UK General Election 2019 - Election Day and Results Thread

[Filuwaúrdjan]

The critical difference between Liverpool and literally everywhere else is that in that city and its immediate surrounds, Corbyn is not hated massively by almost everyone over a certain age. Because one of the things that is now, I think, quite clear is that the extremely poor (hysterically bad) performance of Labour amongst older voters is not mostly down to structural factors, even if they certainly exist.

[CumbrianLefty]

Hmmm, tbh I remain to be convinced by that. You have to accept Osborne "stuffing the pensioners mouths with gold" has had a major electoral effect, for example?

[Oryxslayer]

Also remember it wasn't just a case of Leave vs Remain polarization, you also had Urban vs Rural/Small-town vs various types of Suburbs polarization along with regional polarization. For instance, a Brexit constituency in Liverpool held up better than one in the east Midlands with a similar leave percentage.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

It isn't polarisation if one party is dropping like a rock in some places and merely like a stone in others.

[Skye]

Sorry if I'm being annoying or if this has already been answered, but what where the %s in London? Neither Wiki nor the BBC site has them yet.

[DistingFlyer]

Overall regional lead figures:

North - Tories trail by 4% (best since 1959)
Midlands - Tories ahead by 22% (best since 1931)
London - Tories trail by 16% (better than 2017, but not much else)
rest of South - Tories lead by 31% (best since 1931)
Wales - Tories trail by 5% (best since 1859)
Scotland - Tories trail by 20% (worse than 2017, but best showing vis-a-vis Labour (6.5% lead) since 1935)

Despite all those "best since the 1930s", the overall Tory lead over Labour in 1983 was significantly bigger than now (and 1987 was almost identical) And of course the seat majority is smaller than both.

Quite true; the Tory showing in London is much worse now than in the 1980s (or indeed than almost any time except the 1990s & 2010s), and their southern results, in terms of seats if not votes, are worse too. My point was that they compensated for that by exceeding Margaret Thatcher's results in other areas.

[thumb21]

Sorry if I'm being annoying or if this has already been answered, but what where the %s in London? Neither Wiki nor the BBC site has them yet.

There are results for London and other regions here:

http://principalfish.co.uk/electionmaps/

[Starry Eyed Jagaloon]

The real story of this election was a lack of a progressive pact/tactical voting killed the progressive parties, and that MUST be addressed in 2024 to kick the tories out. If you combine the CON/BRX/UKIP vote and pit it against the LIB/LAB/GRN/Prog independent vote, these 44 seats would have flipped (margin in parenthesis). Note that I'm only looking at English seats in this post.

1. Wimbledon (23.2)
2. Kensington (21.3)
3. Cities of London and Westminster (19.7)
4. Finchley and Golders Green (12.4)
5. Chipping Barnet (10.6)
6. Carshalton and Wallington (10.5)
7. Guildford (10.2)
8. Watford (9.0 )
9. Cheadle (8.1)
10. Truro and Falmouth (8.0 )
11. South Cambridgeshire (7.4)
12. Wycombe (6.3)
13. Hitchin and Harpenden (5.3)
14. Southport (4.
15. Lewes (4.0 )
16. High Peak (3.
17. Warrington South (3.6)
18. Chingford and Woodford Green (3.4)
19. Cheltenham (3.2)
20. Reading West (3.2)
21. Winchester (2.9)
22. Altrincham and Sale West (2.7)
23. Bury North (2.4)
24. Hazel Grove (2.4)
25. Hendon (2.4)
26. Rushcliffe (2.3)
27. Bury South (2.2)
28. Gedling (1.
29. Wolverhampton South West (1.6)
30. Filton and Bradley Stoke (1.2)
31. St Ives (1.1)
32. Woking (1.1)
33. Milton Keynes North (1.0 )
34. Pudsey (0.
35. South West Hertfordshire (0.
36. Wokingham (0.
37. Bolton North East (0.6)
38. Chelsea and Fulham (0.6)
39. Dewsbury (0.2)
40. Sutton and Cheam (0.1)
41. Esher and Walton (0.1)
42. Stroud (0.1)
43. York Outer (0.1)
44. Derby North (0.1)

Notice how most of these seats are in the South, particularly Metropolitan London. Sure, a few of the Labour heartland seats could have been saved with a progressive coalition, but on the whole, the easiest seats to win are in the South. Furthermore, trends towards the progressive parties in the South have been particularly dramatic, with many constituencies in Oxfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Hertfordshire, and Surrey swinging 20+ points towards the progressives since 2015. This is where the election will be won in 2024, and that's part of why I think someone like Sadiq Khan should lead Labour going forward. Applying 2015-19 trends again coupled with a full progressive party pact, in 2024, these flips occur basically no matter what:

1. Kensington
2. Cities of London and Westminster
3. Wimbledon
4. Guildford
5. Hitchin and Harpenden
6. Chipping Barnet
7. Esher and Walton
8. South Cambridgeshire
9. Woking
10. South West Hertfordshire
11. Finchley and Golders Green
12. Wokingham
13. Chelsea and Fulham
14. Watford
15. Truro and Falmouth
16. Winchester
17. Chingford and Woodford Green
18. Altrincham and Sale West
19. Rushcliffe
20. Bury South
21. Reading West
22. Filton and Bradley Stoke
23. Cheadle
24. Bolton North East
25. East Worthing and Shoreham
26. Wycombe
27. Carshalton and Wallington
28. Wantage
29. Bournemouth East
30. Milton Keynes North
31. High Peak
32. York Outer
33. North East Somerset
34. South West Surrey
35. Milton Keynes South
36. South East Cambridgeshire
37. Cheltenham
38. North Somerset
39. Morecambe and Lunesdale
40. Aylesbury
41. Beckenham
42. Hastings and Rye
43. Warrington South
44. Bromley and Chislehurst
45. Epsom and Ewell
46. Mid Sussex
47. Hazel Grove
48. Beaconsfield
49. Pudsey
50. Northampton South
51. Uxbridge and South Ruislip
52. Totnes
53. Bury North
54. Loughborough
55. Croydon South
56. Bournemouth West
57. Chesham and Amersham

All of these seats flip with a progressive coalition and trends, even if the Conservative coalition wins the popular vote by 5+ points. Again, the vast majority are in the South, and the North remains mostly out of reach. Of course, they'll be offset by a few inevitable flips in Wales and Northern England (perhaps the Welsh Valleys will finally go), but in these places, Labour is mostly constrained to the big cities and has far fewer vulnerable seats than these ones. Besides, after that, there are still more competitive seats:

58. East Devon (flips if Conservatives win national vote by 5 points)
59. Welwyn Hatfield
60. Keighley
61. Macclesfield (flips if Conservatives win national vote by 4 points)
62. Shipley
63. Reigate
64. Wolverhampton South West
65. Crawley
66. Banbury
67. Henley
68. Worcester
69. Stroud
70. Tunbridge Wells (flips if Conservatives win national vote by 3 points)
71. Harrogate and Knaresborough
72. Romsey and Southampton North
73. Witney
74. Runnymede and Weybridge
75. Mole Valley
76. Lewes (flips if Conservatives win national vote by 2 points)
71. Southport
70. Gedling
71. Lincoln
72. Maidenhead
73. St Ives
74. Sutton and Cheam
75. Norwich North
76. South Swindon (flips if Conservatives win national vote by 1 point)
77. Huntingdon
78. South Thanet
79. Peterborough
80. Worthing West
81. Dewsbury
82. Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner
83. Derby North
84. Shrewsbury and Atcham (flips if national vote is tied)
85. Harborough
86. Bastingstoke
87. Arundel and South Downs
88. Colne Valley
89. Southampton Itchen (flips if Progressives win national vote by 1 point)
90. Hexham
91. Newbury
92. Birmingham Northfield
93. Stevenage
94. Central Devon
95. Calder Valley
96. North East Hertfordshire (flips if Progressives win national vote by 2 points)
97. Chichester
98. Northampton North
99. Telford
100. West Bromwich East
101. Hemel Hempstead (flips if Progressives win national vote by 3 points)
102. Torridge and West Devon
103. West Dorset
104. Rochester and Strood
105. Hendon
106. Heywood and Middleton
107. Chelmsford
108. Hertford and Stortford (flips if Progressives win national vote by 4 points)
105. Salisbury
106. Ipswich
107. Gloucester
108. Somerton and Frome
109. Isle of Wight
110. Windsor
111. Pendle (flips if Progressives win national vote by 5 points)

Obviously, these figures are a bit crude, but there are two clear takeaways: there needs to be a progressive coalition and 2024 will be won in the traditionally Conservative South. What this means now, is that the Greens, Lib Dems, and Labour need to reach some consensus on a unifying, center-left message which is pro-immigrant, pro-Europe, pro-environment, pro-working and middle class but not anti-business; and consistently hammer the Conservatives on the same talking points. Regardless, trying to win back the small-town postindustrial North isn't going to work.

[TheDeadFlagBlues]

It isn't polarisation if one party is dropping like a rock in some places and merely like a stone in others.

Especially when post-election surveys suggest that something like one third of this party's voters only voted for that party because they wanted to stop the other major party and had no real conviction or belief in the platform of that party or its leadership...

[Silent Hunter]

@Blairite: Alas, I think there is more chance of me playing table tennis with Daisy Ridley.

[Oryxslayer]

I hate to burst your progressive coalition bubble, but they were unable to win a majority of seats with a 51-46 vote split in their favor. Now, some  of this is obviously the fact that the current map has been in use for too long and is getting into mallaportionment territory. However, most has to do with votes getting packed hard into cities. Like, the progressive coalition loses 2019 Labour seats in the Northeast thanks to Brexit.

And the SNP would never be part of some hypothetical progressive coalition, so that further bursts this bubble. I'm not arguing against looking at the London commuter region, that has to happen for Labour to win in the 2020s, I'm just pushing back on the idea that division in the  left is what doomed the country to Boris.

[jaichind]

A couple of interesting facts I found by randomly looking at results

1) Neale Hanvey was the SNP candidate for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath but disowned him when it came out that he had made anti-semitic social media posts in the past.  But but it was too late to remove him from the ballot but SNP called on their supporters not to support Neale Hanvey.  Neale Hanvey ended up winning seat narrowly and capturing the seat from LAB.  So this is sort of a anti-signal on how important the anti-semitic issue really is.

2) In Luton North, the sitting MP Kelvin Hopkins was suspended on accusations of sexual misconduct.  He is also a strong Brexit supporter so he broke with his party both on that issue and the issue of these allegations which he rejects.  He ended up not running as an independent and the LAB was able to retain the seat.  One reason could be that in Luton South next door the sitting LAB MP Gavin Shuker also broke with LAB and was a founder of CHUK and ended up running as an independent with LDEM support.  LAB ended nominating in Luton South Kelvin Hopkins's daughter Rachel Hopkins who went on to win with ease pushing Gavin Shuker to a weak third place.

[Silent Hunter]

Some other fun facts:

1. George Galloway lost his deposit in West Bromwich East.
2. So did Chris Williamson in Derby North.

[DistingFlyer]

Notice how most of these seats are in the South, particularly Metropolitan London. Sure, a few of the Labour heartland seats could have been saved with a progressive coalition, but on the whole, the easiest seats to win are in the South. Furthermore, trends towards the progressive parties in the South have been particularly dramatic, with many constituencies in Oxfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Hertfordshire, and Surrey swinging 20+ points towards the progressives since 2015. This is where the election will be won in 2024, and that's part of why I think someone like Sadiq Khan should lead Labour going forward. Applying 2015-19 trends again coupled with a full progressive party pact, in 2024, these flips occur basically no matter what:


All of these seats flip with a progressive coalition and trends, even if the Conservative coalition wins the popular vote by 5+ points. Again, the vast majority are in the South, and the North remains mostly out of reach. Of course, they'll be offset by a few inevitable flips in Wales and Northern England (perhaps the Welsh Valleys will finally go), but in these places, Labour is mostly constrained to the big cities and has far fewer vulnerable seats than these ones. Besides, after that, there are still more competitive seats:


Obviously, these figures are a bit crude, but there are two clear takeaways: there needs to be a progressive coalition and 2024 will be won in the traditionally Conservative South. What this means now, is that the Greens, Lib Dems, and Labour need to reach some consensus on a unifying, center-left message which is pro-immigrant, pro-Europe, pro-environment, pro-working and middle class but not anti-business; and consistently hammer the Conservatives on the same talking points. Regardless, trying to win back the small-town postindustrial North isn't going to work.

I've said it before; London & the South appear to be going the way of Ontario in 1962-3. (Scotland has certainly started behaving like Quebec post-1993). In two decades, will the North & Midlands be blue while London & the Home Counties are red & yellow? Obviously one can't say for certain, but it does look possible.

This may be a good long-term plan for Labour & the Liberals, since it's the southern commuter regions (though not London) that are growing the fastest, while the North has generally been losing seats at every reapportionment. Future redistributions may therefore end up helping Labour for the first time.

If that does happen ('Surrey Man' becomes Liberal/Labour while Workington & Essex Men stay Tory), we can also expect the class distinctions Labour has tended to draw ('rich Surrey brokers' vs. 'honest northern workers') to disappear too, in favor of the kind of language we've seen in Canada since the 1960s, and in the US since the 1980s/90s ('sophisticated' vs. not).

As for a progressive vs. conservative coalition, there's enough disagreement between the Liberal & Labour parties (not to mention the Greens & nationalists) that a formal pact isn't very likely, and even if it did happen they'd bleed some voters (either towards someone else or just into abstaining).

[jaichind]

Obviously, these figures are a bit crude, but there are two clear takeaways: there needs to be a progressive coalition and 2024 will be won in the traditionally Conservative South. What this means now, is that the Greens, Lib Dems, and Labour need to reach some consensus on a unifying, center-left message which is pro-immigrant, pro-Europe, pro-environment, pro-working and middle class but not anti-business; and consistently hammer the Conservatives on the same talking points. Regardless, trying to win back the small-town postindustrial North isn't going to work.

It seems the best way to do this is for LAB to come out for AV to be implemented without a referendum.  If LAB could not get their MPs to agree to this there is no way they can be persuaded to step down for LDEM or Greens.

[DistingFlyer]

A couple of interesting facts I found by randomly looking at results

1) Neale Hanvey was the SNP candidate for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath but disowned him when it came out that he had made anti-semitic social media posts in the past.  But but it was too late to remove him from the ballot but SNP called on their supporters not to support Neale Hanvey.  Neale Hanvey ended up winning seat narrowly and capturing the seat from LAB.  So this is sort of a anti-signal on how important the anti-semitic issue really is.

Yes, that whole question seemed largely to be a focus of political & media types rather than in the country at large (though that's not to say it wasn't noticed by other people, or that it shouldn't have been or was unimportant).

I would say, however, that the swing toward Mr. Hanvey (1.6%) was much smaller than what was recorded in the neighboring seats (9.2% in Dunfermline, 10.1% in Glenrothes), so all this probably did affect him - it was just his luck that he only needed to overturn a Labour margin of 259 in a seat that had gone SNP by nearly ten thousand in 2015.

[Starry Eyed Jagaloon]

@Oryxslayer
The conservatives+bxp may have a majority of seats, but 44 seats were lost because of progressive vote splitting and another 30 or so were decided by under 30 points.

In regards to progressive vote packing, that's about to change in a big way. Hertfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Berkshire, Surrey, Oxfordshire, the South Coast, and the Bristol area all had swings that would put Orange County 2012-2018 to shame. When these seats go, that's like 80 more seats to the progressives. That said, if they end up going 40 Com/ 30 Lib/ 30 Lab, there is no effective solution. Winning that and shoring up seats in the metropolitan North gives progressives a clear path to a majority, even without nationalists.

In regards to Scotland, there are so few tory seats that a progressive coalition with the SNP becomes pointless, although Labour and the Lib Dems might band together to beat the SNP.

Regardless, I think Labour and the Lib Dems should be explicit abput working together to beat the Tories, have a clear vision for what a Lib-Lab government would look like, and not shy away from picking a Londoner like Khan as Labour leader to lead this new metropolitan majority.

[Cassius]

The Home Counties are not abandoning the Tories any time soon. Apart from a handful of strong Lib Dem performances in seats which they threw the kitchen sink at (and still lost) like Guildford, Esher and Wokingham, the ‘progressive’ parties were crushed almost everywhere else in the Home Counties. Sevenoaks, Tunbridge Wells, Runnymede and Weybridge, Beaconsfield, South West Hertfordshire, Surrey Heath, Reigate, Chesham and Amersham, and on and on, the Tories were still miles ahead in all of these. Miles ahead, in spite of the fact that most of these constituencies voted to remain and in spite of the Lib Dems essentially rebranding themselves as ‘the Tories but pro-Europe’ for this election campaign. Given that this election has exposed the Lib Dem ‘resurgence’ as a paper tiger, and given the fact that by 2024 they will have lost their EU lifeboat to campaign on, their prospects do not look good in the South East, bar in that handful of seats where they were always competitive anyway (aside from during their 2015-2017 Götterdämmerung), like St Albans and Guildford.

As for Labour, they’re going nowhere in the South East, unless the demography of commuter belt seats changes to the point where they are basically like London/Brighton. This could happen, but banking on demographic changes that may or may not occur (and if they do, possibly not for decades) is not a good strategy and even in places where the demography has become much more favourable to Labour (such as in Chingford) Labour failed to win this time round, proving the point that demography is not destiny. As things stand at the moment, Labour do not have a hope in hell of winning big in the South East (outside of the towns they already hold)  with their current platform and leadership.

No ‘progressive alliance’ will change this. As others, and I, have pointed out, many Lib Dem voters would plump for the Tories before Labour in a two party contest, whilst it is not a dead certainty that all Labour voters would lend their votes to the Lib Dems in a Tory-Lib Dem matchup. More to the point, in many constituencies it is not clear who the better anti-Tory challenger would be, so dividing the seats in such a way would be difficult.

In short, the Home Counties are fools gold for Labour. The thing about this election is that the dam finally burst in a lot of (but not all) traditionally Labour constituencies, whilst the Tories simultaneously held on to practically all of their traditional strongholds, usually with a comfortable majority. Any hopes for Labour regaining power should focus on them winning the constituencies they’ve actually been able to win in the past, rather than upon some wild goose chase after the mythical ‘liberal internationalists’ of the South East.

Also, re Sadiq Khan, you can forget winning over Kent, Surrey, Berkshire, Oxfordshire et al with a soft-left Lahndener at the helm of the Labour Party.

[Starry Eyed Jagaloon]

Guildford
Conservative Bloc 2015: 65.9
Conservative Bloc 2019: 44.9
Swing: 21.0

Esher and Walton
Conservative Bloc 2015: 72.6
Conservative Bloc 2019: 49.4
Swing: 23.2

Wokingham
Conservative Bloc 2015: 67.6
Conservative Bloc 2019: 49.6
Swing: 18.0

Sevenoaks
Conservative Bloc 2015: 74.8
Conservative Bloc 2019: 60.7
Swing: 14.1

Tunbridge Wells
Conservative Bloc 2015: 71.3
Conservative Bloc 2019: 55.1
Swing: 16.2

Runnymede and Weybridge
Conservative Bloc 2015: 73.6
Conservative Bloc 2019: 55.8
Swing: 17.8

South West Hertfordshire
Conservative Bloc 2015: 68.4
Conservative Bloc 2019: 49.6
Swing: 18.8

Surrey Heath
Conservative Bloc 2015: 74.2
Conservative Bloc 2019: 59.7
Swing: 14.5

Reigate
Conservative Bloc 2015: 70.1
Conservative Bloc 2019: 55.1
Swing: 15.0

Chesham and Amersham
Conservative Bloc 2015: 72.8
Conservative Bloc 2019: 55.4
Swing: 17.4

St Albans
Conservative Bloc 2015: 54.4
Conservative Bloc 2019: 39.2
Swing: 15.2

You really think there's nothing here?

[DistingFlyer]

A lot will depend on who leads the Liberals & Labour, and how the parties pitch themselves to the voters - if one (or both) goes for a US Democratic-style approach, they might be able to win over Southern business types. Certainly they were able to make a few inroads there in the 1990s by using those methods, and if the Tories' popularity plunges again they may do even better this time because of Brexit. This election, the angry-student-radical stereotype that followed Labour doomed them in both their old heartland and the southern stockbroker belt, and if they elect a similar leader and keep up a similar image they won't do well in either area again.

Two big questions:
1) Will pro-Brexit, former Labour voters in the North & Midlands stay Conservative even after Britain has left the EU?; and
2) Will pro-remain, former Conservatives in London & the Home Counties stay Liberal & Labour?

If the answer to both is 'Yes,' then we've seen the first big political realignment in Britain in many decades (arguably the biggest since social class, rather than religion, became the biggest factor in political allegiance) and the beginning of a similar voting pattern to Canada or the US.

If it's 'No' to both, then this is just temporary and we'll be going back to the old norm within 10-15 years. (In spite of others' comments, I think this is the least likely answer but we shall see.)

If it's 'Yes' to one and 'No' to the other, then either the Tories or Labour/Liberal are in serious trouble - if a big part of their base is gone without a new bloc of voters to compensate, then future victories will be very difficult.

A lot will depend on how well the EU departure goes: if the rosy forecasts of Leavers are born out, then it will be 'Yes' to #1 and 'No' to #2, leaving Labour in near-permanent opposition. If the doomsday forecasts of Remainers are correct, then it will be 'No' to #1 and 'Yes' to #2, leaving the Tories hobbled. If things are in between, then it will be 'Yes' or 'No' to both.

The old voting patterns in Britain have proved remarkably durable over the years, holding up reasonably well even while other nations have abandoned them. Certainly it would take something very big to shake them up, and it's understandable not to believe that it may finally be happening, but the EU may finally be what does it (though if it doesn't, then maybe nothing will). Perhaps it's my North American perspective clouding my judgment here, and I'm seeing an emergence of our voting patterns in Britain just because that's what I'm used to seeing around me, but then again I (and others, of course!) may be correct this time.

[Cassius]

Guildford
Conservative Bloc 2015: 65.9
Conservative Bloc 2019: 44.9
Swing: 21.0

Esher and Walton
Conservative Bloc 2015: 72.6
Conservative Bloc 2019: 49.4
Swing: 23.2

Wokingham
Conservative Bloc 2015: 67.6
Conservative Bloc 2019: 49.6
Swing: 18.0

Sevenoaks
Conservative Bloc 2015: 74.8
Conservative Bloc 2019: 60.7
Swing: 14.1

Tunbridge Wells
Conservative Bloc 2015: 71.3
Conservative Bloc 2019: 55.1
Swing: 16.2

Runnymede and Weybridge
Conservative Bloc 2015: 73.6
Conservative Bloc 2019: 55.8
Swing: 17.8

South West Hertfordshire
Conservative Bloc 2015: 68.4
Conservative Bloc 2019: 49.6
Swing: 18.8

Surrey Heath
Conservative Bloc 2015: 74.2
Conservative Bloc 2019: 59.7
Swing: 14.5

Reigate
Conservative Bloc 2015: 70.1
Conservative Bloc 2019: 55.1
Swing: 15.0

Chesham and Amersham
Conservative Bloc 2015: 72.8
Conservative Bloc 2019: 55.4
Swing: 17.4

St Albans
Conservative Bloc 2015: 54.4
Conservative Bloc 2019: 39.2
Swing: 15.2

You really think there's nothing here?

With the exception of St Albans, Guildford, Wokingham and Esher, yes, pretty much. Excluding those seats, the Tories were still far ahead of the opposition in the rest of them, no matter whom that happened to be (in South West Hertfordshire the effective ‘progressive alliance’ candidate was a former Tory cabinet minister!), usually with a vote share barely changed from 2015 (in Sevenoaks they actually got a higher share of the vote). This is Britain, not Sweden, we do not do Blockpolitik, the Conservatives and UKIP did not form a ‘conservative bloc’ in 2015 (a not insignificant number of 2015 UKIP voters had previously voted Lib Dem or Labour), just as there was and is no ‘progressive bloc’ facing them.

Granted, the Lib Dems put on a lot of votes in many Home Counties constituencies, which was enough to turn a handful of them marginal. For the rest, it frankly doesn’t matter very much. Take Tunbridge Wells, sure, the Lib Dems went up by 18%, but the sitting Tory MP still has a majority of 15,000 votes and the seat is still a safe Tory seat. Maybe the composition of the Tory vote has changed since 2015, but the point is they still won it (and many, many seats like it) comfortably. The Lib Dems have had two elections in which to exploit the high remain vote in many Home Counties constituencies, and twice they’ve fallen flat on their faces (they made a solitary gain in this region, St Albans, which was balanced out by their losing Eastbourne). The salience of hardline remainer politics is likely to diminish in the future, once we leave the EU and membership ceases to be the status quo option and becomes the radical change (which it will be, given that if we do ever re-enter the EU we will have to sign up to the Euro, Schengen and various other bits and bobs we’d previously secured opt outs from). If the Lib Dems couldn’t turn the commuter belt yellow this year, then I doubt that they will ever do, barring the handful of exceptions like Guildford.

[Clyde1998]

The real story of this election was a lack of a progressive pact/tactical voting killed the progressive parties, and that MUST be addressed in 2024 to kick the tories out. If you combine the CON/BRX/UKIP vote and pit it against the LIB/LAB/GRN/Prog independent vote, these 44 seats would have flipped (margin in parenthesis). Note that I'm only looking at English seats in this post.

I've had a look at the numbers for it and it would've taken 85% of votes for the non-largest 'progressive' parties (Lab/Lib/Grn/SNP/PC/CUK/major independents) to move to the largest in a constituency to prevent the Conservatives+DUP from having a majority, assuming no change in the Conservative, Brexit Party and UKIP votes nor in Northern Ireland.

A number that's highly unrealistic, especially in Scotland where independence preference may be more important than Brexit outcome to many (the Lib Dems seem to have benefited from 2017 Conservative votes in all the seats they won, for example). Also, you have to assume that 85% of those parties' voters have a second preference for the others - particularly Lib Dem voters who may prefer a Conservative government to a Labour one, outwith their Brexit position.

Even then, you'd've only ended up with: Con 310 (-55), Lab 239 (+37), SNP 53 (+5), Lib 23 (+12), PC 4 (nc), Grn 1 (nc), Spk 1 (nc), Ashfield Inds 1 (+1)

I don't know what the Ashfield Independents' position on Brexit was, but given size of the local Brexit vote (71%) I'd imagine they'd not be endorsing a softer Brexit than the current deal. I included them in these calculations anyway as they may oppose the Conservatives in key areas.

[jaichind]

Why do we not put the 2016 Leave vote share next to each constituency   

Guildford
Conservative Bloc 2015: 65.9
Conservative Bloc 2019: 44.9
Swing: 21.0
2016 Leave 41.2

Esher and Walton
Conservative Bloc 2015: 72.6
Conservative Bloc 2019: 49.4
Swing: 23.2
2016 Leave 41.6

Wokingham
Conservative Bloc 2015: 67.6
Conservative Bloc 2019: 49.6
Swing: 18.0
2016 Leave 42.7

Sevenoaks
Conservative Bloc 2015: 74.8
Conservative Bloc 2019: 60.7
Swing: 14.1
2016 Leave 54.0

Tunbridge Wells
Conservative Bloc 2015: 71.3
Conservative Bloc 2019: 55.1
Swing: 16.2
2016 Leave 44.7

Runnymede and Weybridge
Conservative Bloc 2015: 73.6
Conservative Bloc 2019: 55.8
Swing: 17.8
2016 Leave 49.9

South West Hertfordshire
Conservative Bloc 2015: 68.4
Conservative Bloc 2019: 49.6
Swing: 18.8
2016 Leave 46.2

Surrey Heath
Conservative Bloc 2015: 74.2
Conservative Bloc 2019: 59.7
Swing: 14.5
2016 Leave 51.9

Reigate
Conservative Bloc 2015: 70.1
Conservative Bloc 2019: 55.1
Swing: 15.0
2016 Leave 48.0

Chesham and Amersham
Conservative Bloc 2015: 72.8
Conservative Bloc 2019: 55.4
Swing: 17.4
2016 Leave 45.0

St Albans
Conservative Bloc 2015: 54.4
Conservative Bloc 2019: 39.2
Swing: 15.2
2016 Leave 37.8

You really think there's nothing here?

This seems more about the Conservative Bloc converging toward the 2016 Leave vote share.  Either these trends are permanent or they are not.  Meaning if we believe there have been a realignment in Remain heavy areas then we have to believe the same for Leave heavy areas.  If we believe these shifts are temporary and LAB could regain some of its seats in the North then some of this convergence above will also reverse itself next time around.

[jaichind]

Some other fun facts:

1. George Galloway lost his deposit in West Bromwich East.
2. So did Chris Williamson in Derby North.

Yeah, I saw that.  Too about about George Galloway.  He is one of the few people on the Left I really admire.  I wonder why BXP stood here?  They should have stepped aside to give George Galloway a clear run at getting the LAB pro-Brexit vote.

[The Free North]

I wont quote all the earlier posts made here and I know people on are always eager for interesting and lasting trends, but does anyone else see 2019 as a painfully clear anomaly election?

Brexit has been a looming spectre over UK politics for almost 4 years now. People are sick and tired of hearing about it which is part of the reason why Johnson's campaign was so much more effective than Corbyn's. When the UK leaves, its logical to assume that all of the debate thats been pushed to the forefront over the past few years will finally drop off.

When that happens and when Labour elects someone who isn't perceived to be an anti-semetic lunatic, Labour voters in the north that either sat out, bit their tongue and voted Tory, or voted Brexit, will trickle back. Similarly, I don't understand how people can look at trends from 2015-2019 and expect half of Surry or something to suddenly back Labour in 2024. Its already been rumored JRM is going to lose his position in the government and its clear Johnson is not going to turn the Conservatives into UKIP so I don't see how the Lib Dems or Labour make any further inroads in the south if the leave/remain cleavage is weaker 5 years from now than it is today.

Certainly things can change and perhaps Johnson's government will look different than assumed, but I still stand by the fact that 2019 was an exception to the rule, not the start of some vast re-alignment.