Historical continuity of Democrats and Republicans

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

1) Fair enough, but on the whole the Federalists and Whigs were more antislavery than their opponents, I think you'd agree, owing to their bases of power in the Northeast, even if there existed many individual pro-slavery Federalists/Whigs and antislavery Republicans/Democrats.

I would put it slightly differently, that a militant abolitionist was more likely to be a Whig than a Democrat due the the sectional/cultural issues you mention. I would not characterize the Whig party, or even Northern Whigs, as a whole as being genuinely committed to an anti-slavery policy. The Whigs' reputation for being a "moderate" party on slavery is pretty unearned in my view, as their so-called moderation always seemed to yield results that were beneficial to the slave power. Henry Clay was absolutely hated by abolitionists in the North, and he disliked them for good measure; John Quincy Adams famously distrusted him, and the abolitionist song I named my most recent attempt at a TL after includes a verse castigating Clay:

Railroads to emancipation
Cannot rest on Clay foundation ...

And for good reason! Clay's brand of Unionism blamed abolitionists for "antagonizing" the South with their attacks on slavery and sought primarily to silence criticism of the peculiar institution rather than put it on the path to extinction as the Republicans would later propose. There were individual Whigs who took an anti-slavery position (JQA and Joshua Reed Giddings being the two most famous), but with a few exceptions these tended to be of the younger generation. The majority of the party—and indeed the national population—had a dim view of anti-slavery activism and had little interest in addressing the institution one way or the other.

As for the Federalists, I tend to take a somewhat more generous view of someone like John Jay (who as governor signed the 1799 law to abolish slavery in New York) or even Washington than I do of Clay, given they actually took steps (however small) to dismantle the institution. I will point out, however, that Jefferson pursued much the same plan in Virginia as Jay successfully lobbied for in New York, and arguably did more to weaken slavery in the long term than any other founding father by keeping slavery out of the Northwest and trying unsuccessfully to outlaw it in all federal territory with his 1784 land bill. (He was still a filthy racist of course.) Anti-slavery sentiment was simply more popular with the founding generation than with the generation that came of age after the War of 1812, but with few exceptions not much was accomplished on the slavery front after the 1780s. So I would not characterize the Federalists as an anti-slavery party, merely a party that had some nominally anti-slavery members.

2) In naming themselves the "Whigs" and casting themselves as defenders of the Constitution against "King Andrew", I think there was at least some suggestion or implication that the Democrats were like Tories, but I'll defer to you on the names they called each other. But continuing on this point, it seems strange to me to refer to Jackson and his party as liberals when the sort of populist demagoguery and personal loyalty they engaged in was anathema to the liberalism of the time, which was protective of representative institutions and feared the too great concentration of power in one man. When Alexis de Tocqueville visited America, he had this to say about the President:

General Jackson, whom the Americans have for the second time chosen to be at their head, is a man of violent character and middling capacities; nothing in the whole of his career indicated him to have the qualities needed for governing a free people; moreover, a majority of the enlightened classes in the Union have always been against him. Who then put him on the President's chair and keeps him there still? It is all due to the memory of a victory he won twenty years ago under the walls of New Orleans.

The Jacksonians may have been democrats, as their name implies, but I don't see them as liberals. It is the constitutional rhetoric of the Whigs, moreover, which bears much closer resemblance to how liberals in Europe spoke at the time in their battles with monarchists.

I don't know why it would seem strange. Populism is a rhetorical devise; liberalism is an ideology. The two are not inherently incompatible. It would be strange indeed if liberals in Europe and America were perfectly in agreement with their strategies for contesting and exercising power, considering the dramatic differences between American and European society during this period. Specifically, we cannot discount the significance of universal (white) manhood suffrage existing in the U.S. but not in Europe; the Jacksonians accordingly were appealing to an electorate made up of men of every class and background, while the European liberals were mostly middle-class men appealing to other middle-class men. I find it significant that during the early republic, when the electorate was (somewhat) more restricted than during the Jacksonian period, the Jeffersonians employed much the same rhetorical strategies and appeals to constitutionalism that you describe: and in that line let us not forget that John Adams was the first president to be called a tyrant recklessly concentrating power in the executive, if we are going to be taking propagandists at their word.

Furthermore, cults of personality were hardly unique to the Democrats of this period: basically every presidential candidacy of the middle nineteenth century featured extravagant efforts to transform the candidate into the cartoon of a rustic hero: thus we get "Old Tippecanoe," "Harry of the West," "Young Hickory," "Old Rough and Ready," etc. Throughout the 1830s parties were referred to in newspapers not by their proper names, but by the name of the presidential candidate —the "Van Buren party," the "Harrison party," and so-on. If personal loyalty is inimical to liberalism, there were no liberals in middle nineteenth century America.

In any event, I have never claimed Jackson was personally a liberal. He strikes me as a man who had very few beliefs that could be described as ideological, and it is significant that prior to his presidency he appealed to former Federalists and Republicans alike. What I have maintained is that Jacksonianism as a political movement fits broadly into the tapestry of the evolution of American liberalism, preserving in bastardized form the essential egalitarian impulses of Jeffersonianism with respect to white men, a general suspicion of banks and organized money, which would inform the later candidacies of Bryan and FDR (who I think we would both agree are liberals).


I don't have much more to say about Frederick Douglass (broadly speaking it's a bad idea to accept any historical figure's word as gospel; Douglass had his biases like everybody else and is speaking from a very specific point of view), but I do want to address this bit.

Also, which populist economic issues are you referring to which the Democrats returned to? They had always opposed the tariff and on the currency question they continued to advocate hard money, which was hardly a populist position in the 1870s when the Greenbackers were arguing for fiat currency.

I was referring to the Great Railway Strike of 1877, in which the governor of Indiana at the time—James "Blue Jeans" Williams, a Democrat elected with Greenback support—sided with the strikers by refusing to call in the militia. Williams' election on a Democatic-Greenback fusion ticket was not uncommon, as the Democrats were the Greenback's preferred partner in such ventures outside the South. (Harris M. Plaisted was the Democratic-Greenback governor of Maine from 1881 to 1883, and Benjamin Butler was elected governor of Massachusetts as a result of a similar bargain in 1882.) But in general I agree that the Democrats were not genuinely left-wing during this period, hence my preference for the Greenbacks and the later Populists.

4) But as Alcibiadies noted, capitalism was intrinsically tied up with liberalism at this point, so its advancement was not really a conservative objective. And I'm not sure everyone believed Whig policies were pursued only to help the rich; who are we to say they didn't genuinely believe in Listian economics and the necessity of developing US national industry, regardless of who the most benefits went to? In any case, bankrupting the slaveholders to enrich the capitalist class was a real step forward in the march of history, though it would've been nice if the Radical Republicans had succeeded in redistributing the wealth of the South to poor people as they intended.

That was true in England, but as I said previously there are significant differences between the U.S. and the U.K. during this period that make a direct comparison problematic, significantly the absence of universal manhood suffrage and the existence of a feudal class order prior to the nineteenth century. In the U.K. the elites were a hereditary nobility and many poor men could not vote, so of course the Liberals appealed to the bourgeoisie. In the U.S., you had a landed gentry in the South (who mostly voted Whig outside of Virginia) and a monied interest in the North who prior to 1850 marched in lock step —the "lords of the loom" and the "lords of the lash." After 1850 Northern industrialists came to see slavery as a threat to their self-interest, but that wasn't the case before: hence why slaveholders loved the Whig party and Hamilton kept trying to elect Pinckneys over the more troublesome Adams.

Ultimately, though, this is an interpretive question. If you take Marx's view that the development of capitalism is prerequisite for the rise of the international proletariat, than you can absolutely argue the Federalist/Whig economic platform was overall conducive to left-wing ends. That's not how people saw it at the time, but it's a valid historiographical framework, at least in my opinion.

5) Indeed, but I'm reminded of something Yankee once said in another thread (or perhaps earlier in this one). It was about how sometimes in history there have been ideological alignments which pitted conservatives and leftists/labor together against liberals. His claim was that the Republican Party at its founding included both conservative businessmen and socialists drawn together against Democratic liberals, but I'm increasingly getting the sense that the opposite was true, if you replace "businessmen" with "slave owners" and "socialists" with "labor". Even if socialist thinkers like Marx who understood the importance of the slavery battle supported the Republicans, most workingmen in the 1850s continued to vote Democratic based on the old economic issues and racist demagogic appeals. They were joined in the party by slave owners, of course, desperate to preserve their favored economic and political position from abolitionism. On the other side, in the Republican Party, we see Northern liberals and the bourgeois middle class, determined to liberate the oppressed slaves of the South. Examining the most extreme ends of both sides in the slavery debate, this reversal of Yankee's position bears out at an individual level too. While George Fitzhugh decried Northern capitalism and modernity and argued for his form of "Tory socialism", William Lloyd Garrison championed Lockean natural rights and the cause of individual liberty in his war against the slave power.

I don't immediately disagree with this, though again I would caution against over-reliance on Fitzhugh. (And since this is a thread about political parties, it's worthwhile to note that Garrison hated the Whigs and the Democrats equally and refused to vote on principle.)

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

That was true in England, but as I said previously there are significant differences between the U.S. and the U.K. during this period that make a direct comparison problematic, significantly the absence of universal manhood suffrage and the existence of a feudal class order prior to the nineteenth century.

I scratched some of the surface of this UK versus US difference in terms of economic relationships on the previous page, you might want to check that out out.

hence why slaveholders loved the Whig party and Hamilton kept trying to elect Pinckneys over the more troublesome Adams.

But a play told me that Hamilton was a liberal, abolitionist, hero...

I forgot the details of Hamilton pushing Pinckneys over Adams, this is going on the Youtube comments sections going forward.

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

I don't know why it would seem strange. Populism is a rhetorical devise; liberalism is an ideology. The two are not inherently incompatible.

Populism is a natural reaction to an out of touch elite. If the elite is pro-business and conservative, then its populist opposition would be very likely to be egalitarian and liberal in response to it.

[𝕭𝖆𝖕𝖙𝖎𝖘𝖙𝖆 𝕸𝖎𝖓𝖔𝖑𝖆]

Can I just say that all of this would be more interesting if Henry cited someone other than Frederick Douglass sometimes when talking about e.g. the 1880's?

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

As for the Federalists, I tend to take a somewhat more generous view of someone like John Jay (who as governor signed the 1799 law to abolish slavery in New York) or even Washington than I do of Clay, given they actually took steps (however small) to dismantle the institution. I will point out, however, that Jefferson pursued much the same plan in Virginia as Jay successfully lobbied for in New York, and arguably did more to weaken slavery in the long term than any other founding father by keeping slavery out of the Northwest and trying unsuccessfully to outlaw it in all federal territory with his 1784 land bill. (He was still a filthy racist of course.) Anti-slavery sentiment was simply more popular with the founding generation than with the generation that came of age after the War of 1812, but with few exceptions not much was accomplished on the slavery front after the 1780s. So I would not characterize the Federalists as an anti-slavery party, merely a party that had some nominally anti-slavery members.

I agree with this analysis.

This bold line was true across the board, though there were some who were militantly pro-slavery, especially the Pinckneys, Hamilton's allies. It was because of one of them (I cannot remember which one off hand) stirring up trouble in the convention that we got the 3/5ths compromise.

Prior to the Cotton Gin and the turning of Cotton into a cash commodity there was a different mindset where people hated slavery, but be it Jefferson's personal debt or just sheer inertia felt incapable of escaping but presumed down the road that would change.

The rise of King Cotton is what produces the radicalized Southern fire eater over the course of the ensuing decades, from the likes of John C. Calhoun to Jefferson Davis, by which point you get people trying spin slavery as a positive "civilizing force", which was not present to my knowledge in the 1780s.

This is one of three great sea changes that would effect American and especially Southern politics substantially for the next century and beyond. The other two have been touched on here and thus I will peel them out as well.

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

the Jacksonians accordingly were appealing to an electorate made up of men of every class and background, while the European liberals were mostly middle-class men appealing to other middle-class men. I find it significant that during the early republic, when the electorate was (somewhat) more restricted than during the Jacksonian period, the Jeffersonians employed much the same rhetorical strategies and appeals to constitutionalism that you describe: and in that line let us not forget that John Adams was the first president to be called a tyrant recklessly concentrating power in the executive, if we are going to be taking propagandists at their word.

There are two reasons why the Whigs took a different line on executive power and both tie back to the expanded voting.

1. The Whigs had to be more expansive than just Federalists and included Nationalist Republicans, hence the name, who would have supported large segments of the Jeffersonian view but took issue with Jackson's new take on it. Kind of like how "Tory" politicians early in the 19th century UK said "The gov't of the last century is and could have only been a Whig Gov't". Being a Federalist would be as destructive as being a Tory in the previous generation. The Whigs were even more expansive than the NRs, including Anti-Masons and such forth, which further muddies the waters, and it is worth noting that a good bit of radical abolitionism hails from Anti-Masonry.

2. OMG the plebs took the White House!!!!!

The Federalists depended upon the restrictive voting to survive. The Jeffersonians s were being powered off the influx of immigrants from the Celtic rim (who of course were all solid reactionary Monarchists in your tradition, Truman. ) and these people didn't take kindly to living in an apartheid state essentially with Ango-Saxons controlling everything from the top down. While the Whigs were more inclusive and expansive beyond this Anglo-Saxon elite, they were still a pro-establishment, minoritarian party just as say the Friends of Pitt were in 1780s Britain or even conservatism today (minus the establishment part). It often ends up a minority viewpoint and thus it becomes necessary to cleave off parts of the opposition to get close to control.

You do this through two ways, you go anti-executive and work soften the ideologues on the other side who "didn't sign up for King Andrew" and then when that doesn't work, you run a popular General and build a personality cult for him.

Also if you think there are parallels to something else here, you are probably right

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

The rise of King Cotton is what produces the radicalized Southern fire eater over the course of the ensuing decades, from the likes of John C. Calhoun to Jefferson Davis, by which point you get people trying spin slavery as a positive "civilizing force", which was not present to my knowledge in the 1780s.

And the planters themselves were positively aware that this shift in opinion had occurred —as we've both discussed previously, pro-slavery literature of the 1850s is full of denunciations of Jefferson. There is an essay published in Debow's Review (a pro-slavery publication) during the campaign of 1860 I love to quote that captures this revisionist history quite well:

Now, to return to the year 1790; at that time the number of slaves was comparatively small, and the disposition to emancipate them quite general. People saw that slavery was an evil to the country; they had no longer a King George to compel its existence, and there can be no doubt but that in a few years, there would have been a general emancipation; the negroes would have decreased in numbers, owing to their idleness and profligacy, and afterward the great immigration of Irish and German labor would have crushed them by competition in the marts of industry, and the black race would probably have been swallowed up in the capacious maw of civilization, as many savage races have been before them. But just at this juncture, just in the nick of time, and only ten years after King George had relinquished his rule in America, in steps King Cotton, forbidding by his power what the other had forbidden by his veto, viz.: the abolition of slavery; and so the negroes were saved.

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

Following on the rise of cotton and the expanded voting, the third biggest shift that would define the politics for most of the 19th century has to be the shift in the North in the early 19th century in terms of where money and power was focused on. It is worth noting that the Federalist Party was at first dedicated to economic nationalism and centralism but at the same time was the party wedded to the financial elite of slave traders and Merchants in New England. Well with Britain being the dominant trade power of the time, this led to a preference for a pro-British policy. However, with the Embargo Act of 1807, the War of 1812 and then the Tariff of 1816, this dynamic was wrecked completely and set the stage for a shift of capital from the merchant focus to the industrial one.

This is why Federalists backed a Free Trade Republican in 1812 and then flirted with secession in 1814. Special interests are a powerful drug. The nuking of this economic elite, created the political opening for the Republicans to destroy the Federalists under Madison, because the new industries were certainly not keen on a return to pre-1807, and a lot of ex-Feds who did believe in nationalism of some sort were certainly not going to follow the rump to their special interest driven oblivion. The renewal of the bank, the instituting of the tariff of 1816 and the rise of nationalists like Henry Clay as western allies for this kind of politics also made this possible.

This helps to explain the cleavage in the North between pro-nationalist elites and more economically liberal ones I mentioned on the previous page. So while the Whigs are the successor to the Federalists in that they contain the majority of  Northern elites, it has to be remembered, it is not quite the same elite and they did not always necessarily share the same interests. Going further, actual remnants of such Federalist elites, assuming they were still in an economic position harmed by by economic nationalism would be favoring the Democrats in later periods against Republicans in contrast to their fellow rich types. This should also explain why a pro-Fed planter (Southern of course) or merchant (North or South), might support Southern Whigs or even the Democrats in the Jacksonian Era and then gravitate towards the Democrats if not already so by the 1850s.

It was one thing to support tariffs to fund an army to shoot down the rioting Plebs, quite another to use tariffs to discourage commerce with Britain in favor of internal commerce and industry.

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

The rise of King Cotton is what produces the radicalized Southern fire eater over the course of the ensuing decades, from the likes of John C. Calhoun to Jefferson Davis, by which point you get people trying spin slavery as a positive "civilizing force", which was not present to my knowledge in the 1780s.

And the planters themselves were positively aware that this shift in opinion had occurred —as we've both discussed previously, pro-slavery literature of the 1850s is full of denunciations of Jefferson. There is an essay published in Debow's Review (a pro-slavery publication) during the campaign of 1860 I love to quote that captures this revisionist history quite well:

Now, to return to the year 1790; at that time the number of slaves was comparatively small, and the disposition to emancipate them quite general. People saw that slavery was an evil to the country; they had no longer a King George to compel its existence, and there can be no doubt but that in a few years, there would have been a general emancipation; the negroes would have decreased in numbers, owing to their idleness and profligacy, and afterward the great immigration of Irish and German labor would have crushed them by competition in the marts of industry, and the black race would probably have been swallowed up in the capacious maw of civilization, as many savage races have been before them. But just at this juncture, just in the nick of time, and only ten years after King George had relinquished his rule in America, in steps King Cotton, forbidding by his power what the other had forbidden by his veto, viz.: the abolition of slavery; and so the negroes were saved.

And conversely Republicans constantly invoked Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence, in contrast to the Constitution. They clung to Jefferson's ideals even beyond what the framers had managed to put into law as sort of an aspirational approach. This is also one of the reasons why they took the name Republican.

It goes hand in hand with my post about cleaving off sections of support from the other side (just like Reagan invoked FDR in constrast to 1980s Dems, Obama invoked Ike a lot in contrast to the Tea Party and so on), by shaming them for deviating from their forbears.

[KaiserDave]

1) Fair enough, but on the whole the Federalists and Whigs were more antislavery than their opponents, I think you'd agree, owing to their bases of power in the Northeast, even if there existed many individual pro-slavery Federalists/Whigs and antislavery Republicans/Democrats.

How do we have 11 pages and you're still sticking to this absurd point.

The Whig Party was not a northeastern party with a several pro slavery characters within it. It was an overtly pro slavery party that blamed anti slavery agitators for the disturbances in the country, and went out of it's way to portray itself as a national party, not a north eastern one.

The Whigs were not significantly more anti slavery than the Democrats in any real way. They nominated a pro-expansion hack twice (William Henry Harrison) against a future Free Soiler (although MvB is hardly an icon of the anti slavery cause), it was a Whig President that signed the Fugitive Slave Act! Where did the Whigs actually meaningfully oppose slavery more than their opponents.

Sure the Whig Party had Lincoln and Seward (although, case in point, Seward was inferior in his influence in the NY Whigs to the likes of Fillmore), but it also had Alexander Stephens and Robert Hunter. I really fail to see how it was meaningfully more anti slavery than the Democrats.

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

1) Fair enough, but on the whole the Federalists and Whigs were more antislavery than their opponents, I think you'd agree, owing to their bases of power in the Northeast, even if there existed many individual pro-slavery Federalists/Whigs and antislavery Republicans/Democrats.

How do we have 11 pages and you're still sticking to this absurd point.

The Whig Party was not a northeastern party with a several pro slavery characters within it. It was an overtly pro slavery party that blamed anti slavery agitators for the disturbances in the country, and went out of it's way to portray itself as a national party, not a north eastern one.

The Whigs were not significantly more anti slavery than the Democrats in any real way. They nominated a pro-expansion hack twice (William Henry Harrison) against a future Free Soiler (although MvB is hardly an icon of the anti slavery cause), it was a Whig President that signed the Fugitive Slave Act! Where did the Whigs actually meaningfully oppose slavery more than their opponents.

Sure the Whig Party had Lincoln and Seward (although, case in point, Seward was inferior in his influence in the NY Whigs to the likes of Fillmore), but it also had Alexander Stephens and Robert Hunter. I really fail to see how it was meaningfully more anti slavery than the Democrats.

I sometimes get the feeling that Henry is trying validate his affinity for the GOP in a particular era on a "The party left me" basis as opposed to acknowledging that such across the board progressivism within the GOP even at earlier periods was much weaker and very much a minority position within the party. There is also a lot of us versus them on a religious basis.

This also gets extended back to the Whigs and Federalists.

[Orwell]

1) Fair enough, but on the whole the Federalists and Whigs were more antislavery than their opponents, I think you'd agree, owing to their bases of power in the Northeast, even if there existed many individual pro-slavery Federalists/Whigs and antislavery Republicans/Democrats.

How do we have 11 pages and you're still sticking to this absurd point.

The Whig Party was not a northeastern party with a several pro slavery characters within it. It was an overtly pro slavery party that blamed anti slavery agitators for the disturbances in the country, and went out of it's way to portray itself as a national party, not a north eastern one.

The Whigs were not significantly more anti slavery than the Democrats in any real way. They nominated a pro-expansion hack twice (William Henry Harrison) against a future Free Soiler (although MvB is hardly an icon of the anti slavery cause), it was a Whig President that signed the Fugitive Slave Act! Where did the Whigs actually meaningfully oppose slavery more than their opponents.

Sure the Whig Party had Lincoln and Seward (although, case in point, Seward was inferior in his influence in the NY Whigs to the likes of Fillmore), but it also had Alexander Stephens and Robert Hunter. I really fail to see how it was meaningfully more anti slavery than the Democrats.

I sometimes get the feeling that Henry is trying validate his affinity for the GOP in a particular era on a "The party left me" basis as opposed to acknowledging that such across the board progressivism within the GOP even at earlier periods was much weaker and very much a minority position within the party. There is also a lot of us versus them on a religious basis.

This also gets extended back to the Whigs and Federalists.

Agree completely with both David and NCYankee. I think it may be because Henry Wallace’s father had been a Republican so the “party left me” idea is even more strong.

I think the problem with quantifying the Whigs as a party opposed or supporting any particular issue is that it was formed off the basis of a single issue originally and expanded further. It was formed originally from the apparatus of Henry Clay and his opposition to Andrew Jackson. The similar idea led to the foundation of the Democrats though it was Jackson and his own personality cult that formed the Democrats. The Whigs not only had a large and virulent pro slavery wing the so-called cotton Whigs, but they had a huge nativist presence as well. In fact their 1844 Vice Presidential nominee held significant sway among these nativist mobs. The Whigs serving as a precursor to the modern Republican Party is dishonest, due to the foundation of the modern GOP coming from a coalition of Whigs, Know Nothing’s, and Disaffected Northern Democrats. While the secessionist movement was a combined force of Democrats, Cotton Whigs, and even those who had supported the Constiutional Unionist party I.e. John Bell.

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

1) Fair enough, but on the whole the Federalists and Whigs were more antislavery than their opponents, I think you'd agree, owing to their bases of power in the Northeast, even if there existed many individual pro-slavery Federalists/Whigs and antislavery Republicans/Democrats.

How do we have 11 pages and you're still sticking to this absurd point.

The Whig Party was not a northeastern party with a several pro slavery characters within it. It was an overtly pro slavery party that blamed anti slavery agitators for the disturbances in the country, and went out of it's way to portray itself as a national party, not a north eastern one.

The Whigs were not significantly more anti slavery than the Democrats in any real way. They nominated a pro-expansion hack twice (William Henry Harrison) against a future Free Soiler (although MvB is hardly an icon of the anti slavery cause), it was a Whig President that signed the Fugitive Slave Act! Where did the Whigs actually meaningfully oppose slavery more than their opponents.

Sure the Whig Party had Lincoln and Seward (although, case in point, Seward was inferior in his influence in the NY Whigs to the likes of Fillmore), but it also had Alexander Stephens and Robert Hunter. I really fail to see how it was meaningfully more anti slavery than the Democrats.

I sometimes get the feeling that Henry is trying validate his affinity for the GOP in a particular era on a "The party left me" basis as opposed to acknowledging that such across the board progressivism within the GOP even at earlier periods was much weaker and very much a minority position within the party. There is also a lot of us versus them on a religious basis.

This also gets extended back to the Whigs and Federalists.

Agree completely with both David and NCYankee. I think it may be because Henry Wallace’s father had been a Republican so the “party left me” idea is even more strong.

I think the problem with quantifying the Whigs as a party opposed or supporting any particular issue is that it was formed off the basis of a single issue originally and expanded further. It was formed originally from the apparatus of Henry Clay and his opposition to Andrew Jackson. The similar idea led to the foundation of the Democrats though it was Jackson and his own personality cult that formed the Democrats. The Whigs not only had a large and virulent pro slavery wing the so-called cotton Whigs, but they had a huge nativist presence as well. In fact their 1844 Vice Presidential nominee held significant sway among these nativist mobs. The Whigs serving as a precursor to the modern Republican Party is dishonest, due to the foundation of the modern GOP coming from a coalition of Whigs, Know Nothing’s, and Disaffected Northern Democrats. While the secessionist movement was a combined force of Democrats, Cotton Whigs, and even those who had supported the Constiutional Unionist party I.e. John Bell.

I would agree at least initially, that the Republicans were indeed a single issue party as well founded from various politically affiliations previous to that point.

What I have contended in this thread is that from 1860 onward, Lincoln made various appeals to bring on elitist, business and other more conservative Whig factions who were uneasy about abolition and likewise of the Republicans but were willing to trust this Clay disciple (economically speaking) and especially once he ran on most of their old economic platform.

Furthermore, it is worth remembering that Democrats took complete control in 1856, lowered tariffs in 1857 and there was a recession of sorts in 1857-1858. Some of have blamed this on the Dred Scott decision, while more recent analysis says it was more caused by external factors. Even so, the view at the time was likely prevalent that Democrats had wrecked the economy to please the South, so by 1860 there is thus much broader Northern appetite for Republicanism especially as extolled by Lincoln in contrast to Fremont and other earlier hard liners.

Following from there, as the Civil War gave way to the gilded age and their influence was manifest in their party of choice, the party itself came much more defined by their interest at the expense of other considerations. This is so much so by the 1870s that you see Republicans being see as "The party of the rich" and the "Party of the businessman", just as much as the party of Lincoln and abolishing slavery. Overtime the former would begin to outweigh and erode the latter, with 1876 being the moment when it is definitive that business had the upper hand in the party and regardless of factions to come later and various Presidents, this general relationship would remain continue to strengthen.

What Henry is doing is relying on hard coded ideologies as if they are attached to ones DNA and thus saying that because Republicans were the party of the abolitionism and Yankees, they must have been the more liberal party until they shed their Yankee base in the 1960s in favor of a Catholic one. It discounts human agency, or the general left-wing character economically speaking of the poor debtor farmer in the South and West who were left out of the industrial prosperity, were getting screwed by banks, screwed by railroads and shot whenever they demanded change either by Pinkerton's or the national guard.

This is not to say that Democrats were perfect champions for such people, a point he often clings to. In fact it is very likely that the Democrats were able to become better such champions precisely because Republicans were alienating so many people to them by being so business oriented. However you have to recognize this dynamic as being underway as far back as the early 1870s.

[Wikipedia delenda est]

I do feel like we're reaching a consensus of sorts, as I have little to argue with in response to Truman or most of Yankee's points, but there's one thing Yankee said which is still bugging me. That is, his insistence that the Democratic party of the 1850s and 60s was still a liberal party, despite all evidence to the contrary.

5) Indeed, but I'm reminded of something Yankee once said in another thread (or perhaps earlier in this one). It was about how sometimes in history there have been ideological alignments which pitted conservatives and leftists/labor together against liberals.

Yep, here we go

His claim was that the Republican Party at its founding included both conservative businessmen and socialists drawn together against Democratic liberals

Yes I did

but I'm increasingly getting the sense that the opposite was true, if you replace "businessmen" with "slave owners" and "socialists" with "labor".

Yes you would naturally.

Even if socialist thinkers like Marx who understood the importance of the slavery battle supported the Republicans, most workingmen in the 1850s continued to vote Democratic based on the old economic issues and racist demagogic appeals.

Old economic issues drawn heavily from a classical liberal policy base, combined with an opposition to monopolies, yes.

Even so, working voters were divided as I have repeatedly said since 1) Slavery was beginning to be seen as a threat to working people in the north as opposed to a salvation, post Dred Scott. 2) Republican Economic Nationalism was more befitting their economic interest then the Democrats agrarian+period liberal economic policy (which threatened deindustrialization in the eyes of many workers).

They were joined in the party by slave owners, of course, desperate to preserve their favored economic and political position from abolitionism.

Glad you finally acknowledge they were joining an egalitarian party out of mutual interest.

I just don't see how you can continue to insist this. The Democratic party of the 1850s was a reactionary mess that no longer stood for anything or anyone, least of all the unfortunate, besides the slave power and Southern interests. Truman himself has stated that by 1850, all genuine liberals bolted the party. Is it not obvious that in a political arena in which slavery was the defining issue, perhaps the one true issue of the 1850s which underlaid all else, that the defenders of such an institution are nothing but the most blatant of conservatives? I'm curious how you would respond to these two passages I posted a couple pages back from the Louisville paper, which make quite clear to me that in the 1850s-60s the Republicans were a liberal party and the Democrats a conservative one:

Not only did Church officials perceive the Republicans to be anti-Catholic and associate them with the nativist riots that occurred during the prewar period, but prelates and priests also argued that the party of Lincoln represented the ill-effects of Protestantism in American society. Clergy considered the Republican antislavery platform and the party’s association with abolitionism to be examples of Protestant fanaticism. Although by 1860 nearly all Protestant sects contained an antislavery faction, almost all members of the Church—in both the United States and Europe—denounced abolitionism as a radical movement that opposed Catholic teachings. Catholic leaders considered abolitionism to be a product of Protestant liberalism which threatened to upend the social and legal status quo in the country. As abolitionists demanded an immediate end to slavery, despite American laws that protected the institution, Catholic leaders sought to preserve order by upholding the sanctity of the Constitution. Thus, prelates and priests believed that the Republican Party—the party of northern Protestants—endangered the stability of the country by advancing its antislavery platform. In particular, ultramontane clergy—like Francis Patrick Kenrick and Spalding—adhered to the belief that slavery remained a legitimate human relation that fit within a structured social hierarchy. Clergy referenced Catholic theology, doctrine, and dogma to offer an alternative course of action than the one pursued by abolitionists and antislavery Republicans. According to members of the American hierarchy, Catholicism defended national laws, protected the social order, and prevented political factionalism because it provided a central authority—the Church—to settle internal disputes. On the other hand, prelates and priests contended that Protestantism allowed for lawlessness, fomented social disorder, and led to political disunion because, without the acceptance of a central moral authority, Protestantism allowed each man (or woman) to become a law unto himself (or herself). Thus, not only did clergy oppose the Republican Party because of its perceived anti-Catholic stance, but prelates and priests also disparaged the party of Lincoln because it represented the interests of northern Protestants, a group that Catholics considered uninformed religious fanatics that fomented disunion.

Although the clergy in Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri did not publicly endorse or campaign for a candidate in the presidential election of 1860, the majority of prelates and priests privately supported Stephen Douglas, the northern Democratic candidate from Illinois. The clergy’s antebellum experiences with nativism and anti-Catholicism forged a strong bond between members of the Church and Democrats. However, by the summer of 1860, the Democratic Party had divided into northern and southern wings, forcing Border State Catholics to decide between Douglas and John C. Breckinridge of the southern Democratic Party. Although some Catholics backed Breckinridge—particularly fellow Kentuckians from the western portion of the state—most members of the Church in the region supported Douglas. The northern Democratic candidate promoted unionism and vowed to uphold the status quo, which, to Catholic clergy, meant an adherence to the law and the preservation of social order. As Catholic historian William B. Kurtz explained, “Catholics’ faith and religious worldview, which emphasized stability over reform, also made them predisposed to favor a conservative and national party.” Douglas gained the support of Catholics because he advocated the policy of popular sovereignty to decide the fate of slavery in the West, opposed abolitionism, promised to protect the rights of immigrants, and promoted the sanctity of the Union by running a national campaign. For example, regarding the dispute over slavery in the western territories, the Douglas Democratic platform pledged to “abide by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States [the Dred Scott decision] upon these questions of Constitutional law.” Thus, clergy from the Border States viewed Douglas as the candidate least influenced by Protestant liberalism and most committed to the interests of the Church and the nation.

On the other side, in the Republican Party, we see Northern liberals and the bourgeois middle class, determined to liberate the oppressed slaves of the South.

And Northern Socialists, Northern Aristocrats, Northern Capitalists, Northern Speculators and Northern Landed Elites and everyone else who for a multitude of reasons listed below came to regard slave power as a threat to their situation or values.

1. Genuine moral outrage
2. Corruption of the Constitution and the courts
3. Violation of Northern State's with Fugitive Slave law
4. Fear of Slavery being spread north by the courts and out competing paid labor (Dred Scott and Bleeding KS before that)
5. Hindrance to the economic development of the country, getting in the way of desired policy outcomes (economic nationalism).
6. Hindrance to the spreading of the gospel to the unwashed

The problem with emphasizing the nature of "The Northern Middle Class" here is that it fails to account for the economic dynamic by which this middle class existed and the resulting altered policy orientation to which they existed towards the establishment. This is the same problem with failing to account for the relative dominance of more calvinistic sects in America and expecting the political relationship of dissenters in Britain and Calvinists/Pius Sects in the US  to be exactly the same. Power dynamics matter.

The Northern Middle Class, or at least that portion of which that was connected to and depended upon the Industrial Revolution, would be thus depended on a set of economically nationalist policies that would put it in contrast to say the middle class in Britain that depended on a trading empire and a free trade policy for its wealth. The effect of this in reality means this portion of the middle class is going to adhere to and behave similarly to the elites, in the US, more so then elsewhere and especially in Britain.

Also before we go further, there was strong middle class support from the Jacksonian era for the Democratic Party. Of course in your view every Catholic is a right wing reactionary Monarchist, but that would be one group of middle class support. Aside from them there would be middle class and likewise even elements of he Wall Street Class that supported Democratic policies precisely because they were engaged in industries that were harmed or at least not benefited directly by the economic policies of the Republican Protective System. Also anti-monopoly politics had a strong middle class appeal in an era where large portions of the middle class were getting screwed by monopolists, just like anti-speculation politics had a strong appeal to the small and poor farmers getting screwed by the speculators.

When you dig into this, you find a clear cleavage on an economic nationalist vs. "liberal" (mostly classical but also with some compromises in terms of opposing speculators/monopolists and trying to regulate that). This would cleave a minority of the Northern Wealthy into opposing the Republicans and an even larger group (though likely not a majority or even close) of the middle class and a significant group, perhaps even a majority of working class voters (variably by era), that would be supporting the Democrats.

Now I know you have repeatedly said you don't give a crap about economic and class dynamics, but just because you don't like it, doesn't mean that these dynamics don't exist.

Yes, the Republicans combined all sorts of Northerners into one party, but what they all had in common was their Protestant liberalism. Read the passages I posted above. Despite the multitude of reasons that led people to oppose slavery, I maintain that the Republicans were at their founding fundamentally a classical liberal party, committed to eradicating slavery for ideological reasons first and foremost before any economic concerns. The party's opposition to slavery came from its ideological commitment to classical liberalism - that is to say, its founding belief in the equality of man under the law and determination to "make men free". This is borne out by everything the party said and did, who founded it, the candidates it ran, how it was perceived and reacted to by contemporaries, etc. Orwell is right; the Republicans were not just a continuation of the Whigs, and it is dishonest to pretend as if they were.

Also, I'm tired of hearing your "economic nationalist = conservative" claim, which you seem to have accepted as a predetermined truth that requires no backing evidence whatsoever. I've already explained how Listian economic nationalism was very much in line with 19th century American liberal capitalism, not "free trade". As you like to say, motivations and interest groups are more important ideological determiners than the policies themselves, or in this case how strictly those policies adhere to classical economic orthodoxy.

[Don Vito Corleone]

But economic interventionism, if you mean things like tariffs and trade barriers or internal improvements, isn't an anti-capitalist position. In fact, it's one of the most capitalist positions possible, when it is used to support business like it was in the 19th century.

Yes? You seem to be arguing against a point I never made.

State capitalism (which the US was never even close to, by the way) is still capitalism and no less so than laissez-faire. It's just a different approach, one which at the time was favored by bourgeois liberals and capitalist classes. It was traditional rural landowners and small farmers who liked free trade. So did Karl Marx. Nationalist economic policies like those of Friedrich List were more liberal and capitalistic, for their time, than free trade or economic libertarianism (not to mention Marxism).

Now that is quite the claim. For one thing, List was writing in a particular place; Continental Europe. His influence was not the same everywhere. After all, you're not going to dispute that the British Liberals were pro-free-market, are you? For another thing, as has been pointed out by both Truman and Alcibiades, the tendency of Classical Liberals to be economically interventionist and supportive of Business was even less so in America, so using his writings as proof that the pro-business economic nationalism of both the Federalists and the Whigs is indicative of liberalism is misleading.

But all the evidence I've seen is that nothing had fundamentally changed in the discourse around Catholicism since the 17th century. Pardon me, but when the American nativists are using the exact same arguments as the Whigs, the same language about liberty and the constitution, and Catholics are responding with the same attitude of entrenching themselves deeper into conservatism and opposition to Protestant liberalism; it's hard not to think that it's the same fight of the 17th century just two centuries later. I mean, it's the same exact stuff about preventing arbitrary government, preserving religious toleration (by suppressing an inherently intolerant religion), etc.

Well believe it or not, quite a lot changed in 150 years . Again, I'm not too knowledgeable on the political issues in 17th Century Britain, but I know the basics. After the Glorious Revolution, a Catholic absolute monarch had just been overthrown. In America, there had never been an absolute monarch period, nevermind a Catholic one. Furthermore, by the 1850s, any claim, in either Britain or America, that Catholics were about to reconstitute an absolute monarchy was laughable, considering that by this point Catholics held little political power and had been a maligned minority for over a century. If this doesn't sway you (as I suspect it doesn't) and you still believe that American anti-Catholicism was in line with Whig tradition, consider what the Whigs themselves were doing. In 1829, when Catholic Emancipation was finally introduced in Britain, the Whigs were the staunchest supporters of it, and the Tories (where they were supporters at all, which oftentimes they weren't) were considerably more hesitant. I found this excellent 25 page article from the English Historical Review which highlights the political situation a few years before Emancipation*. You really should read the whole thing, but I've pulled a few select quotes which highlight the Whigs more enthusiastic support for Emancipation:

For it seemed that the Catholic cause was being removed from the Whigs and was coming to rest within the nerveless grasp of the Government, where its champions, lulled by office, would be content to let the stalemate continue.

The impact of the Catholic association sharpened the current division of opinion on the Catholic question between English political groups. The radicals welcomed the association, and the orthodox Whigs sympathized with it. But the anti-Catholics denounced it, and the pro-catholic Tories wished to suppress it as a menace to peaceable government and a quiet settlement of the Catholic Claims. Thus the pro-catholic Tories became still further divided from the Whigs along party lines.

This one in particular I want to highlight because it shows the Ultra-Tories (more on them later) viewed the Tory Government's position as too friendly to Catholics and thus too "liberal"

Letters show that there was a movement among Ultra peers to form a group which would demand repressive action. John Cam Hobhouse was told that the Duke of Newcastle, the Earl of Lonsdale and others '. . . are said to disclaim the present Administration on account of its Liberalism

Whereas the Whigs would not agree to suppress the association unless emancipation was simultaneously granted, the Tory Pro-catholics would not consider emancipation unless the association was
previously suppressed. This sharp division of opinion was intensified by the prevailing Whig Scepticism of the sincerity of government pro-Catholics. Grey was especially suspicious of Canning, whom he attacked in a letter to Lord Holland:
"I am prepared for measures against the Catholic Association, & for Canning's taking advantage of the alarm occasioned by it, and for which it is made a pretence, to relieve himself of the embarrassment of the Catholick [sic] Question. He will of course be for coercion, increase of army, and all its consequences, and our friends I suppose will go on praising him for his liberality."

Although certain Tory pro-Catholics, such as Charles Wynn, thought that the danger of the Catholic association had been exaggerated, many others were as alarmed as the ultras at the threatened destruction of ' our Church Establishment & our Protestant Constitution ',* and all were in favour of suppression.

George Tierney claimed that Plunket had, by taking office, abandoned the Catholic cause; Burdett condemned the whole system of a Cabinet divided on the Catholic question; and Brougham attacked Canning for not using his talents to carry emancipation,' as he might easily do if he list. On 15 February, the bill passed its first reading by 278 votes to 123, and these figures showed the exerted party cleavage. Most of the minority were at once Whig and pro-Catholic, but there were nine exceptions. Six of these were Whigs who had hitherto voted anti-Catholic in the current parliament: perhaps, as Whigs, they were loath to see a popular association put down, while they did not want to support the general question of Catholic relief because it was antipathetic to their constituents. The three other exceptions were Tory pro-Catholics.

Not only was O'Connell convinced that his own example would persuade the Irish Catholics to forget their dislike of securities, but it seemed that many pro-Catholic Whigs were prepared to accept them in order to make the relief measure more palatable to the Tory pro-Catholics.

Frankly, I could quote the entire thing, but I'll stop there, and recommend again that you read it.

Consider also the existence of the faction of Ultra-Tories, who were fiercely opposed to Emancipation. Notice that no such faction label exists for the Whigs. This is not a coincidence. In fact, so large and influential were the Ultra-Tories (174 Tory MPs voted against Emancipation) that their anger was key to the downfall of Wellington's Ministry. Notice too that eventually the Ultra-Tories would return to the Tories after the episode passed. 

So then, we can see that by 1829 the Whigs were decidedly less hostile to Catholics than the Tories. So, if I accept your premise that the Glorious Revolution made it so that hostility to Catholics was automatically a liberal position and support for them was automatically conservative, then by 1829 the Whigs are now conservative and the Tories are now liberal. Obviously, this was not the case. As has been repeated many times in this thread, issues and the political circumstances around them do not stay fixed, and this is one such case. As such, we can see that by the early 19th Century, hostility to Catholicism was no longer a small-l liberal or left-wing position. I keep repeating 1829 intentionally because I want to underline all this is occurring 3 decades before the rise of the Know-Nothings in America. Therefore, it's a little silly to say the Know-Nothings were merely hostile to a poor immigrant group because they were acting in-line with Whig principles and traditions when the Whigs themselves didn't even believe that Catholicism was a menace anymore. Unless you think there was also a party switch in England wherein the Whigs became Tories and the Tories became Whigs I guess.

One more example, partly just because this one is close to my own heart. After Confederation (the formation of Canada in 1867), in Ontario the Catholic Church was supportive of the provincial Liberal Party, because the Conservatives were filled with Nativist Protestants who were shall we say not the biggest fan of Catholics, especially as many of them were poor immigrants. However, in Quebec where Catholics were the overwhelming majority and the Church had a near endless list of special privileges and little fear of protestant prosecution, the Church was strongly aligned with the provincial Conservative Party, with Clergy often telling their church flock that "Heaven is Blue, Hell is Red" in a not very subtle ploy to tell their followers to vote Tory (Blue was and is the colour of the Conservatives in Canada and Red was and is the colour of the Liberals). This was because the Church was fearful that the provincial Liberals were a radical anti-clerical bunch who would emulate their European cousins in their concentrated attacks on religious power.

Now the issue of course, arises when you try and apply a blanket position to either support of hostility to Catholics. If we say, as you do, that hostility to Catholicism and Catholics is a liberal position, then the Ontario Tories are now liberals. If we say that support of Catholicism is a liberal position, then now the Quebec Tories are liberals. Obviously, neither of these were the case. The solution then is recognizing that Ontario and Quebec had completely different political environments, and that this means that both the Quebec and Ontario Tories were conservatives just as the Quebec and Ontario Liberals were both liberals, even if that manifested as the literal exact opposite position on a key political issue. And that's in the same country at the same time, imagine just how different political allies could be in more varied circumstances. Say, in different countries across an ocean 150 years apart ?

Anti-Catholicism was different in the 20th century. Without Pius IX at the helm, the Catholic Church posed a much less obvious threat to democracy.

Catholics were also very much not a threat to democracy in the 19th Century in America or Britain, and the Whigs, the Democrats, and later the British Liberals recognized this. Besides, you don't seriously mean to tell me that you think the Know-Nothings were keeping up with Catholic Doctrine?

In England, too, William Ewart Gladstone, the leader of the Liberals, published his famous pamphlet against the Catholic Church in the 1870s as a response to the Papal infallibility doctrine promulgated by Pius IX (an extreme reactionary and Confederate sympathizer).

I am aware of Gladstone's pamphlet, but here's the thing about that: Gladstone was opposed to Catholic doctrine and hierarchy, he was not racist against Catholics (at least, not as much as his Conservative Peers). Consider Gladstone's decade long struggle for Irish Home Rule, which was deeply tied into questions about the rights of Irish Catholics. It is not a coincidence that opponents of Home Rule used the phrase "Home Rule means Rome Rule". It is also not a coincidence that when quite a few members of Gladstone's own Liberal Party objected to his plans for Home Rule, they bolted and formed their own "Liberal Unionist" Party which was allied the Conservatives, and it was definitely not a coincidence that the Liberal Unionists formally merged into the British Tory Party in the 1910s. Gladstone also pushed (successfully) for the Disestablishment of the Church of Ireland which freed Irish Catholics from having their tax money support a Church actively hostile to them. Yet more proof that in the 19th Century, hostility to Catholics was a purview of the right, not the left.   

As a result, anti-Catholic feeling shifted from the more democratic minded Northeast to the South, where their feelings were driven by pure religious bigotry without any of the Yankee values. While Northerners were suspicious of Catholicism because of its use in political repression and persecutory tendencies, Southerners had a more Tory like hatred of any who dared oppose the established church. As Fitzhugh said, "we would rejoice to see intolerance of error revived in New England".

Now, I could point out to you that the North held on to Established Churches for longer than the South did, or that Jefferson and his Republicans who led the charge for Disestablishment were Southerners, but I don't want to get into that right now. What I will say is I have outlined why I am very skeptical of the idea that 19th century Anti-Catholicism in America was anything other than an unfortunate and ugly episode of naked bigotry, and also I will say that Smith and Kennedy very much did face bigotry on the basis of their religion in the North. Smith in particular had to deal with a very much Northern-based Republican Party that had little issue exploiting his faith for political advantage. To the extent that this was less than the Know-Nothings, it should be remembered the Catholic population in these Northern states had increased dramatically from the heydey of the Know-Nothings to their respective runs for President, and that (in Kennedy's case at least) they were also doing better in the South than previously.

Also, I find it interesting you keep citing George Fitzhugh as a representative of the South considering he was very much not in line with common opinion anywhere, ever.

*G. I. T. MACHIN, The Catholic Emancipation Crisis of 1825, The English Historical Review, Volume LXXVIII, Issue CCCVIII, July 1963, Pages 458–482, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/LXXVIII.CCCVIII.458
Copyright © 1963, Oxford University Press

EDIT: Forgot to address this in the original post

I don't see their ideological orientation as being illiberal for the 19th century; especially since the reaction among most American Catholics was to double down on their ultramontanist and ultraconservative views.

Henry, I really, really, really, really, cannot emphasize enough just how little the personal beliefs of American Catholics matters in this question. I don't even know if what you're saying is true, but even if I accept it, it's really not anymore relevant than the personal opinions of a Muslim immigrant on Abortion or any other political issue when it comes to whether restricting his civil liberties is liberal or conservative.

[Wikipedia delenda est]

As for the Federalists, I tend to take a somewhat more generous view of someone like John Jay (who as governor signed the 1799 law to abolish slavery in New York) or even Washington than I do of Clay, given they actually took steps (however small) to dismantle the institution. I will point out, however, that Jefferson pursued much the same plan in Virginia as Jay successfully lobbied for in New York, and arguably did more to weaken slavery in the long term than any other founding father by keeping slavery out of the Northwest and trying unsuccessfully to outlaw it in all federal territory with his 1784 land bill. (He was still a filthy racist of course.) Anti-slavery sentiment was simply more popular with the founding generation than with the generation that came of age after the War of 1812, but with few exceptions not much was accomplished on the slavery front after the 1780s. So I would not characterize the Federalists as an anti-slavery party, merely a party that had some nominally anti-slavery members.

How much would you say that has to do with the Enlightenment? In the book Burr by Gore Vidal, set in the 1830s, a repeated trope is this idea that Burr is a thoroughly 18th century man with ideas and attitudes that are no longer fashionable in the 19th.

Now, I could point out to you that the North held on to Established Churches for longer than the South did

It doesn't make any sense to me how there could be an "established" state Congregational church in the North, when the whole point of Congregationalism is that local congregations control their own affairs. Case in point: when the Independents came to power in Britain, they abolished the Church of England and granted freedom of religion to Protestant dissenters.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

As for the Federalists, I tend to take a somewhat more generous view of someone like John Jay (who as governor signed the 1799 law to abolish slavery in New York) or even Washington than I do of Clay, given they actually took steps (however small) to dismantle the institution. I will point out, however, that Jefferson pursued much the same plan in Virginia as Jay successfully lobbied for in New York, and arguably did more to weaken slavery in the long term than any other founding father by keeping slavery out of the Northwest and trying unsuccessfully to outlaw it in all federal territory with his 1784 land bill. (He was still a filthy racist of course.) Anti-slavery sentiment was simply more popular with the founding generation than with the generation that came of age after the War of 1812, but with few exceptions not much was accomplished on the slavery front after the 1780s. So I would not characterize the Federalists as an anti-slavery party, merely a party that had some nominally anti-slavery members.

How much would you say that has to do with the Enlightenment? In the book Burr by Gore Vidal, set in the 1830s, a repeated trope is this idea that Burr is a thoroughly 18th century man with ideas and attitudes that are no longer fashionable in the 19th.

I don't know about Gore Vidal or his characterization of Burr, but in broad terms I would agree that the Enlightenment concept of natural rights lent itself to certain anti-slavery conclusions. If you hold that all people are created essentially equal and with inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property, it is very difficult to justify holding your fellow men in bondage, whatever racial prejudices you may harbor notwithstanding. (I'm reminded of a letter Jefferson wrote to the French abolitionist Henri Gregoire in 1808, where he equivocates over whether blacks are the intellectual equals of whites, but then adds, "whatever be their degree of talent it is no measure of their rights" —meaning, in essence, that even if blacks are inferior, it does not justify slavery, a sentiment later generations of Southerners would passionately denounce as you are so fond of quoting.) As those ideals passed out of fashion in the early nineteenth century, it is in some ways not surprising that white Americans found it easier to ignore the obvious inhumanity of slavery.

Now, I could point out to you that the North held on to Established Churches for longer than the South did

It doesn't make any sense to me how there could be an "established" state Congregational church in the North, when the whole point of Congregationalism is that local congregations control their own affairs. Case in point: when the Independents came to power in Britain, they abolished the Church of England and granted freedom of religion to Protestant dissenters.

Okay, but there was. The Congregationalist Church remained the state church of Connecticut until 1818, when it was finally disestablished by a coalition of Republicans and moderate Federalists who ran under the banner of the "Toleration party"; New Hampshire had disestablished its state Congregationalist Church only the previous year, while neighboring Massachusetts kept its established church for another decade and a half, only formally disestablishing the Church in 1833. I should think this should not be too surprising to anyone familiar with the history of Puritanism in New England.

[Wikipedia delenda est]

As for the Federalists, I tend to take a somewhat more generous view of someone like John Jay (who as governor signed the 1799 law to abolish slavery in New York) or even Washington than I do of Clay, given they actually took steps (however small) to dismantle the institution. I will point out, however, that Jefferson pursued much the same plan in Virginia as Jay successfully lobbied for in New York, and arguably did more to weaken slavery in the long term than any other founding father by keeping slavery out of the Northwest and trying unsuccessfully to outlaw it in all federal territory with his 1784 land bill. (He was still a filthy racist of course.) Anti-slavery sentiment was simply more popular with the founding generation than with the generation that came of age after the War of 1812, but with few exceptions not much was accomplished on the slavery front after the 1780s. So I would not characterize the Federalists as an anti-slavery party, merely a party that had some nominally anti-slavery members.

How much would you say that has to do with the Enlightenment? In the book Burr by Gore Vidal, set in the 1830s, a repeated trope is this idea that Burr is a thoroughly 18th century man with ideas and attitudes that are no longer fashionable in the 19th.

I don't know about Gore Vidal or his characterization of Burr, but in broad terms I would agree that the Enlightenment concept of natural rights lent itself to certain anti-slavery conclusions. If you hold that all people are created essentially equal and with inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property, it is very difficult to justify holding your fellow men in bondage, whatever racial prejudices you may harbor notwithstanding. (I'm reminded of a letter Jefferson wrote to the French abolitionist Henri Gregoire in 1808, where he equivocates over whether blacks are the intellectual equals of whites, but then adds, "whatever be their degree of talent it is no measure of their rights" —meaning, in essence, that even if blacks are inferior, it does not justify slavery, a sentiment later generations of Southerners would passionately denounce as you are so fond of quoting.) As those ideals passed out of fashion in the early nineteenth century, it is in some ways not surprising that white Americans found it easier to ignore the obvious inhumanity of slavery.

Indeed, the anti-slavery societies that formed in Britain and America in the late 18th century were definite products of the Enlightenment, and the ideological influences are obvious. So too in France, where abolition occurred as a direct result of the Revolution and the most ardent abolitionists, like Sonthonax, were partisans of the new regime. But all this is well established already, so the question is how much influence the Enlightenment had. In my view the Enlightenment, and the liberalism that came out of it, was the single most important influence on the anti-slavery movement.

There are those who say the abolitionist movement was most influenced by religious fundamentalism, not by Enlightenment ideas or liberalism. They point to the numerous English and American evangelicals, such as William Wilberforce, who made up a large portion of the anti-slavery movement. But if the anti-slavery movement was primarily a religious one, then why did it not coalesce a century earlier, in the much less secular 17th century? The Puritans of early modern England and New England were no less zealous in their Protestant Christianity than their evangelical descendants, but they had few qualms about the institution of slavery. Puritan Boston was a major slave trading port well into the 18th century, and it was Oliver Cromwell's regime that acquired the island of Jamaica for England, which would soon become the most important slave colony in the British Empire.

The answer is that the intellectual changes wrought by the Enlightenment were necessary for the existence of the movement. In a world in which natural rights did not exist, who would think to stand up for the slave, who was not a man and a brother, born free with certain inalienable rights? Nobody would. As much as I admire such men as Henry Vane and William Penn, a liberalism based on Protestant Christianity alone is not sufficient for the enslaved. Many liberal ideas, it is true, came from Protestant individualism, but it took the skeptical, often irreligious lens of the Enlightenment to fully form these ideas and apply them to the whole of humanity.

Another flaw in the religious argument is that even within 19th century American evangelicalism, opinions on slavery were deeply divided. As you have noted, nearly every denomination produced many pro-slavery apologists as well as abolitionists. How could men following the same faith come away with such radically different conclusions? I surmise that the difference between these theologians is explained by their embrace or rejection of Enlightenment values. Though often critical of organized religion, the Enlightenment impacted Christianity just as it did every other aspect of society. Preachers could either adopt the ideas of the Enlightenment or scorn them, and they did both. Anti-slavery Christians like Garrison used Locke (himself a slaver) to argue against the institution, while Father John Bannon appealed to tradition and inveighed against modernity in support of slavery. Those whose Protestant liberalism had more in common with the Enlightenment were more often willing to embrace its values than, say, Roman Catholics, but there were plenty of other Protestants who were traditionalist in their politics and supportive of slavery. Thus we may observe that evangelical Christians, who are supposed to have driven the anti-slavery movement in one narrative, were far from united on the issue.

What about liberals, the natural successors of Enlightenment thinking and those most supportive of the French Revolution? On both sides of the Atlantic, liberals and radicals everywhere were unanimous in their opposition to slavery. In America, at least in the founding generation, even those who owned slaves, like Jefferson, were ideologically opposed to the institution. Though lost in the next, less enlightened generation, opposition to slavery was revived by the later abolitionists, many of whom ascribed to a Protestant liberalism informed by the Enlightenment. The Republican party was founded as a classical liberal party, based on these fundamental principles. In Europe the connections between the anti-slavery movement and liberalism are more obvious. In Britain the Foxite Whigs led the charge against the slave trade, and in France the Revolutionary government abolished the institution altogether. In later years when the slavery question became an exclusively American one, the Italian independence hero Giuseppe Garibaldi was so against slavery that he turned down an offer to be a Union Major General because Lincoln would not yet state abolition as an official war goal. His sentiments echoed radical opinion throughout Europe, while conservatives and reactionary noblemen, particularly those in Catholic countries like France and Austria, sympathized overwhelmingly with the Confederacy. It was a belief in liberalism and the ideas of the Enlightenment, not religiosity, that formed the basic grounding of the anti-slavery movement.

Now, I could point out to you that the North held on to Established Churches for longer than the South did

It doesn't make any sense to me how there could be an "established" state Congregational church in the North, when the whole point of Congregationalism is that local congregations control their own affairs. Case in point: when the Independents came to power in Britain, they abolished the Church of England and granted freedom of religion to Protestant dissenters.

Okay, but there was. The Congregationalist Church remained the state church of Connecticut until 1818, when it was finally disestablished by a coalition of Republicans and moderate Federalists who ran under the banner of the "Toleration party"; New Hampshire had disestablished its state Congregationalist Church only the previous year, while neighboring Massachusetts kept its established church for another decade and a half, only formally disestablishing the Church in 1833. I should think this should not be too surprising to anyone familiar with the history of Puritanism in New England.

I just don't understand it on a conceptual level. How can a denomination that definitionally gives congregations local control have a state church?

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

Now, I could point out to you that the North held on to Established Churches for longer than the South did

It doesn't make any sense to me how there could be an "established" state Congregational church in the North, when the whole point of Congregationalism is that local congregations control their own affairs. Case in point: when the Independents came to power in Britain, they abolished the Church of England and granted freedom of religion to Protestant dissenters.

Okay, but there was. The Congregationalist Church remained the state church of Connecticut until 1818, when it was finally disestablished by a coalition of Republicans and moderate Federalists who ran under the banner of the "Toleration party"; New Hampshire had disestablished its state Congregationalist Church only the previous year, while neighboring Massachusetts kept its established church for another decade and a half, only formally disestablishing the Church in 1833. I should think this should not be too surprising to anyone familiar with the history of Puritanism in New England.

I just don't understand it on a conceptual level. How can a denomination that definitionally gives congregations local control have a state church?

I wonder what you imagine a state church to be, and how it is incompatible with Congregationalism? In New England, the established Congregational Church had the support of the state, meaning it was able to collect tithes and enforce church attendance. As I say, this continued well into the nineteenth century, long after the rest of the country disestablished their state churches in the late eighteenth century.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

The ideological origins of anti-slavery really deserve their own thread, but in broad terms, yes: clearly the anti-slavery argument was deeply influenced by the Enlightenment and the American Revolution. Even before 1776, the doctrine of natural rights proposed by Locke and other philosophers of the Enlightenment was working to convince a growing number of educated men in the colonies that slavery was incompatible with natural law and ought to be put on the path to extinction. (Of course, we have to be careful not to be too congratulatory of the Enlightenment: many of its proponents had no problem with slavery, including Locke himself, as you note, and the spirit of scientific inquiry that produced many of the achievements of this period also led to the invention of scientific racism.) The inherent contradiction of declaring, on the one hand, that "all men are born free and equal," while on the other continuing to hold half a million men in bondage, was not lost on Americans of the late eighteenth century; in fact, this was the basis for the abolition of slavery in Massachusetts, which was achieved, not by any act of the legislature, but by a series of judicial decisions made in the summer and fall of 1781, culminating with the declaration by the Supreme Judicial Court of the commonwealth:

"Whatever sentiments have formerly prevailed in this particular or slid in upon us by the example of others, a different idea has taken place with the people of America, more favorable to the natural rights of mankind, and to that natural, innate desire of Liberty, with which Heaven (without regard to color, complexion, or shape of noses-features) has inspired all the human race. And upon this ground our Constitution of Government, by which the people of this Commonwealth have solemnly bound themselves, sets out with declaring that all men are born free and equal – and that every subject is entitled to liberty, and to have it guarded by the laws, as well as life and property – and in short is totally repugnant to the idea of being born slaves. This being the case, I think the idea of slavery is inconsistent with our own conduct and Constitution; and there can be no such thing as perpetual servitude of a rational creature, unless his liberty is forfeited by some criminal conduct or given up by personal consent or contract." (Source)

This theme was adopted by the nineteenth century abolitionists, some of whom went so far as to argue (as Lysander Spooner did in his 1860 work, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery) that slavery ought to have been outlawed by the Declaration of Independence, as the "original constitutional law" of the United States, its principles being clearly opposed to the continuation of slavery —which principles being, as Jefferson himself testified, essentially plagiarized from Locke. Charles Elliot, a Methodist minister and abolitionist, cited Enlightenment scholars such as William Blackstone in his two-volume denunciation of the institution.

However, I think it is a mistake to give too much credit to the Enlightenment, or to discount the role of the Second Great Awakening in producing and sustaining the abolitionist movement. If Enlightenment liberalism were enough to abolish slavery, it would have happened in 1790; Evangelical Protestantism absolutely played a crucial role in furthering abolitionism, and its place within the larger tapestry of reform movements in the middle nineteenth century cannot be ignored.

[Wikipedia delenda est]

Now, I could point out to you that the North held on to Established Churches for longer than the South did

It doesn't make any sense to me how there could be an "established" state Congregational church in the North, when the whole point of Congregationalism is that local congregations control their own affairs. Case in point: when the Independents came to power in Britain, they abolished the Church of England and granted freedom of religion to Protestant dissenters.

Okay, but there was. The Congregationalist Church remained the state church of Connecticut until 1818, when it was finally disestablished by a coalition of Republicans and moderate Federalists who ran under the banner of the "Toleration party"; New Hampshire had disestablished its state Congregationalist Church only the previous year, while neighboring Massachusetts kept its established church for another decade and a half, only formally disestablishing the Church in 1833. I should think this should not be too surprising to anyone familiar with the history of Puritanism in New England.

I just don't understand it on a conceptual level. How can a denomination that definitionally gives congregations local control have a state church?

I wonder what you imagine a state church to be, and how it is incompatible with Congregationalism? In New England, the established Congregational Church had the support of the state, meaning it was able to collect tithes and enforce church attendance. As I say, this continued well into the nineteenth century, long after the rest of the country disestablished their state churches in the late eighteenth century.

I'd imagine a state church to have bishops (or presbyters), for starters. "No bishop, no king", as King James said. I would also think state churches are used to enforce a standardized doctrine and book of common prayer, if you will. That was certainly a responsibility of both the Anglican Church of England and the Presbyterian Church of Scotland. But the thing about the Independents is that they didn't have a standardized doctrine and held no book of common prayer. They were "sectaries", men and women of varying shades of Protestantism whose local congregations made up their own rules. Each of them interpreted the Bible in his or her own way without a bishop to instruct them. Accordingly, they didn't believe in a state church, and when Cromwell took over he abolished the Church of England and gave dissenters the freedom to worship as they chose. This is in contrast to episcopacy and presbytery, both of which sought to enforce religious uniformity. As far as I know "Congregationalism" is just the American term for Independency, so I assumed that their view on state churches was the same due to their internal religious diversity. Then again, I know the Massachusetts Puritans were not at all fond of religious diversity when it came to the Antinomians, so there's probably something I'm missing here. It almost seems like American Congregationalists weren't true small-c "congregationalists".

However, I think it is a mistake to give too much credit to the Enlightenment, or to discount the role of the Second Great Awakening in producing and sustaining the abolitionist movement. If Enlightenment liberalism were enough to abolish slavery, it would have happened in 1790; Evangelical Protestantism absolutely played a crucial role in furthering abolitionism, and its place within the larger tapestry of reform movements in the middle nineteenth century cannot be ignored.

Oh, I did not mean to discount the role of Evangelical Protestantism; far from it. My point was that Evangelicalism on its own was not the primary motivator behind the anti-slavery movement, but rather Enlightenment ideas that often (though not always) mixed well with Protestant liberalism. God knows how many times I have lauded and praised Puritans in this thread as the originators of this form of Protestant liberalism, so do not think for one second I am minimizing the role of their enlightened Yankee descendants in ending the pox of slavery. It is simply to say both parts were necessary: say what you want about 1790, but if Protestant religiosity were enough abolition would have happened in 1690. Instead, we got the Salem Witch Trials.

[Don Vito Corleone]

I know it was just a misplaced word, but the image of Oliver Cromwell abolishing the Church of England is very funny.

[Wikipedia delenda est]

I know it was just a misplaced word, but the image of Oliver Cromwell abolishing the Church of England is very funny.

Why? It’s what happened. Anglicanism was disestablished and partially replaced with a semi-Presbyterian mode of governance, though Protestants (including Anglicans) were free to worship however they chose.

[S019]

Now, I could point out to you that the North held on to Established Churches for longer than the South did

It doesn't make any sense to me how there could be an "established" state Congregational church in the North, when the whole point of Congregationalism is that local congregations control their own affairs. Case in point: when the Independents came to power in Britain, they abolished the Church of England and granted freedom of religion to Protestant dissenters.

Okay, but there was. The Congregationalist Church remained the state church of Connecticut until 1818, when it was finally disestablished by a coalition of Republicans and moderate Federalists who ran under the banner of the "Toleration party"; New Hampshire had disestablished its state Congregationalist Church only the previous year, while neighboring Massachusetts kept its established church for another decade and a half, only formally disestablishing the Church in 1833. I should think this should not be too surprising to anyone familiar with the history of Puritanism in New England.

I just don't understand it on a conceptual level. How can a denomination that definitionally gives congregations local control have a state church?

I wonder what you imagine a state church to be, and how it is incompatible with Congregationalism? In New England, the established Congregational Church had the support of the state, meaning it was able to collect tithes and enforce church attendance. As I say, this continued well into the nineteenth century, long after the rest of the country disestablished their state churches in the late eighteenth century.

I'd imagine a state church to have bishops (or presbyters), for starters. "No bishop, no king", as King James said. I would also think state churches are used to enforce a standardized doctrine and book of common prayer, if you will. That was certainly a responsibility of both the Anglican Church of England and the Presbyterian Church of Scotland. But the thing about the Independents is that they didn't have a standardized doctrine and held no book of common prayer. They were "sectaries", men and women of varying shades of Protestantism whose local congregations made up their own rules. Each of them interpreted the Bible in his or her own way without a bishop to instruct them. Accordingly, they didn't believe in a state church, and when Cromwell took over he abolished the Church of England and gave dissenters the freedom to worship as they chose. This is in contrast to episcopacy and presbytery, both of which sought to enforce religious uniformity. As far as I know "Congregationalism" is just the American term for Independency, so I assumed that their view on state churches was the same due to their internal religious diversity. Then again, I know the Massachusetts Puritans were not at all fond of religious diversity when it came to the Antimonians, so there's probably something I'm missing here. It almost seems like American Congregationalists weren't true small-c "congregationalists".

However, I think it is a mistake to give too much credit to the Enlightenment, or to discount the role of the Second Great Awakening in producing and sustaining the abolitionist movement. If Enlightenment liberalism were enough to abolish slavery, it would have happened in 1790; Evangelical Protestantism absolutely played a crucial role in furthering abolitionism, and its place within the larger tapestry of reform movements in the middle nineteenth century cannot be ignored.

Oh, I did not mean to discount the role of Evangelical Protestantism; far from it. My point was that Evangelicalism on its own was not the primary motivator behind the anti-slavery movement, but rather Enlightenment ideas that often (though not always) mixed well with Protestant liberalism. God knows how many times I have lauded and praised Puritans in this thread as the originators of this form of Protestant liberalism, so do not think for one second I am minimizing the role of their enlightened Yankee descendants in ending the pox of slavery. It is simply to say both parts were necessary: say what you want about 1790, but if Protestant religiosity were enough abolition would have happened in 1690. Instead, we got the Salem Witch Trials.

This seems to be a misunderstanding of the Second Great Awakening. Yes, it was a religious revival, but the much more important and consequential part of it was that it encouraged people to be the most moral that they could be and instilled a sense of urgency in people to force change, which would give rise to reform movements such as temperance and abolition. The Puritans are kind of irrelevant in this case, honestly, and connecting the Puritans to the Second Great Awakening is bad history.

[Don Vito Corleone]

I know it was just a misplaced word, but the image of Oliver Cromwell abolishing the Church of England is very funny.

Why? It’s what happened. Anglicanism was disestablished and partially replaced with a semi-Presbyterian mode of governance, though Protestants (including Anglicans) were free to worship however they chose.

I know what you mean, but I've only ever seen "disestablished" used to refer to that, so when you said "abolished" I pictured him storming in and declaring the CoE was now illegal.