Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[Virginiá]

It seems plausible and would still allow the missiles to hit the vast majority of the country, assuming Russia was incapable of removing the restrictions. Software restrictions would seem the simplest to introduce, but who's to say you can't jailbreak a missile?

I think when they say Iran wants to 'limit' the range, they mean limit by only sending missiles with a max range of 300km or less, such as the Fateh-110. The article states the Zolfaghar was ruled out. If they do modify it to be less than 300km, Russia working around that might not gain them too much more range.

Article: https://www.axios.com/2022/12/12/ukraine-war-russia-missiles-iran-limit

Still, I'd take Israeli govt. claims with more than a few grains of salt. They are aware of their own stance and history in this conflict and the benefits of obscuring these. Israeli drones have also proven quite useful to Russia.

Yeah, that's fair, still seemed worth forwarding along if only for the record though.

[Virginiá]

https://twitter.com/AlexRaptor94/status/1602628815930417152

[Virginiá]

Honestly, I wouldn't be surprised if Ukraine selectively fires Patriot missiles at cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Chances are they will put it in an area where it at least partially overlaps with an existing IRIS-T or NASAMS battery - maybe around Kyiv. I can't imagine Ukraine would willingly use up PAC missiles on drones, and they are probably going to be strongly encouraged to not do so by the US.

Financially-speaking, I agree, they are criminally expensive, but at the same time, this would give Ukraine a capability they sorely need, especially as Russia seems likely to get ballistic missiles from Iran at some point. Also, at least over the next 12 months, I don't think it would be a financial burden on the US, so long as it is used more sparingly. Congress actually seems willing to give Ukraine more than Biden wants. I wouldn't be surprised if the limiting factor becomes the physical PAC missiles rather than the cost, as it's unclear how many US can give, especially with Saudi Arabia previously begging the US to dip into their reserves to speed up replacements for their air defenses that they are wasting on drones.

[Virginiá]

Unsure if this is actually confirmed or just more mis-translations and rumors, but for what it's worth:

https://twitter.com/FHeisbourg/status/1602741332870516736

If so, that would be a welcomed delivery, as it has notably longer range than systems like NASAMS. I think it has at least some ballistic missile capability, although not 100% on that. Like the Aspide battery being given to Ukraine, there is the question of how many missiles Ukraine can be provided with. Spain had very little to provide compared to the needs of Ukraine, unsure what kind of stockpiles Italy & France have, so we'll see.

[Virginiá]

Fundamentally, while it would tie up Ukrainian resources and a sizable # of troops, Belarus is also a small, poor country of ~9 million people with a small military and a significant amount of civil unrest boiling under its atom-thin veneer of stability, and has already been sending a lot of their munitions and weapons to Russia to backfill their losses. And the Ukrainian-Belarusian border is also a patchwork of marshes and swamps, further limiting offensive options. There is a not-insignificant chance mobilizing and going to war could cause the Lukashenko regime to implode. So they are a threat to Ukraine, but not a game-changing one, IMO.

More likely if they participate at all is through continued weapon transfers and maybe using their troops to assist Russian forces.

[Virginiá]

https://twitter.com/LianaFix/status/1603814723182641191

[Virginiá]

Lawmakers unveil $1.7T bill to avoid shutdown, boost Ukraine

https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-3e0fef206f524f6b1b67f7c36178a688

The spending package includes about $45 billion in emergency assistance to Ukraine as it battles Russia’s invasion, according to Sen. Patrick Leahy, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. It would be the biggest American infusion of assistance yet to Ukraine, above even President Joe Biden’s $37 billion emergency request, and ensure that funding flows to the war effort for months to come.

It seemed obvious that Congress would build on the base number provided by the Biden administration, but still, as I was posting earlier in this thread, even 45 billion doesn't come close to the level of aid given in 2022. This is actually only marginally more than the first large package earlier in the year, with there being other supplementals (and the original emergency aid) along the way.

This would indicate that either the previous article(s) indicating Biden not wishing to increase arms to Ukraine (ostensibly due to limits imposed by US policy on minimum stocks for preparedness reasons) have some truth to them, or that Biden believes they will be able to secure more aid to Ukraine in 2023 as needed, or possibly both.

[Virginiá]

Good time to be a Central/Eastern European arms manufacturer

[Virginiá]

I see that some online Trumpist was raging over Zelensky not wearing a suit last night.

Nice to see they have their priorities right.

These people were always destined to complain, and the fact that they spent it on the lack of a suit is a testament to how disingenuous they are. They had to whine about something.

[Virginiá]

(thread)

https://twitter.com/sommervilletv/status/1605887743422144512

a human story for once

[Virginiá]

https://twitter.com/bopanc/status/1605914839423098880

Although I do generally agree with Twitter's trusty OSINT / war loss counter - the problem isn't as severe and more easily solvable if we factor in total combined industrial output across all possible producers:

https://twitter.com/Rebel44CZ/status/1605951061872762880

I think the one hiccup is that at least until recently, NATO has been extremely slow to actually issue long-term munitions contracts. Hard to say why, but it's crystal clear at this point that the US & NATO are not treating the Ukraine war with nearly the same urgency they would as a conflict against their own. In some ways they do, but in other ways, like production capacity, they aren't. I would normally say, that's fine I guess, Ukraine isn't part of NATO, but everyone keeps saying they are in this until Ukraine wins, so if that is the case, why wouldn't they rush to secure long-term ammunition supplies as soon as possible??

[Virginiá]

One would assume that the odds that Russia will attack NATO countries directly because they are low on arms supplies are next to zero. So yes, it seems like a red herring.

Yeah, I feel like that goes without saying at this point. Russia is a hostile country on a warpath right now, but Putin isn't stupid nor suicidal. Attacking NATO would do nothing but drastically increase the speed and scale of Russian losses. They simply aren't capable of waging a successful war against NATO anymore and likely haven't been since at least the end of the Cold War.

Any weapons the US has squirreled away for a future war with Russia should be used now and re-stocked when able. To drain Russia's capacity for war now is to protect NATO and everyone else in the future.

[Virginiá]

The argument that Abrams tanks are (1) have a heavy logistical footprint, (2) require significant training in use maintenance, and (3) are too heavy for existing Ukrainian recovery vehicles and infrastructure, are not the worst arguments, to be honest.

Ukraine still has to send systems like the PzH 2000 SPG to repair facilities in Lithuania and soon, Slovakia, because they lack the widespread expertise to do it themselves, whether at field centers or capital depots, and this is definitely going to be a similar issue with the Abrams tanks if they were to get it. It's just not something you can drop into a battlefield and immediately learn to service & use it. I'm sure Ukrainian crews would quickly be able to use the tank, but eventually they will run into mechanical issues that require repairs, and Ukraine right now would struggle to even tow a tank like that away from the front line, let alone repair it without sending hundreds of miles away.

That being said, I still think the US should have at least started preemptively training Ukrainians on these tanks, but honestly, it doesn't seem like there is political will to Abram-ize Ukraine, and it still appears unlikely Ukraine will ever get those during this war.

[Virginiá]

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1608113994723622920

[Virginiá]

Aaaaandd to the repair facility weee gooo!

https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/1608199414967066624

[Virginiá]

The general history of Regiment is said that it began as a volunteer unit composed of many awful people, and was later integrated into the army and Ukraine made efforts to disperse those people and depoliticize. Ukraine is extremely dependent on support from foreign countries (and thus sensitive to bad PR), so there is merit to the idea that they would actively seek to remedy this.

The counter-argument, as far as I can tell, is that this group of <= 2,500 people, mired in full blown conventional warfare, and taking heavy losses in Mariupol, is still somehow composed of the same far-right nationalists that gave it the bad image they started with.

I mean, honestly, I have no idea which is true. I feel like the official Ukrainian explanation could be an effort to paper over that unsightly problem, but I doubt it is completely without merit. But for the people saying it's basically 100% Nazis and is scum, I mean, after all this war, I just doubt that not only those same people all survived, but if they didn't, they were replaced with equally bigoted soldiers. I'd prefer someone to actually back up this assertion with some facts.

I don't think anyone here actually knows what kind of soldiers staff that regiment right now, to be honest. So this argument is going nowhere.

[Virginiá]

Basically, aren't quite a lot of the "hardcore" Azovists either dead or otherwise out of action?

Considering those people date back to around 2014, and Ukraine has been in various states of regional conflict since, and then factoring into the large scale warfare since February 2022 and all that happened (including what we know about Azov/Mariupol), yeah, that is a fair assumption. Whoever was left has probably been marginalized considering the military has been absolutely inundated with draftees and volunteers.

I'll just clarify ahead of time that I don't think there are no extremists, I just think that due to the realities of large scale conventional warfare, whatever the Azov Regiment was, is no longer, and what remains has been massively diluted due to widespread mobilization in Ukraine.

[Virginiá]

Perhaps an unfair question, but given your relative expertise compared to most of the rest of us, or at least me, if Putin does play the  full mobilization and closes the borders to exiting fit males, what if any card should the allies play back? It would seem to me that Ukraine is going to need to repel a mass wave of hostile bodies (at some point in the next few months presumably with some semblance or training if not totally adequate equipment) and somehow better secure its skies from destructive ordinance falling down on it, making so  much of it within range inhospitable to human life. At this point, it seems as if Ukraine liberating real estate is just a precursor to its destruction. At some point that story line needs to hit the cutting room floor.

There aren't many cards left to play, and personally I do believe that is why we keep seeing negotiations come up more and more. Biden can send Bradleys, but honestly, how many can Ukraine expect? The US hasn't even sent 1,000 M113s (obsolete thinly armored APCs) and we have been dumping those where ever we can for years now. If this war escalates that far, Ukraine can probably kill a lot more Russians but it's going to accelerate their own equipment losses as well, and NATO is not prepared to match those losses at the scale they are happening. The US is the only country that can conceivably do that on demand, and we have our own readiness requirements and practical concerns that limit what we would send. For example, sure, we can scare up more Soviet-era tanks like the 90 (+30) they bought to refit for Ukraine, but those take time to refurbish - probably 6-7 months to complete that order, at least. ~2 years to get all 6 additional NASAMS batteries, aside from whatever the US can finagle out of the Middle East (possibly a couple systems or so). My point is that if Ukraine loses some of these things, they can't be quickly replaced, and that hurts Ukraine, because they don't have the industrial capacity that Russia has (even under sanctions).

I do believe the ammunition issue will start to ease as time goes on and more production comes online, but simply blowing out the enemy with artillery and long range strikes is not enough. You're supposed to follow that up with strategic maneuvers using armor and close air support. Ukraine is really lacking in both departments and the longer this goes on, the better Russia fortifies the front lines, the more people they draft, and the less weak spots Ukraine will be able to find on the front. In other words, the longer this goes on, the less and less likely we are to see another Kharkiv blitz where Russia loses territory en masse. This is becoming an industrial war of attrition, and Ukraine doesn't have much of a war industry. Not saying Russia is in a great position either, their position is pretty dire in the grand scheme of things tbh, but they are not nearly as dependent on massive foreign military aid like Ukraine is and seem to be willing to endure horrible losses and painful economic costs so far.

The only realistic cards we have left to play are long range strike systems, such as cruise missiles, ATACMS, etc.  And it's hard to see anyone giving Ukraine cruise missiles. ATACMS even seems truly off the table absent something like WMD usage. Maybe Abrams tanks if you believe the US is willing to invest significantly in building up the support and sustainment capacity Ukraine needs to field those tanks. So more heavy trailer trucks, more fuel trucks, more recovery vehicles, more fuel, more training, and all of it happening on a very accelerated time table. But as for increased weapons - Europe doesn't have a lot more to give now without gutting their own militaries, and the US, as said earlier, has other concerns. We could see hundreds and hundreds more MRAPs, Humvees, M113s, and other systems like the Bradleys, but there are limits starting to show here and Ukraine is going to have to get crafty and strategic in how it fights so they can avoid sinking into a long-winded war of attrition.

[Virginiá]

That is all very depressing. What are the prospects of better protecting Ukraine's civilian skies, so that what is otherwise a stalemate can be effected that does not terrorize and freeze and drive out the civiian population while Russia is reduced over time to an autarky headed to insolvency who sells some oil on the cheap to India and China (maybe India at least could be persuaded to stop buying it).

That seems to be what is in play here. Time is not on Russia's side when it comes to financing the war, so it tries to move things along by making living in Ukraine a living and dangerous hell.

WAPO has a headline today that is behind a paywall (that unlike the NYT I don't pay to surmount) that the Russian elites are very unhappy these days. Apparently autarky is just not their cup of tea.

I do think one of the best chances for Ukraine to have a total victory is the collapse of the Putin regime. It's not impossible, and it gets more plausible every wave of mobilization they do, which will continue to destabilize Russian society. The longer this grinds on, the more Russia's sanctions and general isolation saps support from the ruling class, and the more they will plot against him. We're already seeing alternate centers of power emerge, such as Prigozhin. War can and has caused governments to fall in the past, even if the state itself didn't face an existential threat because of it. Russia has been through this before. I can only hope we get so lucky again, for Ukraine's sake.

[Virginiá]

A key for Ukraine will also be retaking Svatove as Russian entire supply route for the their whole front and especially the north runs through the train system that runs out of Svatove. Retaking that area is going to f over Russia logistics even for the new mobilized troops

Not hard to see them recapturing all of Northern Luhansk in the first half of next year, tbh. After Svatove, the last major hub is Starobilsk, quite a ways in, after which, GLOCs and supplies must run south from Rostov Oblast in Russia. I do get worried thinking about the time and blood it will take, which depends on the quality of cannon fodder and the Russian industry's ability to equip them to die less quickly. I get nervous thinking about the southern campaign and Ukraine pushing past 2014-15 borders in Northern Donbas - for the reasons I ranted about above.

Easily part of a range of scenarios, and not at odds necessarily with a broader stalemate later on, either, but also a likely sign of further Russian collapses, should they happen. More large territory losses like that will further deteriorate morale and support among regime stakeholders.

[Virginiá]

I've been reading headlines along the lines of "Russia only has enough missiles for 3-4 mass strikes" for months now, and it's going up to as many as 8. Obviously if these predictions were accurate, Russia would have run out of strike options a while ago.

I think the general issue here is some combination of everyone under-counting Russian stocks of missiles, even if some are older and not widely in use anymore, and also the rate at which Russia can produce new missiles.

Granted we are also talking mostly about cruise missiles, which are relatively easy to take down with enough air defenses. Ballistic missiles are much more of a problem and why potential deals with Iran are such a major threat.

[Virginiá]

Really vibing with this article (not new)

Cut the Baloney Realism
Russia’s war on Ukraine need not end in negotiation.

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/11/russia-ukraine-negotations-mark-milley/672198/

There is a large dose of what one might call “baloney realism” in the judicious declarations by those—most of them tepid at best in their support of Ukraine’s cause to begin with—who say that all wars must end in negotiations. No, they do not have to. These self-styled foreign-policy adults evidently failed to notice that America’s protracted negotiations with the Taliban had nothing to do with the Biden administration’s ending of that war with a skedaddle rather than a deal.

Russia’s Afghan war ended the same way, although it executed its withdrawal more brutally and more skillfully than America’s. The 1991 Iraq War ended with a cease-fire negotiated (badly, on the American part) at gunpoint; the 2003 war in surrender. One need not reach for Winston Churchill’s refusal to negotiate with Adolf Hitler or Abraham Lincoln’s refusal to negotiate with Jefferson Davis to realize that not all wars end in a diplomatically arranged peace. Ukraine is fighting for its survival as a state and as a distinct people. In some sense, for that matter, this is a similarly existential conflict for the Putin regime, whose survival (though not Russia’s) requires victory.

The calls for negotiations, like the strategically inane revelations of our fears of escalation—inane because they practically invite the Russians to get inside our head and rattle us—are dangerous. It is the nature of a small, embattled ally to look over its shoulder at those who support it today but may lack the grit required to do so over a long period of time. These calls telegraph a lack of strategic patience and staying power that only encourages Russia. Moreover, an official, understated discussion of talks can take a particularly disingenuous form: The decision to negotiate is yours, but we won’t give you the weapons to go any further than you have gone.

More important is our goal, and our theory of victory. The West cannot intend merely to “help Ukraine defend itself”—a mushy phrase for a mushy idea. We must help Ukraine defeat Russian aggression and expel Russian forces from within Ukraine’s recognized international borders. How does this lead to success? Ukrainian tank armies will not roll into Moscow to dictate peace, of course. But throughout Russian history, defeat on the periphery—Crimea in the 1850s, the Russo-Japanese War in the early 20th century, and Afghanistan in the 1980s—has led to political change domestically. It is perfectly reasonable to see that as our objective.

The one part where I would have something to add is that I think the push to negotiate is not just because they feel that is what has to be done with Russia, but because Ukraine is so dependent on foreign aid to keep up their fight, that a negotiated settlement is just a reality that NATO powers are preparing for as there is at least some belief that the west just doesn't have the will to ramp up production and support in ways Ukraine will likely need if they can't win this war more quickly. Granted there are some of the opinion that Ukraine can't be allowed to win outright as that could force Russia to use nuclear weapons. I disagree here but it's still an opinion I've seen at numerous levels of discourse.

Overall I think the US needs to cut the bullsh**t and get more aggressive. There is no realistic nuclear threat against NATO, it's Ukraine's risk to take, and Russia lacks the conventional military capacity to take on NATO, so any decision-making based around this is born out of fear and this fear may prevent us from realizing a safer world with a weakened, neutered Russia. Defeat may even be exactly what Russia needs to undergo actual societal change for the better. Exactly what we shouldn't want is any situation that lets Russia bail out of this war with their leadership safely in control both at home and of large parts of currently occupied territory, all but vindicating at least some of the imperialists and their bottomless ambitions.

[Virginiá]

[...]

Unrelated to your point, I think SirWoodbury's post with the twitter illustration of Russian advance into Dorozhnyanka is extremely interesting.  I disagree with his conclusion that Ukraine currently holds this small settlement given that Ukraine merely had recon forces that were probing the Russian defenses in Polohy while Russia alway retained fire control from higher terrain.  In Polohy, Russia has dug some big trenches, built fortified positions, secured supply lines from the rail station in Tokmak (Ukraine just launched missiles at it today), and even created underground bunkers.  Both Russian and Ukrainian sources seem to believe that Russia will launch an offensive through the lower elevated areas of the Dneiper River Valley in Zaporizhzhia and Southern Donetsk in order to cut-off supplies to Ukrainian positions on the Eastern Front, particularly the positions of artillery shelling Donetsk City.  Place like Huliapole and Veylka Novasilka might be the jumping off points given their fortified positions along some important railroad tracks.  The area plays to the Russian military's advantage of aerial location of enemies and artillery strikes, because they will traversing mostly fields, farming communities, and small settlements.   

Just to be clear, while I think many collective West commentaries about Russia running out of A or B are just wishful thinking I also think Russia's narratives of Ukraine running out of munitions, trained officers, recruits etc etc are also wishful thinking.  There are no real material constraints on this war going on for a couple of more years.  The result of this war will be decided by relative political will on both sides and not either side running out of A or B.  The constraints are psychological and not material.

There's a difference between a side running out of materiel and munitions entirely, and simply having their position encircled and thus cut off from re-supply that is otherwise readily available.

Granted I find the idea of this hypothetical Zaporizhzhia offensive succeeding laughable, mostly because Russia had better options to encircle large Ukrainian front line positions months ago when their combat power was stronger, better supplied and more competent (albeit less numerous) and they completely blew it - notably in the Donbas region. Virtually every aspect of the Russian military is worse off right now, in some cases by far, except for maybe their raw numbers (due to mobilization). Strategic success on this level would require a level of success they haven't seen in nearly 6 months.

[Virginiá]

Thanks for regularly providing these round-ups. They are especially helpful for me when I have too little time to go through recent news about the conflict.

Yeah same. Part of the week I don't have time to keep up to date on just about anything except maybe skimming this thread for a few minutes.

[Virginiá]