Historical continuity of Democrats and Republicans

[Asenath Waite]

Something I've thought about recently is that contrary to a common misconception that the Democrats and Republicans have "switched sides" there's always been some continuity within each. Republicans have always tended to be the more nationalistic party and accused Democrats of being traitors/soft on the rebs/reds/terrorists, and included in their coalition Protestant zealots (in the north) and small business owners. To some extent current trends are causing the parties to revert to coalitions resembling those in the third party system as well with Democrats as the party of more recent immigrants, finance capital and free trade (DLC type Democrats are actually sort of similar ideologically to the Bourbon Democrats) and Republicans as the party of the native born working class and protectionism. The difference is that now it's as if their had been a nineteenth century coalition that had included the northern conservative Republicans and southern ex-slaveholders.

[Skill and Chance]

I mostly agree with this.  We are reverting to something resembling the post-Reconstruction, pre-Great Depression coalitions.  What people forget is how long the protectionist, pro-infrastructure spending, vaguely isolationist version of the GOP went on.  1932 was as far from 1876 as it was from 1988 and Republicans were much stronger nationally.  Including Trump, all Republican presidents split 13/6 in favor of protectionism over free trade.  Yes, it's true that there were more 1-termers early on, but that gives a great perspective on where the parties have been in the long run.  There hasn't ever been an aggressively protectionist Democratic president. 

I think you are wrong about the elite South in the present day though.  Look at GA-06, TX-07, TX-32, the Birmingham suburbs in the Doug Jones senate special, Jefferson Parish going 57% for JBE when he got 51% statewide, Bredesen doing really well in Rutherford and Williamson, etc.  The wealthy South is rapidly shifting post-Trump and likely to end up in the Dem coalition soon.  Democratic elite South vs. Republican working class South (especially during economic downturns) was absolutely something that happened in various late 19th century elections, at least before the poll taxes were imposed.  If Harrison had succeeded in getting his proto-VRA plan through the Senate in 1890, that may well have been the long term alignment in that era.

[Asenath Waite]

I mostly agree with this.  We are reverting to something resembling the post-Reconstruction, pre-Great Depression coalitions.  What people forget is how long the protectionist, pro-infrastructure spending, vaguely isolationist version of the GOP went on.  1932 was as far from 1876 as it was from 1988.

I think you are wrong about the elite South in the present day though.  Look at GA-06, TX-07, TX-32, the Birmingham suburbs in the Doug Jones senate special, Jefferson Parish going 57% for JBE when he got 51% statewide, Bredesen doing really well in Rutherford and Williamson, etc.  The wealthy South is rapidly shifting post-Trump and likely to end up in the Dem coalition soon.  Democratic elite South vs. Republican working class South (especially during economic downturns) was absolutely something that happened in various late 19th century elections, at least before the poll taxes were imposed.  If Harrison had succeeded in getting his proto-VRA plan through the Senate in 1890, that may well have been the long term alignment in that era.

That's a good point actually. I have noticed that trend of the suburban counties outside of Atlanta shifting towards the Democrats.

[darklordoftech]

I find Gilded Age/present parallels interesting, with debates over immigration, income inequality, debt, and anger towards Wall Street among the parallels.

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

I mostly agree with this.  We are reverting to something resembling the post-Reconstruction, pre-Great Depression coalitions.  What people forget is how long the protectionist, pro-infrastructure spending, vaguely isolationist version of the GOP went on.  1932 was as far from 1876 as it was from 1988 and Republicans were much stronger nationally.  Including Trump, all Republican presidents split 13/6 in favor of protectionism over free trade.  Yes, it's true that there were more 1-termers early on, but that gives a great perspective on where the parties have been in the long run.  There hasn't ever been an aggressively protectionist Democratic president. 

I think you are wrong about the elite South in the present day though.  Look at GA-06, TX-07, TX-32, the Birmingham suburbs in the Doug Jones senate special, Jefferson Parish going 57% for JBE when he got 51% statewide, Bredesen doing really well in Rutherford and Williamson, etc.  The wealthy South is rapidly shifting post-Trump and likely to end up in the Dem coalition soon.  Democratic elite South vs. Republican working class South (especially during economic downturns) was absolutely something that happened in various late 19th century elections, at least before the poll taxes were imposed.  If Harrison had succeeded in getting his proto-VRA plan through the Senate in 1890, that may well have been the long term alignment in that era.

It also happened in 1928.

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

Something I've thought about recently is that contrary to a common misconception that the Democrats and Republicans have "switched sides" there's always been some continuity within each. Republicans have always tended to be the more nationalistic party and accused Democrats of being traitors/soft on the rebs/reds/terrorists, and included in their coalition Protestant zealots (in the north) and small business owners. To some extent current trends are causing the parties to revert to coalitions resembling those in the third party system as well with Democrats as the party of more recent immigrants, finance capital and free trade (DLC type Democrats are actually sort of similar ideologically to the Bourbon Democrats) and Republicans as the party of the native born working class and protectionism. The difference is that now it's as if their had been a nineteenth century coalition that had included the northern conservative Republicans and southern ex-slaveholders.

You can extent it back to the Federalists with rebs/red/terrorists. Daniel Shays played a role in triggering the Constitutional Convention. There is also the whiskey rebellion, and the Dorr Rebellion.

Its one aspect of the Conservative versus Liberal that has remained relatively constant for 200 years and is a good indicator of which side is a Conservative versus which is a Liberal. Ironically, one of the few times this comes up with a contrary example is the Wilson administration, though it should be noted that Wilson came from elitist circles, was very anglophile and was part of a melting of traditional conservative aspects (including elements from Burke) into Liberalism. This is not a flip though, it is an academic absorption to compensate for the embrace of government for egalitarian ends that the left was doing in this period on both sides of the pond. In the UK, the Liberal Party was doing the same things, taking it from largely the same sources, and just like in the US the end result was electoral disaster in the 1920's. The difference is that the Democrats had a rotten borough of a whole region to fall back on for a decade, while the Liberals went bye bye.

There was a chart posted on here some time ago from an election in the late 19th century and it detailed how religious affiliations voted and it is worth mentioning that "Pious Protestants" and Quakers voted almost as Republican as white Evangelicals today, so for most of the Party's existence there has been a connection and even dependence on strong support from a vocal religious sect, often usually Calvinist in its teachings. This also goes right back to the 1790s with issue being made of Adam's faith versus Jefferson's lack thereof.

[Former President tack50]

Something I've thought about recently is that contrary to a common misconception that the Democrats and Republicans have "switched sides" there's always been some continuity within each. Republicans have always tended to be the more nationalistic party and accused Democrats of being traitors/soft on the rebs/reds/terrorists, and included in their coalition Protestant zealots (in the north) and small business owners. To some extent current trends are causing the parties to revert to coalitions resembling those in the third party system as well with Democrats as the party of more recent immigrants, finance capital and free trade (DLC type Democrats are actually sort of similar ideologically to the Bourbon Democrats) and Republicans as the party of the native born working class and protectionism. The difference is that now it's as if their had been a nineteenth century coalition that had included the northern conservative Republicans and southern ex-slaveholders.

You can extent it back to the Federalists with rebs/red/terrorists. Daniel Shays played a role in triggering the Constitutional Convention. There is also the whiskey rebellion, and the Dorr Rebellion.

Its one aspect of the Conservative versus Liberal that has remained relatively constant for 200 years and is a good indicator of which side is a Conservative versus which is a Liberal. Ironically, one of the few times this comes up with a contrary example is the Wilson administration, though it should be noted that Wilson came from elitist circles, was very anglophile and was part of a melting of traditional conservative aspects (including elements from Burke) into Liberalism. This is not a flip though, it is an academic absorption to compensate for the embrace of government for egalitarian ends that the left was doing in this period on both sides of the pond. In the UK, the Liberal Party was doing the same things, taking it from largely the same sources, and just like in the US the end result was electoral disaster in the 1920's. The difference is that the Democrats had a rotten borough of a whole region to fall back on for a decade, while the Liberals went bye bye.

Probably a bridge too far and too many butterflies, but from this do you think that if the South won the Civil War (ie no South for the Dems to fall back on), that the Democrats would have collapsed as a national party and been replaced by something else entirely?

If so, what replaces them?

The obvious answer looking at other countries seems to be a socialist party not unlike say, the British Labour party; probably getting elected nationally for the first time in 1932?

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

Something I've thought about recently is that contrary to a common misconception that the Democrats and Republicans have "switched sides" there's always been some continuity within each. Republicans have always tended to be the more nationalistic party and accused Democrats of being traitors/soft on the rebs/reds/terrorists, and included in their coalition Protestant zealots (in the north) and small business owners. To some extent current trends are causing the parties to revert to coalitions resembling those in the third party system as well with Democrats as the party of more recent immigrants, finance capital and free trade (DLC type Democrats are actually sort of similar ideologically to the Bourbon Democrats) and Republicans as the party of the native born working class and protectionism. The difference is that now it's as if their had been a nineteenth century coalition that had included the northern conservative Republicans and southern ex-slaveholders.

You can extent it back to the Federalists with rebs/red/terrorists. Daniel Shays played a role in triggering the Constitutional Convention. There is also the whiskey rebellion, and the Dorr Rebellion.

Its one aspect of the Conservative versus Liberal that has remained relatively constant for 200 years and is a good indicator of which side is a Conservative versus which is a Liberal. Ironically, one of the few times this comes up with a contrary example is the Wilson administration, though it should be noted that Wilson came from elitist circles, was very anglophile and was part of a melting of traditional conservative aspects (including elements from Burke) into Liberalism. This is not a flip though, it is an academic absorption to compensate for the embrace of government for egalitarian ends that the left was doing in this period on both sides of the pond. In the UK, the Liberal Party was doing the same things, taking it from largely the same sources, and just like in the US the end result was electoral disaster in the 1920's. The difference is that the Democrats had a rotten borough of a whole region to fall back on for a decade, while the Liberals went bye bye.

Probably a bridge too far and too many butterflies, but from this do you think that if the South won the Civil War (ie no South for the Dems to fall back on), that the Democrats would have collapsed as a national party and been replaced by something else entirely?

If so, what replaces them?

The obvious answer looking at other countries seems to be a socialist party not unlike say, the British Labour party; probably getting elected nationally for the first time in 1932?

Depends on what happens afterwards. I am favorable towards the perspectives that left wing academics add to discussions. For instance, they are very rarely suckered in by "party's flipped on x date". That being said (and here come the Vittorio flashbacks), there is a desire to shoehorn in socialist parties where the ground just simply wasn't there for that to exist.

The Democrats had strong positions in the border states and the Mid-Atlantic excluding Pennsylvania (how appropriate to today in that sense lol). I don't think they would have collapsed and in the aftermath of the war you saw rather close elections in many northern states and that is why the GOP would often lose the PV since they would narrowly win most northern states and get destroyed in the South (lower turnout and small populations meant that the disparity caused by this was not as severe as might at first glance presume but it had an impact).

You run into this a lot with alternate history's about the GOP collapsing if the South won. This is a factor in the Turtledove series of books. It relies on an oversimplification of "war lost/GOP collapses". For the Republican side of things, it is important to understand how the GOP coalition that dominated the North came about in the time since the the founding and I recently laid this out in a series of posts on a Youtube video where this had come up in the context of the vote split in 1860 and whether or not it was relevant to the final outcome:

Lincoln won a majority in all but three of his states. Republicans had secure holds on ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT, OH, MI, WI, IA and MN. NY was at risk bc of the Irish, but Fremont had won it in 1856. Fremont had lost PA, ILL and Indiana, but Fremont had focused only on slavery. Lincoln ran as a Whig on economics and tariffs typically sold well in PA since 1846, when the Whigs scored massive gains in the state on that issue, and Lincolns final margin was 56% - 37% (with Breckenridge in second). As for Illinois, already in 1858, the GOP scored more votes than Dems (won by 3,400 votes) but failed to win a legislative majority (Dems had an 8 seat majority) due to nearly decade old maps. Since the 1850 apportionment Northern Illinois had swelled in population mostly with Pious Yankees leaving New England, and also Germans. This means that had direct election of Senators been a thing then, Lincoln would have beat Douglas in 1858. By 1860, Lincoln won by 11,000 votes, nearly quadrupling the 1858 pv margin. Indiana had also had a surge of German immigrants as well as some Yankee migration as well. The flipping of PA, ILL and Indiana were dictated by demographics, economic interests and Dred Scott. After Dred Scott the racist nimby (no blacks taking my jobs) voters were ripe for Lincolns containment message and Northern Democratic narrative that slavery kept them in the South rang hollow. I think however narrow, Lincoln had those states in the bag regardless of his opponent.

New York was more difficult but Lincolns economic message, softer tone on immigrants and solid support upstate would hold the state and as it was he beat a fusion ticket getting 53% of the vote. So yeah I think the split was largely irrelevant bc Lincoln had a good lock on an ec majority.

The Republican coalition that would come dominate the Northern states until the New Deal was coming together right at the end of the 1850s:
1. Pious Yankees voted ~75% Republican or so kind of like the Evangelicals of today. They were the abolitionist base and due to the "Yankee diaspora" as I call it, they had spread to places like Michigan, Illinois, Kansas, Northern CA and Oregon. This meant that Republicans had a energetic core base spread across the Northern states. Over time, intermarriage would erase the voting power of this block as they diffused into the larger group of "Northern Protestant Whites", but that is decades into the future.
2. As the Erie Canal and then later the railroads connected the Great Lakes region to the coastal cities of Boston, New York and Philly, this pulled that region out of the grip of New Orleans river trade and also made settlement in the Northern parts of these states, which had been underpopulated, very attractive. Easy transportation into the region for people and easy export of agricultural products and increasingly manufactured goods, is what made possible a North that was inclusive of the Midwest and thus powerful enough to overtake the South.
3. Republicans held all of the cards in this fight because they had the business interests who wanted protectionism from British competition, meanwhile the factory workers were inclined to vote their industries interest over labor interests because of job preservation (Coal miners and mine owners vote the same way today because of the same reason, they view the other party's policies as economic doomsday). Democrats were traditionally a free trade party and the South especially so, since they wanted global trade and cheap imports. This would constantly leave Democrats struggling over the next decades.

Some over generalizations present obviously, but the big three factors would be present regardless and therefore the idea of a Republican collapse post war doesn't make sense. If anything, it would do well against he backdrop of a Southern victory as a revanchist party and one constantly pointing out how Democrats are "soft on the South", "selling out workers to British Merchant interests" etc.


For the Democrat side of things, you have the immigrant populations, you have the Southern parts of the ILL/IN/OH, you have the dominant positions in the border states as well as NJ, and the ability to make things difficult in New York and Connecticut. Trade will always leave some dissatisfied with the Republicans obviously. There is also Southern PA east to the York/Lancaster county border, The block of Counties including, Lehigh, Monroe and the Lackawanna area, which was settled by a combination of non-Yankee whites and Irish and thus leaned Democratic in the 19th century, and of course the WV like Counties in Western PA.

The Republicans would usually have the upper hand in the Senate, but Democrats would certainly be able to win the House and the White House without the South in a good year. So no, I don't think either party collapses absent a South and then it begs the question of how long does this last and what breaks it. Furthermore, it must be asked if the South wins how long does it last and what happens down there economically and in terms of population growth, as well as if they start conquering in the Carribean, Mexico etc.

[darklordoftech]

Something I've thought about recently is that contrary to a common misconception that the Democrats and Republicans have "switched sides" there's always been some continuity within each. Republicans have always tended to be the more nationalistic party and accused Democrats of being traitors/soft on the rebs/reds/terrorists, and included in their coalition Protestant zealots (in the north) and small business owners. To some extent current trends are causing the parties to revert to coalitions resembling those in the third party system as well with Democrats as the party of more recent immigrants, finance capital and free trade (DLC type Democrats are actually sort of similar ideologically to the Bourbon Democrats) and Republicans as the party of the native born working class and protectionism. The difference is that now it's as if their had been a nineteenth century coalition that had included the northern conservative Republicans and southern ex-slaveholders.

You can extent it back to the Federalists with rebs/red/terrorists. Daniel Shays played a role in triggering the Constitutional Convention. There is also the whiskey rebellion, and the Dorr Rebellion.

Its one aspect of the Conservative versus Liberal that has remained relatively constant for 200 years and is a good indicator of which side is a Conservative versus which is a Liberal. Ironically, one of the few times this comes up with a contrary example is the Wilson administration, though it should be noted that Wilson came from elitist circles, was very anglophile and was part of a melting of traditional conservative aspects (including elements from Burke) into Liberalism. This is not a flip though, it is an academic absorption to compensate for the embrace of government for egalitarian ends that the left was doing in this period on both sides of the pond. In the UK, the Liberal Party was doing the same things, taking it from largely the same sources, and just like in the US the end result was electoral disaster in the 1920's. The difference is that the Democrats had a rotten borough of a whole region to fall back on for a decade, while the Liberals went bye bye.

Probably a bridge too far and too many butterflies, but from this do you think that if the South won the Civil War (ie no South for the Dems to fall back on), that the Democrats would have collapsed as a national party and been replaced by something else entirely?

If so, what replaces them?

The obvious answer looking at other countries seems to be a socialist party not unlike say, the British Labour party; probably getting elected nationally for the first time in 1932?

Depends on what happens afterwards. I am favorable towards the perspectives that left wing academics add to discussions. For instance, they are very rarely suckered in by "party's flipped on x date". That being said (and here come the Vittorio flashbacks), there is a desire to shoehorn in socialist parties where the ground just simply wasn't there for that to exist.

The Democrats had strong positions in the border states and the Mid-Atlantic excluding Pennsylvania (how appropriate to today in that sense lol). I don't think they would have collapsed and in the aftermath of the war you saw rather close elections in many northern states and that is why the GOP would often lose the PV since they would narrowly win most northern states and get destroyed in the South (lower turnout and small populations meant that the disparity caused by this was not as severe as might at first glance presume but it had an impact).

You run into this a lot with alternate history's about the GOP collapsing if the South won. This is a factor in the Turtledove series of books. It relies on an oversimplification of "war lost/GOP collapses". For the Republican side of things, it is important to understand how the GOP coalition that dominated the North came about in the time since the the founding and I recently laid this out in a series of posts on a Youtube video where this had come up in the context of the vote split in 1860 and whether or not it was relevant to the final outcome:

Lincoln won a majority in all but three of his states. Republicans had secure holds on ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT, OH, MI, WI, IA and MN. NY was at risk bc of the Irish, but Fremont had won it in 1856. Fremont had lost PA, ILL and Indiana, but Fremont had focused only on slavery. Lincoln ran as a Whig on economics and tariffs typically sold well in PA since 1846, when the Whigs scored massive gains in the state on that issue, and Lincolns final margin was 56% - 37% (with Breckenridge in second). As for Illinois, already in 1858, the GOP scored more votes than Dems (won by 3,400 votes) but failed to win a legislative majority (Dems had an 8 seat majority) due to nearly decade old maps. Since the 1850 apportionment Northern Illinois had swelled in population mostly with Pious Yankees leaving New England, and also Germans. This means that had direct election of Senators been a thing then, Lincoln would have beat Douglas in 1858. By 1860, Lincoln won by 11,000 votes, nearly quadrupling the 1858 pv margin. Indiana had also had a surge of German immigrants as well as some Yankee migration as well. The flipping of PA, ILL and Indiana were dictated by demographics, economic interests and Dred Scott. After Dred Scott the racist nimby (no blacks taking my jobs) voters were ripe for Lincolns containment message and Northern Democratic narrative that slavery kept them in the South rang hollow. I think however narrow, Lincoln had those states in the bag regardless of his opponent.

New York was more difficult but Lincolns economic message, softer tone on immigrants and solid support upstate would hold the state and as it was he beat a fusion ticket getting 53% of the vote. So yeah I think the split was largely irrelevant bc Lincoln had a good lock on an ec majority.

The Republican coalition that would come dominate the Northern states until the New Deal was coming together right at the end of the 1850s:
1. Pious Yankees voted ~75% Republican or so kind of like the Evangelicals of today. They were the abolitionist base and due to the "Yankee diaspora" as I call it, they had spread to places like Michigan, Illinois, Kansas, Northern CA and Oregon. This meant that Republicans had a energetic core base spread across the Northern states. Over time, intermarriage would erase the voting power of this block as they diffused into the larger group of "Northern Protestant Whites", but that is decades into the future.
2. As the Erie Canal and then later the railroads connected the Great Lakes region to the coastal cities of Boston, New York and Philly, this pulled that region out of the grip of New Orleans river trade and also made settlement in the Northern parts of these states, which had been underpopulated, very attractive. Easy transportation into the region for people and easy export of agricultural products and increasingly manufactured goods, is what made possible a North that was inclusive of the Midwest and thus powerful enough to overtake the South.
3. Republicans held all of the cards in this fight because they had the business interests who wanted protectionism from British competition, meanwhile the factory workers were inclined to vote their industries interest over labor interests because of job preservation (Coal miners and mine owners vote the same way today because of the same reason, they view the other party's policies as economic doomsday). Democrats were traditionally a free trade party and the South especially so, since they wanted global trade and cheap imports. This would constantly leave Democrats struggling over the next decades.

Some over generalizations present obviously, but the big three factors would be present regardless and therefore the idea of a Republican collapse post war doesn't make sense. If anything, it would do well against he backdrop of a Southern victory as a revanchist party and one constantly pointing out how Democrats are "soft on the South", "selling out workers to British Merchant interests" etc.


For the Democrat side of things, you have the immigrant populations, you have the Southern parts of the ILL/IN/OH, you have the dominant positions in the border states as well as NJ, and the ability to make things difficult in New York and Connecticut. Trade will always leave some dissatisfied with the Republicans obviously. There is also Southern PA east to the York/Lancaster county border, The block of Counties including, Lehigh, Monroe and the Lackawanna area, which was settled by a combination of non-Yankee whites and Irish and thus leaned Democratic in the 19th century, and of course the WV like Counties in Western PA.

The Republicans would usually have the upper hand in the Senate, but Democrats would certainly be able to win the House and the White House without the South in a good year. So no, I don't think either party collapses absent a South and then it begs the question of how long does this last and what breaks it. Furthermore, it must be asked if the South wins how long does it last and what happens down there economically and in terms of population growth, as well as if they start conquering in the Carribean, Mexico etc.

I wonder what would happen in terms of the Gilded Age Populist movement. Would there even be a Gilded Age?

[Asenath Waite]

Something I've thought about recently is that contrary to a common misconception that the Democrats and Republicans have "switched sides" there's always been some continuity within each. Republicans have always tended to be the more nationalistic party and accused Democrats of being traitors/soft on the rebs/reds/terrorists, and included in their coalition Protestant zealots (in the north) and small business owners. To some extent current trends are causing the parties to revert to coalitions resembling those in the third party system as well with Democrats as the party of more recent immigrants, finance capital and free trade (DLC type Democrats are actually sort of similar ideologically to the Bourbon Democrats) and Republicans as the party of the native born working class and protectionism. The difference is that now it's as if their had been a nineteenth century coalition that had included the northern conservative Republicans and southern ex-slaveholders.

You can extent it back to the Federalists with rebs/red/terrorists. Daniel Shays played a role in triggering the Constitutional Convention. There is also the whiskey rebellion, and the Dorr Rebellion.

Its one aspect of the Conservative versus Liberal that has remained relatively constant for 200 years and is a good indicator of which side is a Conservative versus which is a Liberal. Ironically, one of the few times this comes up with a contrary example is the Wilson administration, though it should be noted that Wilson came from elitist circles, was very anglophile and was part of a melting of traditional conservative aspects (including elements from Burke) into Liberalism. This is not a flip though, it is an academic absorption to compensate for the embrace of government for egalitarian ends that the left was doing in this period on both sides of the pond. In the UK, the Liberal Party was doing the same things, taking it from largely the same sources, and just like in the US the end result was electoral disaster in the 1920's. The difference is that the Democrats had a rotten borough of a whole region to fall back on for a decade, while the Liberals went bye bye.

There was a chart posted on here some time ago from an election in the late 19th century and it detailed how religious affiliations voted and it is worth mentioning that "Pious Protestants" and Quakers voted almost as Republican as white Evangelicals today, so for most of the Party's existence there has been a connection and even dependence on strong support from a vocal religious sect, often usually Calvinist in its teachings. This also goes right back to the 1790s with issue being made of Adam's faith versus Jefferson's lack thereof.

I have sometimes hypothesized that either the Socialist Party in the 1910s or the progressive party in the 1930s (say FDR gets assassinated and after one term of Garner the progressives in both parties jump ship) could have overtaken Democrats as the second major party in the same way that Labour overtook the Liberals. Democrats would continue to exist as a regional southern party with a handful of hardline free traders in the north but be permanently locked out of the presidency.

I'd imagine that in most countries the conservative party is more likely to have closer ties to the church and particularly the dominant church of that country which here has always been Protestants. Even if the current incarnation of the Republican Party includes conservative catholics they aren't the ones in the drivers seat. In Latin America, France and Spain (possibly Italy) though I do think the Catholic Church has played a similar role on the political right which makes me wonder if there it was Protestants as the minority religion that tended to align with the left.

[Asenath Waite]

I find Gilded Age/present parallels interesting, with debates over immigration, income inequality, debt, and anger towards Wall Street among the parallels.

Perhaps we are reaching a point at which both parties will have a faction that is more committed to addressing the income inequality and debt if on one side Bernie and Warren have a lasting impact and on the other if the "National Conservatives" actually are sincere.

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

Something I've thought about recently is that contrary to a common misconception that the Democrats and Republicans have "switched sides" there's always been some continuity within each. Republicans have always tended to be the more nationalistic party and accused Democrats of being traitors/soft on the rebs/reds/terrorists, and included in their coalition Protestant zealots (in the north) and small business owners. To some extent current trends are causing the parties to revert to coalitions resembling those in the third party system as well with Democrats as the party of more recent immigrants, finance capital and free trade (DLC type Democrats are actually sort of similar ideologically to the Bourbon Democrats) and Republicans as the party of the native born working class and protectionism. The difference is that now it's as if their had been a nineteenth century coalition that had included the northern conservative Republicans and southern ex-slaveholders.

You can extent it back to the Federalists with rebs/red/terrorists. Daniel Shays played a role in triggering the Constitutional Convention. There is also the whiskey rebellion, and the Dorr Rebellion.

Its one aspect of the Conservative versus Liberal that has remained relatively constant for 200 years and is a good indicator of which side is a Conservative versus which is a Liberal. Ironically, one of the few times this comes up with a contrary example is the Wilson administration, though it should be noted that Wilson came from elitist circles, was very anglophile and was part of a melting of traditional conservative aspects (including elements from Burke) into Liberalism. This is not a flip though, it is an academic absorption to compensate for the embrace of government for egalitarian ends that the left was doing in this period on both sides of the pond. In the UK, the Liberal Party was doing the same things, taking it from largely the same sources, and just like in the US the end result was electoral disaster in the 1920's. The difference is that the Democrats had a rotten borough of a whole region to fall back on for a decade, while the Liberals went bye bye.

Probably a bridge too far and too many butterflies, but from this do you think that if the South won the Civil War (ie no South for the Dems to fall back on), that the Democrats would have collapsed as a national party and been replaced by something else entirely?

If so, what replaces them?

The obvious answer looking at other countries seems to be a socialist party not unlike say, the British Labour party; probably getting elected nationally for the first time in 1932?

Depends on what happens afterwards. I am favorable towards the perspectives that left wing academics add to discussions. For instance, they are very rarely suckered in by "party's flipped on x date". That being said (and here come the Vittorio flashbacks), there is a desire to shoehorn in socialist parties where the ground just simply wasn't there for that to exist.

The Democrats had strong positions in the border states and the Mid-Atlantic excluding Pennsylvania (how appropriate to today in that sense lol). I don't think they would have collapsed and in the aftermath of the war you saw rather close elections in many northern states and that is why the GOP would often lose the PV since they would narrowly win most northern states and get destroyed in the South (lower turnout and small populations meant that the disparity caused by this was not as severe as might at first glance presume but it had an impact).

You run into this a lot with alternate history's about the GOP collapsing if the South won. This is a factor in the Turtledove series of books. It relies on an oversimplification of "war lost/GOP collapses". For the Republican side of things, it is important to understand how the GOP coalition that dominated the North came about in the time since the the founding and I recently laid this out in a series of posts on a Youtube video where this had come up in the context of the vote split in 1860 and whether or not it was relevant to the final outcome:

Lincoln won a majority in all but three of his states. Republicans had secure holds on ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT, OH, MI, WI, IA and MN. NY was at risk bc of the Irish, but Fremont had won it in 1856. Fremont had lost PA, ILL and Indiana, but Fremont had focused only on slavery. Lincoln ran as a Whig on economics and tariffs typically sold well in PA since 1846, when the Whigs scored massive gains in the state on that issue, and Lincolns final margin was 56% - 37% (with Breckenridge in second). As for Illinois, already in 1858, the GOP scored more votes than Dems (won by 3,400 votes) but failed to win a legislative majority (Dems had an 8 seat majority) due to nearly decade old maps. Since the 1850 apportionment Northern Illinois had swelled in population mostly with Pious Yankees leaving New England, and also Germans. This means that had direct election of Senators been a thing then, Lincoln would have beat Douglas in 1858. By 1860, Lincoln won by 11,000 votes, nearly quadrupling the 1858 pv margin. Indiana had also had a surge of German immigrants as well as some Yankee migration as well. The flipping of PA, ILL and Indiana were dictated by demographics, economic interests and Dred Scott. After Dred Scott the racist nimby (no blacks taking my jobs) voters were ripe for Lincolns containment message and Northern Democratic narrative that slavery kept them in the South rang hollow. I think however narrow, Lincoln had those states in the bag regardless of his opponent.

New York was more difficult but Lincolns economic message, softer tone on immigrants and solid support upstate would hold the state and as it was he beat a fusion ticket getting 53% of the vote. So yeah I think the split was largely irrelevant bc Lincoln had a good lock on an ec majority.

The Republican coalition that would come dominate the Northern states until the New Deal was coming together right at the end of the 1850s:
1. Pious Yankees voted ~75% Republican or so kind of like the Evangelicals of today. They were the abolitionist base and due to the "Yankee diaspora" as I call it, they had spread to places like Michigan, Illinois, Kansas, Northern CA and Oregon. This meant that Republicans had a energetic core base spread across the Northern states. Over time, intermarriage would erase the voting power of this block as they diffused into the larger group of "Northern Protestant Whites", but that is decades into the future.
2. As the Erie Canal and then later the railroads connected the Great Lakes region to the coastal cities of Boston, New York and Philly, this pulled that region out of the grip of New Orleans river trade and also made settlement in the Northern parts of these states, which had been underpopulated, very attractive. Easy transportation into the region for people and easy export of agricultural products and increasingly manufactured goods, is what made possible a North that was inclusive of the Midwest and thus powerful enough to overtake the South.
3. Republicans held all of the cards in this fight because they had the business interests who wanted protectionism from British competition, meanwhile the factory workers were inclined to vote their industries interest over labor interests because of job preservation (Coal miners and mine owners vote the same way today because of the same reason, they view the other party's policies as economic doomsday). Democrats were traditionally a free trade party and the South especially so, since they wanted global trade and cheap imports. This would constantly leave Democrats struggling over the next decades.

Some over generalizations present obviously, but the big three factors would be present regardless and therefore the idea of a Republican collapse post war doesn't make sense. If anything, it would do well against he backdrop of a Southern victory as a revanchist party and one constantly pointing out how Democrats are "soft on the South", "selling out workers to British Merchant interests" etc.


For the Democrat side of things, you have the immigrant populations, you have the Southern parts of the ILL/IN/OH, you have the dominant positions in the border states as well as NJ, and the ability to make things difficult in New York and Connecticut. Trade will always leave some dissatisfied with the Republicans obviously. There is also Southern PA east to the York/Lancaster county border, The block of Counties including, Lehigh, Monroe and the Lackawanna area, which was settled by a combination of non-Yankee whites and Irish and thus leaned Democratic in the 19th century, and of course the WV like Counties in Western PA.

The Republicans would usually have the upper hand in the Senate, but Democrats would certainly be able to win the House and the White House without the South in a good year. So no, I don't think either party collapses absent a South and then it begs the question of how long does this last and what breaks it. Furthermore, it must be asked if the South wins how long does it last and what happens down there economically and in terms of population growth, as well as if they start conquering in the Carribean, Mexico etc.

I wonder what would happen in terms of the Gilded Age Populist movement. Would there even be a Gilded Age?

Depends on the exact manner of the defeat and such and where the boundaries end up, but the North had the necessary ingredients to become an industrial powerhouse on its own and even become the leading Industrial nation though perhaps this occurs later on by a few years. The very poverty of the South in the late 19th and early 20th century (a factor also overwhelmingly overlooked by "party flip theorists") is precisely in large part because it is a region left behind economically. It produces cotton and that is great for textiles but textiles are yesterday's news by 1900. There are more sources of cotton coming online in Egypt and India, there is a shift in investment capital to new emerging industries (money follows returns). For comparison there are still people making a lot of money off of sugar today but you don't have sugar islands a few miles across that are more valuable then whole continents like in the 17th century. That is the way cash crops evolve in terms of the economic and trade networks.

There is still the railroad building, the land grant colleges, the Homestead Act, the Morrill Tariff and thus the basis for the second wave industrial revolution is most certainly present and thus by extension the formation of a gilded age is very possible.

One thing that must be said though is that without the South, there is nothing really to break the Democrats from Middle Class non-Yankee whites and Germans. To understand 1896 it is important to remember that Democrats had entryism into the business, commercial and middle class sectors of the population via the trade issue and also the religious divides even if they were just mainline Protestants who loathed the cliche of New England Witch hanging Republicans. This is why those Northern states remain so close for the next thirty years after the war and you can see in some counties the slow decline of GOP support as Germans and Irish begin to catch up to the Yankee voting base. Then in the 1890's, this just implodes and Republicans solidify their hold on the North. WJB breaks the back of Northern Democratic Middle Class support in the process of nuking the Bourbon Democrats. You also see a bit of rebellion against the elites in the South in favor of more populist and agrarian oriented candidates.

This reclaiming of Jacksonian legacy of the Democrats a poor farmer's party, a shift that would prove essential for the rise of Wilson and later the New Deal would not be possible without the South.

[FEMA Camp Administrator]

@NCYankee, the dynamic you discuss at the end leaves us with a Democratic Party, by the 1910s, probably resembles the UK's Liberal Party. The Liberals lost any chance at power shortly thereafter, which leads us to question the place of the Democrats. The four possibilities are (1) this pattern somehow holds, and the left in the United States is even weaker than OTL--given the very good possibility of some sort of depression, combined with a very combative and pluralistic domestic schema that encourages instability, I see this as unlikely; (2) the Democrats moving left as in OTL; (3) the Republicans moving left as was flirted with briefly; and (4) the emergence of a third party that could displace the two (the Democrats being more likely as the weaker party).

In the short run this likely leaves greater room for ideological diversity in the GOP as the liberal Democrats may not have much to offer unions in a variety of industries, and a Theodore Roosevelt-like figure might have substantial support from the cadres. But ultimately involvement in a world war combined with domestic ethnic discrimination and an economic downturn could serve to cleave substantial portions of the working class from either party. I was toying with this idea in at least one timeline, though I never saw it through.

[The Mikado]

Cathcon: how about 5th: the Democratic Party dies off outside of the South, but keeps the South as a one party ruled area run through terror and electoral style events.

I could see a situation where the Democrats become basically kingmakers in the House and the Senate between the GOP and some new Progressive Party fighting it out in the North/West.

[FEMA Camp Administrator]

Cathcon: how about 5th: the Democratic Party dies off outside of the South, but keeps the South as a one party ruled area run through terror and electoral style events.

I could see a situation where the Democrats become basically kingmakers in the House and the Senate between the GOP and some new Progressive Party fighting it out in the North/West.

I was under the impression that in the context discussed this is a US without the South.

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

@NCYankee, the dynamic you discuss at the end leaves us with a Democratic Party, by the 1910s, probably resembles the UK's Liberal Party. The Liberals lost any chance at power shortly thereafter, which leads us to question the place of the Democrats. The four possibilities are (1) this pattern somehow holds, and the left in the United States is even weaker than OTL--given the very good possibility of some sort of depression, combined with a very combative and pluralistic domestic schema that encourages instability, I see this as unlikely; (2) the Democrats moving left as in OTL; (3) the Republicans moving left as was flirted with briefly; and (4) the emergence of a third party that could displace the two (the Democrats being more likely as the weaker party).

In the short run this likely leaves greater room for ideological diversity in the GOP as the liberal Democrats may not have much to offer unions in a variety of industries, and a Theodore Roosevelt-like figure might have substantial support from the cadres. But ultimately involvement in a world war combined with domestic ethnic discrimination and an economic downturn could serve to cleave substantial portions of the working class from either party. I was toying with this idea in at least one timeline, though I never saw it through.

Actually the UK Liberals had adapted economically by the 1910s just as the Democrats had in our timeline. The destruction of the Liberals was caused by an external factor, namely the Great War and related items to that, absent that I don't think the Labor Party would have displaced them and instead the Liberals would have absorbed most of that support over the next several years, which is also what the Democrats ended up doing over the 1930s under the New Deal, eventually shedding (or reshedding) middle class Catholic support to the Republicans.

So it is possible that eventually you end up in a similar place in the mid 20th century that you are in real life.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

I am dubious that the U.S. would have seen a powerful socialist or "labor" party emerge in this alternate reality. Disregarding the probable repercussions of a Confederate victory on the Second Industrial Revolution and Westward expansion (the latter having significant implications for the Grange movement and the Populists), the American labor movement was fractured and politically isolated throughout the late nineteenth century. (We tend to forget that most Americans viewed labor organizers as dangerous insurrectionists during this period.) Without the Solid South propping them up or holding them back, the Democrats would need to look elsewhere for support against a powerful and conservative Whig successor party: so I tend to think we'd see the Democrats evolve leftward, albeit differently from IOTL.

[RINO Tom]

I think it's important to remember that motive is a lot more important than method when analyzing ideology, though.  While a current protectionist Republican (when looking at politicians, I think their numbers are really overstated here...) might be advocating for the same surface-level policy as a protectionist Republican from the Nineteenth Century, it's important to ask why each was doing so. 

A current protectionist is arguing against the economic consensus on what is best for the American economy, which can and often is read as what is best for the business community.  They are effectively saying they don't care and that other things - such as a moral obligation to protect domestic industries and workers hurt by free trade - should trump economic concerns.  Is this really the same?  I'd argue not at all.

Nineteenth Century protectionists wanted high import tariffs because our economy was not in a global position to compete on price yet we had a huge domestic population needing goods ... the "pro-business" answer, ironically, was to tax imports to the point where consumers had a clear incentive to buy domestically and prop up American industry.  While it's supporting the exact same policy, it's doing it for quite literally the opposite reason.  There were certainly campaign speech overlaps ("protect the American worker!"), but who would ever label a modern protectionist as a corporate shill who is championing corporate welfare as these Republicans were accused of?

If we appreciate the historical classification of "pro-business" as a conservative ideology and "pro-worker" as a left-leaning one, I suggest that the motive to achieve those ends is somewhat irrelevant.  I mean, the GOP didn't just drop the high tariffs for no reason in the Twentieth Century; our business community had reached such a height after World War II that it didn't just no longer need them, it was actively harmed by them.  The pro-business Republican Party very naturally adjusted what it wanted to promote BECAUSE of what its end goal - which had not changed! - now demanded.

[1978 New Wave skinny trousers]

How can we have a topic about the period from 1876-1932 without mentioning the single most important ideological movement of that era, progressivism? The existence of the Progressive movement makes me skeptical of the idea that the Republicans were always the more conservative party than the Democrats, even if they were less open on issues like immigration and trade. Even though there were progressives in both major parties, it's no coincidence that a great many of them were Western and Midwestern Republicans like Bob La Follette, William Borah, George Norris, and Hiram Johnson. And in case anyone should doubt it, the progressives were certainly the liberals of their day and their opponents the conservatives; just see how many ended up supporting FDR and take a look at the Bull Moose party platform from 1912, which translates well to modern liberalism in many ways. 

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

I'm skeptical of the idea that the Republicans were always the more conservative party than the Democrats, even if they were less open on issues like immigration and trade. How can we have a topic about the period from 1876-1932 without mentioning the single most important ideological movement of that era, progressivism? Just read the Bull Moose party platform from 1912, which translates well to modern liberalism in many ways. Even though there were progressives in both major parties, it's no coincidence that a great many of them were Western and Midwestern Republicans like Bob La Follette, William Borah, George Norris, and Hiram Johnson.

Oh, I would be very hesitant to suggest a one-to-one relationship between progressivism and liberalism in the late nineteenth century. In many cases, they were directly opposed to each other. The "Bull Moose" platform aligns with twenty-first century liberal orthodoxy to a degree, but was also in many ways an aberration, and considerably more radical than anything Teddy or Taft pursued in office.

Beyond that, describing the fifty-odd years from 1876-1932 as a homogenous period is problematic for a variety of reasons, and progressivism as a meaningful identity only existed for perhaps half that time.

[FEMA Camp Administrator]

I am dubious that the U.S. would have seen a powerful socialist or "labor" party emerge in this alternate reality. Disregarding the probable repercussions of a Confederate victory on the Second Industrial Revolution and Westward expansion (the latter having significant implications for the Grange movement and the Populists), the American labor movement was fractured and politically isolated throughout the late nineteenth century. (We tend to forget that most Americans viewed labor organizers as dangerous insurrectionists during this period.) Without the Solid South propping them up or holding them back, the Democrats would need to look elsewhere for support against a powerful and conservative Whig successor party: so I tend to think we'd see the Democrats evolve leftward, albeit differently from IOTL.

I'm curious as to what you think the available room to maneuver leftward is, sans a labor + agrarian populist movement. That leads us away from both industrial proletarian "socialism" and more traditional Jeffersonian "small farmer" foci... into what? I can see one credible alternative being a coalition centered on anti-imperialism, as that would probably still end up being an issue even with more restricted access to the Caribbean, and it could assemble a geographically-diverse constituency. This might align well with an increased emphasis on rights for both immigrants and freedmen.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

I am dubious that the U.S. would have seen a powerful socialist or "labor" party emerge in this alternate reality. Disregarding the probable repercussions of a Confederate victory on the Second Industrial Revolution and Westward expansion (the latter having significant implications for the Grange movement and the Populists), the American labor movement was fractured and politically isolated throughout the late nineteenth century. (We tend to forget that most Americans viewed labor organizers as dangerous insurrectionists during this period.) Without the Solid South propping them up or holding them back, the Democrats would need to look elsewhere for support against a powerful and conservative Whig successor party: so I tend to think we'd see the Democrats evolve leftward, albeit differently from IOTL.

I'm curious as to what you think the available room to maneuver leftward is, sans a labor + agrarian populist movement. That leads us away from both industrial proletarian "socialism" and more traditional Jeffersonian "small farmer" foci... into what? I can see one credible alternative being a coalition centered on anti-imperialism, as that would probably still end up being an issue even with more restricted access to the Caribbean, and it could assemble a geographically-diverse constituency. This might align well with an increased emphasis on rights for both immigrants and freedmen.

I hadn't considered that, but it's an intriguing possibility. We can imagine such a coalition reabsorbing the "Radical Democracy" that split to fuse with the Republicans after Kansas–Nebraska in the 1850s. To the labor question, it's important to remember that you had really two labor movements that developed in parallel and to a large degree in conflict with each other during the 1870s and 80s. If the left forgoes a direct foray into socialism, I can see the Democrats aligning themselves with "respectable" unions like the KoL —who wanted their traditional privileges restored but weren't so keen on the more radical proposals of the IWW. Considering late nineteenth century American liberalism IOTL was in many ways characterized by a desire to return to pre-Industrial economic relationships, this seems it could be a natural fit.

[1978 New Wave skinny trousers]

I'm skeptical of the idea that the Republicans were always the more conservative party than the Democrats, even if they were less open on issues like immigration and trade. How can we have a topic about the period from 1876-1932 without mentioning the single most important ideological movement of that era, progressivism? Just read the Bull Moose party platform from 1912, which translates well to modern liberalism in many ways. Even though there were progressives in both major parties, it's no coincidence that a great many of them were Western and Midwestern Republicans like Bob La Follette, William Borah, George Norris, and Hiram Johnson.

Oh, I would be very hesitant to suggest a one-to-one relationship between progressivism and liberalism in the late nineteenth century. In many cases, they were directly opposed to each other. The "Bull Moose" platform aligns with twenty-first century liberal orthodoxy to a degree, but was also in many ways an aberration, and considerably more radical than anything Teddy or Taft pursued in office.

Beyond that, describing the fifty-odd years from 1876-1932 as a homogenous period is problematic for a variety of reasons, and progressivism as a meaningful identity only existed for perhaps half that time.

If your idea of a late 19th century liberal is Grover Cleveland, then yeah. His belief in laissez-faire economics couldn't be more opposed to progressivism, I agree. But by the 1910s I think this distinction no longer really existed, considering that Wilson was described as both a liberal and a progressive in equally strong terms. Like has been mentioned earlier in this thread, the same happened to the British Liberals of the time, who adopted progressive ideas under Lloyd George.

I think part of the problem is that I started with 1876. You're right that 1876-1932 isn't a homogeneous period, as progressivism didn't really exist for those first 20 years. I should've started with 1896, as by that point one might be able to say that progressivism and liberalism had already become intertwined in the form of William Jennings Bryan's populist campaign.

[darklordoftech]

I think it's important to remember that motive is a lot more important than method when analyzing ideology, though.  While a current protectionist Republican (when looking at politicians, I think their numbers are really overstated here...) might be advocating for the same surface-level policy as a protectionist Republican from the Nineteenth Century, it's important to ask why each was doing so. 

A current protectionist is arguing against the economic consensus on what is best for the American economy, which can and often is read as what is best for the business community.  They are effectively saying they don't care and that other things - such as a moral obligation to protect domestic industries and workers hurt by free trade - should trump economic concerns.  Is this really the same?  I'd argue not at all.

Nineteenth Century protectionists wanted high import tariffs because our economy was not in a global position to compete on price yet we had a huge domestic population needing goods ... the "pro-business" answer, ironically, was to tax imports to the point where consumers had a clear incentive to buy domestically and prop up American industry.  While it's supporting the exact same policy, it's doing it for quite literally the opposite reason.  There were certainly campaign speech overlaps ("protect the American worker!"), but who would ever label a modern protectionist as a corporate shill who is championing corporate welfare as these Republicans were accused of?

If we appreciate the historical classification of "pro-business" as a conservative ideology and "pro-worker" as a left-leaning one, I suggest that the motive to achieve those ends is somewhat irrelevant.  I mean, the GOP didn't just drop the high tariffs for no reason in the Twentieth Century; our business community had reached such a height after World War II that it didn't just no longer need them, it was actively harmed by them.  The pro-business Republican Party very naturally adjusted what it wanted to promote BECAUSE of what its end goal - which had not changed! - now demanded.

In fact, the income tax was seen as a “populist” alternative to tariffs.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

If your idea of a late 19th century liberal is Grover Cleveland, then yeah. His belief in laissez-faire economics couldn't be more opposed to progressivism, I agree. But by the 1910s I think this distinction no longer really existed, considering that Wilson was described as both a liberal and a progressive in equally strong terms.

To a degree. But Wilsonian progressivism is sufficiently distinct from the "mainstream" Republican progressives that I would consider it a mistake to conflate the two entirely. (La Follette is more difficult to characterize, and frankly I know less about him —though one could say he is in a class of his own, and certainly he was more favorable to Wilson than Roosevelt, Hughes, or Lodge.) Progressive conservatism both predates and predisposes liberal progressivism; the latter arising in response to the former, and though drawing significant influence from it, having a very different pedigree from its Republican cousin. The term isn't of much use after Wilson, having lost a large degree of its potency from circulation. (1924 is often cited as the "high water mark" of American conservatism, but all three major candidates for president that year had described themselves as progressives at some point in their careers, illustrative of just how widespread the term had become.)

I think part of the problem is that I started with 1876. You're right that 1876-1932 isn't a homogeneous period, as progressivism didn't really exist for those first 20 years. I should've started with 1896, as by that point one might be able to say that progressivism and liberalism had already become intertwined in the form of William Jennings Bryan's populist campaign.

Bryan is an interesting case. The common wisdom is that his ideas were coopted by the progressives after 1896, but I'm not sure that makes him a progressive, at least before 1908. His candidacy indisputably served to transform American liberalism nonetheless, acting as the hinge swinging the party from the Bourbon liberalism of Cleveland to Wilsonian "New Freedom." We might regard 1896–1912 as the chrysalis period of the Democratic party, a period in which it was neither indisputably Bourbon nor inarguably progressive.