What is God?

[Tetro Kornbluth]

Ah, the Joys of Metaphysics.

Basically my point is that it is a subjective judgement to perceive the Rock as a "rock" and not a thing positioned in time and space or as not a 'stone' or whatever. So here enters perception, of course x=x but that depends on how we define 'x' the subject. The Rock is not a stone for instance. So yes I do believe that the definition of the word is completly culturally contigent and that the word refers to a preconceived idea of reality, not reality-in-itself. In that sense, logic needs cultural and linguistic assumptions to work*. We can not conceive of anything logically, or at least express them, except through the medium of language. The Rock is not a stone, after all.

* I would hold that logic is a human invention and back to our original topic, thus flawed especially finding out about what we might call the transcendental. The argument that God can not exist because it 'refutes logic' assumes that logic is both an accurate description of reality and can be applied to the whole of totality (all that exists). Neither of which are very logical (or rather, empirical - given that most people now believe the two things to be same) assumptions. Reason is a limited tool, many of our experiences can not be reasoned with, usually we just invent or hear 'an explanation' and accept it is fact, the content of the explanation dependent on what we believe to be true or sounds true. But I'm rambling again...

[Alcon]

* I would hold that logic is a human invention and back to our original topic, thus flawed especially finding out about what we might call the transcendental. The argument that God can not exist because it 'refutes logic' assumes that logic is both an accurate description of reality and can be applied to the whole of totality (all that exists). Neither of which are very logical (or rather, empirical - given that most people now believe the two things to be same) assumptions. Reason is a limited tool, many of our experiences can not be reasoned with, usually we just invent or hear 'an explanation' and accept it is fact, the content of the explanation dependent on what we believe to be true or sounds true. But I'm rambling again...

Ignoring confirmation bias for a moment... 

On what basis do you assume that tenants of logic, such as reflexive identity, are culturalized human constructs instead of articulated observations?  Do you maintain that it is impossible to make even basic observations (about, say, mathematical operations) without being influenced by culture in a way that modifies the result of that operation?

Because, if so, I do not agree.

[Tetro Kornbluth]

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Yes, that is my position, more or less. Or rather the reason for this is that we don't have a symbol system, language or mathematics (which is of course different, and deserves a different topic) which is a description of reality-as-it-is or reality independent of ourselves, rather humans attach meanings to reality as the basis of language. All our intellectual operations are done in a linguistic form, thus the nature of that form effects the outcome of the results. Is the rock really not a stone? What is the difference?

Also we can't empirically prove whether one system of logic is more referent to reality than another especially if we are discussing nominalism v realism, men v man, 'rock' v that rock and so on. (well, that depends actually on what you define as 'logic', a tricky word to define. I'm mainly thinking here of Levi-Strauss and his idea that the 'primitive thought' or prescientific thought was itself a form of logic and that 'alternative' medicine, magic systems, etc are all logical when made in reference to their cultural (ie. non-empirical) assumptions about the nature of reality. Some cultures hold that sun revolves around the earth, some - most today thankfully, hold the opposite. So clearly then some cultural systems are more accurate representations if the Levi-Strauss thesis is correct).

[Alcon]

But I'm not talking about something as culturally-defined as "rock" or "stone."  I am talking about taking a defined property (not an abstraction like "good" or "bad") accepted as axiomatic by both parties and testing for consistency. Moreover, I'm just advocating the assumption of correctness, not the objectivity.

And I can't think of any alternative systems pertaining to this specific instance, other than "screw this, I'll believe what I want!"  I don't know of any cultures that actually maintain that something can be simultaneously true and untrue?  Against what burden of proof would one be theoretically climbing?

P.S. Your article on Problems of Universals actually distinguishes particular and abstract objects in a way that seems relevant to what I'm arguing, nein?

Edit: Admittedly I just read the first few paragraphs...gotta bus to catch, but I didn't think this post would derail my chance to read/respond to it later.

[Tetro Kornbluth]

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If it is accepted by both parties then it is to some extent a cultural item. You agree that we define the world around ourselves? After all if the two people disagree on whether it is a rock or a stone... then can we say anything axiomatic about it?

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Of course no culture holds things to be both true and untrue (at least none I know of). That's because 'culture' as a concept is to a certain extent an interpretation of reality. I believe here you are confusing Is-Ought or bringing in moral ideals into an area which doesn't have any. I am, from my point of view, describing language as I see it.. only if we have a particularly defined concept of reality (which apparently I am going against) could we say that I am making a "moral point". Perhaps a linguistic system should refer to reality as a whole, but it obviously does not. It's not a rock, or a stone, it is a zwigwag (a word I just made up).

Admittely this bit might not be completely well thought out: I'm a bit tired right now. But I really enjoy this discussion.

[Alcon]

If it is accepted by both parties then it is to some extent a cultural item. You agree that we define the world around ourselves? After all if the two people disagree on whether it is a rock or a stone... then can we say anything axiomatic about it?

My argument is that there is a marked difference between an artificial concept ("rock" and "stone") and an operation of logic ("something is itself.")

There are theoretically cultures that could be grown to not directly observe the results of reality, yes.  I will concede that my argument does not hold up if you assume something other than observed reality is real, and likelier than observed reality.  But how are those Theoretical Cultures relevant to my argument?

Of course no culture holds things to be both true and untrue (at least none I know of). That's because 'culture' as a concept is to a certain extent an interpretation of reality. I believe here you are confusing Is-Ought or bringing in moral ideals into an area which doesn't have any. I am, from my point of view, describing language as I see it.. only if we have a particularly defined concept of reality (which apparently I am going against) could we say that I am making a "moral point". Perhaps a linguistic system should refer to reality as a whole, but it obviously does not. It's not a rock, or a stone, it is a zwigwag (a word I just made up).

Admittely this bit might not be completely well thought out: I'm a bit tired right now. But I really enjoy this discussion.

I do too, but how you've managed to turn a description of the reflexive property into a moral ideal is something I don't understand

How have I brought up morality here, in any way, shape or form?

(I don't mean to sound rude or anything here -- I'm enjoying this even more than I am being confused by it.)

[Tetro Kornbluth]

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Yes I recognize that but
1) We can't empirically disemble our concepts and the things-in-themselves, our concepts of things is always our concept of things. If our rock/stone had conciousness, say, and a mind with an ability to logic and form language, would it come to the same conclusions as ourselves? I would not think so. "If a lion could speak, we could not understand him" (Wittgenstein).
2) The Desire to logically order things is not logical in-itself, at its basic level logic is about ordering reality in a sensible way and so that we can describe reality 'better' than with our naive intutions. There is nothing logical or empirical about that ordering (what Al said; with a caveat - what sort of the person is an intellectual who organizes things?).
3) Also that ordering is based around language to a certain extent* and to our intutions and reactions to the outside world, especially when we think of language as something having value or meaning-by-itself. This is something intellectuals do more so than your average person. There is quite alot on this that can be elaborated. (In short, it is a fallacy to believe that words have any sort of 'truth value' themselves. The word "believe" is a good example of that actually, If you want me to elaborate on that I will, but will take time.)

* (Actually there are 'universals' that human mind constructs or at least so it seems, though the evidence is so far a bit patchy, examples would be colour, time, space, etc... everyone knows or so it seems** about blue or black or days or sky or night or day or etc. But I don't wish to get into a debate about the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. This is somewhat irrelevant, after all, all human have some shared experiences, so they should have some shared languages)

** (Except possibly one Amazonian peoples)

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That presumes that our understanding of reality isn't cultural. But it is. As I mentioned before that great tool of logic, Occam's Razor, was invented by a 14th Century Theologian, a period when God's existence as an overarching 'reality' in the world was taken for granted (and not from observation mind). I remember reading one historian who claimed that even among the very rare nonconformists of the middle ages, the amount of nonbelievers was a tiny, tiny proportion. And whether they actually didn't believe or not is up to question. Now, do we consider God's omnipresence to be the most likely explanation to reality or not. (Going slightly back on-topic).

Also we think of reality in concepts relative to humanity, like day-night, man-woman, edible-not edible, etc. While these concepts have a strict existence, there are days, there are women, they are also ways of organized our direct experience - could you imagine your life if you didn't understand the day-night or man-woman dicthomony? Yet it is describing reality a) cyclically, that is not as things 'are' at a particular time (it is bright) but as knowledge of what things will be or are in reference to a concept (it is day, it will be night) and b) with labels attached to people, who at least in modern society, would probably prefer to think - at least intellectually - of themselves as individuals, as things-in-themselves, rather than as a gendered concept (which says nothing about whether there are any innate differences between the sexes). All that I hold is just one way of looking at reality, which suits us homo sapiens fine, but perhaps not things (remember my concious rock). Also It is probable that these understandings are innate to human understanding (we are not pure blank slates after all) but that is irrelevant to the argument actually it strengthens it because then we can't 'unlearn' it, our logic revolves around us.

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Because of this comment:

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Which seemed to suggest that you were accusing me of uber-relativism (and stated a moral implication for that relativism). What ethics has to do with the philosophy of language I'm not too sure.

[Alcon]

That's a lot of post, and there are stretches where I do not follow your logic at all.  I mean, I understand it all, but it seems like digressions, so I must not understand what you're actually saying.  For instance, I think I've clearly never said that words have truth value themselves, but that's like the third time you've rebutted that argument.  Am I missing something?

I also feel like you're continuously using arguments that pertain to, say, "woman" as a cultural construct.  Your argument is that "woman" has no truth value because it is a cultural construct.  I agree and never have implied that I don't.  My argument is that there are certain properties (such as, I don't know, "breasts" -- not the word, but perhaps the shape or feel) that aren't exactly (outside of description) subject to cultural bias.  That is, the existence of the thing with the properties described by "breasts" is, word issues aside, not subject to cultural pretense.

I understand that there is an off-chance that, despite every culture in the universe believing this, that they all feature the same reality-distorting bias.  There is also a chance that I am schizophrenic or in the Matrix.  I am not talking in objective absolutes; not being omniscient, I have no use for them.  I understand that "burden of proof" is structurally a concept of my own culture.  But assuming the underlying elements are apparent "universal observances" the will -- for practical purposes -- be the mode in which I operate.  And, going back and assuming our science is valid for a minute (because to make your argument you do too!), I don't think that is remotely unreasonable.

Either way, instead of continuing to relate this all to "property of 'rock'," something that I'm not actually arguing for, why not relate it to the reflexive property?

I wasn't accusing you of uber-relativism.  Even if I were, that's not a moral issue per se.  I'm accusing you of denying the usefulness of empiricism using an argument advanced from it.  Your argument resents on the same premise of the argument against which you are using it.  (Unless you're accusing it of being self-defeating or something, an entirely different tract of logic?)

[Tetro Kornbluth]

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No that is probably me, it is just how my mind works. (I like my tangents)

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No, I don't necessarily hold that the concept "woman" is a cultural construct. I think it is an innate human construct, for obvious reasons (reproduction, sexual attraction, etc). I think here you are assuming that I am arguing that if something ain't 'real' as an object then it must be a cultural construct. No, I am not, rather we associate certain feelings, perceptions or things with a certain quality that the abstraction has (so breasts in this), which we then categorize the person as a woman. This categorization obviously pre-exists the person herself (she can't choose her sex) and doesn't and can not and should not the person-in-herself, it is a label other people give to her (which isn't of course saying it isn't a biological fact aswell, but that is a different isse). And furthermore these categorizations are purely natural or subconcious phenomena. That is to say that our natural cognition presupposes reality alot. I'm not really talking nature vs. Culture here.

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Oh I assume that natural science is closer as a description to actual reality as any other system we have I don't doubt that. I am saying that at root there is alot of non-science and non-empirical logic operating in the sciences and this effects the results. This does not necessarily mean 'bad', but it may help explain some of the things we can't explain.

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I'm not denying the usefulness of otherwise of empiricism, I'm trying to show its limitations, I'm showing that human assumptions - that is human nature, assuming it exists, and reflections about the nature of reality effect the results of empiricism/natural science because it uses unempirical concepts, which are experiential, such as night/day, man/woman and supposes that the quality things these have to us, as we experience them, is what they are. For example my concious rock probably can't tell the difference or isn't interested in the difference between night and day because it doesn't effect his experiental reality, of being a "rock". Instead using night and day, we structure time cyclically based on empirical data that night falls after day, but that is a way of structuring time around experience - which is related to the experience of being human, especially in societies which require a deal of self-sufficiency (unlike our own). "night" and "day" have no empirical basis outside of our own experience (this isn't 'bad', but presupposes that 'our' reality of experience is universal...)

Btw, this is somewhat off my original argument which started this whole thing, which I'm now struggling to recall what it was.

[Alcon]

That's the problem I'm having too, to be honest

I understand your argument.  I agree with it.  I don't put as much emphasis on it, obviously, not being a sociologist, but I think it's entirely true--

But I was talking about tautologies originally.  I took your original comment to be a rejection of assuming that certain logical operations are "true," because they are instead just cultural manifestations (or whatev.)  Not speaking of something like "rock," but something like...I don't know, "fire-sky makes see circles pained" (or the phenomena entailed therein).  Now I don't really think you were arguing against assuming that those empirical observations are accurate, and even judging other empirical observations like that.  I just think you were arguing for sensitivity about how concrete we take general descriptions (my "bright blinding light" may be another's "white pain.")

Like, I think we've successfully boiled down our "disagreement" to the inevitable differing-focus non-disagreement.  Now I don't understand what your original argument was, since I think you understood mine but still seemed to be disagreeing.  I hate to just drop a good discussion because of that   It would be so unfulfilling!

[Tetro Kornbluth]

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FANTASTIC! I WINORZ!!!111

Actually no that I realize it and have thought about it I think you are right here, my essential problem is with "the rock is a rock" type sentences is there abstract unrealness to it, or rather it is only possible to state with language. It is a not statement I recognize as reality, a rock is always in a particular place, at a particular time, etc. Such tautologies are only possible through linguistic expression (by human beings) so....

Also I want to be an Anthropologist, not a sociologist. Subtle difference.

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Ah okay, you are speaking of platonic truths about the nature of objects and the world, or science as we call it. I have no problem with that in itself, I was just trying to show that its basis is not purely empirical or logical.

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Yes, this is a question I've always been interested in actually. How do whether my 'sadness' or 'joy' is the same thing as another's 'sadness' or 'joy'. I can't (so emotions, at least until behavior science finally conquers the human brain, are nonempirical beasts...) the words are concepts I give to my own feelings, but that may differ for another person.

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I think so; In saying that I don't see any harm in seeing life in more than just one way. Actually through the eyes of many is the most useful.

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ALCON I HATE YOU!!!!1111111