Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

https://twitter.com/HawleyMO/status/1488926785848946692

The crux of his argument lies in the odd assertion that the US cannot fulfil its obligations in Europe while also countering the increasing military threat posed by China. I thought the US was able to win a world war with major theaters in Europe and Asia. Maybe I'm just losing my marbles but, didn't the US also work to contain Communism in Europe and Asia during the Cold War? Didn't that effort involve massive military commitments in both regions?

The correlation of forces in the world is not as favorable to the USA as it was in the Cold War.  And even in the Cold War, the USA roped in the PRC as a de facto ally against the USSR. 

His argument mostly matches my own proposal for the USA strategy which is to do everything to break the PRC-Russia alliance.  If that means demarkating a Russian sphere of influence that sounds reasonable given Russia's Great Power status. The USA should seek to be on friendlier terms with every Great Power in the world than they are with each other.  That is how the USA will maintain its relative power in an era where its relative strength has dimished since the 1990s.

I don't disagree.
I think China+Russia is too big of a coalition against us as well and it's a problem.

[StateBoiler]

https://twitter.com/HawleyMO/status/1488926785848946692

The crux of his argument lies in the odd assertion that the US cannot fulfil its obligations in Europe while also countering the increasing military threat posed by China. I thought the US was able to win a world war with major theaters in Europe and Asia. Maybe I'm just losing my marbles but, didn't the US also work to contain Communism in Europe and Asia during the Cold War? Didn't that effort involve massive military commitments in both regions?

The correlation of forces in the world is not as favorable to the USA as it was in the Cold War.  And even in the Cold War, the USA roped in the PRC as a de facto ally against the USSR.  

His argument mostly matches my own proposal for the USA strategy which is to do everything to break the PRC-Russia alliance.  If that means demarkating a Russian sphere of influence that sounds reasonable given Russia's Great Power status.

There's never going to be a majority of politicians from both parties that will agree to that until there are vast changes to the geopolitical system that makes it unrecognizable to its current state.

[Statilius the Epicurean]

But your starting point is that the Russian build-up is proof of some sort of invasion.  I disagree.  I read the Russian buildup as a defensive measure.

The deployment of multiple Iskander missile brigades, amphibious landing ships sailing from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the movement of units from the Eastern Military District at other end of Eurasia, 30,000 troops in Belarus, the mobilisation of Rosgvardia (including in the past day Chechen regiments?), the full picture is not defensive. Russia is deploying its military on the Ukraine border in the exact manner it would do if it intended to launch an unprovoked full invasion of all of Ukraine's territory. That doesn't mean Russia necessarily intends to do so, but that is the manner of its buildup. It cannot be reasonably described as defensive.

I think Russia views  Nord Stream 2 coming online will mean Ukraine will get more desperate and try to start something with the breakaway the Republics to try to create a crisis.

Ukraine launching an offensive in Donbas would do nothing to address Nord Stream, and in fact only make it more likely that Germany would certify it, whereas Russia's current military buildup makes it less likely that Germany will certify. So this is backwards logic.

In the broader view, it would make even less sense for Ukraine to escalate militarily in 2022 when it is in the middle of a military reorganisation to meet NATO standards, is only just developing ballistic missiles to hit Russian cities and has only just purchased Turkish drones of the sort that were decisive in the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020. The military balance between Ukraine and Russia is improving for Ukraine year-on-year and this is a major reason why Russia is contemplating an invasion now. Conversely it makes no sense for Ukraine to escalate today when Russia proved in 2014-15 that it currently has escalation dominance (which forced Ukraine into the Minsk agreements).

The Russian buildup under stuck a framework could be read as a measure to deter possible aggressive moves from Ukraine and pressure Ukraine to open talks with the breakaway Republics as per Minsk Agreement.

There is no diplomatic pressure on Ukraine from Russia. In fact Russia depreciated the idea of negotiating with Ukraine (and European countries and NATO) and demanded direct talks with the US over the general security architecture in Europe. This indicates that Russia does not care about Minsk implementation and is only interested in something bigger: US and Western recognition that all of Ukraine is under Russia's exclusive "sphere of influence".

So under this way of looking at things Ukraine knows there is no invasion and when the invasion threat is pushed so high that their economy is impacted they get angry.

I'm not sure how much this is public relations and how much the downplaying of invasion last week matches Ukraine's objective assessment of Russia's actions. Zelensky did not seem to be acting as if there is no threat of invasion when he met with Boris yesterday.

https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1488572771412193285

[jaichind]

Minsk was dead within a month of its signature as no one lived up to it. It's a failed treaty.

 

You are getting Minsk I mixed up with Minsk II. Minsk II which was signed in Feb 2015 which did hold up in terms of ending fighting does have within it

"Constitutional reform in Ukraine, with a new constitution to come into effect by the end of 2015, the key element of which is decentralisation (taking into account peculiarities of particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, agreed with representatives of these districts), and also approval of permanent legislation on the special status of particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in accordance with the measures spelt out in the attached footnote,[note 1] by the end of 2015."

[Storr]

https://twitter.com/HawleyMO/status/1488926785848946692

The crux of his argument lies in the odd assertion that the US cannot fulfil its obligations in Europe while also countering the increasing military threat posed by China. I thought the US was able to win a world war with major theaters in Europe and Asia. Maybe I'm just losing my marbles but, didn't the US also work to contain Communism in Europe and Asia during the Cold War? Didn't that effort involve massive military commitments in both regions?

The correlation of forces in the world is not as favorable to the USA as it was in the Cold War.  And even in the Cold War, the USA roped in the PRC as a de facto ally against the USSR.  

His argument mostly matches my own proposal for the USA strategy which is to do everything to break the PRC-Russia alliance.  If that means demarkating a Russian sphere of influence that sounds reasonable given Russia's Great Power status. The USA should seek to be on friendlier terms with every Great Power in the world than they are with each other.  That is how the USA will maintain its relative power in an era where its relative strength has dimished since the 1990s.

I don't disagree.
I think China+Russia is too big of a coalition against us as well and it's a problem.

The China-Russia alliance is one factor why I was disappointed the TPP was scuttled. The US needs to do more than just renaming the military command for the region from "Pacific" to "Indo-Pacific". Creating an Asian NATO has long been floated among academics, but I doubt there will be a willingness to do so unless China does something blatantly aggressive (such as invading Taiwan). The lack of interest is mostly due to lingering disputes/issues between possible members (S. Korea and Japan for example) and China's overall increasingly dominant influence over the region. China would make all efforts to prevent SE Asian nations from joining.

Edit: Not to mention the incredibly faricial failure which was SEATO, created in the lead up to American intervention in Vietnam.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

https://twitter.com/HawleyMO/status/1488926785848946692

The crux of his argument lies in the odd assertion that the US cannot fulfil its obligations in Europe while also countering the increasing military threat posed by China. I thought the US was able to win a world war with major theaters in Europe and Asia. Maybe I'm just losing my marbles but, didn't the US also work to contain Communism in Europe and Asia during the Cold War? Didn't that effort involve massive military commitments in both regions?

The correlation of forces in the world is not as favorable to the USA as it was in the Cold War.  And even in the Cold War, the USA roped in the PRC as a de facto ally against the USSR.  

His argument mostly matches my own proposal for the USA strategy which is to do everything to break the PRC-Russia alliance.  If that means demarkating a Russian sphere of influence that sounds reasonable given Russia's Great Power status. The USA should seek to be on friendlier terms with every Great Power in the world than they are with each other.  That is how the USA will maintain its relative power in an era where its relative strength has dimished since the 1990s.

I don't disagree.
I think China+Russia is too big of a coalition against us as well and it's a problem.

The China-Russia alliance is one factor why I was disappointed the TPP was scuttled. The US needs to do more than just renaming the military command for the region from "Pacific" to "Indo-Pacific". Creating an Asian NATO has long been floated among academics, but I doubt there will be a willingness to do so unless China does something blatantly aggressive (such as invading Taiwan). Since there are lingering disputes/issues between possible members (S. Korea and Japan for example) and China's overall increasingly dominant influence over the region. China would make all efforts to prevent SE Asian nations from joining.

The single biggest issue with an Asian NATO is this: the situation in the Asia-Pacific has more factors to consider than Europe does, on balance. Japan has conflicts with China but actually mainly with SK. SK and Japan are conflicted with NK (more the latter than the former under the left government, but that changes if the right takes control). India, while receptive to working with Japan and us, treasures its strategic autonomy and neutrality. Australia is very reliant on Chinese university students, as Australia's world-class universities are where the Chinese elite takes its children. Also Australia's mines are basically controlled (and needed) by China, so Beijing will keep a tight lid on that as well.

Then you have a Non-Aligned tradition in the region, with many players in the area wheeling and dealing and working with China, Washington, Tokyo, etc., on an issue-by-issue basis.

Force-fitting a NATO framework onto Eastern Asia looks nice and paper and would be a great accomplishment. But it's also very difficult to bring about on the first place, maybe even if China took Taiwan. Eastern Asia has a lot of players with their own interests.

Sure, there are differences between players here. For example, Japan and China are competing for soft power in Africa, India and China are competing for the support of the Arab World's bigwigs, et cetera. But that's not enough to make an East Asian NATO a workable goal.

Like you, I was disappointed that TPP was scuttled. I believe we need to confront China, and we lost credibility there. The steps the administration is doing to tighten relationships with Japan, India, and Australia are good by-and-large (though I'd be careful to maintain ties with Burma and Pakistan just to be safe), but it'd be good if we got a very good operative framework in the long-term, with bipartisan backing. China is a powerful opponent that is going to be potentially very powerful in the future, evenmoreso than now. We aren't an Asian country, but we can be of assistance to Asian allies, and let them generally dictate how things work in broad strokes, in a flexible framework.

[Statilius the Epicurean]

The mollify Russia to encircle China idea is a tempting one but I think has a couple of big problems:

1) There's very little evidence that the Russian leadership is interested in allying with the West against China. Their ideal situation would be to have their own sphere of influence encompassing the former USSR that allows them to remain an independent great power actor and play China and the US off against each other. Actually committing to an alliance against China would expose Russia to military conflict with its largest and most powerful neighbour for what benefit?

2) The US/West would have to offer the Russian leadership regime security, i.e. opposing peaceful protests and muzzling free press and NGOs in Russia, Russia's sphere and at home. I don't think that's compatible with US and European countries remaining liberal democracies, or at least upholding liberal and democratic values. This is a fundamental unbridgeable divide that is probably the major factor driving Russia and China together as a club of autocracies who feel their regimes and nations are under threat by the values of the Western-led liberal international order.

If the US was happy enough sacrificing independent democratic allies and free speech for geopolitical benefit, then it could just as easily surrender Taiwan to China, shut up about Xinjiang and Tibet and negotiate an evolution of the international order to accommodate a grand bargain with China. In fact, given China's greater power that would probably make more sense than sacrificing it for the sake of Russian neutrality.

[StateBoiler]

Creating an Asian NATO has long been floated among academics, but I doubt there will be a willingness to do so unless China does something blatantly aggressive (such as invading Taiwan). The lack of interest is mostly due to lingering disputes/issues between possible members (S. Korea and Japan for example) and China's overall increasingly dominant influence over the region. China would make all efforts to prevent SE Asian nations from joining.

The reason the Quad is even a thing is because Australia and Japan really want it. India are engaged as well but have been more slow-moving on it than those two countries.

[StateBoiler]

The mollify Russia to encircle China idea is a tempting one but I think has a couple of big problems:

1) There's very little evidence that the Russian leadership is interested in allying with the West against China. Their ideal situation would be to have their own sphere of influence encompassing the former USSR that allows them to remain an independent great power actor and play China and the US off against each other. Actually committing to an alliance against China would expose Russia to military conflict with its largest and most powerful neighbour for what benefit?

There was some Chinese strategic thought in say the first half of Trump's presidency that they thought this was his goal. Become friends with Russia to use them to counter Chinese power. Regardless of if you think that was Trump's plan or not or whether he even had a plan, our foreign policy establishment ("the Blob" as Ben Rhodes calls them) was never going to accept that, fought him tooth and nail on it his whole presidency, and it didn't last past him leaving office. His "China are not a friend" stance did.

If the US was happy enough sacrificing independent democratic allies and free speech for geopolitical benefit, then it could just as easily surrender Taiwan to China, shut up about Xinjiang and Tibet and negotiate an evolution of the international order to accommodate a grand bargain with China. In fact, given China's greater power that would probably make more sense than sacrificing it for the sake of Russian neutrality.

In 2022, China is way more an existential threat to the future and livelihood of the people of the United States than Russia is, it's not close. I'm not talking in military terms either. Russia even when it was Soviet never had as a goal manipulate all our multinational corporations to not offend Chinese political sensibilities and a policy to put mass numbers of people in this country out of work. That does not excuse Russia invading Ukraine, but our first geopolitical priority should be China, not Russia.

[compucomp]

2) The US/West would have to offer the Russian leadership regime security, i.e. opposing peaceful protests and muzzling free press and NGOs in Russia, Russia's sphere and at home. I don't think that's compatible with US and European countries remaining liberal democracies, or at least upholding liberal and democratic values. This is a fundamental unbridgeable divide that is probably the major factor driving Russia and China together as a club of autocracies who feel their regimes and nations are under threat by the values of the Western-led liberal international order.

The whole "ally with Russia against China" concept is essentially a white supremacist meme, essentially unite all white Christian peoples to fight against the great Yellow Peril. White supremacists, including dabblers like Trump, really couldn't care less about your point #2 so to them it's not an impediment at all, in fact they probably prefer their government behave that way as long as it is on their side.

[○∙◄☻¥tπ[╪AV┼cVê└]

It seems very unlikely that Hungary would allow Ukraine to join NATO any time soon, so what's the big deal?

[StateBoiler]

The NATO and U.S. response to Russia was leaked to a Spanish newspaper, and the U.S. said it was real. Not much for the Russians in it.

https://www.politico.eu/article/us-nato-accuse-russia-provocative-troop-missile-deployments/

So what is this magical diplomacy answer the Ukrainians think will stop war? The Russians are not giving away anything and the Americans/NATO are not giving away anything.

[2952-0-0]

It seems very unlikely that Hungary would allow Ukraine to join NATO any time soon, so what's the big deal?

It's always one election away from a new policy. The next one is this April.

[Statilius the Epicurean]

If the US was happy enough sacrificing independent democratic allies and free speech for geopolitical benefit, then it could just as easily surrender Taiwan to China, shut up about Xinjiang and Tibet and negotiate an evolution of the international order to accommodate a grand bargain with China. In fact, given China's greater power that would probably make more sense than sacrificing it for the sake of Russian neutrality.

In 2022, China is way more an existential threat to the future and livelihood of the people of the United States than Russia is, it's not close. I'm not talking in military terms either. Russia even when it was Soviet never had as a goal manipulate all our multinational corporations to not offend Chinese political sensibilities and a policy to put mass numbers of people in this country out of work. That does not excuse Russia invading Ukraine, but our first geopolitical priority should be China, not Russia.

I agree. The problem is that if you concede to Russia its desire to remake the international order into one akin to the Concert of Europe, where great powers carve up the world into spheres of influence according to their strategic interest, abrogating smaller nations' right to democratic self-determination, with noninterference in domestic human rights issues as a fundamental principle, then you're already pretty much conceding what China's vision of the global order is also. What would there be to fight about?

2) The US/West would have to offer the Russian leadership regime security, i.e. opposing peaceful protests and muzzling free press and NGOs in Russia, Russia's sphere and at home. I don't think that's compatible with US and European countries remaining liberal democracies, or at least upholding liberal and democratic values. This is a fundamental unbridgeable divide that is probably the major factor driving Russia and China together as a club of autocracies who feel their regimes and nations are under threat by the values of the Western-led liberal international order.

The whole "ally with Russia against China" concept is essentially a white supremacist meme, essentially unite all white Christian peoples to fight against the great Yellow Peril. White supremacists, including dabblers like Trump, really couldn't care less about your point #2 so to them it's not an impediment at all, in fact they probably prefer their government behave that way as long as it is on their side.

Right. I think this misses that the current Russian leadership doesn't conceive of Russians as part of a universal brotherhood of white Christian people or whatever, but as a nation historically situated between East and West in a way that marks Russians off from the West culturally. Michael McFaul had a funny anecdote about this:
 

In March 2011, I was in the room during a meeting between then-Vice President Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin (who was then serving as Russia’s prime minister until he returned to the presidency not long thereafter). At one point, Putin told Biden (and I’m paraphrasing from memory), “You look at us and you see our skin and then assume we think like you. But we don’t.” To emphasize his point, Putin slid his index finger down his white cheek.

But sure. Josh Hawley would probably approve if the US government shut down Amnesty International to appease the Kremlin. It's possible such a view could eventually become mainstreamed in the Republican party post-Trump. But as above it conflicts with democracy promotion as a strategic weapon against China and opens the door to similar corporate self-censorship that US conservatives hate. It's just difficult for me to see such a vision cohere.

[Vaccinated Russian Bear]

https://twitter.com/VALERIEin140/status/1488624751098667008
Not that Hungary has a say there, but 😬

Well, stops NATO and the EU from being unanimous on anything.

In theory. But I'm pretty sure, that 10 mln Hungary can't do anything, even if they wished to. It's more symbolical.

[Vaccinated Russian Bear]

The mollify Russia to encircle China idea is a tempting one but I think has a couple of big problems:

1) There's very little evidence that the Russian leadership is interested in allying with the West against China. Their ideal situation would be to have their own sphere of influence encompassing the former USSR that allows them to remain an independent great power actor and play China and the US off against each other. Actually committing to an alliance against China would expose Russia to military conflict with its largest and most powerful neighbour for what benefit?

2) The US/West would have to offer the Russian leadership regime security, i.e. opposing peaceful protests and muzzling free press and NGOs in Russia, Russia's sphere and at home. I don't think that's compatible with US and European countries remaining liberal democracies, or at least upholding liberal and democratic values. This is a fundamental unbridgeable divide that is probably the major factor driving Russia and China together as a club of autocracies who feel their regimes and nations are under threat by the values of the Western-led liberal international order.

If the US was happy enough sacrificing independent democratic allies and free speech for geopolitical benefit, then it could just as easily surrender Taiwan to China, shut up about Xinjiang and Tibet and negotiate an evolution of the international order to accommodate a grand bargain with China. In fact, given China's greater power that would probably make more sense than sacrificing it for the sake of Russian neutrality.

Take arguments to extreme and then fight them.

allying with the West - enough with not allying with China. Just 10 years ago, there Russia was extremely suspicious of China and economically/technically totally independent. Still quite suspicious, but doesn't really has a choice.

The US/West would have to offer the Russian leadership regime security, i.e. opposing peaceful protests and muzzling free press and NGOs in Russia, Russia's sphere and at home. nuh, non-NATO/EU is enough. Denouncing "coup" against Yanukovych (after he already agreed on snap elections) would be enough. Moreover, it's basically what US does to Saudi, Paquies or whatnot.

The problem is that if you concede to Russia its desire to remake the international order into one akin to the Concert of Europe, where great powers carve up the world into spheres of influence according to their strategic interest

It's literally what it is. Do you really think, Ukraine is not in NATO, because of some requirements (imagine there was no frozen conflicts)? Obviously, it's because Russia won't let it happen. It's the reality. Just make it official.

[Vaccinated Russian Bear]

And it's not like it came out of the blue. Putin started to warn about NATO enlargemnt in 2005? Then you have Munchin speech in 2007.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U4MAsIh3zMA
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034

 Here's how US Ambassador to Russia summarized Russia's/Putin's/Lavrov said to (thank you Wikileaks) in 2008. Nice subject title of the email! Imo, pretty reasonalbe fears. Nevertheless, despite all the warnings Bush pushed for MAP for Ukraine and Georgia to NATO.


NYET MEANS NYET: RUSSIA'S NATO ENLARGEMENT REDLINES 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MOSCOW265_a.html

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000265
 
SIPDIS
 
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018
TAGS: PREL, NATO, UP, RS
SUBJECT: NYET MEANS NYET:  RUSSIA'S NATO ENLARGEMENT
REDLINES
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 147
     B. MOSCOW 182
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns.  Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Following a muted first reaction to
Ukraine's intent to seek a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)
at the Bucharest summit (ref A), Foreign Minister Lavrov and
other senior officials have reiterated strong opposition,
stressing that Russia would view further eastward expansion
as a potential military threat.  NATO enlargement,
particularly to Ukraine, remains "an emotional and neuralgic"
issue for Russia, but strategic policy considerations also
underlie strong opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and
Georgia.  In Ukraine, these include fears that the issue
could potentially split the country in two, leading to
violence or even, some claim, civil war, which would force
Russia to decide whether to intervene.  Additionally, the GOR
and experts continue to claim that Ukrainian NATO membership
would have a major impact on Russia's defense industry,
Russian-Ukrainian family connections, and bilateral relations
generally.  In Georgia, the GOR fears continued instability
and "provocative acts" in the separatist regions.  End
summary.
 
MFA: NATO Enlargement "Potential Military Threat to Russia"
--------------------------------------------- --------------
 
2.  (U) During his annual review of Russia's foreign policy
January 22-23 (ref B), Foreign Minister Lavrov stressed that
Russia had to view continued eastward expansion of NATO,
particularly to Ukraine and Georgia, as a potential military
threat.  While Russia might believe statements from the West
that NATO was not directed against Russia, when one looked at
recent military activities in NATO countries (establishment
of U.S. forward operating locations, etc. they had to be
evaluated not by stated intentions but by potential.  Lavrov
stressed that maintaining Russia's "sphere of influence" in
the neighborhood was anachronistic, and acknowledged that the
U.S. and Europe had "legitimate interests" in the region.
But, he argued, while countries were free to make their own
decisions about their security and which political-military
structures to join, they needed to keep in mind the impact on
their neighbors.
 
3.  (U) Lavrov emphasized that Russia was convinced that
enlargement was not based on security reasons, but was a
legacy of the Cold War.  He disputed arguments that NATO was
an appropriate mechanism for helping to strengthen democratic
governments.  He said that Russia understood that NATO was in
search of a new mission, but there was a growing tendency for
new members to do and say whatever they wanted simply because
they were under the NATO umbrella (e.g. attempts of some new
member countries to "rewrite history and glorify fascists").
 
4.  (U) During a press briefing January 22 in response to a
question about Ukraine's request for a MAP, the MFA said "a
radical new expansion of NATO may bring about a serious
political-military shift that will inevitably affect the
security interests of Russia."  The spokesman went on to
stress that Russia was bound with Ukraine by bilateral
obligations set forth in the 1997 Treaty on Friendship,
Cooperation and Partnership in which both parties undertook
to "refrain from participation in or support of any actions
capable of prejudicing the security of the other Side."  The
spokesman noted that Ukraine's "likely integration into NATO
would seriously complicate the many-sided Russian-Ukrainian
relations," and that Russia would "have to take appropriate
measures."  The spokesman added that "one has the impression
that the present Ukrainian leadership regards rapprochement
with NATO largely as an alternative to good-neighborly ties
with the Russian Federation."
 
Russian Opposition Neuralgic and Concrete
-----------------------------------------
 
5.  (C) Ukraine and Georgia's NATO aspirations not only touch
a raw nerve in Russia, they engender serious concerns about
the consequences for stability in the region.  Not only does
Russia perceive encirclement, and efforts to undermine
Russia's influence in the region, but it also fears
unpredictable and uncontrolled consequences which would
seriously affect Russian security interests.  Experts tell us
that Russia is particularly worried that the strong divisions
in Ukraine over NATO membership, with much of the
ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a
major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war.  In
that eventuality, Russia would have to decide whether to
 
intervene; a decision Russia does not want to have to face.
 
6.  (C) Dmitriy Trenin, Deputy Director of the Carnegie
Moscow Center, expressed concern that Ukraine was, in the
long-term, the most potentially destabilizing factor in
U.S.-Russian relations, given the level of emotion and
neuralgia triggered by its quest for NATO membership.  The
letter requesting MAP consideration had come as a "bad
surprise" to Russian officials, who calculated that Ukraine's
NATO aspirations were safely on the backburner.  With its
public letter, the issue had been "sharpened."  Because
membership remained divisive in Ukrainian domestic politics,
it created an opening for Russian intervention.  Trenin
expressed concern that elements within the Russian
establishment would be encouraged to meddle, stimulating U.S.
overt encouragement of opposing political forces, and leaving
the U.S. and Russia in a classic confrontational posture.
The irony, Trenin professed, was that Ukraine's membership
would defang NATO, but neither the Russian public nor elite
opinion was ready for that argument.  Ukraine's gradual shift
towards the West was one thing, its preemptive status as a de
jure U.S. military ally another.  Trenin cautioned strongly
against letting an internal Ukrainian fight for power, where
MAP was merely a lever in domestic politics,  further
complicate U.S.-Russian relations now.
 
7.  (C) Another issue driving Russian opposition to Ukrainian
membership is the significant defense industry cooperation
the two countries share, including a number of plants where
Russian weapons are made.  While efforts are underway to shut
down or move most of these plants to Russia, and to move the
Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk earlier than
the 2017 deadline, the GOR has made clear that Ukraine's
joining NATO would require Russia to make major (costly)
changes to its defense industrial cooperation.
 
8.  (C) Similarly, the GOR and experts note that there would
also be a significant impact on Russian-Ukrainian economic
and labor relations, including the effect on thousands of
Ukrainians living and working in Russia and vice versa, due
to the necessity of imposing a new visa regime.  This,
Aleksandr Konovalov, Director of the Institute for Strategic
Assessment, argued, would become a boiling cauldron of anger
and resentment among the local population.
 
9.  (C) With respect to Georgia, most experts said that while
not as neuralgic to Russia as Ukraine, the GOR viewed the
situation there as too unstable to withstand the divisiveness
NATO membership could cause.  Aleksey Arbatov, Deputy
Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, argued that Georgia's
NATO aspirations were simply a way to solve its problems in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and warned that Russia would be
put in a difficult situation were that to ensue.
 
Russia's Response
-----------------
 
10.  (C) The GOR has made it clear that it would have to
"seriously review" its entire relationship with Ukraine and
Georgia in the event of NATO inviting them to join.  This
could include major impacts on energy, economic, and
political-military engagement, with possible repercussions
throughout the region and into Central and Western Europe.
Russia would also likely revisit its own relationship with
the Alliance and activities in the NATO-Russia Council, and
consider further actions in the arms control arena, including
the possibility of complete withdrawal from the CFE and INF
Treaties, and more direct threats against U.S. missile
defense plans.
 
11.  (C) Isabelle Francois, Director of the NATO Information
Office in Moscow (protect), said she believed that Russia had
accepted that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join NATO
and was engaged in long-term planning to reconfigure its
relations with both countries, and with the Alliance.
However, Russia was not yet ready to deal with the
consequences of further NATO enlargement to its south.  She
added that while Russia liked the cooperation with NATO in
the NATO-Russia Council, Russia would feel it necessary to
insist on recasting the NATO-Russia relationship, if not
withdraw completely from the NRC, in the event of Ukraine and
Georgia joining NATO.
 
Comment
-------
 
12. (C) Russia's opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine
and Georgia is both emotional and based on perceived
 
strategic concerns about the impact on Russia's interests in
the region.  It is also politically popular to paint the U.S.
and NATO as Russia's adversaries and to use NATO's outreach
to Ukraine and Georgia as a means of generating support from
Russian nationalists.  While Russian opposition to the first
round of NATO enlargement in the mid-1990's was strong,
Russia now feels itself able to respond more forcefully to
what it perceives as actions contrary to its national
interests.
BURNS

[Absolution9]

https://twitter.com/HawleyMO/status/1488926785848946692

The crux of his argument lies in the odd assertion that the US cannot fulfil its obligations in Europe while also countering the increasing military threat posed by China. I thought the US was able to win a world war with major theaters in Europe and Asia. Maybe I'm just losing my marbles but, didn't the US also work to contain Communism in Europe and Asia during the Cold War? Didn't that effort involve massive military commitments in both regions?

In WWII the US had a similar population and 2x the GDP of Germany and Japan combined.  Also was allied with both the British Empire and the SU both of which were not drastically weaker than Germany. In this case China and Russia have 4.5x the US’s population and in PPP terms about 1.5x the US’s economy.  A challenge of a slightly different magnitude here.

[Storr]

The NATO and U.S. response to Russia was leaked to a Spanish newspaper, and the U.S. said it was real. Not much for the Russians in it.

https://www.politico.eu/article/us-nato-accuse-russia-provocative-troop-missile-deployments/

So what is this magical diplomacy answer the Ukrainians think will stop war? The Russians are not giving away anything and the Americans/NATO are not giving away anything.

It's obviously nowhere close to what Russia wants but at least the US mentioned a few areas for compromise: "The U.S. did offer to negotiate with Russia over reciprocal commitments “to refrain from deploying offensive ground-launched missile systems and permanent forces with a combat mission in the territory of Ukraine.”"

"Permanent forces with a combat mission" seems purposely opaque. Does that include US advisors to the Ukrainian military? The Russians wouldn't agree to anything that vague.

[Vaccinated Russian Bear]

https://twitter.com/thehill/status/1489022319083212804

Appeasing Zelensky?! 

[StateBoiler]

If the US was happy enough sacrificing independent democratic allies and free speech for geopolitical benefit, then it could just as easily surrender Taiwan to China, shut up about Xinjiang and Tibet and negotiate an evolution of the international order to accommodate a grand bargain with China. In fact, given China's greater power that would probably make more sense than sacrificing it for the sake of Russian neutrality.

In 2022, China is way more an existential threat to the future and livelihood of the people of the United States than Russia is, it's not close. I'm not talking in military terms either. Russia even when it was Soviet never had as a goal manipulate all our multinational corporations to not offend Chinese political sensibilities and a policy to put mass numbers of people in this country out of work. That does not excuse Russia invading Ukraine, but our first geopolitical priority should be China, not Russia.

I agree. The problem is that if you concede to Russia its desire to remake the international order into one akin to the Concert of Europe, where great powers carve up the world into spheres of influence according to their strategic interest, abrogating smaller nations' right to democratic self-determination, with noninterference in domestic human rights issues as a fundamental principle, then you're already pretty much conceding what China's vision of the global order is also. What would there be to fight about?

2) The US/West would have to offer the Russian leadership regime security, i.e. opposing peaceful protests and muzzling free press and NGOs in Russia, Russia's sphere and at home. I don't think that's compatible with US and European countries remaining liberal democracies, or at least upholding liberal and democratic values. This is a fundamental unbridgeable divide that is probably the major factor driving Russia and China together as a club of autocracies who feel their regimes and nations are under threat by the values of the Western-led liberal international order.

The whole "ally with Russia against China" concept is essentially a white supremacist meme, essentially unite all white Christian peoples to fight against the great Yellow Peril. White supremacists, including dabblers like Trump, really couldn't care less about your point #2 so to them it's not an impediment at all, in fact they probably prefer their government behave that way as long as it is on their side.

Right. I think this misses that the current Russian leadership doesn't conceive of Russians as part of a universal brotherhood of white Christian people or whatever, but as a nation historically situated between East and West in a way that marks Russians off from the West culturally. Michael McFaul had a funny anecdote about this:
 

In March 2011, I was in the room during a meeting between then-Vice President Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin (who was then serving as Russia’s prime minister until he returned to the presidency not long thereafter). At one point, Putin told Biden (and I’m paraphrasing from memory), “You look at us and you see our skin and then assume we think like you. But we don’t.” To emphasize his point, Putin slid his index finger down his white cheek.

But sure. Josh Hawley would probably approve if the US government shut down Amnesty International to appease the Kremlin. It's possible such a view could eventually become mainstreamed in the Republican party post-Trump. But as above it conflicts with democracy promotion as a strategic weapon against China and opens the door to similar corporate self-censorship that US conservatives hate. It's just difficult for me to see such a vision cohere.

Democracy promotion as a strategic weapon against autocracies died with Iraq and Afghanistan. The West en masse said they can't be bothered any longer.

[Statilius the Epicurean]

allying with the West - enough with not allying with China. Just 10 years ago, there Russia was extremely suspicious of China and economically/technically totally independent. Still quite suspicious, but doesn't really has a choice.

The US/West would have to offer the Russian leadership regime security, i.e. opposing peaceful protests and muzzling free press and NGOs in Russia, Russia's sphere and at home. nuh, non-NATO/EU is enough. Denouncing "coup" against Yanukovych (after he already agreed on snap elections) would be enough. Moreover, it's basically what US does to Saudi, Paquies or whatnot.

I think we just disagree on what it would take to detach Russia from China. If it was just no Ukraine in NATO/EU, well that's far too simple. Even today Russia is demanding bilateral US-Russia negotiations to overhaul the security architecture of all of Europe. And even if an agreement there were possible, it's doubtful to me that Russia is negotiating in good faith. It is making ad hoc demands that would take months if not years to fully negotiate and finalise, to only one of the parties, and only presenting them in response to US entrees to negotiate, well after the military buildup on Ukraine's border had begun and after it was called out by the US. So it doesn't seem like Russia believes a deal is really possible. I don't think there is enough trust on both sides for any grand bargin to happen, and that seems to be why Russia hasn't taken the diplomatic track very seriously. If one were to be possible, it appears Putin would rather grab Ukraine now and negotiate from a position of strength rather than deescalate and hope the West sticks to any agreement they sign.

But more generally, like I said above, I think Russia and the West have unbridgeable views on how great power politics should be conducted in the 21st century.

[OSR stands with Israel]

The mollify Russia to encircle China idea is a tempting one but I think has a couple of big problems:

1) There's very little evidence that the Russian leadership is interested in allying with the West against China. Their ideal situation would be to have their own sphere of influence encompassing the former USSR that allows them to remain an independent great power actor and play China and the US off against each other. Actually committing to an alliance against China would expose Russia to military conflict with its largest and most powerful neighbour for what benefit?

There was some Chinese strategic thought in say the first half of Trump's presidency that they thought this was his goal. Become friends with Russia to use them to counter Chinese power. Regardless of if you think that was Trump's plan or not or whether he even had a plan, our foreign policy establishment ("the Blob" as Ben Rhodes calls them) was never going to accept that, fought him tooth and nail on it his whole presidency, and it didn't last past him leaving office. His "China are not a friend" stance did.

If the US was happy enough sacrificing independent democratic allies and free speech for geopolitical benefit, then it could just as easily surrender Taiwan to China, shut up about Xinjiang and Tibet and negotiate an evolution of the international order to accommodate a grand bargain with China. In fact, given China's greater power that would probably make more sense than sacrificing it for the sake of Russian neutrality.

In 2022, China is way more an existential threat to the future and livelihood of the people of the United States than Russia is, it's not close. I'm not talking in military terms either. Russia even when it was Soviet never had as a goal manipulate all our multinational corporations to not offend Chinese political sensibilities and a policy to put mass numbers of people in this country out of work. That does not excuse Russia invading Ukraine, but our first geopolitical priority should be China, not Russia.

As big of a threat China is today, they still arent as big as the USSR were during the Cold War(and neither is Russia).

[○∙◄☻¥tπ[╪AV┼cVê└]

It seems very unlikely that Hungary would allow Ukraine to join NATO any time soon, so what's the big deal?

It's always one election away from a new policy. The next one is this April.

OK, maybe. But I really don't think Orban is the only NATO leader opposed to it. He's just more obvious than the others.

[jaichind]

 
I agree. The problem is that if you concede to Russia its desire to remake the international order into one akin to the Concert of Europe, where great powers carve up the world into spheres of influence according to their strategic interest, abrogating smaller nations' right to democratic self-determination, with noninterference in domestic human rights issues as a fundamental principle, then you're already pretty much conceding what China's vision of the global order is also. What would there be to fight about?

So your vision for USA foreign policy is really just a Western Left version of Jihad.  This sounds like a recipe for eternal conflict with a resonable risk of a Greater Power war.