Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

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Germany traded around 40 heavy trucks for Slovenia's 28 M-55S tanks (to be sent to Ukraine)

https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1571958523898241024

These are T-55 tanks that were heavily modernized 20+ years ago. It sounds useless but it has had a large amount of upgrades, such as reactive armor, new engine, new optics, firing control system, new comms, etc. It's actually reasonably capable, at least compared to some of the decrepit tanks Russia has been pulling out of storage.

Also, apparently NATO is open to sending modern tanks to Ukraine at some point:

https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1571949385080254465

Not something I would expect until next year, though, particularly with winter coming up. That would be an ideal time to train new soldiers on these systems.

In addition to these, Ukraine should be seeing deliveries of significant quantities of BMPs and other armored vehicles within the next month, given what has been announced recently.

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https://twitter.com/sotiridi/status/1572568782748680194

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An additional one million men in the army is going to have next to nothing for an officer class, and the ones they will have will be green and practically worthless. This is on top of what is essentially a brand new army with at best, bare minimum training, and in some cases, no training whatsoever. Also this doesn't really address the supply chain issue. Up to a few months ago, they were using CPU chips from washing machines and other appliances in new weapons, not to mention all the other parts they've been sourcing from the west. Some takedowns of weapons by Ukrainians showed drones and vehicles with hundreds of western parts. I don't doubt their ability to adjust over time, and even in the short term (using stockpiled or repurposed parts and parallel import schemes), but to mass produce weapons, vehicles and even basic field kit for a drastically enlarged army of this scale?

I honestly don't think mobilization will be totally useless for Russia - at least in theory - it could help them fill in many weak spots on the front line, in addition to logistical support and freeing up better trained soldiers for fighting, but the production side of this mobilization doesn't quite add up, at least so long as Russia's remaining major allies like China are unwilling to give them the support they need.

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Honestly it's a little irritating to read that western tanks are indeed "on the table" but for now Soviet tanks are the easiest to deploy quickly, when in fact very few western powers, if any aside from Poland, and to a limited degree Germany/Czech (via it's "ring" exchange program), are actually providing any main battle tanks whatsoever.

Poland provided ~230 tanks at the beginning, and it's speculated they will be sending the rest (another 230 - 300) of their T-72 variants over when the first 180 tanks from their massive South Korean arms deal arrives sometime in the next few months, but other than that and the 28 modernized T-55 tanks, where exactly are the rest coming from? There are no easy Soviet tanks to "quickly" deploy. All the countries that have them don't want to give them up without 1:1 replacements or similarly lucrative exchanges. In terms of vehicles, it's been months of lightly armored M113s, IMVs (infantry mobility vehicles - like Humvees, MRAPS, etc), and IFVs like the BMP, which are just not the same as a tank.

Russia's mobilization may indeed fall apart or at least fail to achieve their strategic goals, but it's going to cause a lot more death and destruction before any of that happens, and if the west is serious about providing Ukraine with more military aid, now is the time.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1573097026245500928

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How do you know Sir W that those tanks are still in existence as opposed to having been blown to kingdom come by a nice big accurate missile given to Ukraine as a most special present by NATO?

 

https://twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1573012679953981440

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Only the best for the Second Army of the World

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1573604558835785729

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Good reason why despite Ukraine capturing so many Russian tanks and other armored vehicles, it's not good enough in the long run as half the tanks the Russians are trying to field don't work, and the other half that supposedly do, many of them have a lot of broken components that inhibit their effectiveness. There's only so many repairs even the Ukrainians can do.

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1573561620151746562

This is a fairly common gripe from Rus telegram-world

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Of course deals like this indicate that NATO might now be running out of T-72s to send to Ukraine.

There isn't a shortage, it's just that all the countries that still have operational T-72s or similar all need them, or want substantial replacements (as far as 1:1 modern tank swaps). Slovakia themselves has ~30 T-72s they were open to sending to Ukraine but wanted 30 Leo 2 MBTs. Germany balked at that and the deal fell through. Poland has around 200+ T-72 variants they will probably send to Ukraine when they get their new South Korean K-2 tanks later this year.

There are a lot of T-72s around Europe in varying states of decay, it's just NATO countries don't seem to want them enough to trade or buy.

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Confirmation that at least some mine-laying rockets for HIMARS/M270 were sent to Ukraine

https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1573753676115726342

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If Svatove and Lyman fall, Russia could face another Kharkiv-esque collapse, although this time it would be more limited by Ukrainian logistics as there is no major river to impede them.

Reports indicate Russia is already pulling most troops out of Lyman to avoid encirclement.

https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1573823272176816130

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https://twitter.com/ukraine_map/status/1574085103877341185

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-receives-us-air-defence-system-2022-09-25/

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I don't even understand why Russia would want to send untrained civilians into battle. They are far more likely to be a liability than anything else, and a waste of resources. Even people assigned to administrative & logistical jobs need some basic training, particularly when they are regularly losing not-insignificant patches of territory to the AFU's frenzied thrusting into Russia's rear (occupied areas)

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Cautiously optimistic but need confirmation on this

https://twitter.com/MrKovalenko/status/1574200167959494657

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Great article about matériel losses in the Kharkiv offensive

https://kyivindependent.com/national/hundreds-of-russian-vehicles-weapon-systems-seized-during-kharkiv-counterattack

And for us nerds, a configurable data chart:

https://datastudio.google.com/reporting/dfbcec47-7b01-400e-ab21-de8eb98c8f3a/page/p_gqerfsjkyc?s=tWeosgYXPTU

According to combined daily lists by Oryx, from Sept. 1 to 23, Ukrainians captured over 100 tanks, close to 200 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, over 20 command & control vehicles, and dozens of artillery pieces. Close to 100 trucks and jeeps were also taken, along with some more specialized vehicles.

In addition, huge stockpiles of ammunition were taken. While there are no confirmed numbers for how much was acquired, Janovsky’s best guess is that Ukraine may have claimed “hundreds” of anti-tank weapons and “tens of thousands” of artillery rounds.

These are only visually proven loses, so actual losses are probably higher, and based on some tweets I saw today, are still rolling in.

Going by the chart, Russia lost (destroyed, captured or abandoned) a total of 1,037 pieces of equipment in the Kharkiv offensive, so weapon systems, vehicles, etc. Likewise, Ukraine lost a total of 100 pieces of equipment, including 26 tanks and 36 infantry fighting vehicles. So Ukraine came out massively ahead and captured enough operational (or soon to be operational) equipment to fuel a whole new offensive.

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Russians seem to be adjusting to HIMARS

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1574537071942717440

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Interesting stuff in Pentagon budget docs from early August

Lots of expenditures for replacement ammunition & weapons, but I'll post the tweets that hint at industrial expansion efforts and GMLRS usage

https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1574606905363898387

Even more interesting - the Pentagon spends:
• $10,000,000 to increase 155mm ammo production at the existing plant
• $200,000,000 for a new M795 metal parts plant
• $30,000,000 for a new M795 load, assemble and pack plant
• $265,850,000 for a new propelling charges plant
5/n

• $33,000,000 to increase M739A1 fuze production
• $7,000,000 to increase M82 primer production
• $8,000,000 for 155mm production line spare parts
• $30,000,000 for a dedicated XM1113 and XM1210 production line to speed up introduction of these new projectiles
6/n

Until 12 August the Pentagon ordered $139,599,000 of GMLRS rockets. According to these Pentagon papers M31A2 rockets cost $774,750 per pod of six... so we can assume (with a margin of error) that Ukraine received around 180 pods with 1,080 rockets in July.
9/n

And the Pentagon is also increasing M142 and GMLRS production:
• $77,000,000 to procure long lead items for GMLRS
• $44,000,000 to shorten GMLRS production times
• $71,500,000 to increase M142 HIMARS production

10/n

US both expanding current 155mm artillery munitions plant and building a new one.

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https://twitter.com/374News/status/1574755327882436609

Looks like it was raining heavily in Nova Kakhovka on referendum day

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Apparently Ukraine actually hasn't received NASAMS air defense systems yet, and the statements about it before were either mistranslated or mistaken. Not sure. Either way, should be delivered by the end of November. Traditionally batteries have 12 launchers but at least the first two systems Ukraine is getting will have 8, possibly to speed up the delivery.

https://twitter.com/ukraine_map/status/1574858316605493262

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“I’m greatly concerned. Unless we have new production, which takes months to ramp up, we’re not going to have the ability to supply the Ukrainians,” Des Roches told CNBC.

“We need to put our defense industrial base on a wartime footing,” Des Roches said. “And I don’t see any indication that we have.”

So why haven't they already started working on new production lines? The number of months (or longer) it would take wouldn't be as much of a concern if it was already started a few months ago. I know the US has made some efforts at least as of August, but not sure about the European defense industry.

It's been increasingly obvious that increased production capabilities were going to be needed for western systems, as EU countries are looking to not only replace the weapons they've donated but also increase their military power, and to also keep aid to Ukraine flowing, and a more ambiguous but probable increase in western weapon sales overall into the future as Russian systems lose credibility.

It's also worth noting here that depth of stockpiles, production capacity and logistics are going to be a bigger concern in future war plans, as many countries have seemingly adequate stocks of weapon systems, but apparently not nearly enough ammunition and other munitions to wage any kind of combat operations for longer than a few weeks. Again, it shouldn't be a question of whether to expand production capacity, but when and by how much.

And yeah, none of this is straightforward or easy to do, but it's still necessary.

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Surrender time in Lyman as Ukrainians broadcast message to encircled Russians

https://twitter.com/INTobservers/status/1576018980976095232

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For those of you who are not up to speed on the matter of tactical nukes, the essay below might be helpful. It seems that, aside the issue of more real estate being subject to a silent spring, they are not much different from the most thoroughly modern conventional bombs these days, which is why perhaps Europe abandoned them (it does not have much real estate to spare for silent springs), and the US just has a few odd ones left. But because Russia's conventional hardware of destruction tends to not be the best (shocking I know), it has a couple of thousand of these baby nukes on hand to try to make up for that. But given that what is in play is mother Russia itself, now that it just expressed its love for Putin by a margin of 95% or more, putting aside from what Putin's detractors might think, their use would be consigning to a silent spring considerable swaths of Russia itself.

So on balance I found the piece reassuring. That, along with the spat of articles in the last week about the US and UK having elaborate plans to eliminate Putin if he gets carried away.

So let the conventional slaughter continue, as the planet's quality of life declines, and we sink into a painful recession, with the value of assets everywhere slashed by a third or more. Putin may not get his way, but he's in everyone's life, up close and personal.

https://theconversation.com/what-are-tactical-nuclear-weapons-an-international-security-expert-explains-and-assesses-what-they-mean-for-the-war-in-ukraine-191167

It's must have been a couple of months ago now that I read a similar assessment that the damage from tactical nukes in Ukraine wouldn't be that much different from a huge conventional bomb and that the use of nukes on the Ukrainian battlefield would have more of a symbolic (or let's rather say "shock") value for Putin.

Yes, for instance a tactical nuke in the 8 - 10 kiloton range would be enough to significantly damage or destroy half of Lyman. The problem is that these units aren't all grouped together in a single city or area. They are spread out along the front. Tactical nuclear weapons in the military sense were developed to hit military bases, air fields, depots, and large formations / columns of mechanized units.

I can't think of many scenarios where a nuclear weapon would achieve a goal that they can't achieve with conventional weapons. Maybe a decapitation strike against Ukraine by targeting Kyiv with a strategic nuclear weapon? (so 300+ kt). The international blowback (and the increased support to Ukraine + possibly retaliatory strikes) from using a small tactical nuke doesn't seem worth the limited damage it would do to Ukraine's military forces.

The other thing is, if they are using tactical nukes to actually gain an advantage, they need the troops and vehicles to actually move into the area after the Ukrainians are wiped out, which Russia doesn't really have, else they wouldn't be losing territory in the first place. If they just want to scare Ukraine into halting their advance, that's not going to work at this point.

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Not sure what the overall goal of recent Kherson ops was but it seems like Ukraine might have tried a pincer move on the eastern front to encircle a large area of Russian forces, and the southeastern group broke through but the one at Davydiv Brid didn't and suffered losses. Not totally surprising though, the southern front has the largest concentration of actually-trained Russian forces and seems to be the most important to Putin himself. That front is unfortunately likely to exact a greater toll to liberate.

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Everyone, please check your images before or at least after you post to make sure they don't stretch the page out. I've had to manually reduce embedded images twice in the past few days. It just takes a few seconds to verify what you are posting won't mess things up. Preview the post, or view it after posting and edit if necessary.