Crime + punishment

[Dr. MB]

So a lot of people use the argument "well if there's no God then there's no morality". But let's imagine two different realities.

Reality #1 takes the view of an afterlife. Could be the Christian version, Muslim version, Buddhist version, ancient Greek version, hippie pagan version, you name it. But the general thing rings true that death isn't the end. There might be some version of heaven or hell, maybe not, but everybody ends up in this afterlife.

In Reality #2, there isn't any sort of afterlife. Once you're dead, you're dead. No coming back, no heaven, no reincarnation, no ghosts doomed to haunt the earth. Just decomposition until nothing but a skeleton remains.

So let's say there's a murderer. He kills an innocent person. A 25 year old, healthy woman with lots of time ahead of her. In reality #1, she goes to heaven or maybe is reincarnated and comes back as a different person or a dog or something. But in reality #2, she's gone forever. Wouldn't the murder be a much worse crime in a world without an afterlife than a world with one? Because you're not ending their complete existence in reality #1 but you are completely in reality #2.

Thoughts?

[FEMA Camp Administrator]

The morality of the second world is a pragmatic survival pact.

[vitoNova]

That is why the Golden Rule should be the universal basis for all moral and ethical systems.

Systems which have nothing to do with organized religions, which are man-made political constructs. 

[Kingpoleon]

That is why the Golden Rule should be the universal basis for all moral and ethical systems.

Systems which have nothing to do with organized religions, which are man-made political constructs. 

Some religions are political constructs - most notably Confucianism - but to say that all are equally so is objectively incorrect.

[RFayette]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

[afleitch]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

[🐒Gods of Prosperity🔱🐲💸]

I don't understand the argument that morality depends on God to be anything to do with an afterlife.  The question is: if there is no God, can there be a moral standard that is not merely a matter of biological predisposition or social convention?  If so, what is it's source?

[Kingpoleon]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

This sounds more like Dostoevsky than Lewis, which is rather surprising for an evangelical.

[Statilius the Epicurean]

I don't understand the argument that morality depends on God to be anything to do with an afterlife.  The question is: if there is no God, can there be a moral standard that is not merely a matter of biological predisposition or social convention?  If so, what is it's source?

I honestly don't see why biological predisposition or social conventions are any more problematic groundings for morality than the arbitrary* dictates of a supreme being.

*if not arbitrary then the standard is higher than God and you get the grounding problem of what exactly that is again

[Kingpoleon]

I honestly don't see why biological predisposition or social conventions are any more problematic groundings for morality than the arbitrary* dictates of a supreme being.

*if not arbitrary then the standard is higher than God and you get the grounding problem of what exactly that is again

Not arbitrary. Given the idea that God is supreme and superior to us, then our inability to fully grasp morality’s workings stems from our own inferiority, not the arbitrary nature of morality.

Natural law has outpaced its critics on a cosmic scale. Even given that a biological predisposition can correctly create(NOT find) morality, then there is the whole question of natural laws aside from morality. The best explanation to the existence of laws within the universe is their creation by something outside of and superior to the universe. The sole alternative, that laws exist within the universe in and of themselves, poses a contradiction. Show me a nation with laws and no lawmaker and I will concede the possibility of a universe with laws and no lawmaker.

[Associate Justice PiT]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

[Kingpoleon]

There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

I dissent. Even granted that an individual’s preferences are objective, it is impossible for a lesser being to be the judge of a higher being. The Supreme Court is superior to the appeals courts by its very nature - to have the former be judged by the latter is logically incomprehensible. A thousand times more illogical is it for man to pass judgment on God.

[Associate Justice PiT]

There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

I dissent. Even granted that an individual’s preferences are objective, it is impossible for a lesser being to be the judge of a higher being. The Supreme Court is superior to the appeals courts by its very nature - to have the former be judged by the latter is logically incomprehensible. A thousand times more illogical is it for man to pass judgment on God.

     I made my statement with an eye to Jonathan Haidt's Moral Foundations Theory. I don't know how aware you are of the concept, but he developed a theory that measured a person's understanding of morality based on emphasizing a number of foundations. Liberals tended to emphasize the foundation of Care much more than anything else, while conservatives emphasized Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity as well as Care. Both groups put moderate emphasis on Fairness.

     With that in mind, your contention here (which I agree with, for the record), which is predicated on the concept that the authority to judge rightly belongs to some and not to others, already operates outside of the orthodoxy of liberal morality. The lack of deference given to authority in the morality of the modern liberal is key to why many of our fellows in this thread believe they can judge God's morality by the standards that seem appropriate to them.

[Kingpoleon]

     I made my statement with an eye to Jonathan Haidt's Moral Foundations Theory. I don't know how aware you are of the concept, but he developed a theory that measured a person's understanding of morality based on emphasizing a number of foundations. Liberals tended to emphasize the foundation of Care much more than anything else, while conservatives emphasized Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity as well as Care. Both groups put moderate emphasis on Fairness.

     With that in mind, your contention here (which I agree with, for the record), which is predicated on the concept that the authority to judge rightly belongs to some and not to others, already operates outside of the orthodoxy of liberal morality. The lack of deference given to authority in the morality of the modern liberal is key to why many of our fellows in this thread believe they can judge God's morality by the standards that seem appropriate to them.

I should note that I operate under the assumption of balancing things against each other. I do not care for authority for its own sake - rather, I grant the case through a rationalist’s lens. The existence of an infinite God alone refutes challenges to its own authority, which is why I pointed out that it was silly to argue that a greater being has no authority to judge a lesser being.

[Associate Justice PiT]

     I made my statement with an eye to Jonathan Haidt's Moral Foundations Theory. I don't know how aware you are of the concept, but he developed a theory that measured a person's understanding of morality based on emphasizing a number of foundations. Liberals tended to emphasize the foundation of Care much more than anything else, while conservatives emphasized Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity as well as Care. Both groups put moderate emphasis on Fairness.

     With that in mind, your contention here (which I agree with, for the record), which is predicated on the concept that the authority to judge rightly belongs to some and not to others, already operates outside of the orthodoxy of liberal morality. The lack of deference given to authority in the morality of the modern liberal is key to why many of our fellows in this thread believe they can judge God's morality by the standards that seem appropriate to them.

I should note that I operate under the assumption of balancing things against each other. I do not care for authority for its own sake - rather, I grant the case through a rationalist’s lens. The existence of an infinite God alone refutes challenges to its own authority, which is why I pointed out that it was silly to argue that a greater being has no authority to judge a lesser being.

     As I recall, Haidt does not distinguish between human and divine authority in terms of developing the Authority dimension. And he certainly did not forget to consider this, since comparing responses given to moral propositions in different cultures is a major aspect of his research, and part of what led to him identifying the WEIRD (Western Educated Industrial Rich and Democratic) cohort; this group diverged heavily from basically all other places and times in what they prioritized in terms of moral beliefs.

     The attitudes to authority you indicate seem consistent with a center to center-left bearing, which coheres with your politics overall. While it may not apply universally to individuals to the left of center, I do note that there is a definite tendency among left-leaning individuals to dismiss the concept that the morality of God must be ontologically prior to the moralities of human beings. Certainly someone who does not believe has no reason to place a system of morality as such prior to their own intuitions in this fashion, but the result is that their critiques of religion fall flat very quickly since they begin by taking as given something that is contrary to the metaphysics of pretty much every organized religion.

[Alcibiades]

There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

I dissent. Even granted that an individual’s preferences are objective, it is impossible for a lesser being to be the judge of a higher being. The Supreme Court is superior to the appeals courts by its very nature - to have the former be judged by the latter is logically incomprehensible. A thousand times more illogical is it for man to pass judgment on God.

You are begging the question here by assuming your conclusion that an omnibenevolent God exists to prove it.

[afleitch]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

If an infinitely 'good' entity edicts eternal punishment, what actions would an infinitely 'bad' entity edict and how could you tell them apart?

[Kingpoleon]

You are begging the question here by assuming your conclusion that an omnibenevolent God exists to prove it.

That is because the original post granted such an existence, but merely questioned God’s morality.

[Associate Justice PiT]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

If an infinitely 'good' entity edicts eternal punishment, what actions would an infinitely 'bad' entity edict and how could you tell them apart?

     The question would be whether the edict is just or unjust. As Rfayette articulated above, sin is an offense against God, who rightfully possesses the authority to define moral law. As God is infinitely greater than us, an offense against His majesty merits an infinite punishment. That God is willing to forgive us for our sins at all is a powerful proof of His love and mercy.

[Okay, maybe Mike Johnson is a competent parliamentarian.]

I've never found the "offense against an all-good victim" explanation for eternal punishment at all compelling, honestly. It's the sort of theological concept that seems like a reflection of the extremely hierarchical and clientelistic society in which it originated rather than a timeless statement about the ways of God to man. The explanation that hell is in some sense a voluntary refusal of God that can't be "taken back" for reasons internal to the human soul has always struck me as a lot more economical and less legalistic.

Before anybody accuses me of theological liberalism, let me clarify that if I did think RFayette and PiT's position had a robust explanatory power, I wouldn't reject it out of personal squeamishness.

[RFayette]

I've never found the "offense against an all-good victim" explanation for eternal punishment at all compelling, honestly. It's the sort of theological concept that seems like a reflection of the extremely hierarchical and clientelistic society in which it originated rather than a timeless statement about the ways of God to man. The explanation that hell is in some sense a voluntary refusal of God that can't be "taken back" for reasons internal to the human soul has always struck me as a lot more economical and less legalistic.

I don't think these explanations are mutually incompatible, but if one rejects the explanation of eternal punishment being merited on the account of being an offense against an all-good being, then why would the state of the condemned be much worse than they are in this Earth?  Whatever the nature of hell exactly is, all accounts we see in scripture are of something far worse than whatever we face on Earth, including fire, perpetually being eaten by worms, etc.  Interestingly, it seems Catholic doctrine goes even further, with the New Advent encyclopedia saying that there is no happiness whatsoever in hell, and that the pains inflicted on the damned will never have any period of rest or respite.  

If there were no retributive justice element to hell, it would seem strange as to why God couldn't keep the reprobate in a condition more similar to that here on Earth, even if they perpetually refuse him.  For it to be just for a sinner to suffer eternal punishment, it must be said that they deserve that eternal punishment; and to ground that eternality/infinite nature of the punishment it makes sense to connect it to the nature of God, who is infinitely good and just.  So it seems to me that to account for the severity of hell, there must be an element of retributive justice in addition to the idea of death being final for the human soul.  This also seems to make the most sense of the many verses in the Bible where God is the judge, declares vengeance is his, promises to repay sinners according to their works, etc.

[Okay, maybe Mike Johnson is a competent parliamentarian.]

The Catholic Encyclopedia--a remarkable work in many ways, but also unapologetically a product of the decadent neoscholasticism that dominated Catholic theology in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries--also falsely asserts in the article you cite that "we find among all nations the belief that evil-doers will be punished after death", and even says that "theologians generally accept" that hell is physically located within the Earth!

That aside, you're absolutely right in the general observation that it's difficult to justify or excuse how relentlessly horrific hell is taught to be without recourse to some sort of retributive theory. However, I prefer to associate this with the finality of dying in a state of impenitence rather than with the feudal notion that the gravity of an offense depends on the dignity appropriate to the person against whom it's committed. (In fact, you'll have noted that that finality, as well as the infinite authority of God rather than His infinite goodness, actually is what the Catholic Encyclopedia itself stresses when addressing the question of hell's eternity.)

[afleitch]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

If an infinitely 'good' entity edicts eternal punishment, what actions would an infinitely 'bad' entity edict and how could you tell them apart?

     The question would be whether the edict is just or unjust. As Rfayette articulated above, sin is an offense against God, who rightfully possesses the authority to define moral law. As God is infinitely greater than us, an offense against His majesty merits an infinite punishment. That God is willing to forgive us for our sins at all is a powerful proof of His love and mercy.

That's a sidestep. If eternal punishment, something we as humans cannot levy comes from a 'good' infinite being, what discerns a good infinite being from a bad one? What would a bad entity do, as the worst form of punishment?

You ask about what is 'just'. The whole point of justice is to make 'whole' the victim, whether the justice is punitive or mild, whether the person is alive or dead. That is what justice means. A God can never be less than 'whole'. A crime against them cannot matter never mind merit any punishment. A finite being such as ourselves cannot inflict harm on an infinite being.

[Associate Justice PiT]

I've never found the "offense against an all-good victim" explanation for eternal punishment at all compelling, honestly. It's the sort of theological concept that seems like a reflection of the extremely hierarchical and clientelistic society in which it originated rather than a timeless statement about the ways of God to man. The explanation that hell is in some sense a voluntary refusal of God that can't be "taken back" for reasons internal to the human soul has always struck me as a lot more economical and less legalistic.

Before anybody accuses me of theological liberalism, let me clarify that if I did think RFayette and PiT's position had a robust explanatory power, I wouldn't reject it out of personal squeamishness.

     The idea that God's punishment upon the wicked is in a sense their own choice to reject Him is a novel idea in the West, but actually has a long tradition in the East and is attested as far back as St. Isaac of Nineveh in the 7th century, who wrote that the damned punish themselves by failing to accept the love that God offers to them. I do agree with the notion you propound, but I think we must also consider that it is just for God to infinitely punish the wicked. Otherwise He seems apathetic to our suffering if He can leave the condemned in that state for eternity knowing with exactitude the consequences of His actions in doing so.

[Associate Justice PiT]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

If an infinitely 'good' entity edicts eternal punishment, what actions would an infinitely 'bad' entity edict and how could you tell them apart?

     The question would be whether the edict is just or unjust. As Rfayette articulated above, sin is an offense against God, who rightfully possesses the authority to define moral law. As God is infinitely greater than us, an offense against His majesty merits an infinite punishment. That God is willing to forgive us for our sins at all is a powerful proof of His love and mercy.

That's a sidestep. If eternal punishment, something we as humans cannot levy comes from a 'good' infinite being, what discerns a good infinite being from a bad one? What would a bad entity do, as the worst form of punishment?

You ask about what is 'just'. The whole point of justice is to make 'whole' the victim, whether the justice is punitive or mild, whether the person is alive or dead. That is what justice means. A God can never be less than 'whole'. A crime against them cannot matter never mind merit any punishment. A finite being such as ourselves cannot inflict harm on an infinite being.

     The question of how to discern a good infinite being from a bad one is actually moot. Evil is ontologically negative, and only exists as a privation of the good. C.S. Lewis points out that nobody acts with the intention of doing evil in all things, but rather they do evil because they lack goodness in their hearts. This implies the falsity of dualist cosmology, which precludes the existence of an evil infinite being.

     I strongly question the idea that justice is all about making the victim whole, and I am not sure where you get that from. If we lock away a murderer, it does not restitute the victim, who is dead either way. That you reference this scenario as not being a challenge to your definition of justice perplexes me. It would seem to be the case that you are presupposing that the victim must be ontologically capable of being made whole, but if we were to say that human beings are purely material and have no soul (i.e. Reality #2 from the topic post), then a dead person would likewise be incapable of being made whole. So for your definition of justice to be functional as presented by you, we must assume that souls are real, which I don't think you believe (correct me if I am wrong).