🇩🇪 German elections (federal & EU level)

[Astatine]

Would a confidence and supply agreement with die Linke be more palatable than R2G? Or is that option completely unrealistic given Germany's fear of minority governments?

Any form of minority government is virtually excluded. Germans, German politicians even more, prefer coalition agreements with no "surprising" results in parliamentary votes.

[mgop]

it's gonna be portugal coalition (green-red-red), it's already happening in the states of berlin and bremen. germany will finally be free, and cdu will need decades to recover from merkel dictatorship, just like spd after shroder.

[urutzizu]

Third and final Triell was today. Here is a stream: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9-CA_BmhKA
Non-geoblocked, but without subtitles.

[President Johnson]

How would Green voters and members react if the Green Party ignored the SPD clearly winning the National popular vote and clearly having by far the most popular leader, and instead made a shady deal with the CDU and FDP. That led to a rightwing government led by Laschet?

Speaking on my behalf, I don't think Green members and voters care too much about Scholz as a person, but most would clearly prefer an SPD-led government over a Union-led one, based on ideological and issue-based common ground, which is certainly bigger, there.

So the concessions to make Jamaica palatable in this situation would have to be huge (and from an FDP standpoint maybe even bigger than with a traffic light coalition.

While I was - and still am - concerned about a Jamaica coalition, even with the SPD winning the most votes, my mind tells me it's not going to happen as long as the SPD comes in first. CDU/CSU at second place would most likely mean a result of 21-23%, which is a loss of over then points from 2017. Just remember the last election was already considered a debacle at time, like the CSU's 39% finish in Bavaria. If the screens on September 26 indeed show the black bar at minus eleven points, the Union will be thrown in total disarray and Laschet run out of town the very same night. And even Sonnenkönig Söder would have a hard time with the CSU at 30% or less in Bavaria (which is what polls show and would be consistent with national polls). Back in 2017, 39% helped to end Seehofer's reign as Minister-President. I'm not saying Söder will be gone as a result of such a disastrous result, but he'd be under heavy scrutiny as well (and he'll certainly try to scapegoat Laschet and Schäuble for the debacle, with the latter spending his final years in politics as a backbencher).

Coming in second after the SPD, let alone trailing by more than three points, would be a complete meltdown for CDU/CSU and they certainly wouldn't be able to claim any governing mandate, let alone the chancellorship. I'm still not fully convinced it's actually turning out this bad for them, but if the current polls are accurate, there's going to be a CDU/CSU meltdown of epic proportions. I'd certainly enjoy watching that.

[Geoffrey Howe]

If (and it is an if) the FDP can extract significant concessions on taxation and so forth in a traffic light coalition, wouldn't that demonstrate their worth to the base? From that perspective entering into coalition with the SPD rather than than the Union may be better for the FDP.

[Anzeigenhauptmeister]

https://twitter.com/Wahlen_DE/status/1439684518210899972

Scholz reacting to Laschet speaking:

https://twitter.com/PhilipLeButt/status/1439695413460848644

https://twitter.com/simondnhr/status/1439675827726213120

[palandio]

Wasn't the FDP historically seen as the "sister party" to the FPO in Austria? The FPO has always been the repository of ex-Nazis

Until the 1980s the FPÖ was an odd mixture of liberals, 'reformed' former Nazis, and assorted other small groupings of cranks. It basically functioned as an umbrella organisation that gave people not associated with the two big monopoly parties (as they were at the time) a small degree of access to the political system and the social benefits that were directly tied to it at the time. It polled about 5% of the vote in election after election. An attempt to turn it into a normal liberal party aligned with the SPÖ backfired catastrophically, resulting in Haider (who had been the leader of the party's youth wing) taking it over and turning into the far right monster that we know and do not love.

Also pre-1933 the FDP's and the FPÖ's predecessor parties were different.

The FDP's pre-1933 predecessors were the DDP (since 1930 DStP) and to some degree the DVP. The predecessors of these parties in the Kaiserreich were various "left-liberal" parties and the National Liberals. And while it would be a long discussion what liberalism (and "left-liberalism") meant then and what it means now, I think that we can recognize that all in all these parties had ideas that can be called liberal in the wider sense on many issues.

The FPÖ traces its roots to the "Third Camp" (the other two camps being Christian Socials/Austrofascists and Socialists/Austromarxists). The Third Camp in the Habsburg monarchy never managed to establish a unified party between liberals, conservatives and ultra-nationalists (including antisemites), peasants and bourgeois voters, but they all had their names begin with "Deutsch-" and nationalism and unification with Germany was a central pillar of all of their programs. (It's true that some of these parties stood in the tradition of the failed 1848/49 liberal/bourgeois revolution [which of course was also quite nationalist], but over time the liberal part lost importance.) After 1918 they lost most of their strongholds in the Sudetenland and consolidated into the Greater German People's Party (GDVP) and the Rural League which in some elections ran on joint lists. If you compare the GDVP's program and political actions to DDP and even DVP, the GDVP was a party of the nationalist (and often antisemitic) Right that even denounced liberalism.

[urutzizu]

Nobody else want to talk about the triell? Anyways, my take: Laschet a bit better than the last two, but not going to be enough to break through. Scholz as always, just what he needed to, and Baerbock with in my opinion a strong, combative performance, but attacking the person who isn't her threat.

Overall mostly a green-on-black fight, lots of agreement between Scholz and Baerbock. Baerbocks problem at this stage is that she is marginalized by Scholz, and her performance tonight won't help her with that. Additionally in terms of her speech she was (likely inadvertently) shifting in terms of her vocabulary to "Green government participation" as opposed to stressing that she wants to become Chancellor. Despite that, what I though was a strong perfromance. And I say this as someone who neither particularly likes her personally, nor plans to vote green, but this is the third debate in a row, where she can be the one who did her homework best, polls show people will find her "sympathetic etc., but Scholz will always come off as highest on "competent" and win the debate. Frankly, I find it a bit hard to deny that there is at least a tiny bit of sexism involved here.

Anyway, barring anything very unexpected in the final week, this should be it. Lindner and Habeck on Anne Will on the analysis right afterwards were strong, though not sure how many people watch that, and Lindner was getting a bit very overexcited about Hydrogen for my taste. Esken was uninspiring and Bouffier was completely off the rails.

And lots of foreign journos are mad because the biggest EU country has again nothing about foreign policy lol. Sorry guys but no time to talk about "the rise of China and the desperately necessary defense of our values or our continent in the 21st century", can you make do with speed limits on the autobahn?

[Astatine]

It feels like in every debate or town hall, viewers, pundits and even candidates all agree that there is not enough discussion about a long term strategy on foreign policy, and yet the debate/town hall hosts don't give a damn sh#t lol

[parochial boy]

The take that I have come across repeatedly is that the Merkel years were defined by "management" and reacting to events while very much lacking in any long term strategic thought or risk taking. Hence falling behind on all the things like energy transition and digitalisation that have defined the campaign, as well as not being ready to step in to the role as European leader. Then, as the Germans are "inherently" risk averse, want stability in these incertain times and Scholz is offering that.

Which is a roundabout way of saying that there is a grain of truth in every stereotype and why it's kind of funny and fitting that the debates and the campaign more widely have steered away from the big geopolitical games.

[Secretary of State Liberal Hack]

How would Green voters and members react if the Green Party ignored the SPD clearly winning the National popular vote and clearly having by far the most popular leader, and instead made a shady deal with the CDU and FDP. That led to a rightwing government led by Laschet?

The popular vote means literally nothing in a proportional system where you have 5 parties being represented.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

How would Green voters and members react if the Green Party ignored the SPD clearly winning the National popular vote and clearly having by far the most popular leader, and instead made a shady deal with the CDU and FDP. That led to a rightwing government led by Laschet?

The popular vote means literally nothing in a proportional system where you have 5 parties being represented.

I know that you want to say that it doesn't matter who comes out on top (which is also debatable, concerning standards and political traditions in Germany), but let me suggest a small correction:

The popular vote means literally everything in a proportional system.

[Astatine]

https://twitter.com/Wahlen_DE/status/1439944818185195527

The last-minute Laschet surge seems to be a thing.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

I would be careful about reading much into very small shifts in any direction until and unless it can be seen to be an established pattern.

[DL]

How would Green voters and members react if the Green Party ignored the SPD clearly winning the National popular vote and clearly having by far the most popular leader, and instead made a shady deal with the CDU and FDP. That led to a rightwing government led by Laschet?

The popular vote means literally nothing in a proportional system where you have 5 parties being represented.

I think its a bit of an exaggeration to say the winner of the popular vote means "nothing". As has been stated, the if the CDU came in second to the SPD it would very much be seen as the "loser" of the election and as having been rejected by the electorate and the optics of the Greens deciding to prop them up in a coalition would be very, very bad. In contrast, at this stage of the game if the polls were all wrong and the CDU emerged as the largest party even if by a teeny margin - it would be seen as somewhat of an upset and would put some wind in the sails for some form of a CDU led government.

For those who say the popular vote means NOTHING, I draw your attention to the 2005 when the CDU beat the SPD by an infinitesimal 3 seats... that tiny margin was enough to ensure that Angela Merkel would become chancellor in a grand coalition. Had the SPD remained the largest party Schroeder would have led that grand coalition and its quite possible that Merkel would never have become chancellor at all!

[Astatine]

How would Green voters and members react if the Green Party ignored the SPD clearly winning the National popular vote and clearly having by far the most popular leader, and instead made a shady deal with the CDU and FDP. That led to a rightwing government led by Laschet?

The popular vote means literally nothing in a proportional system where you have 5 parties being represented.

I think its a bit of an exaggeration to say the winner of the popular vote means "nothing". As has been stated, the if the CDU came in second to the SPD it would very much be seen as the "loser" of the election and as having been rejected by the electorate and the optics of the Greens deciding to prop them up in a coalition would be very, very bad. In contrast, at this stage of the game if the polls were all wrong and the CDU emerged as the largest party even if by a teeny margin - it would be seen as somewhat of an upset and would put some wind in the sails for some form of a CDU led government.

For those who say the popular vote means NOTHING, I draw your attention to the 2005 when the CDU beat the SPD by an infinitesimal 3 seats... that tiny margin was enough to ensure that Angela Merkel would become chancellor in a grand coalition. Had the SPD remained the largest party Schroeder would have led that grand coalition and its quite possible that Merkel would never have become chancellor at all!

Although it should be noted that in 2005, the popular vote only mattered because CDU/CSU and SPD formed a coalition and the largest partner gets the position of the Chancellor. Gerhard Schröder was very eager to have the FDP as third partner in a traffic light coalition, although the liberals had excluded that ahead of the election, and was perceived a winner when taking the expectations (massive SPD loss) into account.

Examples of popular governments in spite of the winner of the popular vote being in opposition after the election exist on federal (1969, 1976) and statewide level. In 2019 for instance, Bremen's SPD received the worst result in its history, the CDU became largest party for the first time there, while the Greens only made modest gains in spite of their nationwide breakthrough. The red-green government was voted out only to be replaced by a red-red-green coalition - Although afaik, no poll has been conducted yet on its approval.
In a more recent example, it's clear how a party can barely enter the state Parliament and yet take over the post of the Minister-President.

[President Johnson]

Just came back from Esslingen, near Stuttgart at a SPD rally. Olaf Scholz gave a great speech about several policy proposals, especially securing jobs and managing the transformation to a corbon neutral economy of the future. He even was humerous at times and certainly not the Scholzomat from a few years ago. At the end, we were able to take a couple of photos with him.

Weather was also fine (these shots are better than mine, lmao):

https://twitter.com/spdbawue/status/1439957068774100999

https://twitter.com/OHenning/status/1439961038661857281

[buritobr]

So, the concern related to a Jamaica coalition might be an incentive for a generic center-left vote to choose the SPD and not the Greens.

[Astatine]

Btw, here is an overview of some districts to look out for on election night:

61 - Potsdam
2017 margin: SPD +1.2
One of the few SPD pickups in 2017 and likely a hold for the party, as Chancellor candidate Olaf Scholz is running there, as well as Chancellor candidate Annalena Baerbock, who was seen as probable winner at some point in time. Besides, Linke MP Norbert Müller (who didn't get placed on the list) and CDU MP Saskia Ludwig (controversial right-winger, hopeless list spot) are running there too - During the CDU surge after the Green drop in early July, it seemed as if either of them could have a shot at winning the district due to a prospected heavy SPD/Greens split. It's almost certain that Scholz will win. Other candidates: Former FDP General Secretary and current FDP Brandenburg chairwoman Linda Teuteberg, who will make it into Parliament over the list.

100 - Rheinisch-Bergischer Kreis
2017 margin: CDU +15.5
Incumbent CDU MP Hermann-Josef Tebroke, a backbencher, is running for a second term, but he has a high-profile competitor in FDP leader Christian Lindner, who won 15.7 % four years ago, while Tebroke got 40.0 %. Lindner almost matched with the party's proportional vote, unusual for FDP candidates who usually underperform their party by a lot. Considering that the CDU is in free fall and Lindner has strong personal appeal, this district is the only one where the FDP has a shot to win (albeit chances are slim). A CDU/FDP split could benefit the Social Democrats' candidate Kastriot Krasniqi.

128 - Steinfurt III
2017 margin: CDU +14.4
Incumbent Minister of Education Anja Karliczek is running for re-election here, and her poor performance as Minister could result in a SPD pickup. The Social Democratic candidate is Jürgen Coße, who had been in the Bundestag before for one year. Koße, who challenged the incumbent 4 years ago already, and Karliczek both outperformed their party's proportional result in 2017, but we will see if her crossover appeal still remains after her tumultuous term as Minister for Education. If she loses, she might not make it over the list.

147 - Hochsauerlandkreis
2017 margin: CDU +21.1
This is the district of Friedrich Merz, who had hoped to become CDU leader in 2018 and 2021 and defeated incumbent CDU MP Patrick Sensberg in the pre-selection process. He didn't run for the list, so he needs to win this district directly to be represented in the next Bundestag. Although district 147 is a CDU stronghold, the party's federal downfall could open some chances for the local SPD candidate.

196 - Suhl/South Thuringia
2017 margin: CDU +10.8
The former CDU MP for this district resigned from his seat in March due to his involvement in the mask scandal, so the local party had to find a replacement. They nominated former Head of the Agency of Protection of the Constitution, Hans-Georg Maaßen, a staunch right-winger who has flirted with cooperation with the AfD, which won more than 22 % in 2017 in this district. That might help him, but on the other hand, the SPD nominated a strong candidate: Frank Ullrich, a former athlete who has his roots in this region and was famous in the DDR, while Maaßen is literally a carpetbagger. The Green candidate has indicated Green voters should vote for Ullrich, whose candidacy is likely to succeed thanks to both the nationwide SPD surge and his personal appeal.

201 - Kreuznach
2017 margin: CDU +5.5
This district was quite safe SPD territory for more than 50 years, until a young CDU hopeful called Julia Klöckner unseated an incumbent, winning by whooping 18.3 points in 2009. After she switched to statewide politics in RLP, the district became remarkably more competitive. Incumbent Antje Lezius is retiring, so Klöckner could run again. The former rising star has lost two state elections since, and is incredibly unpopular as Minister of Agriculture. It remains to be seen what's left of the popularity that once contributed to her winning this district by double digits. Klöckner could still make it over the list, if her state party doesn't win too many districts.

258 - Stuttgart I
2017 margin: CDU +2.3
CDU incumbent Stefan Kaufmann is all but certain to lose. Four years ago, he barely won against Cem Özdemir, then Green Party leader, who is challenging him again. Kaufmann is, afaik, the first CDU MP to come out as gay, but beyond that, he has a much lower profile than Özdemir who enjoys a lot of crossover support. Other candidates running include former Linke leader Bernd Riexinger, Dirk Spaniel, a controversial AfD MP, and FDP Environmental Policy spokeswoman Judith Skuldeny.  

296 - Saarbrücken
2017 margin: SPD +0.7
This district is classically red territory and has been represented by SPD MP Josephine Ortleb since 2017. The CDU won the district only twice in recent times due to a strong Linke, but the party has been on decline since, although they nominated a formidable union candidate. Ortleb has to face Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, incumbent Minister of Defense and former Minister-President, who might very well still win, although it is an uphill battle. Neither AKK nor Ortleb, #1 and #2 on their respective state party lists, are "safe" in the next Bundestag, as all depends on which party wins the other Saarland districts.

297 - Saarlouis
2017 margin: CDU +5.9
The battle of the outgoing ministers - Peter Altmaier (CDU) and Heiko Maas (SPD), Ministers of Economy and Foreign Affairs respectively, are running in the only district with a competition of government members. Unlikely either of them will be part of the next government, but still a competitive district. Maas himself hasn't been campaigning as much in recent days from what I've heard, which could benefit incumbent Altmaier. Additionally, an incumbent Linke state legislator is running, being a possible "spoiler" for Maas. What counts for AKK and Ortleb counts for Altmaier and Maas, who are #2 and #1 on the state party lists respectively, too.
Those are districts I know at least a bit about, I am really clueless about most in Bavaria for instance, so if some other German posters have any other "interesting" districts to add... I'd be excited for that

[Yeahsayyeah]

I think, the most fun to watch will be east German city-based districts, because with that many demographic and political trend moving parts they are very hard to predict

This would be

14 Rostock - Landkreis Rostock II (CDU +4,7 over Linke, +11,6 over SPD): CDU-incumbent and the Left's Dietmar Bartsch running again. Merkel gone in her home state, good SPD result in the parallel state election incoming.

61 Postdam - Potsdam-Mittelmark II - Teltow-Fläming II (They really should find another idea for naming electoral districts in Brandenburg with their sectoral Landkreise. Already covered as the clash of the chancellor candidates. As the things lay now, carpetbegging Olaf will win.

69 Magdeburg (The city of Magdeburg and some surrounding muncipalities, CDU +5,7 over SPD). The 2017 SPD candidate had a good chunk of personal votes, which the CDU incumbent  had not. But the SPD is going with a new candidate. Good pick-up opportunity, though

72 Halle (The city of Halle and some surrounding muncipalities, CDU +5,8 over SPD, +6,8 over Linke, + 9,8 over AfD). Similar story linke Magdeburg, but the SPD candidate Karamba Diaby who has been a well-known civil-society activist in Halle for years and seems to be quite popular is standing again against the CDU-incumbent.

152 Leipzig I (the northern parts of the city, a mix of bourgeois older-city areas, gentifying and still more working class pre-WK I areas, housing estates from the interwar and GDR periods and northern suburbs that were incorporated to the city around the year 2000.  CDU +7 over AfD, +8 over Linke, +11 over SPD.
The CDU is fielding the quite popular ex-athlete turned politician Jens Lehmann (the olympic gold medal cyclist, not the football/soccer player). He is probably still favored to win, as this district includes many of the strongest pro-CDU-areas of the city, but how the different demographic-political trends will affect this quite diverse district, that the SPD also won 3 times, will be interesting.

153 Leipzig II (the centre, western and southern parts of the city, more affluent, hipster, gentrified and gentrifying, younger population, all this. Connewitz as one epicenter of left wing activism and radicalism in Saxony over more bourgeois parts, but also the biggest of the GDR housing estates, Grünau, that once was built to house 100,000 people, which is now basically 40,000. Linke +0,7 over CDU, +10,3 over AfD, +11,6 over SPD, +15,4 over Greens.
In the 2017 campaign the CDU tried to do a red-scare campaign against the most left parts of the districts (which seems to be the main raison d'etre for the city party, well this and being against bicycle infrastructure...) that did not go over too well with the more left parts of the district's population and in this climate of poralisation the Left's Sören Pellmann unseated the CDU-incumbent. On the other hand, in the 2019 Landtag election, the Greens won 2 of the 4 districts that mostly cover this area and came close in a third, and dominated the parts of the fourth that are included in this district, so they could still have a shot. Federal trends could also propel the SPD to victory. If the leftish vote is cancelling each other out, CDU or in a freak accident AfD could happen with maybe even under 20 per cent.

I'll do Dresden and Erfurt later.

[palandio]

Yes, many Eastern races will be fun to watch, with up to five candidates having a realistic chance in certain districts in Leipzig and Dresden.

Regarding Bavaria, one interesting race will be
217 München-Nord
Incumbent: Bernhard Loos (CSU) since 2017, +6.4 over SPD in 2017, +19.3 over Greens.
The SPD candidate is MP Florian Post, a close ally of former party chairman Sigmar Gabriel, who lost his spot on the state list and has been at odds with most of his party on several occasions.
München-Nord was the only remaining SPD district in Bavaria in 2002 and 2005 and can therefore be considered a relative SPD stronghold. If the SPD manages to win seats in Bavaria then it is likely that München-Nord will be one of them and that Post, who was safe to lose his seat, will remain an MP.
Socio-geographically the district can be divided into an outer part (roughly speaking everything north of Scheidplatz) and an inner part (south of Scheidplatz). The outer part is socially mixed and contains some of the poorest areas of Munich, (still this is Munich we are speaking about). The inner part is very densely populated and was the first quarter of Munich that has seen extensive gentrification since the 1960s. There is fertile SPD territory in the outer part, but (unusual for Munich) also in some wealthy areas of the inner part.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

Don't forget

81 - Berlin Tempelhof Schöneberg (CDU +6.9 over SPD)
Held by CDU-Moderate Jan-Marco Luczak, he is challenged by the young SPD-rebel Kevin Kühnert and the Green senior politician Renate Künast. In 2017, SPD and Greens were separated by 3.1%. This seat may easily flip, but it is a tight race between Kühnert and Künast so far.

204 - Trier (CDU +3.8 over SPD)
This is the district with the historic city of Trier (which is the birthplace of Karl Marx!) and its surroundings. The region around Trier is rural and catholic and therefore probably more conservative than Trier proper, which has seen a considerable leftward shift in the last few elections. Surprisingly, the seat went for the SPD during the Schröder-years, and Katarina Barley, who was the family minister then, came very close to winning this seat in 2017 against freshmen Andreas Steier, who is a backbencher without a very clear profile. The SPD chose a young start-up entrepreneur called Verena Hubertz - I thought that she was a not-so-good pick considering she hasn't lived in the region for years, but she seems to be a very good campaigner. This is probably the easiest pickup opportunity in Rheinland-Pfalz for the SPD. Note that the Landkreis of Trier-Saarburg also has a mayoral election. The incumbent, Günter Scharz (CDU) had to face accusations by Rezo of being too close with the coal lobby, and his challenger from the SPD is the father of a very nice girl who I went to school with.

205 - Mainz (CDU +7.7 over SPD)
The capital of Rheinland-Pfalz has seen a massive green surge lately, but what's good for the SPD and CDU is that the incumbent green MP doesn't seem to be massively popular. Daniel Baldy, the SPD-candidate, has a hill to climb, but given the shifts in the proportional vote, it's not impossible that this district flips.

Also, the SPD has nominated two PoC in the two districts of Frankfurt am Main: Armand Zorn, who was born in Senegal, and Kaweh Mansoori, the son of Iranian immigrants. Both have a good shot of flipping their districts, which are held by the CDU.

[Grand Wizard Lizard of the Klan]

Do we have any data on how many people already have voted (via postal voting)?

[Astatine]

Do we have any data on how many people already have voted (via postal voting)?

Leipzig (Saxony) is quite transparent about their postal voting statistics. The city has en eligible population of about 460,000 and by now, 138,000 (30 %) postal ballots were issued, 95,000 (21 %) have been returned. In 2017, the city had a total turnout of 75 % (of which 25 % voted by mail). In Düsseldorf (NRW), 41 % of the eligible population has applied for mail-in ballots.

I think in the end we'll see a slight drop in turnout to ~70-75 % (2017: 76.2 %), although I doubt the record low of 70.8 % (2009) will be broken. Postal voting will probably account for more than 40 % of all ballots.

[H. Ross Peron]

Are there any large pool of voters who might vote SPD/Green in their local constituency race but for the Union in the list election or vice versa? Given how left wing Kuhnert is, I wonder if that could happen in his seat.