Two theories that refuse to die

[A18]

Time for a rerun.

I of course vote option 2.

[Beet]

The next election will be a realignment, Philip. Just like every election since 1948. Just you wait.

[A18]

My problem is not so much that there hasn't "been one" in a while; it's that the very concept is essentially incoherent. And of course, even the supposed paradigmatic examples of 1860, 1896, and 1932 are basically random.

[Beet]

The concept is not incoherent. A realignment in theory happens when there is a critical election in which the most salient issues at stake are changed from the past such that the parties' coalitions are formed along lines determined by the new issue, and the new issue brings a turnover in the majority party where one party takes a majority in all three branches of government and generally keeps it for about 10 years.

See the discussion on page 25 of "The Great Divide" by Geoffrey Layman, my old professor.

[A18]

The point of a critical election, is that a new political regime is supposed to be locked into place for a good many years. In your words, there is "a turnover in the majority party where one party takes a majority in all three branches of government and generally keeps it for about 10 years." Yet the heart of the realignments genre, is the notion that the election itself is critical; not that it is the beginning of a new "era," as determined retrospectively. And of course, whether a new governing coalition proves successful in subsequent elections, depends on subsequent actions and events.

That is what I had in mind in labeling the concept "essentially incoherent." The other criteria are simply too vague to be useful.

[Beet]

The point of a critical election, is that a new political regime is supposed to be locked into place for a good many years. In your words, there is "a turnover in the majority party where one party takes a majority in all three branches of government and generally keeps it for about 10 years." Yet the heart of the realignments genre, is the notion that the election itself is critical; not that it is the beginning of a new "era," as determined retrospectively. And of course, whether a new governing coalition proves successful in subsequent elections, depends on subsequent actions and events.

That is what I had in mind in labeling the concept "essentially incoherent." The other criteria are simply too vague to be useful.

I guess the realignment theorists would reply that the reason they call the election critical is that they are using the election to measure or prove that a new issue or set of issues became salient enough to form new voting coalitions. Otherwise, how would they prove it, and if a new coalition exists only in public opinion but never expresses itself at the ballot, why would anyone care? On the second issue I would completely agree. The realignment theorists tend to base their theory on empirical evidence where they try to show that only a few elections (1860, 1896, 1932) were realignments and these elections were in fact followed by long periods of one-party rule. But you could easily argue that other elections (1912, 1964, 1976, etc.) fit the critical election bill yet did not produce lasting realignments.

[Associate Justice PiT]

     I voted re-alignment theory because as Beet has shown, there's actually an argument for it, while astrology is just random hocus-pocus.

[○∙◄☻¥tπ[╪AV┼cVê└]

My problem is not so much that there hasn't "been one" in a while; it's that the very concept is essentially incoherent. And of course, even the supposed paradigmatic examples of 1860, 1896, and 1932 are basically random.

1788 (actually 1789), 1824, 1860, 1896, 1932, 1968, and uhhhhh 2004. They happen every 36 years.

Actually that's just coincidence. I did cherry pick a bit.

[J. J.]

I would not call 1968 and 2004 reaignments, though I think we are heading for one, hence my saying to whomever wins, "After you, the deluge."

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

I would not call 1968 and 2004 reaignments, though I think we are heading for one, hence my saying to whomever wins, "After you, the deluge."

I disagree about 1968. It did set many trends that have continued such as the Democrats loss of the the South and even considering 76,92,96 none produced the huge Dem margins that previously had occured. Also the dominance of the GOP over the White House since then compared to the Democrats dominance since 1932. However this did not prove clear help to either party for the Congress remained Dominated by Democrats with the exception of the Senate from 1980-1986. Even the Republican Revolution, which lasted for 12 years, half of it was under a Democrat. The congress was split from 2000-2002. That meant that there were only three short periods of one party control. 1976-1980, 1992-1994, and 2002-2006. Compared to the complete dominance of the Dems from 1932-1946,1948-1952, 1960-1968, and the complete domiance of the Republicans from 1896-1910, 1920-1932.   

The problem is 2004, even if it produced Karl Rove's permenent GOP majority it would not be considered a realignment election, more like a reaffirmation of a prexisting party control with a stronger Majority like 55% or 56% instead of 50.1%.  2004 was just a continuence of the status quo. So I am apt to agree there will be a realignment in the future and the closeness of this election tells me it isn't this one.

[A18]

I guess the realignment theorists would reply that the reason they call the election critical is that they are using the election to measure or prove that a new issue or set of issues became salient enough to form new voting coalitions.

The problem is that the reconfiguration is also supposed to be enduring; otherwise, the election is merely a "deviating election." And whether new voting patterns last, depends on future actions and events. It's simply unintelligible to speak of one election's outcome as "measur[ing] or prov[ing] that a new issue or set of issues became salient enough" to result in a long-term disruption of the political order.

Realignment theory, in short, is an implicit attack on the concept of contingency. And it verges on superstitious.

[Associate Justice PiT]

I guess the realignment theorists would reply that the reason they call the election critical is that they are using the election to measure or prove that a new issue or set of issues became salient enough to form new voting coalitions.

The problem is that the reconfiguration is also supposed to be enduring; otherwise, the election is merely a "deviating election." And whether new voting patterns last, depends on future actions and events. It's simply unintelligible to speak of one election's outcome as "measur[ing] or prov[ing] that a new issue or set of issues became salient enough" to result in a long-term disruption of the political order.

Realignment theory, in short, is an implicit attack on the concept of contingency. And it verges on superstitious.

     I would agree. Unless something major (as in a war) happens between elections, all changes occur gradually. 1932 was affected by the Great Depression, which caused significant changes to happen more quickly than they would have otherwise.

     The point ultimately is that unless something big happens, all change occurs slowly. Just look at the polarization from 1876-1908 for an example.

[Beet]

I guess the realignment theorists would reply that the reason they call the election critical is that they are using the election to measure or prove that a new issue or set of issues became salient enough to form new voting coalitions.

The problem is that the reconfiguration is also supposed to be enduring; otherwise, the election is merely a "deviating election." And whether new voting patterns last, depends on future actions and events. It's simply unintelligible to speak of one election's outcome as "measur[ing] or prov[ing] that a new issue or set of issues became salient enough" to result in a long-term disruption of the political order.

Realignment theory, in short, is an implicit attack on the concept of contingency. And it verges on superstitious.

Agreed, that the enduring part of the reconfiguration being tied to a critical election-- that is, the mechanism that guarantees a critical election is 'critical' rather than merely deviating, is poorly defined. You would have to assume that new majorities are generally competent at handling the problems they are confronted with (which are the problems that created the electoral realignment) and that their success leads to continued success at the ballot box.

[pbrower2a]

The most recent re-alignment election for the Presidency was in 1992.  After three Republican landslides, that election established a skeleton upon which all five subsequent elections could be structured. From 1964 until 1976  California, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Illinois typically went for the Republican candidate in all but blowouts for the Democrats; at the same time Texas went for the Democrat except in Republican landslides. After 1992 such was reversed.

The difference between Barak Obama and Bill Clinton was that Obama had little chance of picking up some southern states. Clinton's appeal as a southern moderate populist could play better in the North than Obama's liberalism could play in most of the South (Florida and North Carolina have never been core areas of the South, and Virginia -- which never voted for Clinton, anyway -- seems to have drifted away from the political South.  Thus if who wins an election depends upon regional ties of politicians over a time, then there is not much of a realignment. There were eight different candidates for President and eight different candidates for Vice-President.  There was war and there was peace, and the economy had its ups and downs. So what really changed in politics?


Three of those elections have been Democratic wins, and two were Republican wins.  Two were close, three weren't.

The maps below depict no particular election, but instead a composite of FIVE Presidential elections, and cannot itself predict any election from 2012 onward. Dark shades of blue indicate those states (except NE-02, which voted for Obama in 2008) that always voted for the Republican candidate; dark shades of red indicate those states (and the District of Columbia) that always voted for the Democratic candidate:

That is 242 electoral votes for the Democrats, and 93 electoral votes for the Republicans. Add those together, and that skeleton determined 345 electoral votes that never switched. All electoral action in effect was over the other 193 electoral votes. 

Some States and NE-02 voted four out of five times for one party: 

   

   

Or three (three times in a pale red or pale blue):

Note that the three states in pink (Colorado, Nevada and Ohio) voted for the winner in all five elections.

It is tempting to say that a state that votes four out of the last five elections for the Republican Party will have a much higher likelihood of voting for the Republican nominee in 2012. That clearly does not hold true for Arizona or Virginia in 2012. Demographic shifts are real, and they can shift a state from Republican-leaning to Democratic-leaning, or vice-versa. Both seem more likely to go for Obama in 2012 than either Florida, Missouri, or North Carolina, all of which went 'only' three times for the Republican nominee.

Even so it is a bit crude. Some of the states that Bill Clinton won in 1992 and 1996 were double-digit (or near-double-digit) losses for Obama. Obama won North Carolina (barely) and came close to winning Missouri, so those states don't count in this category. Obama is unlikely to pick off any of these States except in an electoral blowout in which he is likely also to pick off states that have never voted for the Democratic nominee for President since 1976 (like Mississippi, North Dakota, South Dakota, South Carolina, or Texas). I can color them green (and neutralize the shade) to show that a Democrat can win those Southern states only if a moderate populist like Carter or Clinton (but not Al Gore, who became too much of a liberal by 2000). I will make some modifications for visibility: I am going to lighten the redness of the three states that voted for Democratic nominees to plain red while coloring Colorado, Nevada, and Ohio, the true bellwether states of 1992-2008, yellow:

I will make some modifications for visibility: I am going to lighten the redness of the three states that voted for Democratic nominees to plain red while coloring Colorado, Nevada, and Ohio, the true bellwether states of 1992-2008, yellow. 

So in essence, in order of ease  for Democrats to win them:

deep red: the hard core of the Democratic block, difficult to dislodge except by an extremely-strong Republican candidate (Ronald Reagan) or a Favorite Son in a specific state.

248 electoral votes. 

red: states that the Republican nominee can pick off if very effective; Dubya picked off one of them in 2000 (NH) and two in 2004 (IA, NM). Wisconsin came close to one of the Dubya pick-offs in 2004, but it doesn't count here. I need some rules. 

16 electoral votes.

yellow: The three states that voted for the winner every time (CO, NV, OH). Clinton and Obama got them each time; Gore would have won had he picked off any one of them;  Kerry would have won had he won Ohio. A Republican nominee who picks off all three of these States, essentially middle-of-the road states throughout the period 1992-2008, almost certainly wins. 

34 electoral votes. (Yellow, 34 electoral votes).

lime green: Possible wins for a Democrat, but only a populist and moderate Southerner (Carter, Clinton). Obama got clobbered in these states that Clinton won at least once. D@mnyankees have always had political difficulties in those states, whether Democrats or Republicans, since Strom Thurmond turned against Harry Truman in 1948. Obama will NOT win these states except in an electoral blowout.  (AR, GA, KY, LA, 

53 electoral votes.

pale blue or medium blue (really, there's no pale blue available in the color selection, so I'll have to compromise with teal): These states voted Democratic twice and Republican three times. Democrats can win without Florida, North Carolina, and Missouri; Republican nominees can't win without them. They are prone to wins by third-party candidates on occasion.

53 electoral votes.

blue -- states and NE-02 (Greater Omaha) that voted for the Republican nominees four of five times. These will be battleground states in 2012; Virginia is by far the likeliest win for Obama, who barely won Indiana and is likely to lose it in 2012 except in an electoral blowout. Arizona was a near-double-digit loss for Obama -- but only because the Republican nominee was from Arizona. Montana was close in 2008.

If there was any political realignment in American presidential politics, it was one state: Virginia.  Indiana is very iffy.

38 electoral votes.

deep blue -- the hard core of states (NE-02 excluded)  that have not voted for a Democratic nominee for President since at least 1976. In 1976, Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina last voted for the Democratic candidate for President (Jimmy Carter). Except in the Dakotas and NE-01, Obama was absolutely crushed in this block of states. In this area, only the Dakotas and NE-01 look like possible pickups for Obama.

93 electoral votes.

Any realignment? No.