The Jordanian, Palestinian and the Jordanian-Palestinian identities

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The Jordanian, Palestinian and the Jordanian-Palestinian identities

Joseph Nevo
University of Haifa

Jordan's somewhat artificial creation as a political entity (in 1921) and her meandering territorial and demographic history ever since, have given rise to a unique phenomenon: Instead of a gradual development of one coherent country-wide national identity, several collective identities evolved, sometimes succeeding each other, sometimes existing simultaneously. [1]

The foundation of the Emirate of Transjordan was designed to solve Britain's political and strategic problems as well as to satisfy Abdallah ibn Hussein's personal ambitions. i.e. Transjordan was not created to meet national aspirations of a given community in a common territory. The artificially-drawn boundaries outlined a new 'state' which had not previously constituted a definite political entity. These boundaries were imposed on different, absolutely unrelated, population groups: from the relatively sedentary and 'well developed north, to the basically nomadic south. The various areas were, moreover, known for their extreme local patriotism, giving rise to constant bickering amongst them. As an outsider Abdallah had not only to win legitimacy of the indigenous population for his imposed rule, but also to gain their support for the idea of their being inhabitants of the new entity.

The mere establishment of a central administration and the demarcation of border-lines precipitated the emergence of a sense of Transjordan distinctiveness which, hitherto, never existed. In the course of the years, Amir Abdallah managed to turn the disadvantage of being a foreigner into an asset. As an outsider he owned no commitment to any specific region or to any specific community and, on the face of it at least, had no reason to prefer a certain group or a certain sector. At the end of the day he was accepted by all sections of the population, either out of persuasion, of political expediency or of lack of choice. It is also worth noting that all Prime Ministers of Jordan throughout the first 30 years of her existence as a political entity, were non natives (but Syrians, Palestinians and Hijazis). This had probably much to do with the absence of suitable local candidates and with Abdallah's quest for personal loyalty. Yet he also preferred foreign Prime Ministers in order to avoid opposition and criticism likely to be stirred by sectors who might feel discriminated in case of a local nominee that came from a rival district. It took a whole generation to develop a Jordanian identity that would match the regional local patriotism.

The Jordanian army (popularly known as 'The Arab Legion'), also served as a unifying instrument and a source of identification, being one of the scarce (if not the only) nation-wide Jordanian institutions, whose units absorbed all segments of population.

The Army's most important national role was the integration of the Bedouin into the crystallizing Jordanian society. Since the incorporation of the Bedouin in the army (as of the early 1930s) tied them to a wage-economy, they became economically depended on the state. More and more Bedouin developed a sense of belonging, were introduced into the establishment and became an important pillar of support for the regime, quite the opposite from the position usually taken by their counterparts in most other Arab countries. A Jordanian soldier of a nomadic origin once confided: "I never knew Jordan existed before I joined the army'. [2]

Local leaders (prominent tribal chiefs, heads of the Circassian community, notables of traditional elite families, members of the emerging middle class and urban Intelligentsia), gradually became amenable to adopting the label of Jordanians when they realized the advantages for themselves if people's sense of identification with their immediate locale could be converted into national patriotism. Yet, even though the arrival of Abdallah had contributed to its emergence, the nascent Jordanian identity was not self-evidently pro-Hashemite. Some of those leaders criticized Abdallah's role within the British designs, as well as his preference for foreigners in his governments. They also viewed with disfavour Abdallah's expansionist ambitions, suspecting that he regarded their own land as a mere springboard for the take-over of other territories, namely: Greater Syria. Nevertheless, both Abdallah's opponents and proponents within this group perceived Transjordan as a distinct political entity, the homeland of the Jordanian people. [3]

When the British Mandate came to an end in 1946 and Transjordan turned into an independent Kingdom, the Jordanian identity was adopted by most of her population. It was based on the common territory (which was separated from the neighbouring countries by modern borders), the central administration and the army. Elements of Arabic and Islamic identities were also interwoven. For not a few, it also contained the loyalty to King Abdallah and to the Hashemite Dynasty.

During the 1948 war Abdallah succeeded to materialize at least some of his territorial ambitions. His army took over parts of Arab Palestine (the West Bank) which were practically annexed and later formally incorporated into his Kingdom that henceforward was titled The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. While this added to the Kingdom less than 7 per cent of territory it tripled the population. About half of the newcomers were refugees. The official policy encouraged the complete integration of the Palestinians in the Kingdom and gave them the option of full civil and political rights. At the same time the regime insisted on maintaining the hegemony of the Jordanians over the Palestinians. However, if in numbers the population of the West Bank was double that of the East, qualitatively it was many times its superior. Hence, there was no way of preserving the dominance of the East Bank if a genuine integration was allowed. King Abdallah therefore adopted a policy (that King Hussein has followed) of 'controlled integration' that deliberately discriminated against the collective Palestinian body in the West Bank (but not against the Palestinians as individuals) in order to prevent them from taking advantage of their majority and challenge the political supremacy of the Hashemite establishment and his supporters in the East bank.

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Both economic constraints and government policy encouraged migration from the overpopulated West Bank to the underpopulated East Bank. The educated Palestinians soon became the backbone of the urban middle class (both the salaried and the professional ones) in Amman and other east Bank cities. Together with the 1948 refugees there, the Palestinians constituted, in 1967, about 40 per cent of the population of the East bank. Jordan official ideology portrayed the Kingdom as a Jordanian-Palestinian entity (one of King Hussein's favourite figures of speech was that all people on both Banks are equal members of the 'big Jordanian family'). [4] In practice however this 'Jordanian-Palestinian Entity' was a rather a-symmetric one. If this term could be applied to the East Bank, in which both communities mingled, the West Bank remained exclusively Palestinian and practically no Transjordanians migrated from East to west. The Palestinian-Jordanian identity however was adopted mainly by Palestinians, on both banks, particularly those who recognized the economic and political opportunities that identification with Hashemite establishment (in its wider sense) offered them. It was rather popular among the above mentioned urban middle class and members of the political establishment (cabinet ministers, members of parliaments, civil and military senior officials). West Bank Palestinians of similar background also adopted it but to a lesser extent. Most west Bankers, however, as well as the Palestinian refugees on the East Bank adhered to their Palestinian identity while most non-Palestinians in the East Bank continued to regard themselves as Jordanians.

The fact that the majority of the west Bankers identified themselves as Palestinians did not necessarily questioned their loyalty to the Hashemite crown. Time had taken its toll and reality was stronger than memories and sentiments. Many of them tended to accept the fact that their homeland had been taken and divided by outsiders (Israel and Jordan) and that their sojourn under Jordanian rule was the lesser of two evils. They thus endeavoured to make the best out of it. In 1959 Iraq's ruler Abd al-Karim Qassim came up with the idea of a Palestinian Entity . This notion - that was designated to embarrass King Hussein and therefore was promptly adopted by Gamal abd al-Nasser as well - called for the establishment of such an entity in the West Bank to constitute a base for the liberation of the whole Palestine. Despite intensive Iraqi and Egyptian propaganda campaign the idea did not fall on fertile soil in the West Bank. Most inhabitants were reluctant to transform their personal (Palestinian) identity, which acquired them a passport and other fringe benefits, into a political national option of anti-Jordanian nature. A few years later, however, the wheel had come full circle with the establishment, in 1964, of the PLO. As the organization was founded following the unanimous resolution of an Arab summit, King Hussein could oppose neither it nor its activities in the West Bank. That was the beginning of almost a generation long struggle over the issue of the Palestinian representation. The blunt activities of the PLO's chairman, the vibrant Ahmad Shuqairi, among the West Bank Palestinians not only challenged Jordan's authority there but also threatened to shake the precarious Jordanian-Palestinian entity. Jordan was forced to meet the PLO's challenge even at the price of antagonizing Arab regimes and public. It was the June 1967 war which turned the tables and out an end to this encounter.

Scholars tend to speculate what shape the Jordanian-Palestinian entity would have taken had there been no Six Day War. One school argued that time would be the most decisive factor and a real co-existence and integration of the two communities would eventually have transpired. The other school suggested that the PLO activities had already aroused dormant nationalistic feelings that were about to erupt soon. The outbreak of the war actually postponed the surfacing of militant Palestinian radicalism. It is impossible to tell what would have happened if - but what we do know is that 19 years of Jordan's rule in the West Bank had created a deep and profound impact. Most of political public opinion there regarded the government in Amman as their representatives at least as far as negotiations with Israel were concerned. Indeed, this attitude reflected their total dependence on the East Bank in almost every aspect of daily life, but also that the Palestinian identity (with or without the PLO) was not still a viable political option. The most telling instance in this respect is the results of the municipal elections held by Israel in the West bank in 1972. Even though almost five years elapsed since they were cut off from Jordan and even though the bloody encounter of September 1970 between the Jordanian army and the armed Palestinian organization (Black September) was still fresh in every one's memory, most of the new mayors and councillors elected were pro-Jordanian candidates. Supporters of the PLO or of the idea of a Palestinian entity were much less popular. Only in 1976, after the PLO had scored world-wide recognition, did its candidates gain the upper hand in the second municipal elections in the West Bank.

The Six Day war, nevertheless, created a new reality. Jordan was deprived of the West Bank but took pains to retrieve it and to maintain her influence there for the next twenty odd years. Sooner or later however, the West Bank (under Israel's control) became a de facto Palestinian entity. The PLO's claim to be the legitimate representative of the Palestinians and hence the rightful owner of the West Bank, was gradually enjoying international recognition. The practical meaning of that recognition was that it would be the PLO and not Jordan that would rule the West Bank if and when Israel withdrew

In the long run, the major impact of the Six day war on the collective identity was to be found in the East Bank. Since 1967 this territory de facto corresponded to the pre-1948 Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (and de jure since 1988). Yet, unlike in 1948, about half of her population were Palestinians. That was the reason why the emergence of a Palestinian entity in the west Bank was not promptly reciprocated with the crystallization of a parallel Jordanian entity in the East Bank. The existence of a unique Palestinian-Jordanian entity there, that was distinctly different from each of its two components was manifested in the first years after the War, throughout the encounter between the regime and the Palestinian fida'i organizations. The division between the proponents of the each party had crossed the traditional lines of Jordanians vis-a-vis Palestinians. On the one hand, the presence and activity of the Palestinian armed organizations in Jordan won the sympathy and the active support of non-Palestinian politicians (One explanation for this phenomenon suggests that the outcome of the 1967 war created a deep sense of guilt among the Jordanians who felt that their army had not put enough effort in defending the Palestinians. This was not a popular feeling merely but shared also by members of the intellectual and political elite). [5] On the other hand, many middle-class Palestinians in Amman not only sided with but even encouraged the extreme measures the regime had resorted to in September 1970 against the fida'i organizations.

Simultaneous with the confrontation between the regime and the Palestinian organizations, the idea of enhancing the Jordanian entity in the East Bank gained increasing popularity among members of the Transjordanian political and military elite, whose Jordanian identity was unquestionable. As a group they were offended by the fida'yun activities in Jordan and by the King's 'appeasement' policy towards them. Some of them even paid a personal price, when, at the demand of the Palestinian organizations, the King relieved them of their duties. [6]

Most proponents of the Jordanian entity neither intended to give up the West Bank (only a handful had gone as extremely as that, but among them were the Queen Mother, Zein; Crown Prince Hassan and senior army officers), nor disregarded those Palestinians who constituted 50 per cent of the East Bank population. What they wanted was mainly to strengthen the Jordanian component of the de facto Jordanian-Palestinian entity in the East Bank and to minimize the power and influence of the Palestinian there. They believed that the showdown with the Palestinian organizations in September 1970 had saved this Jordanian component from the severest challenge it ever confronted.

The most eloquent advocate of these ideas, who also endeavoured to turn them into government policy was Wasfi al-Tall, Jordan's Prime Minister in 1970-71. Tall did not only manage to oust the Palestinian organizations from Jordan, destroying their political and military power bases, but had also drastically diminished the influence of the Palestinians in the government, the public administration and the press. Besides those measures of 'negative Jordanization', Tall also pursued a 'positive Jordanization' , i.e., constructive activities, new ideas and new frameworks in which the contribution of the Jordanian element was salient. [7]

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In March 1972, four months after Tall's assassination, King Hussein issued his plan for a federal Jordanian Kingdom. Even though this scheme was designed to elicit the support of the West Bank Palestinians (against Israel and against the PLO), it reflected an indirect acknowledgement of Tall's ideas and political concept. According to the plan the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was to be renamed the United Arab Kingdom and would consist of two regions united by federal ties: The Palestinian one (the West Bank plus any other part of Palestine that might be liberated and whose inhabitants expressed their desire to be part of the state ) with Jerusalem as its capital, and the Jordanian one (the East Bank) whose capital Amman would be the federal capital as well. Each region would be autonomous, with local executive, legislative and judicial bodies and would run its own internal affairs, while the federal government would be responsible for foreign affairs, defense and the unity of the Kingdom.

The federal plan indicated a retreat from Jordan's traditional concept, emanated from the 1950 unification, that the two Banks together with the Jordanian Palestinian people constituted a unified entity. The rationale of the new idea was the acknowledgement that the two parts were distinctively different from each other. The proposed redefinition of Jordanian-Palestinian relations bore a certain resemblance to Tall's approach which perceived of the West Bank as the homeland of the Palestinian entity and of the East Bank as the homeland of the Jordanian entity.

The plan was never put to the test as it was rejected by practically all concerned parties. Furthermore, in the Arab summit meeting in Rabat in late 1974 the PLO was unanimously recognized as the 'sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people'. Its right to establish a 'national authority' on whatever available parts of Palestine was also acknowledged. The meaning of this resolution was that hitherto, Jordan could not have any legal claim to the West Bank. Moreover, the crowning of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative implied that its authority could be exercised not over territory only but over persons as well. It could therefore be construed that the PLO's authority also included the Palestinians in the East Bank.

Even though Jordan had officially accepted the Rabat resolutions King Hussein insisted that his government would maintain its administration of the West Bank and its 'material commitment' to the population of the territory. The regime's relationship with the Palestinians, however would be redefined : Those who chose to remain citizens of the state could do so. Those choosing to adopt a Palestinian identity would be treated like citizens of any other Arab state in Jordan. This somewhat contradictory reaction stemmed from the King's desire to maintain his ties with the West Bank (he was also encouraged to do so by some of the Arab leaders who attended the Rabat meeting). It reflected as well the political debate within the Jordanian elite regarding the relations between the two entities. The Rabat resolution gave new impetus to the adherents of the Jordanian entity, who had advocated more explicit political separation from the West Bank. In the aftermath of Rabat, they maintained, the regime should abandon its claims over the West Bank and focus exclusively on strengthening and developing of the East Bank. [8] They had however to continue this lobbing for a further 14 years before the King decided to comply, in 1988. Nevertheless, in 1974 Hussein eventually adopted a line that, on the face of it, was reminiscent of Wasfi al-Tall's policy: among other things, the number of Palestinians in the Cabinet and in the ministries was slashed . The 'Ministry for the Affairs of the Occupied Lands' was abolished. Preparations were made for the promulgation of a new citizenship law, which meant that the Palestinians would be shorn of their Jordanian nationality, and there was talk of imminent elections in which the inhabitants of the East Bank alone would participate. [9]

These moves did not imply a dissociation from the Palestinian question but were designed to prove to the Arab world that the Rabat resolution was unrealistic: i.e., the PLO was not capable of shouldering such a burden. The organization would be able neither to successfully assume Jordan's administrative function in the West Bank , nor to handle the return of the West Bank to Arab hands.

Hussein's policy was proved to be right and his perseverance eventually bore fruits. More and more Arab leaders realized and admitted that even if a Palestinian state under the PLO would be founded in the West Bank she would be better connected with Jordan. [10] Hussein and his government continued to favour a settlement that would reestablish Jordan's control over the West Bank. Nevertheless, despite of the acknowledgement of Jordan's right to remain a partner to the solution of the Palestine question and despite of her frequent coordination efforts and agreements with the PLO , her prospect of regaining a foothold in the West Bank constantly seemed to dwindle. The Rabat resolution was still in force, the PLO claim for the West Bank was internationally recognized and the possibility of an Israeli withdrawal from this territory looked remote. All these had an inescapable impact on the remaining entity in the East Bank. The original Jordanians were unanimous in their desire to continue the consolidation of the Jordanian entity there. They were only divided over the required role of the Palestinians (who already exceeded 50 per cent of the total population) in this entity. A minority of them continued to perceive this issue with a negative, xenophobic, anti-Palestinian attitude. Yet the majority believed that the Palestinians who had undergone political and social 'Jordanization' were contributing to the internal strength of the Kingdom. Hussein's decision of July 1988 to dismantle the legal and administrative links with the West Bank, indicated, inter alia, that the King too was a partner to this approach. The disengagement from the Palestinian issue was not only an ideological shift and the abandonment of a 40 years old policy. The control of - and after 1967 the claim to - the West Bank, the protection of its population and their integration into both the Jordanian state and society was an essential component of Hashemite ideology and legitimacy . Concession to these elements after July 1988 indicated that ideologically and politically the Hashemite controlled entity that was emerged in the East Bank and consisted of Jordanians as well as of Palestinians, was a sturdy one . Not only its legitimacy was uncontested , so was its ability to survive and function as a sovereign state.

The disengagement was a decisive shift in Jordan's policy. For the first time she felt sufficiently mature to take crucial decisions regarding her future position in the Middle East with total disregard of the Palestinian factor outside the East Bank. For the inhabitants of the East Bank however it was mainly a de jure sanction to a de facto situation. Political and social issues no longer divided Jordan society along the traditional Jordanian-Palestinian line but along new ones such as South vs. North or Islamic fundamentalists vs. moderates. Jordanians and Palestinians could be found on both sides of the division lines. The changes in Jordanian Palestinian relations came to the surface only in the early 1990s, with the beginning of the current Arab Israeli peace process.

In this period the Palestinian majority in Jordan was an accepted fact (estimates varied from 55 per cent to 70 per cent). It did not seem to threaten the Jordanian nature of this entity, as this majority was merely a statistical one with no political consequences. The Palestinians in Jordan constituted 4 distinctive groups differing from each other in their political identity, aspirations, ideology, identification with the state and attitude towards the peace process: The refugees of 1948, who preserved their Palestinian identity, constituted the hard core of the Palestinian opposition to the regime as well as to the rapprochement with Israel, aware that even if a Palestinian state would be founded on the West Bank they would still not be able to return to their homes as most of them came from those parts of Palestine that had become the state of Israel. The refugees of 1967, also did not integrate into the East Bank society and adhered to their Palestinian identity. Yet they were less decisive in their opposition to the peace process as they may be allowed to return to the expected Palestinian state. The Urban Middle Class constituted those Palestinians who migrated from the West Bank to the East in order to improve their economic and social status. They willingly integrated within the Jordanian society, cast their lot with the Hashemite establishment and were the bearers of the banner of Jordanian Palestinian entity and identity. The 1990/91 Gulf returnees. 300-000 Jordanian citizens (85 per cent of them Palestinians) were repatriated from Kuwait and Iraq following the Gulf crisis. They bore a certain resemblance to the aforementioned middle class, but, having been out of the country for some time, they had reservation regarding the regime's general conduct even though they basically supported it against any manifestation of radicalism, religious or otherwise. Palestinians, nevertheless, had blamed the Jordanians for not being aware of this stratification and for regarding the Palestinians in Jordan as a monolithic entity (They admitted, however, that the Palestinians too had viewed the Jordanians the same way). [11]

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The mutual Israel-PLO recognition in 1993, the consequent talks and the parallel Jordanian-Israeli negotiations and peace treaty, were construed in Jordan as if the foundation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were rather close. The timing of these developments was also meaningful, as they corresponded to a process of democratization Jordan was undergoing since the late 1980s. Hence, a blunt and forceful public debate on the nature of the future identity of Jordan and on the place of the Palestinians there evolved. Both Jordanians and Palestinians were reexamining their collective identities and questions such as whether the Palestinians should remain equal citizens in Jordan or whether they should be transferred to the future Palestinian state, were publicly asked.

The official view was that the entity that had been developed in Jordan was an homogeneous society in which Jordanians and Palestinians constituted a unified family that shared a common religion, language and culture. That past conflicts 'of the 1960s, 1970s and the early 1980s' between the two communities were gone and 'now all were equal. The fact that most of its inhabitants were of Palestinian origin was, therefore, irrelevant. [12] King Hussein, among whose informal titles in the press is Amid al-Usra al-Urdunniyya (head of the Jordanian family), had used early Islamic terms to define the characteristics of the two communities and the nature of their relationship: The Palestinians have been the modern version of the Muhajirun and the Jordanians have been the equivalent of the Ansar. [13] The former were the first ones to accept Muhammad's preaching, became Muslims, as well his loyal disciples and migrated with him from Mecca to Medina in 622. The latter were those inhabitants of Medina who accepted the prophet and his new religion. Both are considered of equal importance to the consolidation of the Islamic Umma.

The public debate exposed the various myths that had evolved around common historical experiences, but assumed contradicting interpretations. The battle of Karama, of 21 March 1968, for example, in which Jordanian and Palestinian forces fought an Israeli invasion, is still depicted in the Jordanian press on each recurring anniversary, as a Jordanian victory, one of the symbols of Jordan's modern nationalism and her first war of independence.

The Palestinians, on the other hand, portray it as their victory. Another example is the confrontation between the Jordanian army and the fida'i organizations in September 1970. While Jordanian nationalists perceive it as their second war of independence, for he Palestinians it is still the massacre of Black September. [14]

in January 1997, a Jordanian cabinet minister, who was also the secretary general of a leading political party and brother of a former Prime Minister, Abd al-Hadi Majali, made a public speech on Jordanian identity and on the question of double loyalty. He expressed doubts whether all Palestinians in Jordan identified themselves with the state. According to his perception all those who lived in Jordan were considered Jordanians as long as they were content with the political state of affairs in the country , with the constitution and with the Jordanian-Palestinian unity. Al-Majali also implied that it may be better if those Jordanians of Palestinian origin (especially those who claimed to be deprived of equality) would materialize their political rights in Palestine. [15] These views probably reflected the attitude of many Jordanians who would like to see the Palestinian refugees in Jordan mainly 'repatriated' to Palestine.

The Palestinians for their part, maintained that even the existence of two different entities on the two banks of the Jordan river, should not infringe with the status and identity of the Palestinians in Jordan. They therefore adhered to the concept of Qawmiyya (Pan-Arab nationalism) as their desirable framework of national identity, while the Jordanians insisted that the Jordanian Wataniyya (patriotism) was superior to the Qawmiyya. [16]

It seems, however, that even some of those Palestinians who, for years, had been part of the Hashemite establishment and symbolized the success story of the Jordanian-Palestinian entity, also felt disappointed, if not threatened by a is the recent manifestations of Jordanian patriotism. [17] Their apprehension was not entirely unfounded, as far as one can judge from the composition of Jordanian parliaments and cabinets since 1989. The Palestinians, the majority of the population, are conspicuously underrepresented in both institutes. [18]

One of the more vivid illustrations of the intramural tension transpired in July 1997, when the Jordanian team won the Arab World football championship. Obviously, the outburst of enthusiasm that followed was a demonstration of Jordanian patriotism (King Hussein welcomed the team: 'You are in the heart and soul of every Jordanian ... The sons of Jordan gave a distinguished performance...'). [19] Some Palestinians, however, maintained that most of the players were of Palestinian origin and thus the Palestinians too and not only the Jordanians should be credited for the victory. Skirmishes and fist fights soon ensued.

It seems that the tension between the two components of the Jordanian entity has recently again somewhat subdued. One of the major reasons is the very slow pace of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process that makes the prospect of a Palestinian state looks rather remote. Another cause is the Jordanian Press law of May 1997 (whose amended version was ratified in Sept. 1998), that inter alia practically has stifled the public debate on this issue.

It is reasonable to speculate, however, that even if a Palestinian state were to be established, it would enjoy special ties with Jordan, yet the Jordanian identity would continue to be the dominant one. The Palestinians in Jordan, in spite of being a statistical majority, would have to accept this identity and to be reminded, in certain contexts, of their Palestinian origin. The only possible remedy for this might be the time factor. Even today the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians in Jordan were born there and not in Palestine. Some of them have parents and grandparents who, too, are native of Jordan. Given the political developments, the next decades may further blur differences (as constant intermarriages are doing) and decrease the inter-communal tensions. Alternatively, As some Jordanian nationalists suggest, a tacit understanding would develop between the two communities according to which the Palestinians would dominate economic affairs while the Jordanians would continue to maintain political control. [20]

Notes
1. I am in debt to my graduate student, Ms. Iris Fruchter-Ronen for providing me with her notes from the international symposium on Jordan, Paris, June 1997 and for additional invaluable assistance.

2. James Lunt, Glubb Basha A Biography (London, 1984), p. 92

3. Munib al-Madi, Sulayman Musa, Ta'arikh al-Urdun fi al-Qarn al-'Ishrin (Amman, 1957), pp. 287 ff.

4. Radio Amman, 11 April 1964, The Middle East Record 1967, p. 392

5. Adnan Abu Odeh (former Jordan's Minister of Information), Jordan: Politics and State International Symposium, Paris, 25 June, 1997.

6. Sharif Nasser bin Jamil, Zaid bin Shakir Rasul al-Kaylani, Hassan al-Kayid, are the most prominent examples.

7. Joseph Nevo "The Era of Wasfi al-Tall in Jordan 1970-1971: Attempts to build a Jordanian Entity". Occasional Papers No 18, University of Haifa, February 1979, pp. 3-7.

8. Raad al-Kadiri, The strategy and tactics in Jordanian foreign policy 1967-1988, PhD, Oxford, 1995, p. 94.

9. Joseph Nevo, 'Is There A Jordanian Entity?, The Jersualem Quarterly 16 (spring 1980), pp. 108-9.

10. Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS), Vol. 1, 1976-7, pp. 478-9.

11. Lamis Andoni, (A Jordanian ' journalist of Palestinian origin), Symposium in Paris, 25 June, 1967.

12. Crown Prince Hassan's message to the international symposium in Paris, 24 June, 1997; A lecture by Salman al-Khatab, a senior columnist in the Jordanian daily al-Ra'y, in Giv'at Haviva, Israel, 19 May, 1997.

13. Adnan Abu-Odeh, international symposium, Paris, 25 June, 1997.

14. Ibid

15. Al-Ra'y, 20 January, 1997

16. Tahir al-Masri, former PM of Palestinian origin, al-Ra'y, 27 January, 1997

17. An interview with a former senior cabinet minister (of Palestinian origin), Washington DC, December, 1995; Nahed al-Khatar, editor of Al-Mithaq, international symposium Paris, 25 Junc, 1997

18. Jordanies, Vol. 1, June 1996, pp. 80-81.

19. Al-Ra'y, 29 July, 1997.

20. An interview with a Jordanian journalist, Haifa, May 1998.

Joseph Nevo

[minionofmidas]

Thanks for posting. Provided detail to lots of stuff I approximately knew already.