Crime + punishment

[John Dule]

I struggle to believe that Christians actually say to themselves "well, this person was murdered, but at least she's in heaven now" and therefore hand down less punitive verdicts against murderers. This sounds like a parody of Christians that an edgy internet atheist might think up.

[Alcibiades]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

If an infinitely 'good' entity edicts eternal punishment, what actions would an infinitely 'bad' entity edict and how could you tell them apart?

     The question would be whether the edict is just or unjust. As Rfayette articulated above, sin is an offense against God, who rightfully possesses the authority to define moral law. As God is infinitely greater than us, an offense against His majesty merits an infinite punishment. That God is willing to forgive us for our sins at all is a powerful proof of His love and mercy.

I usually try to avoid sounding like, as John Dule puts it, an edgy internet atheist when debating these things, but the bolded part immediately struck me as the logic of an abuser.

Why, if God is omnibenevolent, does he condemn people to eternal torture with no possibility of redemption (for the thoughtcrime of not believing in him)? What is the point of this? Whom does it help? If I were a Christian, I actually think that the most philosophically consistent position to take would be universal salvation, although I accept this is not supported by scripture.

As an aside, it does make me somewhat uncomfortable that many Christians, who are perfectly pleasant when I interact with them, apparently believe I will suffer eternal torture after death on the basis of only one fact about me (that I am a nonbeliever). Fortunately, I am almost certain that this will not happen.

[Statilius the Epicurean]

I honestly don't see why biological predisposition or social conventions are any more problematic groundings for morality than the arbitrary* dictates of a supreme being.

*if not arbitrary then the standard is higher than God and you get the grounding problem of what exactly that is again

Not arbitrary. Given the idea that God is supreme and superior to us, then our inability to fully grasp morality’s workings stems from our own inferiority, not the arbitrary nature of morality.

Natural law has outpaced its critics on a cosmic scale. Even given that a biological predisposition can correctly create(NOT find) morality, then there is the whole question of natural laws aside from morality. The best explanation to the existence of laws within the universe is their creation by something outside of and superior to the universe. The sole alternative, that laws exist within the universe in and of themselves, poses a contradiction. Show me a nation with laws and no lawmaker and I will concede the possibility of a universe with laws and no lawmaker.

Most of this is unrelated to my point really.

Asserting the existence of natural law is no reason to believe in God. Plenty of atheists believe in natural law, many contemporary Kantian ethicists for example. This debate is about what grounds something like natural law, not whether it exists or not.

Saying that God is a superior being is also besides the point. You still have the grounding problem of getting an ought from an is no less than people who explain morality from biology do. If God murders someone for their own divine pleasure is that really automatically good because God did it? How is this not arbitrary?

The two are also contradictory. If natural law exists then God is subject to it, so he's not unfathomably morally superior as he can be judged by that standard.


Speaking generally, exactly how one gets morality out of God is an extremely thorny theological problem that has been debated for thousands of years and has received multiple different answers. There's no advantage to theism such that belief in God is preferable because by itself it solves our problem of where morality comes from.

[Associate Justice PiT]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

If an infinitely 'good' entity edicts eternal punishment, what actions would an infinitely 'bad' entity edict and how could you tell them apart?

     The question would be whether the edict is just or unjust. As Rfayette articulated above, sin is an offense against God, who rightfully possesses the authority to define moral law. As God is infinitely greater than us, an offense against His majesty merits an infinite punishment. That God is willing to forgive us for our sins at all is a powerful proof of His love and mercy.

I usually try to avoid sounding like, as John Dule puts it, an edgy internet atheist when debating these things, but the bolded part immediately struck me as the logic of an abuser.

Why, if God is omnibenevolent, does he condemn people to eternal torture with no possibility of redemption (for the thoughtcrime of not believing in him)? What is the point of this? Whom does it help? If I were a Christian, I actually think that the most philosophically consistent position to take would be universal salvation, although I accept this is not supported by scripture.

     The crime is not failing to believe in God, but transgressing the moral law which God has given to govern the world, which alienates one from God and makes us unfitting receptacles for His grace. He gave us His only-begotten Son as a sacrifice to take away our sins and redeem us from corruption and from death. If you do not crucify yourself to that sacrifice, then you remain in your sins, rendered unable by the stain upon you to enter into the bliss of Heaven. It bears noting that in the Christian eschatology, the judgment of the wicked is not something arbitrary that God could dispense with, but a necessary result of His plan coming to fruition.

As an aside, it does make me somewhat uncomfortable that many Christians, who are perfectly pleasant when I interact with them, apparently believe I will suffer eternal torture after death on the basis of only one fact about me (that I am a nonbeliever). Fortunately, I am almost certain that this will not happen.

     The reason for this is that most Christians don't actually want people to suffer eternal damnation. While universalists like Hart will often claim otherwise, we don't believe in damnation because we want people to suffer. If I were pleased to see the nonbelievers burn, I would simply go off and pray by myself and not concern myself with them. Christians place a heavy emphasis on preaching and evangelism because it is our hope to convince these people to repent of their sins and be saved.

[Alcibiades]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

If an infinitely 'good' entity edicts eternal punishment, what actions would an infinitely 'bad' entity edict and how could you tell them apart?

     The question would be whether the edict is just or unjust. As Rfayette articulated above, sin is an offense against God, who rightfully possesses the authority to define moral law. As God is infinitely greater than us, an offense against His majesty merits an infinite punishment. That God is willing to forgive us for our sins at all is a powerful proof of His love and mercy.

I usually try to avoid sounding like, as John Dule puts it, an edgy internet atheist when debating these things, but the bolded part immediately struck me as the logic of an abuser.

Why, if God is omnibenevolent, does he condemn people to eternal torture with no possibility of redemption (for the thoughtcrime of not believing in him)? What is the point of this? Whom does it help? If I were a Christian, I actually think that the most philosophically consistent position to take would be universal salvation, although I accept this is not supported by scripture.

     The crime is not failing to believe in God, but transgressing the moral law which God has given to govern the world, which alienates one from God and makes us unfitting receptacles for His grace. He gave us His only-begotten Son as a sacrifice to take away our sins and redeem us from corruption and from death. If you do not crucify yourself to that sacrifice, then you remain in your sins, rendered unable by the stain upon you to enter into the bliss of Heaven. It bears noting that in the Christian eschatology, the judgment of the wicked is not something arbitrary that God could dispense with, but a necessary result of His plan coming to fruition.

As an aside, it does make me somewhat uncomfortable that many Christians, who are perfectly pleasant when I interact with them, apparently believe I will suffer eternal torture after death on the basis of only one fact about me (that I am a nonbeliever). Fortunately, I am almost certain that this will not happen.

     The reason for this is that most Christians don't actually want people to suffer eternal damnation. While universalists like Hart will often claim otherwise, we don't believe in damnation because we want people to suffer. If I were pleased to see the nonbelievers burn, I would simply go off and pray by myself and not concern myself with them. Christians place a heavy emphasis on preaching and evangelism because it is our hope to convince these people to repent of their sins and be saved.

As far as I see it, there are two possible scenarios here:

a) God is omnipotent, so could save everyone if he wanted (without having to resort to relying on them to accept his son as their saviour), but he chooses not to; therefore, he is not omnibenevolent.
b) God is omnibenevolent, so would save everyone if he could, but is not able to do so, and the best he can do is hope that they accept his son as their saviour; therefore he is not omnipotent.

I don’t really see how you can reconcile God being both omnipotent and omnibenevolent without universal salvation.

[John Dule]

My new favorite game is to read posts from Atlas Christians while replacing "God" with "Q."

[Associate Justice PiT]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

If an infinitely 'good' entity edicts eternal punishment, what actions would an infinitely 'bad' entity edict and how could you tell them apart?

     The question would be whether the edict is just or unjust. As Rfayette articulated above, sin is an offense against God, who rightfully possesses the authority to define moral law. As God is infinitely greater than us, an offense against His majesty merits an infinite punishment. That God is willing to forgive us for our sins at all is a powerful proof of His love and mercy.

I usually try to avoid sounding like, as John Dule puts it, an edgy internet atheist when debating these things, but the bolded part immediately struck me as the logic of an abuser.

Why, if God is omnibenevolent, does he condemn people to eternal torture with no possibility of redemption (for the thoughtcrime of not believing in him)? What is the point of this? Whom does it help? If I were a Christian, I actually think that the most philosophically consistent position to take would be universal salvation, although I accept this is not supported by scripture.

     The crime is not failing to believe in God, but transgressing the moral law which God has given to govern the world, which alienates one from God and makes us unfitting receptacles for His grace. He gave us His only-begotten Son as a sacrifice to take away our sins and redeem us from corruption and from death. If you do not crucify yourself to that sacrifice, then you remain in your sins, rendered unable by the stain upon you to enter into the bliss of Heaven. It bears noting that in the Christian eschatology, the judgment of the wicked is not something arbitrary that God could dispense with, but a necessary result of His plan coming to fruition.

As an aside, it does make me somewhat uncomfortable that many Christians, who are perfectly pleasant when I interact with them, apparently believe I will suffer eternal torture after death on the basis of only one fact about me (that I am a nonbeliever). Fortunately, I am almost certain that this will not happen.

     The reason for this is that most Christians don't actually want people to suffer eternal damnation. While universalists like Hart will often claim otherwise, we don't believe in damnation because we want people to suffer. If I were pleased to see the nonbelievers burn, I would simply go off and pray by myself and not concern myself with them. Christians place a heavy emphasis on preaching and evangelism because it is our hope to convince these people to repent of their sins and be saved.

As far as I see it, there are two possible scenarios here:

a) God is omnipotent, so could save everyone if he wanted (without having to resort to relying on them to accept his son as their saviour), but he chooses not to; therefore, he is not omnibenevolent.
b) God is omnibenevolent, so would save everyone if he could, but is not able to do so, and the best he can do is hope that they accept his son as their saviour; therefore he is not omnipotent.

I don’t really see how you can reconcile God being both omnipotent and omnibenevolent without universal salvation.

     This goes back to my first post in this thread, where I said there is no contradiction as long as you do not force modern liberal morality on God. God created humanity as the crown of His creation, with the capacity to choose to do good and follow Him willingly, entering into sonship by His grace. If God were to force people to choose Him who had in their lives rejected Him to the very end, that would defeat the purpose of creating humanity, as at that point we would no longer be moral actors in the true sense. By laying out the plan that He has ordained, He works towards an end far better and more glorious than a mere maximization of human happiness.

[Alcibiades]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

If an infinitely 'good' entity edicts eternal punishment, what actions would an infinitely 'bad' entity edict and how could you tell them apart?

     The question would be whether the edict is just or unjust. As Rfayette articulated above, sin is an offense against God, who rightfully possesses the authority to define moral law. As God is infinitely greater than us, an offense against His majesty merits an infinite punishment. That God is willing to forgive us for our sins at all is a powerful proof of His love and mercy.

I usually try to avoid sounding like, as John Dule puts it, an edgy internet atheist when debating these things, but the bolded part immediately struck me as the logic of an abuser.

Why, if God is omnibenevolent, does he condemn people to eternal torture with no possibility of redemption (for the thoughtcrime of not believing in him)? What is the point of this? Whom does it help? If I were a Christian, I actually think that the most philosophically consistent position to take would be universal salvation, although I accept this is not supported by scripture.

     The crime is not failing to believe in God, but transgressing the moral law which God has given to govern the world, which alienates one from God and makes us unfitting receptacles for His grace. He gave us His only-begotten Son as a sacrifice to take away our sins and redeem us from corruption and from death. If you do not crucify yourself to that sacrifice, then you remain in your sins, rendered unable by the stain upon you to enter into the bliss of Heaven. It bears noting that in the Christian eschatology, the judgment of the wicked is not something arbitrary that God could dispense with, but a necessary result of His plan coming to fruition.

As an aside, it does make me somewhat uncomfortable that many Christians, who are perfectly pleasant when I interact with them, apparently believe I will suffer eternal torture after death on the basis of only one fact about me (that I am a nonbeliever). Fortunately, I am almost certain that this will not happen.

     The reason for this is that most Christians don't actually want people to suffer eternal damnation. While universalists like Hart will often claim otherwise, we don't believe in damnation because we want people to suffer. If I were pleased to see the nonbelievers burn, I would simply go off and pray by myself and not concern myself with them. Christians place a heavy emphasis on preaching and evangelism because it is our hope to convince these people to repent of their sins and be saved.

As far as I see it, there are two possible scenarios here:

a) God is omnipotent, so could save everyone if he wanted (without having to resort to relying on them to accept his son as their saviour), but he chooses not to; therefore, he is not omnibenevolent.
b) God is omnibenevolent, so would save everyone if he could, but is not able to do so, and the best he can do is hope that they accept his son as their saviour; therefore he is not omnipotent.

I don’t really see how you can reconcile God being both omnipotent and omnibenevolent without universal salvation.

     This goes back to my first post in this thread, where I said there is no contradiction as long as you do not force modern liberal morality on God. God created humanity as the crown of His creation, with the capacity to choose to do good and follow Him willingly, entering into sonship by His grace. If God were to force people to choose Him who had in their lives rejected Him to the very end, that would defeat the purpose of creating humanity, as at that point we would no longer be moral actors in the true sense. By laying out the plan that He has ordained, He works towards an end far better and more glorious than a mere maximization of human happiness.

But why does the alternative to heaven have to be fiery damnation? And what is the “end far better and more glorious than a mere maximisation of human happiness”?

[Associate Justice PiT]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

If an infinitely 'good' entity edicts eternal punishment, what actions would an infinitely 'bad' entity edict and how could you tell them apart?

     The question would be whether the edict is just or unjust. As Rfayette articulated above, sin is an offense against God, who rightfully possesses the authority to define moral law. As God is infinitely greater than us, an offense against His majesty merits an infinite punishment. That God is willing to forgive us for our sins at all is a powerful proof of His love and mercy.

I usually try to avoid sounding like, as John Dule puts it, an edgy internet atheist when debating these things, but the bolded part immediately struck me as the logic of an abuser.

Why, if God is omnibenevolent, does he condemn people to eternal torture with no possibility of redemption (for the thoughtcrime of not believing in him)? What is the point of this? Whom does it help? If I were a Christian, I actually think that the most philosophically consistent position to take would be universal salvation, although I accept this is not supported by scripture.

     The crime is not failing to believe in God, but transgressing the moral law which God has given to govern the world, which alienates one from God and makes us unfitting receptacles for His grace. He gave us His only-begotten Son as a sacrifice to take away our sins and redeem us from corruption and from death. If you do not crucify yourself to that sacrifice, then you remain in your sins, rendered unable by the stain upon you to enter into the bliss of Heaven. It bears noting that in the Christian eschatology, the judgment of the wicked is not something arbitrary that God could dispense with, but a necessary result of His plan coming to fruition.

As an aside, it does make me somewhat uncomfortable that many Christians, who are perfectly pleasant when I interact with them, apparently believe I will suffer eternal torture after death on the basis of only one fact about me (that I am a nonbeliever). Fortunately, I am almost certain that this will not happen.

     The reason for this is that most Christians don't actually want people to suffer eternal damnation. While universalists like Hart will often claim otherwise, we don't believe in damnation because we want people to suffer. If I were pleased to see the nonbelievers burn, I would simply go off and pray by myself and not concern myself with them. Christians place a heavy emphasis on preaching and evangelism because it is our hope to convince these people to repent of their sins and be saved.

As far as I see it, there are two possible scenarios here:

a) God is omnipotent, so could save everyone if he wanted (without having to resort to relying on them to accept his son as their saviour), but he chooses not to; therefore, he is not omnibenevolent.
b) God is omnibenevolent, so would save everyone if he could, but is not able to do so, and the best he can do is hope that they accept his son as their saviour; therefore he is not omnipotent.

I don’t really see how you can reconcile God being both omnipotent and omnibenevolent without universal salvation.

     This goes back to my first post in this thread, where I said there is no contradiction as long as you do not force modern liberal morality on God. God created humanity as the crown of His creation, with the capacity to choose to do good and follow Him willingly, entering into sonship by His grace. If God were to force people to choose Him who had in their lives rejected Him to the very end, that would defeat the purpose of creating humanity, as at that point we would no longer be moral actors in the true sense. By laying out the plan that He has ordained, He works towards an end far better and more glorious than a mere maximization of human happiness.

But why does the alternative to heaven have to be fiery damnation? And what is the “end far better and more glorious than a mere maximisation of human happiness”?

     The end promised to us is the reconciliation of the universe itself to God. Those who have prepared for that time by repenting of their sins and walking in His ways will give glory to Him as the angels do. At that time, there is no place where those who are unprepared can go to escape from the imminent reality of God's power. There is an idea, in line with Nathan's response earlier in the thread, that God is not literally judging people and throwing them into the Lake of Fire, but that it appears to be such to those who are not able to receive God into their hearts and recognize the beauty of His coming in glory.

[Kingpoleon]

Most of this is unrelated to my point really.

Asserting the existence of natural law is no reason to believe in God. Plenty of atheists believe in natural law, many contemporary Kantian ethicists for example. This debate is about what grounds something like natural law, not whether it exists or not.

Saying that God is a superior being is also besides the point. You still have the grounding problem of getting an ought from an is no less than people who explain morality from biology do. If God murders someone for their own divine pleasure is that really automatically good because God did it? How is this not arbitrary?

The two are also contradictory. If natural law exists then God is subject to it, so he's not unfathomably morally superior as he can be judged by that standard.


Speaking generally, exactly how one gets morality out of God is an extremely thorny theological problem that has been debated for thousands of years and has received multiple different answers. There's no advantage to theism such that belief in God is preferable because by itself it solves our problem of where morality comes from.

It is my charge that the natural law, like physical laws, is created by God. God is not subject to natural law for the same reason He is not subject to physical laws preventing miracles. Unlike republican lawmakers, a majestic lawmaker is not just the creator of the laws, but superior to the laws. You might as well allege that there is no advantage to theism such that belief in God because by itself it solves our problem of where miracles come from.

I've never found the "offense against an all-good victim" explanation for eternal punishment at all compelling, honestly. It's the sort of theological concept that seems like a reflection of the extremely hierarchical and clientelistic society in which it originated rather than a timeless statement about the ways of God to man. The explanation that hell is in some sense a voluntary refusal of God that can't be "taken back" for reasons internal to the human soul has always struck me as a lot more economical and less legalistic.

Before anybody accuses me of theological liberalism, let me clarify that if I did think RFayette and PiT's position had a robust explanatory power, I wouldn't reject it out of personal squeamishness.

I should note here my second dissent, as a Protestant.

If the moral law has at least some relationship to a God-given conscience, then, if eternal damnation or destruction incites the conscience of some, it is very possible that it not theologically factual. No claims on the subject ought to be authoritative in nature, but rather submissive to the finality of God’s judgment.

[🐒Gods of Prosperity🔱🐲💸]

Most of this is unrelated to my point really.

Asserting the existence of natural law is no reason to believe in God. Plenty of atheists believe in natural law, many contemporary Kantian ethicists for example. This debate is about what grounds something like natural law, not whether it exists or not.

Saying that God is a superior being is also besides the point. You still have the grounding problem of getting an ought from an is no less than people who explain morality from biology do. If God murders someone for their own divine pleasure is that really automatically good because God did it? How is this not arbitrary?

The two are also contradictory. If natural law exists then God is subject to it, so he's not unfathomably morally superior as he can be judged by that standard.


Speaking generally, exactly how one gets morality out of God is an extremely thorny theological problem that has been debated for thousands of years and has received multiple different answers. There's no advantage to theism such that belief in God is preferable because by itself it solves our problem of where morality comes from.

It is my charge that the natural law, like physical laws, is created by God. God is not subject to natural law for the same reason He is not subject to physical laws preventing miracles. Unlike republican lawmakers, a majestic lawmaker is not just the creator of the laws, but superior to the laws. You might as well allege that there is no advantage to theism such that belief in God because by itself it solves our problem of where miracles come from.

Natural laws, physical or moral, depend on the natural properties and relationships which he created.  We can imagine God intervening to change physical properties or the relationships between physical objects.  But a suspension of the moral law would then require some change in the beings or objects upon which is being acted.  What does this mean?  In order for it to suddenly be good to kill an innocent person, there would need to be some change in that person's essence, or somehow in the nature of goodness itself.  And if goodness changes, then God must change along with it if he is ultimate goodness.

[Kingpoleon]

Natural laws, physical or moral, depend on the natural properties and relationships which he created.  We can imagine God intervening to change physical properties or the relationships between physical objects.  But a suspension of the moral law would then require some change in the beings or objects upon which is being acted.  What does this mean?  In order for it to suddenly be good to kill an innocent person, there would need to be some change in that person's essence, or somehow in the nature of goodness itself.  And if goodness changes, then God must change along with it if he is ultimate goodness.

I did not mean to imply that the moral law could be suspended as natural laws can be. Simply that accepting God as sovereign prevents His violation of His own moral law.

[Battista Minola 1616]

My new favorite game is to read posts from Atlas Christians while replacing "God" with "Q."

You should repent and accept Qod.

[Statilius the Epicurean]

It is my charge that the natural law, like physical laws, is created by God. God is not subject to natural law for the same reason He is not subject to physical laws preventing miracles. Unlike republican lawmakers, a majestic lawmaker is not just the creator of the laws, but superior to the laws. You might as well allege that there is no advantage to theism such that belief in God because by itself it solves our problem of where miracles come from.

But again that's just arbitrary. Good is whatever God says it is, regardless of its content. There are massive problems with this position.

In fact it makes it impossible to claim that God is good because it just means whatever God wills. So if natural law were created by an ontologically evil God then evil would be good and no-one would be able to tell otherwise!

[Antonio the Sixth]

The thing about this "Who are you to question God?" line of argument is that, no matter how much logical sense it might make (and yes, I don't dispute that strict Divine Command Theory is logically consistent), I don't think it's possible to seriously buy into it on an intuitive and emotional level. Like, sure, it's possible that God has an understanding of morality so much greater than ours that he might appear to do things we find abhorrent and no matter how much we try to understand them, we never will because we're not God. Sure, that makes sense. But why exactly would you choose to believe that? I guess if all you're looking is justifying a priori a literal interpretation of the Bible, then this is the fastest way to get you from point A to point B. That's basically just the religious equivalent of the MST3K Mantra. If Christian morality is to be something meaningful that speaks to people on a deep level, both emotionally and intellectually, this kind of handwave is something you want to avoid at all costs.

It's actually exactly the equivalent of Young Earth Creationists going "well, God could just had made it look like the Earth is billions of years old" like yes, obviously God could have done that, but why though? Why would you believe that God had given us the senses and cognitive faculties to understand so much of the world around us if it was all just an illusion? Similarly, why would God have given us an intuitive understanding of right and wrong and the cognitive faculties to derive it into abstract moral principles if He didn't think those principles would help us understand the rightfulness of His own actions? The only reason to start from such a presupposition would be to shut down a line of inquiry in a way that would allow no possible retort. It's just not compelling, no matter how sound the logic.

[Statilius the Epicurean]

The thing about this "Who are you to question God?" line of argument is that, no matter how much logical sense it might make (and yes, I don't dispute that strict Divine Command Theory is logically consistent), I don't think it's possible to seriously buy into it on an intuitive and emotional level. Like, sure, it's possible that God has an understanding of morality so much greater than ours that he might appear to do things we find abhorrent and no matter how much we try to understand them, we never will because we're not God. Sure, that makes sense. But why exactly would you choose to believe that? I guess if all you're looking is justifying a priori a literal interpretation of the Bible, then this is the fastest way to get you from point A to point B. That's basically just the religious equivalent of the MST3K Mantra. If Christian morality is to be something meaningful that speaks to people on a deep level, both emotionally and intellectually, this kind of handwave is something you want to avoid at all costs.

It's actually exactly the equivalent of Young Earth Creationists going "well, God could just had made it look like the Earth is billions of years old" like yes, obviously God could have done that, but why though? Why would you believe that God had given us the senses and cognitive faculties to understand so much of the world around us if it was all just an illusion? Similarly, why would God have given us an intuitive understanding of right and wrong and the cognitive faculties to derive it into abstract moral principles if He didn't think those principles would help us understand the rightfulness of His own actions? The only reason to start from such a presupposition would be to shut down a line of inquiry in a way that would allow no possible retort. It's just not compelling, no matter how sound the logic.

Well I think this is a bit unfair. There are multiple considered defences of divine command theory, even though I may not think they work. William of Ockham was not an idiot.

The point I've been trying to make is the fact that reasonable theologians have come up with completely different accounts of how morality is grounded is pretty strong evidence that asserting God's existence doesn't by itself get you much closer to explaining morality. Not without a ton of the same metaethical lifting that nontheists also have to do anyway.

[Antonio the Sixth]

The thing about this "Who are you to question God?" line of argument is that, no matter how much logical sense it might make (and yes, I don't dispute that strict Divine Command Theory is logically consistent), I don't think it's possible to seriously buy into it on an intuitive and emotional level. Like, sure, it's possible that God has an understanding of morality so much greater than ours that he might appear to do things we find abhorrent and no matter how much we try to understand them, we never will because we're not God. Sure, that makes sense. But why exactly would you choose to believe that? I guess if all you're looking is justifying a priori a literal interpretation of the Bible, then this is the fastest way to get you from point A to point B. That's basically just the religious equivalent of the MST3K Mantra. If Christian morality is to be something meaningful that speaks to people on a deep level, both emotionally and intellectually, this kind of handwave is something you want to avoid at all costs.

It's actually exactly the equivalent of Young Earth Creationists going "well, God could just had made it look like the Earth is billions of years old" like yes, obviously God could have done that, but why though? Why would you believe that God had given us the senses and cognitive faculties to understand so much of the world around us if it was all just an illusion? Similarly, why would God have given us an intuitive understanding of right and wrong and the cognitive faculties to derive it into abstract moral principles if He didn't think those principles would help us understand the rightfulness of His own actions? The only reason to start from such a presupposition would be to shut down a line of inquiry in a way that would allow no possible retort. It's just not compelling, no matter how sound the logic.

Well I think this is a bit unfair. There are multiple considered defences of divine command theory, even though I may not think they work. Al-Ghazali and William of Ockham were not idiots.

The point I've been trying to make is the fact that many reasonable theologians have come up with completely different accounts of how morality is grounded is pretty strong evidence that asserting God's existence doesn't by itself get you much closer to explaining morality. Not without a ton of the same metaethical lifting that nontheists also have to do anyway.

I am not criticizing Divine Command Theory though. I am very explicitly criticizing the specific argument that human beings have no business interrogating the moral standards set by an infinite God using their own intuitions and cognitive faculties. I don't think those two need to be synonymous. It seems perfectly possible to me to believe that God created moral laws and endowed us with the ability to understand them though sincere, disinterested inquiry. In this case, the reason we should be moral might be "because God says so", but the way we find out what God has to say is not limited to looking at the literal word of God, but can actually take into account fundamental intuitions and deductions.

[John Dule]

My new favorite game is to read posts from Atlas Christians while replacing "God" with "Q."

You should repent and accept Qod.

There's a fine line between tongue-in-cheek antitheism and steely unironic antitheism. I'm currently torn between the two.

[Kingpoleon]

I am not criticizing Divine Command Theory though. I am very explicitly criticizing the specific argument that human beings have no business interrogating the moral standards set by an infinite God using their own intuitions and cognitive faculties. I don't think those two need to be synonymous. It seems perfectly possible to me to believe that God created moral laws and endowed us with the ability to understand them though sincere, disinterested inquiry. In this case, the reason we should be moral might be "because God says so", but the way we find out what God has to say is not limited to looking at the literal word of God, but can actually take into account fundamental intuitions and deductions.

I was using very narrow wording in morality as a whole. Obviously, I believe that reason is a sound basis for questioning morality in terms of interpersonal action. But in terms of the afterlife, I dispute the very notion of people making authoritative claims about its nature. I do not even think judges should be allowed to judge someone unworthy of this life - I certainly do not think people should judge others’ worthiness of the afterlife. The idea of resolving, by philosophical debate, something which has rarely gotten wide consensus in any large religious denomination in over two thousand years is nonsense. I merely indicate that if God 1) created the afterlife, 2) we don’t know its exact functions, then 3) it is odd to claim that its exact functions are immoral, because we 4) would be subjecting a superior being to a lesser being’s judgment and 5) only do so as a criticism of an idea expressed by an equal being. Therefore, these are not criticisms of God, but criticisms of the hypothetical actions of God said to exist by someone else without authoritative consensus. To be outraged over a posited hypothetical is the highest form of moral pretension.

[Antonio the Sixth]

I am not criticizing Divine Command Theory though. I am very explicitly criticizing the specific argument that human beings have no business interrogating the moral standards set by an infinite God using their own intuitions and cognitive faculties. I don't think those two need to be synonymous. It seems perfectly possible to me to believe that God created moral laws and endowed us with the ability to understand them though sincere, disinterested inquiry. In this case, the reason we should be moral might be "because God says so", but the way we find out what God has to say is not limited to looking at the literal word of God, but can actually take into account fundamental intuitions and deductions.

I was using very narrow wording in morality as a whole. Obviously, I believe that reason is a sound basis for questioning morality in terms of interpersonal action. But in terms of the afterlife, I dispute the very notion of people making authoritative claims about its nature. I do not even think judges should be allowed to judge someone unworthy of this life - I certainly do not think people should judge others’ worthiness of the afterlife. The idea of resolving, by philosophical debate, something which has rarely gotten wide consensus in any large religious denomination in over two thousand years is nonsense. I merely indicate that if God 1) created the afterlife, 2) we don’t know its exact functions, then 3) it is odd to claim that its exact functions are immoral, because we 4) would be subjecting a superior being to a lesser being’s judgment and 5) only do so as a criticism of an idea expressed by an equal being. Therefore, these are not criticisms of God, but criticisms of the hypothetical actions of God said to exist by someone else without authoritative consensus. To be outraged over a posited hypothetical is the highest form of moral pretension.

Of course getting upset at God because of the kind of afterlife that someone else claims He has in store for us is ridiculous. I'm not sure that anyone is actually getting upset at God, though. Admittedly there are a few new atheist types who are basically just antitheists, but I don't think I've seen any such post in this thread? Even Dule hasn't espoused that line of argument.

The basic argument that I understood was being implicitly criticized is the syllogism:
1. God is infinitely just.
2. Eternal damnation is always unjust.
3. Therefore God does not condemn anyone to eternal damnation.

This isn't a condemnation of God at all. It's merely a statement of belief regarding God's plan for us.

Now, forgive me if I'm wrong, but my understanding of some of the arguments made in these thread by you and others was that the second premise is invalid because we simply cannot grasp what is just or unjust in terms of the afterlife, because God's understanding of justice is infinitely deeper that ours. I am defending our ability to make such a premise, because I don't believe it is reasonable to disregard the tools that God gave us to grasp the basic morality of God's actions. Of course I don't pretend to claim that human beings might be able to discern the fullness of God's plan with regard to the afterlife - I understand that most of that realm is unfathomable for us finite beings. But that doesn't mean we cannot rule out any hypotheses. In the specific case of eternal damnation, I do believe that the tools we have can allow us to reach a clear conclusions as to whether or not such an outcome can be consonant to our basic intuitions about justice. And while it is true that our conclusions can be flawed because we are finite beings, I still reject the idea that this means the inquiry itself is inappropriate.

[Kingpoleon]

Now, forgive me if I'm wrong, but my understanding of some of the arguments made in these thread by you and others was that the second premise is invalid because we simply cannot grasp what is just or unjust in terms of the afterlife, because God's understanding of justice is infinitely deeper that ours. I am defending our ability to make such a premise, because I don't believe it is reasonable to disregard the tools that God gave us to grasp the basic morality of God's actions. Of course I don't pretend to claim that human beings might be able to discern the fullness of God's plan with regard to the afterlife - I understand that most of that realm is unfathomable for us finite beings. But that doesn't mean we cannot rule out any hypotheses. In the specific case of eternal damnation, I do believe that the tools we have can allow us to reach a clear conclusions as to whether or not such an outcome can be consonant to our basic intuitions about justice. And while it is true that our conclusions can be flawed because we are finite beings, I still reject the idea that this means the inquiry itself is inappropriate.

It is certainly possible to use our reason to make claims of the afterlife in relationship to the moral law. However, it is not possible for us to be as authoritative about the morality of the afterlife as the morality of this life because the two are inherently different.

To me, the argument sounds similar to another one:
1. God is infinitely just.
2. There is injustice in the world.
3. Therefore, either God does not exist, or He is not infinitely just.

Both claims are similarly flawed because they fail to take into account that just the extremity of the first premise. Once it is granted, then our own claims about the morality of God’s actions are laughable unless we actually claim to be infinitely just ourselves, or at least maximally just.

To respond to those who claim to believe in objective morality or natural law but not God, allow me to quote Kant: “Morality in itself constitutes a system, but happiness does not, except insofar as it is distributed precisely in accordance with morality. This, however, is possible only in the intelligible world, under a wise author and regent. Reason sees itself as compelled either to assume such a thing, together with life in such a world, which we must regard as a future one, or else to regard the moral laws as empty figments of the brain.”

[🐒Gods of Prosperity🔱🐲💸]

I struggle to believe that Christians actually say to themselves "well, this person was murdered, but at least she's in heaven now" and therefore hand down less punitive verdicts against murderers. This sounds like a parody of Christians that an edgy internet atheist might think up.

Maybe not be common but I do believe in those cases where the families of those killed have forgiven their loved ones murderers and advocated against the death penalty, the promise of eternal life plays a significant role.

[Former President tack50]

I usually try to avoid sounding like, as John Dule puts it, an edgy internet atheist when debating these things, but the bolded part immediately struck me as the logic of an abuser.

Why, if God is omnibenevolent, does he condemn people to eternal torture with no possibility of redemption (for the thoughtcrime of not believing in him)? What is the point of this? Whom does it help? If I were a Christian, I actually think that the most philosophically consistent position to take would be universal salvation, although I accept this is not supported by scripture.

As an aside, it does make me somewhat uncomfortable that many Christians, who are perfectly pleasant when I interact with them, apparently believe I will suffer eternal torture after death on the basis of only one fact about me (that I am a nonbeliever). Fortunately, I am almost certain that this will not happen.

Yeah, I agree with this and this puts it way better than I could have ever hoped.

In my mind, an all good and all powerful being would surely have the capability to judge people
based on their works and merits; and know whether a person is has lived a just life. Is it fair to deny salvation to people that have lived just and moral lifes, only for the crime of not being Christian?

Furthermore, an all loving being, who loves everyone, would also give even the most wicked some form of redemption in some way. Punishment could certainly happen, but could it be eternal? Is there any offence so big that you could never have a chance at salvation?

Of course nothing of this is supported by scripture or doctrine of any major Christian denomination to my knowledge.

I can definitely think of many secular reasons as to why requiring belief in the Christian Church as a pre-requisite for salvation is a thing though; most notably that it makes convering people way easier. "Convert to our religion or you'll burn in hell for eternity " is a much bigger incentive than "hey, if you believe in us you will have a better chance of living a just life, but if you don't that's ok "

[Former President tack50]

The thing about this "Who are you to question God?" line of argument is that, no matter how much logical sense it might make (and yes, I don't dispute that strict Divine Command Theory is logically consistent), I don't think it's possible to seriously buy into it on an intuitive and emotional level. Like, sure, it's possible that God has an understanding of morality so much greater than ours that he might appear to do things we find abhorrent and no matter how much we try to understand them, we never will because we're not God. Sure, that makes sense. But why exactly would you choose to believe that?

In a way, Divine Command Theory is the religious equivalent of parents telling their 5 year old child to do stuff "Because I say so"

It is definitely a form of parenting, but kids want to be treated seriously and you'll get better results when you explain things as opposed to just saying "do this because I say so".

I guess the question now is "Why is God such a bad parent?"

[Associate Justice PiT]

I usually try to avoid sounding like, as John Dule puts it, an edgy internet atheist when debating these things, but the bolded part immediately struck me as the logic of an abuser.

Why, if God is omnibenevolent, does he condemn people to eternal torture with no possibility of redemption (for the thoughtcrime of not believing in him)? What is the point of this? Whom does it help? If I were a Christian, I actually think that the most philosophically consistent position to take would be universal salvation, although I accept this is not supported by scripture.

As an aside, it does make me somewhat uncomfortable that many Christians, who are perfectly pleasant when I interact with them, apparently believe I will suffer eternal torture after death on the basis of only one fact about me (that I am a nonbeliever). Fortunately, I am almost certain that this will not happen.

Yeah, I agree with this and this puts it way better than I could have ever hoped.

In my mind, an all good and all powerful being would surely have the capability to judge people
based on their works and merits; and know whether a person is has lived a just life. Is it fair to deny salvation to people that have lived just and moral lifes, only for the crime of not being Christian?

     The crime is not specifically failure to believe, but rather having sinned in general, with belief being an important factor in absolving that sin. Some of the Church Fathers have expressed the idea that there could be "virtuous pagans" who are saved despite never knowing of the Church. The problem is that "nothing impure will ever enter the [Heavenly Kingdom]" (Rev. 21:27), and this bodes ill for us, "for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God" (Romans 3:23), implying that being justified is more difficult than generally being a good person. Thus, the fundamental disagreement Christian doctrine has with your proposition here lies in the question of what it means to be just and moral. That modern secular society embraces the stance of goodness consistent with the doctrine of Moral Therapeutic Deism is a major factor that separates most people (including many self-identified Christians) from a small-o orthodox understanding of the question of atonement and salvation.

Furthermore, an all loving being, who loves everyone, would also give even the most wicked some form of redemption in some way. Punishment could certainly happen, but could it be eternal? Is there any offence so big that you could never have a chance at salvation?

     The issue with the idea of attaining salvation after death is that most Christian theologians have agreed that spirits are unable to repent, since unencumbered by flesh they perfectly understand their choices and the logical implications they must follow. C.S. Lewis writes of Hell as being "locked from the inside", and St. Theophan the Recluse also expresses that the state of the damned renders them unable to repent of their sins, though God Himself would be willing to accept such a repentance if they could offer it.

Of course nothing of this is supported by scripture or doctrine of any major Christian denomination to my knowledge.

     There was the Universalist Church, but they merged with the Unitarian Church and no longer identify themselves as Christian. Historically, Origen also believed in the eventual salvation of all things, even with the demons. He had followers for a while, and now there are some who are trying to revive his movement. But overall, universalism does not tend to thrive or survive long as a movement. I won't deny that the impediment of belief in universal salvation to evangelism could be a factor in this phenomenon.