Crimea as the lynchpin to the whole Russian operation and if they can retake Crimea, the whole house of cards will come tumbling down. Putin would "fall" out of a window and the chaos that ensues would allow Ukraine to retake the eastern territories.

Edit: And to be perfectly honest, retaking Crimea is **far** more important to Ukraine's national security than Donetsk and Luhansk.

I agree with every word of what you posted, but I am not sure NATO will underwrite an invasion of Crimea. I guess the next step anyway is to sever the land bridge. Then Crimea is cut off except by ferry ala Kherson. That bridge that was blown to Crimea will be blown again if it ever gets operational.

[Hindsight was 2020]

https://mobile.twitter.com/WarMonitor3/status/1592979317910540288

[Storr]

Note that this is Makiivka in Luhansk Oblast near Kreminina, not the larger Makiivka in Donetsk Oblast:

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1592931441855598593?s=20&t=tDGKITAJ...

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

I'm not saying Ukraine should cede any territory or sovereignty, but the calculus is not as simple as posters here are making it out to be. I'd obviously prefer for our countries to provide more aid to make that calculus simpler, but this dilemma is to be considered from Ukraine's perspective, not that of an allied state.

The collapse in Kharkiv and the retreat from Kherson have left us vulnerable to recency bias, but Kherson was a distinctly disadvantageous position for Russia and the Kharkiv collapse was/is being addressed by mobilisation (which is likely to continue ramping up until some time between February and June). For a number of reasons which I won't go into for now, it's far from certain that Ukraine would win back - or even hold - all of its territories by force if the war went on. This is assuming the level of support for Ukraine was maintained, but even that in itself would not be certain, because it'd depend on unreliable foreign partners.

Beyond the military dimension, continuation of war imposes costs on Ukraine. Deaths, economic destruction, psychological damage; over time, war rots the psyche of a people suffering from it. Even if we are to assume that Ukraine could take back all of its land, this wouldn't bring back the kidnapped Ukrainians, provide reparations or end the Russian shelling/missile strikes (and the associated reluctance to invest). I hope Ukraine retakes all its land - but even if it did this by force, Russia would not simply give up. Regardless of how successful they are on the battlefield, there will have to be negotiations to bring the conflict to a close - and the kidnapped people home.

[Torie]

I'm not saying Ukraine should cede any territory or sovereignty, but the calculus is not as simple as posters here are making it out to be. I'd obviously prefer for our countries to provide more aid to make that calculus simpler, but this dilemma is to be considered from Ukraine's perspective, not that of an allied state.

The collapse in Kharkiv and the retreat from Kherson have left us vulnerable to recency bias, but Kherson was a distinctly disadvantageous position for Russia and the Kharkiv collapse was/is being addressed by mobilisation (which is likely to continue ramping up until some time between February and June). For a number of reasons which I won't go into for now, it's far from certain that Ukraine would win back - or even hold - all of its territories by force if the war went on. This is assuming the level of support for Ukraine was maintained, but even that in itself would not be certain, because it'd depend on unreliable foreign partners.

Beyond the military dimension, continuation of war imposes costs on Ukraine. Deaths, economic destruction, psychological damage; over time, war rots the psyche of a people suffering from it. Even if we are to assume that Ukraine could take back all of its land, this wouldn't bring back the kidnapped Ukrainians, provide reparations or end the Russian shelling/missile strikes (and the associated reluctance to invest). I hope Ukraine retakes all its land - but even if it did this by force, Russia would not simply give up. Regardless of how successful they are on the battlefield, there will have to be negotiations to bring the conflict to a close - and the kidnapped people home.

The "kidnapped people home" was a heart rendering point. Thanks for the reminder.

[2952-0-0]

b) Areas under Russia's control re-join Ukraine as autonomous regions as part of a Ukraine confederation. The New Ukraine confederation has Constitutional changes to ensure that it is neutral and cannot enter any alliances.  Russia + NATO guarantees Ukraine confederation borders with a rule that ANY foreign troops on Ukraine will mean an act of war EVEN if Ukraine asked for it.

How will that work, in practice? The people of the annexed territories clearly view themselves as Ukrainian, and would view such autonomous regions as merely tools to dilute Ukrainian sovereignty. The moment after such a confederation is formed, they would immediately vote to abolish these autonomous regions. Russia's military capabilities would still be crippled after the losses of this war, and wouldn't be capable of responding. If he's smart enough, such a treaty would only be a face-saving admission of defeat.

Crimea is gone.  Even USA privately seems to indicate that any peace deal would mean Russia keeps Ukraine.  One face-saving possibility for Ukraine would be some sort of free trade setup between Ukraine and a Russia controlled Crimea.

I wouldn't disbelieve that, pre-February 24, Zelensky was open to the idea of abandoning Ukraine's claim over Crimea to rid itself of a potentially subversive element. That the US privately wanted to recognize Crimea as Russian was probably true over the summer, when Biden and other western leaders were somewhat vague when asked about the details on "victory". But, they've been emboldened by Ukraine's progress since then, and were openly high-fiving Ukraine after the attack on the Crimean bridge. This means that they truly do seek a return of Crimea to Ukraine. The details probably will be up for negotiation, such as maybe a temporary UN administration before a UN-held referendum.

In any case, any deal where Ukraine's borders aren't clearly defined and respected, and where it doesn't enjoy full sovereignty over its territory, would put its viability into long-term doubt. It would be impossible for Ukraine to attract the foreign investment needed for long-term development, meaning its economy will stagnate. In particular, the east, which was formerly its industrial heartland, will be left in ruins. Its political class will be able to use the constant existential crisis as a tool to continue enriching themselves. Yes, the examples of Taiwan and South Korea do prove it's possible for (part of) a nation to prosper even when facing a constant existential crisis, but they both had strong western support, which won't be happening under any peace agreement that Putin demands.

[Kahane's Grave Is A Gender-Neutral Bathroom]

Russia's Q3 GDP came in at -4.0% versus the expected -4.7%.  Russia's 2022  GDP numbers by Quarter YoY are
Q1:   3.5%
Q2:  -4.1%
Q3:  -4.0%

It seems absolute output on a QoQ basis has stabilized so it is reasonable to expect Q4 YoY to be -4.0% to -5.0% since we do have to take into account the impact of mobilization.   That should add up to a total 2022 GDP change to be around -2.5% to -3.0%.  This is much lower than the -8% to -10% when the war started and the collective West all-out sanctions started.

I literally monitor the situation to see when I should buy and sell MIC shares and even I think you are too obsessed with this thing.

[HillGoose]

Ukraine should be given 2 options

a) Areas under Russia's control are accepted as part of Russia AND Russia accepts Ukraine will enter NATO with condition that no NATO troops can enter Ukraine unless Russia invades (again) but such a future invasion would trigger an act of war from NATO.

OR

b) Areas under Russia's control re-join Ukraine as autonomous regions as part of a Ukraine confederation. The New Ukraine confederation has Constitutional changes to ensure that it is neutral and cannot enter any alliances.  Russia + NATO guarantees Ukraine confederation borders with a rule that ANY foreign troops on Ukraine will mean an act of war EVEN if Ukraine asked for it.

I do not think Russia will accept either but I will insist Russia accept one of the two as part of the compromise peace.

The idea is Russia can have territory concessions but not get Ukraine neutrality or Russia can get Ukrain neutrality but then cannot get any territories.

What about Crimea? You approach has some logic, but Russia getting to keep any additional territory is a non starter. The only deal that will fly is giving Russia Crimea in the end in exchange for Ukraine having defense guarantees. One other option is a a land swap of some sort where Russia gives up the Donbas for a land bridge to Crimea, but I doubt Ukraine will go for that except under duress.

Crimea is gone.  Even USA privately seems to indicate that any peace deal would mean Russia keeps Ukraine.  One face-saving possibility for Ukraine would be some sort of free trade setup between Ukraine and a Russia controlled Crimea.

lmao NATO's secret rods from god could change that real quick

[The Dowager Mod]

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1592891328433909762

[Hindsight was 2020]

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1592891328433909762

Turns the stomach 😣

[Hindsight was 2020]

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/11/16/a-russian-regiment-reportedly-lost-2500-draftees-in-just-two-weeks-of-fighting/?sh=36ca49bb712f

A lot of rumblings on social media that Ukraine might be nearing a breakthrough towards Svatove and Kreminna as Russian troops are getting hit hard right now as summarized in the article

[Oryxslayer]

I'm not saying Ukraine should cede any territory or sovereignty, but the calculus is not as simple as posters here are making it out to be. I'd obviously prefer for our countries to provide more aid to make that calculus simpler, but this dilemma is to be considered from Ukraine's perspective, not that of an allied state.

The collapse in Kharkiv and the retreat from Kherson have left us vulnerable to recency bias, but Kherson was a distinctly disadvantageous position for Russia and the Kharkiv collapse was/is being addressed by mobilisation (which is likely to continue ramping up until some time between February and June). For a number of reasons which I won't go into for now, it's far from certain that Ukraine would win back - or even hold - all of its territories by force if the war went on. This is assuming the level of support for Ukraine was maintained, but even that in itself would not be certain, because it'd depend on unreliable foreign partners.

Beyond the military dimension, continuation of war imposes costs on Ukraine. Deaths, economic destruction, psychological damage; over time, war rots the psyche of a people suffering from it. Even if we are to assume that Ukraine could take back all of its land, this wouldn't bring back the kidnapped Ukrainians, provide reparations or end the Russian shelling/missile strikes (and the associated reluctance to invest). I hope Ukraine retakes all its land - but even if it did this by force, Russia would not simply give up. Regardless of how successful they are on the battlefield, there will have to be negotiations to bring the conflict to a close - and the kidnapped people home.

I think the issue with the above, which is no doubt why said takes are a little unpopular, is right now true negotiated peace in whatever form can only come by dragging Putin to the table or waiting and hope the pressure causes him to "fall" out a window and the new guy (even if he's another thug) wants to break with his predecessor. So while I hope and pray for equally-footed negotiations at some point, rather than negotiations between unequal parties, right now the only options are total liberation or partial capitulation. And only one of those is acceptable.

[Meclazine for Israel]

Perth businessman Andrew Forrest to donate $750 million dollars to help re-build Ukraine infrastructure.

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-11-17/andrew-forrest-rebuilding-ukraine-744-million/101667346

"With support from other global investors, Tattarang expects the fund to grow to at least $US100 billion, to be poured into primary infrastructure including energy and communications."

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

I've refrained from posting Mearsheimer's hot takes because the man has every incentive to attempt a defence of his credibility in the twilight of his academic career. However, his interviews are getting weirder: https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/john-mearsheimer-on-putins-ambitions-after-nine-months-of-war

[Torie]

I've refrained from posting Mearsheimer's hot takes because the man has every incentive to attempt a defence of his credibility in the twilight of his academic career. However, his interviews are getting weirder: https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/john-mearsheimer-on-putins-ambitions-after-nine-months-of-war

It was a strange conversation, and he was certainly very testy. It does not matter really at this point whether Putin's motive was anti-Nato, or just to control the Black Sea for strategic reasons, or because he is an imperialist and thinks much of Ukraine is Russified enough to make it work as part of Russia. I think it is probably true Putin would have been satisfied with Ukraine being a puppet state like Belarus. But that was not in the cards, so that is also irrelevant.

The one interesting thing he said, is that Putin may well use nukes if Russia is losing the war and being expelled from Ukraine. He offers up no evidence of that, and I think he is full of sh**t most probably. It is more likely that if Putin thinks he is losing the game, and decides he is just going to toss up the game board, and destroy everything, or even try to use baby nukes that won't work too well, risk radiation blowing into Russia, and probably cause China and India to cut if off, before Putin goes there he will be killed.

[Mopsus]

I've refrained from posting Mearsheimer's hot takes because the man has every incentive to attempt a defence of his credibility in the twilight of his academic career. However, his interviews are getting weirder: https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/john-mearsheimer-on-putins-ambitions-after-nine-months-of-war

Are you sure this isn’t an interview with TimTurner?

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Kofman's forecast post-Kherson: https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/the-liberation-of-kherson/

- The grain deal is unfinished business
- Offensives will slow down for the next couple of months. Ukraine will want to launch an offensive after that; Russia is likely to wait four months instead. Whoever launches it will depend on the results of the upcoming attritional warfare
 - Russia will want to bring its mobilised forces and repaired equipment online, and may be suffering from a general lack of ammunition, in which case they'll also want ship in lots of ammunition from the likes of North Korea
- Ukraine will want to create more cohesive units (potentially with the help of more weapons) and keep the initiative with disruptive tactics until it is ready to launch an offensive
- Bakhmut is probably going nowhere. Other offensives are to secure positional gains for the months to come
- The infrastructure destruction campaign is Russia's most competent since the early phase of the war
- The biggest challenge for Ukraine's supporters is air defence, especially ammunition (he has earlier said there is a real possibility they're running low on ammunition for their pre-existing air defences, which are pretty advanced, effective, and numerous). The next biggest challenges are protected mobility and helping the country weather the infrastructure campaign

[😥]

https://twitter.com/Acyn/status/1593351982516867072?t=mWIs2Z8pMOAcb4A8ikAi-w&...

What a dumb racist person. She needs to be nowhere near the Congress. I wonder why I missed that immigrants came to US on tanksx killed tens of thousands of innocent civillians, destroyed infrastructure and wiped out of the earth hundreds of cities and villages

[Frodo]

I think in addition to launching an offensive from Zaporizhzhia to Melitopol, the Ukrainian army would be wise to make a simultaneous offensive further east, first taking the city of Donetsk, and then attack Mariupol from there, cutting off Russian attempts to reinforce and supply their forces overland, then conduct mopping-up operations on that land bridge ridding it of all remaining Russian forces before pressing on to Kherson oblast and making it ultimately to the gates of Crimea:  



I assume though these will wait for spring.  

An offense on Donetsk will be quite difficult as it is the most fortified region Russia has as they had built up trenches and fortifications since 2014 in that region. Any offense in that region would have to come after the aforementioned Mariupol offensive spilts Russia lines in half and the hitting that region from the side

Point taken on Donetsk city, though I was envisioning Sherman's Atlanta campaign when I typed that, and not a direct frontal assault on the city itself.

In any case, I am still insisting that when Ukraine has had a chance to rest and recuperate, the taking of Mariupol (and subsequently cutting off Russia's access to its 'land-bridge') should take precedence before any offensive is taken further west on Melitopol.  

Edit: Which would make the taking of Melitopol much easier -in fact, once Russian forces stuck on the land-bridge realize they are cut off and isolated, I am willing to bet they will abandon Melitopol and the rest of mainland Ukraine, fleeing to Crimea instead.  So much of the action after Mariupol could possibly be more a matter of mopping up and restoring Ukrainian sovereignty than another full-blown offensive.  

Mariupol is the key -take it, and the rest will follow. The ultimate object is to force Russia at the negotiating table to choose between keeping the Donbas (namely Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) or Crimea.  I think they would rather keep Crimea, which would work to Ukraine's advantage since the Donbas is more economically important.  

[I spent the winter writing songs about getting better]

[CanadianDemocrat]

Kofman's forecast post-Kherson: https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/the-liberation-of-kherson/

- The grain deal is unfinished business
- Offensives will slow down for the next couple of months. Ukraine will want to launch an offensive after that; Russia is likely to wait four months instead. Whoever launches it will depend on the results of the upcoming attritional warfare
 - Russia will want to bring its mobilised forces and repaired equipment online, and may be suffering from a general lack of ammunition, in which case they'll also want ship in lots of ammunition from the likes of North Korea
- Ukraine will want to create more cohesive units (potentially with the help of more weapons) and keep the initiative with disruptive tactics until it is ready to launch an offensive
- Bakhmut is probably going nowhere. Other offensives are to secure positional gains for the months to come
- The infrastructure destruction campaign is Russia's most competent since the early phase of the war
- The biggest challenge for Ukraine's supporters is air defence, especially ammunition (he has earlier said there is a real possibility they're running low on ammunition for their pre-existing air defences, which are pretty advanced, effective, and numerous). The next biggest challenges are protected mobility and helping the country weather the infrastructure campaign

The fall mud season is worse for offensives then winter. Ukraine is waiting until winter when the ground freezes before launching a counter offensive. Ukraine has the imitative, so the mud has slowed down their counter offensives in Luhansk.

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the fall mud was worse then the winter. Germany had to stop the Moscow offensive until the ground froze in the winter.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Kofman's forecast post-Kherson: https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/the-liberation-of-kherson/

- The grain deal is unfinished business
- Offensives will slow down for the next couple of months. Ukraine will want to launch an offensive after that; Russia is likely to wait four months instead. Whoever launches it will depend on the results of the upcoming attritional warfare
 - Russia will want to bring its mobilised forces and repaired equipment online, and may be suffering from a general lack of ammunition, in which case they'll also want ship in lots of ammunition from the likes of North Korea
- Ukraine will want to create more cohesive units (potentially with the help of more weapons) and keep the initiative with disruptive tactics until it is ready to launch an offensive
- Bakhmut is probably going nowhere. Other offensives are to secure positional gains for the months to come
- The infrastructure destruction campaign is Russia's most competent since the early phase of the war
- The biggest challenge for Ukraine's supporters is air defence, especially ammunition (he has earlier said there is a real possibility they're running low on ammunition for their pre-existing air defences, which are pretty advanced, effective, and numerous). The next biggest challenges are protected mobility and helping the country weather the infrastructure campaign

The fall mud season is worse for offensives then winter. Ukraine is waiting until winter when the ground freezes before launching a counter offensive. Ukraine has the imitative, so the mud is worse for them.

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the fall mud was worse then the winter. Germany had to stop the Moscow offensive until the ground froze in the winter.

This is true, but he didn’t say that they’d slow down only because of winter. There are reasons besides that for both sides to pause. For Ukraine - troops probably needed some time for R&R/reorganisation after the Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives, gains must be consolidated, etc.

He also said that the next offensive, whether Russian or Ukrainian, would probably occur in the  south rather than e.g. Kharkiv (for the Russians) or Luhansk (for the Ukrainians). The Russian lines in the south have been quite stable east of the Dnieper, and will take time to soften up - hence the expectation of attritional warfare before any Ukrainian offensive there.

[Person Man]

Basically just Ice Age Mexico.

[Torie]

I think in addition to launching an offensive from Zaporizhzhia to Melitopol, the Ukrainian army would be wise to make a simultaneous offensive further east, first taking the city of Donetsk, and then attack Mariupol from there, cutting off Russian attempts to reinforce and supply their forces overland, then conduct mopping-up operations on that land bridge ridding it of all remaining Russian forces before pressing on to Kherson oblast and making it ultimately to the gates of Crimea:  



I assume though these will wait for spring.  

An offense on Donetsk will be quite difficult as it is the most fortified region Russia has as they had built up trenches and fortifications since 2014 in that region. Any offense in that region would have to come after the aforementioned Mariupol offensive spilts Russia lines in half and the hitting that region from the side

Point taken on Donetsk city, though I was envisioning Sherman's Atlanta campaign when I typed that, and not a direct frontal assault on the city itself.

In any case, I am still insisting that when Ukraine has had a chance to rest and recuperate, the taking of Mariupol (and subsequently cutting off Russia's access to its 'land-bridge') should take precedence before any offensive is taken further west on Melitopol.  

Edit: Which would make the taking of Melitopol much easier -in fact, once Russian forces stuck on the land-bridge realize they are cut off and isolated, I am willing to bet they will abandon Melitopol and the rest of mainland Ukraine, fleeing to Crimea instead.  So much of the action after Mariupol could possibly be more a matter of mopping up and restoring Ukrainian sovereignty than another full-blown offensive.  

Mariupol is the key -take it, and the rest will follow. The ultimate object is to force Russia at the negotiating table to choose between keeping the Donbas (namely Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) or Crimea.  I think they would rather keep Crimea, which would work to Ukraine's advantage since the Donbas is more economically important.  

Why do you think it would be easier (or wiser or both) for Ukraine to take Mariupol rather than Melitopol (unfortunate that the names are so similar - I have gotten them mixed up myself)? Taking either one would cut off the land bridge to Crimea.

[Frodo]

I think in addition to launching an offensive from Zaporizhzhia to Melitopol, the Ukrainian army would be wise to make a simultaneous offensive further east, first taking the city of Donetsk, and then attack Mariupol from there, cutting off Russian attempts to reinforce and supply their forces overland, then conduct mopping-up operations on that land bridge ridding it of all remaining Russian forces before pressing on to Kherson oblast and making it ultimately to the gates of Crimea:  



I assume though these will wait for spring.  

An offense on Donetsk will be quite difficult as it is the most fortified region Russia has as they had built up trenches and fortifications since 2014 in that region. Any offense in that region would have to come after the aforementioned Mariupol offensive spilts Russia lines in half and the hitting that region from the side

Point taken on Donetsk city, though I was envisioning Sherman's Atlanta campaign when I typed that, and not a direct frontal assault on the city itself.

In any case, I am still insisting that when Ukraine has had a chance to rest and recuperate, the taking of Mariupol (and subsequently cutting off Russia's access to its 'land-bridge') should take precedence before any offensive is taken further west on Melitopol.  

Edit: Which would make the taking of Melitopol much easier -in fact, once Russian forces stuck on the land-bridge realize they are cut off and isolated, I am willing to bet they will abandon Melitopol and the rest of mainland Ukraine, fleeing to Crimea instead.  So much of the action after Mariupol could possibly be more a matter of mopping up and restoring Ukrainian sovereignty than another full-blown offensive.  

Mariupol is the key -take it, and the rest will follow. The ultimate object is to force Russia at the negotiating table to choose between keeping the Donbas (namely Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) or Crimea.  I think they would rather keep Crimea, which would work to Ukraine's advantage since the Donbas is more economically important.  

Why do you think it would be easier (or wiser or both) for Ukraine to take Mariupol rather than Melitopol (unfortunate that the names are so similar - I have gotten them mixed up myself)? Taking either one would cut off the land bridge to Crimea.

By taking Mariupol, you liberate much more Ukrainian territory (getting rid of that red belt on the map), prevent Russian reinforcements and supplies from Donetsk and Luhansk from reaching the land-bridge, and demoralize those Russian units that are already there once they realize they are isolated and cut off.  That in turn would make the taking of Melitopol much less of a hurdle in the meantime, putting Ukraine in a much more commanding position than it is now when it comes time for negotiations.  

Also, you and I have very different conceptions on what the land-bridge is.  You are thinking of Russian land access to Crimea primarily covering Kherson oblast -I am thinking of the much broader region stretching from Kherson to Donetsk.  And I think that's what Putin had in mind too, otherwise why conquer it?