If you were in charge of NC Democrats, what would your goals be?

[Tekken_Guy]

If you were in charge of North Carolina’s Democratic Party, what would your goal be?

[TML]

Improve partisan organization and persuasion in places which may have been previously written off. A report by NC-based political scientists indicate that the biggest geographic area of Republican strength in NC is not rural/small-town areas, but rather so-called "Countrypolitan" counties which are located on the outskirts of major metropolitan areas. Given the relatively narrow margins of recent Republican statewide victories, Democrats should try to squeeze out as many extra votes as they can, which, in the case of Countrypolitan counties and other R-leaning rural/small-town counties, means narrowing their losing margins in such places. A good place to start would be in so-called "blue outposts" within these R-leaning counties, which are typically the most urban/populous municipalities in these counties and/or places with colleges. Examples include Gastonia (Gaston County), Monroe (Union County), Reidsville (Rockingham County), Hendersonville (Henderson County), Morganton (Burke County), New Bern (Craven County), Goldsboro (Wayne County), Burlington (Alamance County), Sanford (Lee County), Beaufort (Carteret County), Albemarle (Stanly County), etc. Boosting turnout in these kinds of places could be what is needed to push Democrats over the finish line in statewide races.

[Lambsbread]

Selling Cal Cunningham's soul to the devil in exchange for the perfect candidate to beat Thom Tillis in 2026

[GAinDC]

Run up the margins in Wake and Mecklenberg, I’d like to see Dems getting 70+ percent in Meck and 65+ percent in Wake

Improve Black turnout in the northeast part of the state

Cut down Republican margins in “countrypolitan” counties

Increase turnout in college towns like Boone and Durham

[Sol]

1). Invest extremely heavily in Eastern North Carolina. The party has been underperforming there heavily, and it has the most swing districts of anywhere in the state.

2). Work on clawing back the State Supreme Court. Barring a more favorable makeup in federal courts, this will be the only way to level the playing field in redistricting.

3). Attempt to run locally attentive, well-calibrated campaigns with well-chosen candidates. Democrats picked up HD-93, an extremely Republican seat, in 2018 because they ran a well known local meteorologist.

[MargieCat]

Selling Cal Cunningham's soul to the devil in exchange for the perfect candidate to beat Thom Tillis in 2026

That really falls on Schumer for being a dipsh**t and picking the corporate stooge (who had not held elected office in over a decade and was a sleaze) over the top-tier recruit that planned to organize and run a top-tier campaign. The "basement strategy" cost us many competitive races that cycle.

[MARGINS6729]

Focus on the exurban counties while also doing more outreach to Black voters and especially to Hispanics too.

[Del Tachi]

Win next year's gubernatorial and AG races, which both seem very doable. 

[Chancellor Tanterterg]

Selling Cal Cunningham's soul to the devil in exchange for the perfect candidate to beat Thom Tillis in 2026

That really falls on Schumer for being a dipsh**t and picking the corporate stooge (who had not held elected office in over a decade and was a sleaze) over the top-tier recruit that planned to organize and run a top-tier campaign. The "basement strategy" cost us many competitive races that cycle.

In no way, shape, or form was what happened with Cunningham Schumer’s fault.  This myth has been debunked many times.

[TML]

Selling Cal Cunningham's soul to the devil in exchange for the perfect candidate to beat Thom Tillis in 2026

That really falls on Schumer for being a dipsh**t and picking the corporate stooge (who had not held elected office in over a decade and was a sleaze) over the top-tier recruit that planned to organize and run a top-tier campaign. The "basement strategy" cost us many competitive races that cycle.

In no way, shape, or form was what happened with Cunningham Schumer’s fault.  This myth has been debunked many times.

While it may be true that Cunningham's personal problems were not Schumer's fault, it is also true that Schumer's preferred strategy of hyperfocusing on fundraising and attacks against opponents at the expense of in-person campaigning and running on actual policy substance proved to be a terrible one when looking at the actual results. For example, Sara Gideon (another Schumer-backed pick) didn't have Cunningham's personal problems, but her campaign nonetheless turned off more than enough voters in her home state such that she ended up running so far behind the presidential ticket that she actually lost by a significant margin. Similarly, in Cunningham's case, the fact that his campaign was substance-free meant that its foundation was already weak, so even without his personal problems, he was still vulnerable based on his rather uninspiring campaign.

[Tekken_Guy]

Selling Cal Cunningham's soul to the devil in exchange for the perfect candidate to beat Thom Tillis in 2026

That really falls on Schumer for being a dipsh**t and picking the corporate stooge (who had not held elected office in over a decade and was a sleaze) over the top-tier recruit that planned to organize and run a top-tier campaign. The "basement strategy" cost us many competitive races that cycle.

In no way, shape, or form was what happened with Cunningham Schumer’s fault.  This myth has been debunked many times.

While it may be true that Cunningham's personal problems were not Schumer's fault, it is also true that Schumer's preferred strategy of hyperfocusing on fundraising and attacks against opponents at the expense of in-person campaigning and running on actual policy substance proved to be a terrible one when looking at the actual results. For example, Sara Gideon (another Schumer-backed pick) didn't have Cunningham's personal problems, but her campaign nonetheless turned off more than enough voters in her home state such that she ended up running so far behind the presidential ticket that she actually lost by a significant margin. Similarly, in Cunningham's case, the fact that his campaign was substance-free meant that its foundation was already weak, so even without his personal problems, he was still vulnerable based on his rather uninspiring campaign.

The anti-Collins vote was heavily split because of RCV meaning voters didn’t feel obligated to consolidate behind Gideon, which inflated the margin that she lost by.

[MargieCat]

Selling Cal Cunningham's soul to the devil in exchange for the perfect candidate to beat Thom Tillis in 2026

That really falls on Schumer for being a dipsh**t and picking the corporate stooge (who had not held elected office in over a decade and was a sleaze) over the top-tier recruit that planned to organize and run a top-tier campaign. The "basement strategy" cost us many competitive races that cycle.

In no way, shape, or form was what happened with Cunningham Schumer’s fault.  This myth has been debunked many times.

While it may be true that Cunningham's personal problems were not Schumer's fault, it is also true that Schumer's preferred strategy of hyperfocusing on fundraising and attacks against opponents at the expense of in-person campaigning and running on actual policy substance proved to be a terrible one when looking at the actual results. For example, Sara Gideon (another Schumer-backed pick) didn't have Cunningham's personal problems, but her campaign nonetheless turned off more than enough voters in her home state such that she ended up running so far behind the presidential ticket that she actually lost by a significant margin. Similarly, in Cunningham's case, the fact that his campaign was substance-free meant that its foundation was already weak, so even without his personal problems, he was still vulnerable based on his rather uninspiring campaign.

The anti-Collins vote was heavily split because of RCV meaning voters didn’t feel obligated to consolidate behind Gideon, which inflated the margin that she lost by.

Not really. Collins cleared 50%, meaning that the RCV did not advance to a second round. She actually won 51% of the vote. Had Gideon got the remaining 49% of the vote, she would have still lost by 2%. But the bulk of Max Linn's vote share likely would have gone to Collins anyways, in a theoretical second round.

[MargieCat]

Selling Cal Cunningham's soul to the devil in exchange for the perfect candidate to beat Thom Tillis in 2026

That really falls on Schumer for being a dipsh**t and picking the corporate stooge (who had not held elected office in over a decade and was a sleaze) over the top-tier recruit that planned to organize and run a top-tier campaign. The "basement strategy" cost us many competitive races that cycle.

In no way, shape, or form was what happened with Cunningham Schumer’s fault.  This myth has been debunked many times.

While it may be true that Cunningham's personal problems were not Schumer's fault, it is also true that Schumer's preferred strategy of hyperfocusing on fundraising and attacks against opponents at the expense of in-person campaigning and running on actual policy substance proved to be a terrible one when looking at the actual results. For example, Sara Gideon (another Schumer-backed pick) didn't have Cunningham's personal problems, but her campaign nonetheless turned off more than enough voters in her home state such that she ended up running so far behind the presidential ticket that she actually lost by a significant margin. Similarly, in Cunningham's case, the fact that his campaign was substance-free meant that its foundation was already weak, so even without his personal problems, he was still vulnerable based on his rather uninspiring campaign.

I think Cunningham was the inferior option, when compared to Jeff Jackson. He had not held office since 2003, so he was perhaps less seasoned and less refined, versus an actual sitting state senator. It's not dissimilar to how Trump chose political outsiders to run for senate, like Blake Masters, Herschel Walker, Don Bolduc, and Dr. Oz, and it backfired badly for them. I prefer to see unseasoned candidates start in the House of Representatives.

I also think Cunningham had better access to a large donor network, that Jackson likely did not have (he would have relied on small dollar donations).

In general, Democrats used a "basement strategy" during COVID in non-senate races, and it did not yield them good results in 2020. But I think Schumer's basement strategy came out before COVID.

Democrats have always had a base of lower-propensity voters. They need grassroots energy and lots of ground game. Republicans OTOH, could always fear monger and air nasty ads about their Democratic opponents, and their voters would show to the polls and deliver them to victory. Post-Roe, it's possible the dynamics have changed as the suburban shift continues.

[Chancellor Tanterterg]

Selling Cal Cunningham's soul to the devil in exchange for the perfect candidate to beat Thom Tillis in 2026

That really falls on Schumer for being a dipsh**t and picking the corporate stooge (who had not held elected office in over a decade and was a sleaze) over the top-tier recruit that planned to organize and run a top-tier campaign. The "basement strategy" cost us many competitive races that cycle.

In no way, shape, or form was what happened with Cunningham Schumer’s fault.  This myth has been debunked many times.

While it may be true that Cunningham's personal problems were not Schumer's fault, it is also true that Schumer's preferred strategy of hyperfocusing on fundraising and attacks against opponents at the expense of in-person campaigning and running on actual policy substance proved to be a terrible one when looking at the actual results. For example, Sara Gideon (another Schumer-backed pick) didn't have Cunningham's personal problems, but her campaign nonetheless turned off more than enough voters in her home state such that she ended up running so far behind the presidential ticket that she actually lost by a significant margin. Similarly, in Cunningham's case, the fact that his campaign was substance-free meant that its foundation was already weak, so even without his personal problems, he was still vulnerable based on his rather uninspiring campaign.

In Maine, the choices were Gideon and a rando named Betsy Sweet who would have done significant worse than Gideon.  Gideon ran a poor campaign, but it’s not like she was the handpicked candidate of Chuck Schumer or the DSCC.  By most accounts, Collins was on track to either lose or come really close, but many swing voters believed the polls showing 2020 as a Democratic wave election and decided to vote for Collins as a check on Biden/the assumed large Democratic congressional majorities they thought were incoming.  Plus, when you factor in the left-wing third party candidate whose supporters were almost to a person second-preferencing Gideon, the margin isn’t nearly as large as it looks.

Selling Cal Cunningham's soul to the devil in exchange for the perfect candidate to beat Thom Tillis in 2026

That really falls on Schumer for being a dipsh**t and picking the corporate stooge (who had not held elected office in over a decade and was a sleaze) over the top-tier recruit that planned to organize and run a top-tier campaign. The "basement strategy" cost us many competitive races that cycle.

In no way, shape, or form was what happened with Cunningham Schumer’s fault.  This myth has been debunked many times.

While it may be true that Cunningham's personal problems were not Schumer's fault, it is also true that Schumer's preferred strategy of hyperfocusing on fundraising and attacks against opponents at the expense of in-person campaigning and running on actual policy substance proved to be a terrible one when looking at the actual results. For example, Sara Gideon (another Schumer-backed pick) didn't have Cunningham's personal problems, but her campaign nonetheless turned off more than enough voters in her home state such that she ended up running so far behind the presidential ticket that she actually lost by a significant margin. Similarly, in Cunningham's case, the fact that his campaign was substance-free meant that its foundation was already weak, so even without his personal problems, he was still vulnerable based on his rather uninspiring campaign.

I think Cunningham was the inferior option, when compared to Jeff Jackson. He had not held office since 2003, so he was perhaps less seasoned and less refined, versus an actual sitting state senator. It's not dissimilar to how Trump chose political outsiders to run for senate, like Blake Masters, Herschel Walker, Don Bolduc, and Dr. Oz, and it backfired badly for them. I prefer to see unseasoned candidates start in the House of Representatives.

I also think Cunningham had better access to a large donor network, that Jackson likely did not have (he would have relied on small dollar donations).

In general, Democrats used a "basement strategy" during COVID in non-senate races, and it did not yield them good results in 2020. But I think Schumer's basement strategy came out before COVID.

Democrats have always had a base of lower-propensity voters. They need grassroots energy and lots of ground game. Republicans OTOH, could always fear monger and air nasty ads about their Democratic opponents, and their voters would show to the polls and deliver them to victory. Post-Roe, it's possible the dynamics have changed as the suburban shift continues.

As for Cunningham, cross-posted:

I hope the DSCC doesn't endorse in this race. That's a big mistake they made in 2020.

In what way was their intervention in 2020 a mistake?

They coronated Cal Cunningham, a relatively unqualified nobody, which prevented a wider array of options from running.

They also forced out Jeff Jackson, who probably would have won.

As I’ve explained elsewhere, there are a few common misconceptions in the above posts.  A few quick facts that often get overlooked:

1) Cunningham was not the DSCC’s first, second, third, or fourth choice.  

The DSCC’s first choice was Cooper, but he decided to run for reelection.  Then they turned to Josh Stein with the same result.  They then tried really hard to recruit Anthony Foxx, but he wasn’t interested for reasons unknown.  They looked at Winston-Salem Mayor Allen Joines, but he wasn’t interested.  They very briefly looked at former Congressman Brad Miller, but decided he was the wrong candidate and Miller turned out not to be interested either.  Next, they looked at former Raleigh Mayor Charles Meeker and Former NC Treasurer Richard Moore, but IIRC decided they were has-beens who were always kinda overhyped.  Then they tried to recruit former NC Treasurer Janet Cowell who was leaning toward running, but the DSCC’s opposition research team dug up some scandals with her IIRC and decided they needed someone else.  Which brings us to point two...

2) The DSCC did not force out a would-be winning candidate in 2020, it dodged a bullet by keeping Jackson out.  

Finally, the DSCC turned to Josh Jackson...only to find out that he had somehow concluded that the way to win was to do almost literally no fundraising and completely surrender the airwaves to Tillis (or rather, leave ads exclusively to Dem-allied PACs).  

IIRC Schumer indicated that the DSCC would back him if he would commit to doing at least some fundraising, but Jackson refused and that left the DSCC with no one but a random DINO state Senator (Erica Smith).  At this point, the DSCC played the crappy hand it had been dealt and went with Cunningham.  In the meantime, we kept Jackson on the bench for a later campaign whenever he could be made to see reason (and IIRC he eventually accepted you have to fundraise some to win a Senate race).

3) The DSCC definitely had the right strategy in the race.  

People forget what this race looked like before Cunningham got hit with a late-breaking scandal, handled it horribly, faced an aggressively hostile local media, and basically spent the closing stretch hiding from the media.  Even with polling error, it’s pretty likely that Cunningham would’ve won but for that unforeseeable scandal and its aftermath.  

And despite all that, he still only lost by a hair and even outperformed Biden in a few noteworthy places like Union County IIRC.  That suggests that the DSCC - and not Jackson - had the right strategy, but Cunningham’s unforeseeable scandal/horrible handling of said scandal blew the race.  Lastly...

4) If you’re gonna blame Schumer for stuff like this that really isn’t his fault then you’ve also gotta give him credit for things like Osoff and Warnock winning, recruiting Mark Kelly, flipping the Senate, etc.  

This is the second time we’ve flipped the Senate on his watch when few thought we had a real shot at doing so at the beginning of the election cycle.  Between 2006 (when he ran the DSCC), 2008 (IIRC he remained head of the DSCC), and 2020 (when everyone seemed to conflate Schumer with the DSCC), it sure looks like the man knows what he’s doing and has a pretty good track record.  And before anyone brings up 2010, Schumer wasn’t involved with the DSCC that cycle (nor was he in 2012, 2014, or 2016 for that matter).

[Sestak]

In Maine, the choices were Gideon and a rando named Betsy Sweet who would have done significant worse than Gideon.  Gideon ran a poor campaign, but it’s not like she was the handpicked candidate of Chuck Schumer or the DSCC.  By most accounts, Collins was on track to either lose or come really close, but many swing voters believed the polls showing 2020 as a Democratic wave election and decided to vote for Collins as a check on Biden/the assumed large Democratic congressional majorities they thought were incoming.  Plus, when you factor in the left-wing third party candidate whose supporters were almost to a person second-preferencing Gideon, the margin isn’t nearly as large as it looks.

…


As for Cunningham, cross-posted:


…
As I’ve explained elsewhere, there are a few common misconceptions in the above posts.  A few quick facts that often get overlooked:
….

You realize the two claims you’re making here are directly contradictory, right? The DSCC was willing to vet seven candidates and eventually reach more than a decade back in time just so they could avoid the “nightmare scenario” of a Jeff Jackson nomination but they couldn’t bother to try and find a single alternative to nominating Gideon because, according to you, there is only one other Democrat in the entire state of Maine.

Also, looking at Jackson’s final congressional result last year I don’t really see any evidence he’s some horrifically bad candidate.

[Chancellor Tanterterg]

In Maine, the choices were Gideon and a rando named Betsy Sweet who would have done significant worse than Gideon.  Gideon ran a poor campaign, but it’s not like she was the handpicked candidate of Chuck Schumer or the DSCC.  By most accounts, Collins was on track to either lose or come really close, but many swing voters believed the polls showing 2020 as a Democratic wave election and decided to vote for Collins as a check on Biden/the assumed large Democratic congressional majorities they thought were incoming.  Plus, when you factor in the left-wing third party candidate whose supporters were almost to a person second-preferencing Gideon, the margin isn’t nearly as large as it looks.

…


As for Cunningham, cross-posted:


…
As I’ve explained elsewhere, there are a few common misconceptions in the above posts.  A few quick facts that often get overlooked:
….

You realize the two claims you’re making here are directly contradictory, right? The DSCC was willing to vet seven candidates and eventually reach more than a decade back in time just so they could avoid the “nightmare scenario” of a Jeff Jackson nomination but they couldn’t bother to try and find a single alternative to nominating Gideon because, according to you, there is only one other Democrat in the entire state of Maine.

Also, looking at Jackson’s final congressional result last year I don’t really see any evidence he’s some horrifically bad candidate.

- No, they aren’t.  The DSCC wasn’t nearly as actively involved in trying to recruit a candidate for Maine as they were in North Carolina. 

- It’s not that Jackson was a horrifically bad candidate per se, as the strategy he wanted to use if he ran was insane and generally awful.  Hopefully, he has a better team around him now.  As for his House seat, it was a Safe D seat with favorable trends against a sacrificial lamb Republican some dude in an uncompetitive race.  I like Jackson and think he could be an excellent candidate, but his 2022 performance was basically what you’d expect from Generic D.

[I spent the winter writing songs about getting better]

I don't see how Jackson was ever a bad candidate, he's notable for being one of the few politicians who's actually social media savvy and uses it in an effective way instead of being either boring or embarrassing in use of it.

[Chancellor Tanterterg]

I don't see how Jackson was ever a bad candidate, he's notable for being one of the few politicians who's actually social media savvy and uses it in an effective way instead of being either boring or embarrassing in use of it.

See point two in the section of my post about North Carolina.  It’s not that complicated.  If he’s been made to see reason on this, then he’d be a great candidate for 2026.

[Roll Roons]

I think there’s a balance to be struck here. You can’t completely neglect in-person campaigning. Getting your name out there is important, and voters should get to know you, but you also do need to fundraise in order to be a viable candidate, especially in a large state like NC.

The other thing not pointed out is that Jackson’s social media savvy could have been a very effective way of getting a lot of small-dollar donations. I could easily see him raking in a couple million from a well-timed viral video.

[Sol]

I think there’s a balance to be struck here. You can’t completely neglect in-person campaigning. Getting your name out there is important, and voters should get to know you, but you also do need to fundraise in order to be a viable candidate, especially in a large state like NC.

The other thing not pointed out is that Jackson’s social media savvy could have been a very effective way of getting a lot of small-dollar donations. I could easily see him raking in a couple million from a well-timed viral video.

Precisely -- Jackson was clearly angling to run in the vein of Beto O'Rourke 2018, which was a pretty effective strategy! He even had a substantial online following among more plugged-in Democrats prior to 2020, which I don't think was the case for O'Rourke.

I don't love Jeff Jackson -- the guy clearly wants to be president and is a bit slimy in person because he oozes ambition -- but you can't deny his political skill. He clearly would have been a better candidate than Cal Cunningham lol, and that's even a Cal Cunningham who kept his pants on.

The NC Democratic party doesn't have the deepest bench in the world -- and it was a bit worse in 2019 -- but there are a decent number of reasonably qualified and competent Democrats in the legislature who could have made strong 2020 candidates, in addition to Jackson. But Schumer and DSCC cleared the field for a failed Senate candidate and a guy who had been out of politics for about a decade.

[Bush did 311]

NC has silently continued its shift since 2008. Demographically it's where Virginia was in 2008 but performs like a +5 R state because the gerrymandering broke the spirit of young voters. They're sitting around watching other southern states leapfrog them and watching places like CO and MN get cool things--knowing they cannot vote to get any of those things.

The state dems need to provide their voters with a clear roadmap to fighting back and ending the gerrymandering, and offer a series of enticing policies that would improve their material conditions.

NC has a large libertarian presence. These people are willing to vote for dem governors and other statewide offices to counter the general assembly for the state's business image. They will never vote to give dems power in the federal government though through the Senate or Presidency. For state level races these voters are in play and I think doubling down on electoral reform is something that would universally appeal to them.

Take back the supreme court
Strike down the maps and draw new ones
Have a good year statewide and then submit constitutional amendments that affect elections - proportional voting for the legislature (making gerrymandering moot), IRV for gov, senate, and a return to nonpartisan courts. The strengthened 3rd parties would be enticing for NC's largely anti-establishment electorate.

[Samof94]

Pull off a good Presidential-run performance and narrowly win. This makes later races easier.