Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[Oryxslayer]

https://twitter.com/JimmySecUK/status/1504157074372108300?s=20&t=Zf2RGNOBURt...

Also, I am not the 'Oryx' who is nicely posting military updates on twitter btw.

[Oryxslayer]

https://twitter.com/BeijingPalmer/status/1504551175747784704?s=20&t=xZU0kT80...

More China stuff. Apparently the line from the censors is to avoid content that is clearly pro or anti Ukraine/Russia and just present the situation. Which matches what Bejing seems to be signaling: neutrality with the aim of exploiting the eventual outcome to its fullest.  

[Oryxslayer]

Because this current war has many similarities to the Winter War of 1939-40, I decided to read more about it. This description of the Soviet diplomatic and media/propaganda campaign in the lead up to the war could easily be describing Russia's actions this year:

"It demonstrated the classic example of modern political-military aggression: the initial "reasonable" demands for bases and border rectifications, the doubtful border incidents, the whipping up of war fever among the people through the press and radio, the proclamation of the aggressive intent of the potential victim, all rising to a well-timed crescendo on the day of the surprise attack."

Hmmm...this seems familiar:

"After such a build-up the average Russian civilian or soldier could have little doubt that the Russian-Finnish conflict would be merely a 'local' war, and that within three days, or at most a week, Finland would be brought to her knees.  

On this note of anticipated success the Russian press concluded its campaign to bestir the Soviet people and prepare them for a war with Finland. They had presented a good excuse for securing control of Finland (to protect Leningrad) and had predicted that any war, given the disparity in
population and strength, would be very short. Unfortunately, they neglected to convince the Finns of these facts. That omission would create great difficulties later on."

I would also suggest reading on the Crimean War - less the battles and tactics involved but more the political, strategic, and long-term aspects of the conflict. There is a lot of similarities in these fields, and one can say that what NATO is doing right now is analogous to the UK/France sending expeditionary forces when one accounts for the changes in warfare, travel times, and the ways or options available for countries earn other countries favor. Orlando Figes has a good book and a separate Audiobook covering this subject, but the audiobook was 20+ hrs long so prepare for long reads.

[Oryxslayer]

https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1506256136504184834?s=20&t=AMO2rwqUf1U2J...

Needs to be confirmed by a more unbiased source, but that fantasied pocket everyone was talking about yesterday may have actually somehow occurred.

How the hell do you spend 22 years and trillions of dollars 'modernising' your military only for this to happen?

I would not want to be a Russian senior officer right now.

Answer: Corruption, both local and higher up. No doubt the bosses are cooking the books, but then you also have examples of common soldiers taking sh**t and reselling in. There was an image back at the start of march of a several-years long multi-sale ebay listing for Russian MREs from a St. Petersburg server.

[Oryxslayer]

https://twitter.com/JenniferJJacobs/status/1506604722744172546?s=20&t=mXtgyu...

All is not sound at the top of the pyramid.

[Oryxslayer]

Seems like Lukashenko has more sense then Putin.

https://twitter.com/MrKovalenko/status/1506466784815288327

 Whoever expected that Lukashenko would play the role, albeit even tentatively and borderline, as an FF in this conflict?

Dictatorial regime's look out for themselves first, above all else. He's calculated that after what happened last year, and what is happening to the supply lines through his country, perhaps getting involved for no gain would be to the regime's determent. I'm sure if the situation were reversed and little green men were advancing west of Kyiv then the scales would be balanced differently, but we as observers have no idea how those scales look.

[Oryxslayer]

https://twitter.com/DrGJackBrown/status/1508202800043286528?s=20&t=1WrlOiWvG...

Spotted this, though obviously take it with a grain of salt.

[Oryxslayer]

The valuable thing about formally ceding Crimea and part of the Donbass is that it allows Putin to spin this as a victory--"look at what we did"--despite Russia actually handling the war quite poorly. Being able to talk about this as a win for Russia makes peace a lot more plausible.

Hence the phrase "pyrrhic victory".

I have long thought that this war would end with the resolution of the internationally unanswered frozen conflicts of 2014 - initially in favor of Moscow but since the first 24 hours something more mutually acceptable. Putin needs something he can spin as a win and its underdiscussed but Ukraine needs to resolve its territorial issues to have a serious chance at EU membership - which is the real goal, not NATO.

Therefore, we seem to be transitioning to a phase where success in the Donbass clearly gives one side or another leverage in negotiating for that area. Moscow certainly sees that, which is why their more nebulous total integration goals have been abandoned in the face of failure.

[Oryxslayer]

https://twitter.com/MrKovalenko/status/1509280407006724101

That feeling when you try a 21st century Ardennes maneuver but instead you end up in a quagmire with a 21st century medical condition.

[Oryxslayer]

In Russian sovereign default news:


https://mobile.twitter.com/A_Melikishvili/status/1509556290196021249

The Default question is now an interesting one since the pictures from the liberated regions probably tip EU public opinion towards a gas cutoff/embargo, rather than any roundabout compromises, which will see the Ruble plummet - probably below where it was at the start of the war.

[Oryxslayer]

https://twitter.com/TadeuszGiczan/status/1510908227202002947?s=20&t=WSrXNAVt...

This thread includes an english translation of the article and it's F'ing points. All that's really missing for the historical record are claims that Ukraine should be opened up as Living Space for Russians and Russian enterprise.

[Oryxslayer]

You know, everyone thinks that the League of Nations was useless and inefficient, but at least the LN managed to expel Soviet Union from its membership when the Soviets attacked Finland...

And they also of course expelled the Fascist states when they invaded their neighbors. Many however consider this, or more appropriately the existence of powerful nations (also US) outside the League, to be a weakness. It sapped that body of any legitimacy and power if countries were outside of, and not observing, it and therefore beyond it's jurisdiction and influence.

[Oryxslayer]

What is Macron thinking? The Serbs were closer to Bosniaks than the Russians are to Ukrainians, but that didn't stop them from doing the genocide at Srebrenica.

https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1514174397577367555

Translation (maybe): "I'm running for president right now."

For two weeks Macron has to try and appeal to Melenchon voters, and it's clear on a few fronts he lacks ideas besides being a halfhearted copycat that fools nobody.

[Oryxslayer]

https://twitter.com/Mij_Europe/status/1520020783967444993?s=20&t=tL97X5veoI5...

If true, Putin has speedran the megalomaniac dictatorial descent into self-destruction.

[Oryxslayer]

https://twitter.com/Liveuamap/status/1520285786880491522?s=20&t=6MabQfzz-V2z...

Insanely far from the warzone so... Agents? Quiet civilian sabotage? Lack of necessary replacement parts? Or random incompetency?

[Oryxslayer]

Well, I was operating on the assumption that nukes were off the table. Militaries have to plan for all sorts of scenarios and countries have to be able to have some means of defense besides nuclear weapons (such as air and anti-air defense of urban centers, etc). Russia's leadership is right to think that Ukraine in NATO is a significant blow to its power. I think the leadership of the West broadly thinks likewise.

Furthermore, Russia has a strong chance of eventually not being in the position to prevent Ukrainian NATO membership. The realist case for Russia is to prevent this, but conversely, it means we should strongly consider getting Ukraine in it, on those same grounds.

The geopolitical map of Europe is changing as we speak.

Russia sees NATO in former/current regions making up the Commonwealth of Independent States as a blow to its power because it removes war and violence as an option for them to exert influence over otherwise unwilling countries. This isn't about a fear of an invasion of Russia, it's literally the other way around. Russia has spent the past 100+ years seeking to maintain or build an empire for itself. Even in their greatly reduced state now, they are still invading other countries for influence and power.

Nuclear weapons changed everything about warfare. If this were the early 20th century and you said the same thing, you'd have a really good point because yes, they would absolutely have to shore up their borders, and "buffer states" would indeed be useful to protect against an invading force. But we're in the 21st century and Russia is a nuclear state with so many active nuclear weapons that they could completely obliterate an invading army and their entire home country before they ever finish crossing the border. Everyone knows this. That's why no one is itching to invade Russia. It sounds very simplistic but the reality is, it is that simple. The only countries who truly need to worry about this are non-nuclear countries, or countries with such few nuclear weapons or limited delivery capabilities that they could be taken off the table with a single quick strike.

This is correct. But Ukraine still poses a serious danger to modern Russia, just in the exact opposite way that Phil is looking at it. It is a danger not of realpolitik and buffer zones, but a danger of information and culture, things Russia has/is exploited/ing elsewhere and knows just how dangerous they can be in the internet age.

A significant component of the Russian leadership and their population never accepted Ukraine as a thing. Ukrainian and Belarussian to them are just dialects of the Russian language, with what we now call Russian once distinguished as it's own "Great Russian" dialect of the whole. The separation of the three is a crime of nationalism.

So Ukraine going it's own way, towards liberal Democracy and the EU, makes these people scared. It shows that despite Russia having few Democratic traditions, a "Russian" people can achieve democracy and civil liberties. It shows that the great debate which began with Peter the Great was a lie. Russia does not need to achieve its own greatness and success by looking to both the east and west and finding what worked for her, success was also possible within the arms of the western system. Which means much of Russia's past self-inflected sufferings, scars like 19th century serfdom which is believed to have been so entrenched that it was always going to last so late and be so hard to dismantle, could have been avoided by following in the footsteps of other continental powers. It shows the Russian people that they do not need strongman to survive.

For these ideologues, who view Ukraine in this way, every day it succeeds is a threat to their power. It cannot be allowed to succeed, it must be made to look eastwards, or be at war with its own people, or its success is a lie and is so corrupted by western life that Russia can roll over her. Every day Ukraine continues to successfully resist scares these people's ideology, for it continues to prove their whole worldview wrong. This is why we see those on Russian TV who say Russia has already accomplished her "goals" in the Donbass and along the coast, and should now negotiate, are constantly shouted down. Because those with this nationalistic worldview see such a deal as a Ukrainian victory - the liberal regime still stands now stronger than ever.

The initial goal was regime change, forcing Ukraine to look east, and crushing the liberal outpost. This for the nationalistic leadership is still and can be the the only end goal for them, which is why peace can only come with a full exodus of Russian troops and an abandonment of war goals, full Ukrainian collapse, or the Moscow regime making a blunder that endangers stability on the homefront. In many ways, it is becoming a repeat of the Russo-Japanese war: a struggle prompted by an ideology which was quickly shattered, but can only be ended by civilian inability to tolerate increasing failure and hardship.

[Oryxslayer]

https://twitter.com/TpyxaNews/status/1521113120042885121?s=20&t=Y7xe2vwYfG7O...

Once again, one has to wonder if sabotage, incompetence, or a lack of replacement parts taking their toll on those industries ordered to produce as fast as possible.

[Oryxslayer]

Is it more or less near certain Russia is going to further escalate their presence on May 9th?

The theory right now is that Russia will announce general mobilization during their military holiday. One should wonder less about its immediate military effects, since it will take time to get the untrained into uniform and to the front, and more what type of effect it will have on the homefront. Putin has so far avoided such a declaration for a reason.

[Oryxslayer]

You are changing the parameters of your initial question here.

My assessment that is a "dumb" position to take was in direct reference to your statement that "what Russia is doing is wrong and that Ukraine's allies have the right to support their efforts, but to oppose US membership in NATO".

This is of course a contradictory or at least self-defeating position to take because a unified NATO that includes the United States is the best way to counter Russia and help Ukraine.

Are you suggesting it's a dumb position for Ukraine's sake, Europe's sake, or from America's sake? My point here is what is good for Europe isn't necessarily good for America. Hence it may be "dumb" from Europe's POV to not support America's membership in NATO, but is it dumb *from America's POV* to not support America's membership in NATO?

This is a very simplistic view that falls apart upon examination of precedent.

NATO, and most alliances around the world today, are defensive alliances. They by treaty and definition matter very little in peacetime. If a European country wants to go off adventuring, such as France in the Sahara, they are not going to get the rest of two continents on their side automatically - ditto in reverse for the US. It only matters if attacked.

A defensive alliance is effectively a old-school version of a nuclear deterrent - albeit of course this one comes with nukes. It is there to deter aggressor from attacking nations. The stronger and wider the defensive alliance, the less likely the aggressor is to attack. Peace through strength. If someone is outside the pact, but aligned with it like we are seeing in Ukraine, then the pact still finds itself required by public opinion and pressure to commit significant and extraordinary resources. You are spending more than the minimum necessary. But contrast, if Ukraine was hypothetically (unlikely) inside NATO before 2022, Russia would never have attacked. The US would never have needed to spend billions on Ukraine.

This truth has been recognized most by the realist thinkers weirdly since Ukraine attacked. If we assume NATO expansion post 1990 would anger Russia, then the rational move from those inside would have been to not expand. But the east new their history and forced NATO's hands to let them in. Once you started letting countries in, you accepted therefore that you were angering the Russia intelligentsia. The correct play from this point then would have been to expand even more aggressively. If NATO would have expanded to it's fullest extent, accepting the fact that Russia would hate them, then Russia would have no room to operate and peace would continue. This halfway-house we ended up in seemingly guaranteed aggression from Russia against the nonmembers, at least from the realist perspective.

Essentially, if you are a isolationist America-Firster, you should support NATO and NATO expansion from a position of an insurance policy. You don't dump your insurance just cause your house has never burned or you have never crashed a car. Cause the possibility is always there. So it is better for the US long-term to expand NATO, ensure peace among her friends, and spend/commit comparatively minimal resources annually. The alternative is dumping the insurance, and risking there being a conflict, like we see in the Ukraine now, where the US has to commit more resources than it would in the annual sums on not just defense exports, but also the eventual rebuilding.

[Oryxslayer]

If a  free and fair election were held in Crimea, what percentage of the mostly Russian residents (that is my recollection, as what this old addled brain recalls reading), would vote to be a part of Ukraine rather than Russia, assuming the violence were otherwise over because Russia was expelled from the balance of Ukraine due to getting its butt kicked? Would it matter as to whether or not Putin were still in power?

Anyone have any erudite thoughts?

When Ukraine voted for Independence, Crimea only voted 54-46 for independence. If said hypothetical referendum were held under the auspices of Russia or Ukriane, there would no doubt be peer pressure to vote one way. If it was truly without influence, one expects Russia would win that poll given the people they have encouraged to migrate in, as well as 8 years of economic ties which would be disrupted if voting the other way.

Unfortunately, such a poll is unlikely to happen. If we get to the point where Ukraine is driving down the peninsula, there will probably be expulsions of all the Russians who have moved into territory recognized to be Ukrainian - if they didn't flee first. Given the history of the region, this probably sweeps up many who always lived in Crimea, but now identify with Russia and run afoul of the returning government.

[Oryxslayer]

https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1530077202670407682?s=20&t=1W6mms...

Good thread, with the conclusion being the term 'incremental' est applies to what successes are occurring thanks to concentration of attention.

https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1530077226594705408?s=20&t=1W6mms...

[Oryxslayer]

https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1530828710953336834?s=20&t=1p0t1L...

Interesting thread. Essentially the conditions of the Russian breakthrough earlier in the month are such that a modern army should have been able to mount at least small encirclements and spearheads. But we have instead seen consistent favoring of slow and heavy artillery - and the tactics that benefit from their use - rather than a mobile encirclement and advance, leading to a stalled breakthrough. Now, there appears to be a reason for said situation.

https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1530828721522987008?s=20&t=1p0t1L...

https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1530828725822136320?s=20&t=1p0t1L...

https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1530828729219436544?s=20&t=1p0t1L...

[Oryxslayer]

https://mobile.twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1564341780769824768

If Ukraine liberates Kherson, they should move into Melitopol and the Zaporizhzhia Oblast afterwards. Russia wants to illegally annex these regions, so they should be the first to be liberated.

https://twitter.com/mhmck/status/1559923712174051328

I mean the dream that many Military analysts are suggesting right now is that Ukrainian forces move fast and try to trap the Kherson forces between the Dnieper and their hammer, and in doing so try to use geography and destruction of infrastructure to create a pocket. Even if the men can get out severing the bridges would mean that all equipment would need to be abandoned. This is the type of speedy action that could start a panic spiral and mass route if performed effectively, but we won't know what will happen for a while if secrecy  is maintained.

[Oryxslayer]

Very informative read from a Ukrainian journalist who lived in Kherson City until a week or so back when he left about his involvement in underground resistance movement and the GUR.

https://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/events/hersonskiy-zhurnalist-kostyantin-rizhenko-pro-okupaciyu-hersona-interv-yu-nv-novini-ukrajini-50267149.html

"Completely plundered city" [if/when recaptured] is a fairly bleak outlook (some things can be hidden or protected/are practically immovable), but I think there's a real risk of something worse. If Ukraine tries to take it by force, a lot of buildings will be destroyed; if they try to besiege it and Russia leaves because its position becomes unsustainable, they will first prioritise the supply of military materiel for their troops over the supply of food for the local civilians. There might be a threat of mass starvation in the interim.

This is war - urban war. I gives me no joy to say this but the size of the modern city and it's utter dependence upon importing foodstuffs means that when any conflict endangers urban life chaos reigns and civilians become expendable hostages. if the defenders dig in, it becomes a horrific street-to-street maze of skirmishes where numbers and advantages mean very little. We have seen this horror before in Libya, Syria, and Mariupol. It is the accounted-for cost of modern warfare and one of the many reasons why continued NATO and US strength worldwide beneficially keeps many people alive.

Most memoirs or histories of any advanced war within the last 200 years feature something like this tragedy. The video game "This War of Mine" explicitly tries to convey it to people who will hopefully never experience it.

[Oryxslayer]

Between Kharkiv and Kherson; Ukraine has set itself up nice to deal Russia devastating defeats

If there really are two major offensives going on at once - and the alleged* scale of what is being reported would suggest there is - then Ukraine is making an even bigger gamble by not concentrating as much in one offensive as they could (the commentariat insisted the logic of the Kherson offensive was that they could concentrate forces more easily there than Russia). They shouldn't want to fall into slower, positional warfare where they can avoid it, or any towns they gain will end up like those conquered by Russia in the Donbas: taken too slowly to avoid being levelled beforehand, and too slowly to avoid the defenders setting up new defensive lines behind them.

The rasputitsa will slow or possibly halt offensive actions during October, as it hindered the Russian push last spring.

*Not enough reliable information information is present now, but this could become clear in a month or so.

I think the current Ukraine strategy of attacking on several fronts are risky but does give it path toward victory.  I am going to define Ukraine victory as end of conflict without ceding territory. Just letting the Russians slowly chip away at Donbass with massive artillery creates a de facto situation of Russian annexation of Donbass which will not be victory.  Taking advantage of Ukraine manpower advantage while most Russia attention are in Donbass to try to chip away at Russian holdings elsewhere so Russia takes its eye off the ball in Donbass is one route, risky one to be fair, to victory where as status quo does not lead to victory.  Fortune favor the bold.  We will see if it works out for Ukraine.

I have seen a few experts begin to theorize that this was exactly the plan. Lure large numbers of quality troops west of the Dnieper from other comparatively quiet fronts. There they will be 'trapped' in a pocket formed by the river and long-range artillery, and gradually worn down through excess attrition from armillary and limited river crossings. Meanwhile, offenses commence on the weakened fronts previously relived of excess defenders, all while Kherson remains hot and unable to be abandoned.