Will the parties switch economically?

[WalterWhite]

Ever since the failed candidacies of William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic Party has positioned itself as the party of workers. The Republican Party, meanwhile, has positioned itself as the party of business. Even today, that is still true; lower-income and union voters still lean Democratic, and higher-income voters still lean Republican.

This is mainly due to party platform. Republicans generally support lowering corporate taxes, which appeals to wealthy voters and businessowners; Democrats generally support higher corporate taxes to fund social programs, which appeals to working-class voters. People generally vote with their class interests.

While recent Republican candidates have made inroads among working-class voters, the fact remains that the Republican Party platform is aligned with the interests of businessowners and the wealthy, and that the Democratic Party platform is aligned with the interests of unions and the working class.

Will this change in the future? Will the Republican Party ever become the party of labor, and will the Democratic Party ever become the party of business? If so, what would it take for that to happen? Would it take a switch on economic platforms? If not, how would voters reconcile voting against their class interests?

[DS0816]

…

Will this change in the future? Will the Republican Party ever become the party of labor, and will the Democratic Party ever become the party of business? …

Yes.

[Skill and Chance]

It's possible, but I wouldn't say it's likely.  To get on this path would probably require Trump winning next year, and with the vote not being close enough to be controversial.  If it's a Dem win or a non-Trump R win, we probably revert to the status quo.

[WalterWhite]

It's possible, but I wouldn't say it's likely.  To get on this path would probably require Trump winning next year, and with the vote not being close enough to be controversial.  If it's a Dem win or a non-Trump R win, we probably revert to the status quo.

Trump did not win a majority of working-class or union voters in either of his bids for the presidency.

[Skill and Chance]

It's possible, but I wouldn't say it's likely.  To get on this path would probably require Trump winning next year, and with the vote not being close enough to be controversial.  If it's a Dem win or a non-Trump R win, we probably revert to the status quo.

Trump did not win a majority of working-class or union voters in either of his bids for the presidency.

No, but he would likely have to if he wins this time around.

[ملكة كرينجيتوك]

GOP winning the middle 50% of the income distribution while Dems win the bottom and top 25% in a populiberal vs liberaltarian alignment doesn’t really involve this.

Would be trippy to see Dems win small business owners on top of big corporate interests in a full economic realignment though.

[I’m not Stu]

No.

[Agonized-Statism]

The Overton Window will probably just move left for everyone, just like it moved right with the rise of neoliberalism. What I think we might be seeing is a "Red Tory" rebranding of American conservatism: emphasis on the connection between the individual and the community, supportive of some aspects of a welfare state as a noblesse oblige, protectionist.

[Vosem]

The Overton Window will probably just move left for everyone, just like it moved right with the rise of neoliberalism. What I think we might be seeing is a "Red Tory" rebranding of American conservatism: emphasis on the connection between the individual and the community, supportive of some aspects of a welfare state as a noblesse oblige, protectionist.

What aspects of American conservatism do either of these things?

I think the Overton Window moved right for everyone in 2009-10 and there has been a long effort to deny that this happened, which will probably not be tenable by the end of this decade. The causes of that shift suggest that at least for economic/fiscal questions the Overton Window will probably continue shifting right, at least until some kind of very large-scale catastrophe (pandemic/war/climate-shift/rogue-technology) happens.

[S019]

What a strange question. The Republican Party's agenda of late is not necessarily giving out tax cuts to rich people, rather giving out tax cuts to rich people who vote for it (the other ones are the woke elite), and they feel the need to brand themselves against them. Now, McCarthy's debt ceiling proposal is fairly standard Republican orthodoxy, yet it also shows this by focusing on spending cuts to "show it" to the bureaucrats. However the Republican branding against the "elite" naturally has frightened many of the elite, many of whom used to only vote Republican for tax cuts. On that particular note, the latest round of tax cuts actually wound up raising taxes for many people (not just the well off, but especially them) in the Northeast and places like Southern California. So, you're left with a scenario where taxes actually aren't being cut for many people and for others, it feels like the current version of the Republican Party is out to destroy the stability of the nation. The Democratic Party has really never returned to its New Deal-era iteration and has continued as some version of rebranded and reconfigured Clintonism for some 30-odd years. People need to not get moderation confused with conservatism. Clinton raised taxes while cutting welfare, Biden wanted to expand welfare and rule out tax raises on all but a very minuscule amount of people who don't even make up the average person in the nation's richest municipalities (look up the average income in say Great Falls, VA and you'll see it is below $400,000). So, the party has emerged as a non-threatening alternative for these people (and in fact does much better with them than during the Clinton years) because it recognizes non-threatening is not the same as copying the conservatives.

There is of course one factor here I have not addressed, which may be the main reason strong class voting really never developed in America and that is race. Racial resentment still plays a large role in the politics of Southern whites and whichever party this group has historically voted for, minorities have voted for the opposite, this requires both parties to navigate issues of race. For the Republicans to emerge as the left wing party, they would need to adjust parts of their current social agenda to be able to make inroads into minority communities. (and no Miami-Dade and the RGV is not enough, considering that in this scenario they are basically ceding a whole ton of conservative exurbia) Likewise, the Democrats fully embracing economic conservatism would likely turn off both poorer whites and poorer minorities, and it would need to make up with these voters elsewhere. Exurban and suburban areas that are still solidly Republican are typically culturally conservative and heavily white (see WOW, Northeast Tarrant County, the exurbs of Charlotte, etc.) and to win these voters in exchange, the party would likely have to at least somewhat abandon its current socially progressive agenda. What you will likely see in the end is more economically conservative factions in the Democrats and more economically interventionist factions in the Republicans remain in the minority, but still remain key to governing, because as I outlined above the extreme heterogeneity of America necessitates the need of both parties to build a big tent.

[RussFeingoldWasRobbed]

The Overton Window will probably just move left for everyone, just like it moved right with the rise of neoliberalism. What I think we might be seeing is a "Red Tory" rebranding of American conservatism: emphasis on the connection between the individual and the community, supportive of some aspects of a welfare state as a noblesse oblige, protectionist.

What aspects of American conservatism do either of these things?

I think the Overton Window moved right for everyone in 2009-10 and there has been a long effort to deny that this happened, which will probably not be tenable by the end of this decade. The causes of that shift suggest that at least for economic/fiscal questions the Overton Window will probably continue shifting right, at least until some kind of very large-scale catastrophe (pandemic/war/climate-shift/rogue-technology) happens.

Gretchen, stop trying to "make right wing economics are popular" happen! It's not going to happen!

[dw93]

I think the Republicans will become more pro union (minus the teacher's union of course) in order to maintain any gains with WWC Obama/Trump voters. I don't see the Democrats moving rightward at all, but if business becomes more Democratic due to the Republican's reactionary, unstable governing style, I don't see them moving more leftward either.

[patzer]

Neither party is particularly economically left currently. OP's description is most likely to occur in the event of the Democrats staying much the same whilst a Republican moves that party to the left- I think the easiest way that could happen is a Trump/Gabbard ticket winning in 2024 and Gabbard then winning the Presidency for the Republicans in 2028. It would take a while for the traditionally economically conservative factions to lose their grip on the Republican party but a move to an economically big tent party while united around traditional social values would be a stepping stone to such a transformation in the political system.

[Shaula🏳️‍⚧️]

Their rhetoric is basically the same, it'll just take some time for the actual policies to change too.

[Upper Canada Tory]

I'm not sure that they'll switch, but maybe the range of acceptable economic discourse in each party may widen to be more palatable to candidates and voters with economically syncretic views, as has happened before on many occasions in US history.

[RINO Tom]

I'm not sure that they'll switch, but maybe the range of acceptable economic discourse in each party may widen to be more palatable to candidates and voters with economically syncretic views, as has happened before on many occasions in US history.

This.  We had an artificially hyperbolic era of ideological litmus tests from 2000 (Bush-Gore kicking partisanship into another gear) to 2016 (Trump disrupting conservative orthodoxy and Democratic messaging more or less becoming just "anti-Trump").  And that will likely diffuse on economic matters even further over the coming decades.  However, "switch" is a ridiculous term, much less prediction.  Even if the hyper rich completely abandon the GOP (let's remember that 17 of the top 25 billionaire contributors in 2020 gave to Trump, not Biden) or the GOP completely loses support from key economic industries like Wall Street or natural gas (sorry, never going to happen), economic conservatism goes beyond big business.  A "lower middle class" person in Nebraska might actually want and need less government intervention in economic matters than an "upper middle class" person in NOVA.  The GOP will not be literally to the left of the Democrats on economic matters at any point in the next century.

[Vice President Christian Man]

I don't think this can be answered in a concrete manner. but it is possible that the orientation in some ways will look similar to the Dems/GOP pre-New Deal where there were fiscally progressive/conservative wings of both parties but with a very different philosophy. I think it would be largely regional in scale but you have people like Justice & Bloomberg proving that its possible we could be in the early stages. But as long as people like McConnell have leadership positions then don't expect the GOP to agree on anything remotely favorable to the WC.

[Vosem]

The Overton Window will probably just move left for everyone, just like it moved right with the rise of neoliberalism. What I think we might be seeing is a "Red Tory" rebranding of American conservatism: emphasis on the connection between the individual and the community, supportive of some aspects of a welfare state as a noblesse oblige, protectionist.

What aspects of American conservatism do either of these things?

I think the Overton Window moved right for everyone in 2009-10 and there has been a long effort to deny that this happened, which will probably not be tenable by the end of this decade. The causes of that shift suggest that at least for economic/fiscal questions the Overton Window will probably continue shifting right, at least until some kind of very large-scale catastrophe (pandemic/war/climate-shift/rogue-technology) happens.

Gretchen, stop trying to "make right wing economics are popular" happen! It's not going to happen!

It's been happening for the last few decades and the general logic of cultural shifts suggests that it should continue happening for the foreseeable future. My guess is that the sum of both parties' ideological movements will be economically rightwards over the next 10-15 years. (If Republicans move leftwards, it'll be because Democrats are galloping rightwards, and vice versa. Most likely is that both parties will move a little bit right, though.)

[The Right Honourable Martin Brian Mulroney PC CC GOQ]

No, they won't switch. Younger generations of Democrats are particularly driven by left-wing economics. The "woke" stuff I find is often a litmus test used by millennial/Gen Z leftists, and that can be very off-putting to moderates and conservatives. However, that's not what primarily motivates politicians like AOC, nor what drives Sanders/Squad support base. It's economics, on which they are pretty left-wing by comparison to boomer Democrats.

So let's think of it this way - Biden, Pelosi, etc will kick the bucket pretty soon, and AOC, Cori Bush, etc will gain a more prominent role in the party. Same way, boomer/Gen X Democrats who have progressive social views but don't want their taxes to go up or their houses to be devalued, they're going to kick the bucket and be replaced by millennial/Gen Z Democrats who came up during the time of Occupy, Bernie, etc. Does that sound like a recipe for an economically right-wing party?

Now the question is, do the Republicans shift left on economics? To some extent, that's inevitable. The Reagan-era economic worldview has slowly but consistently lost public support for some time now, and that's not going to stop, because the issues today are different. But when it comes to economics, there are other things to consider:

1. Some people have very strongly held views on economics. But they're probably in the minority compared to "pocketbook issue voters". Think about how popular student loan forgiveness is among the Democratic base - yes it's a left-wing policy, but would a similarly left-wing policy targeted to seniors have the same resonance with Bernie supporters? Probably not. Or for another example, if you're a renter and your rent goes up, you're more likely to look to the left for rent control. If you're a homeowner and your property tax goes up, you're more likely to look to the right for tax cuts. It's not a principled disagreement between the two, they both want fundamentally the same thing (lower housing expenses), but big government appeals more to the renter's immediate economic interest, and small government appeals more to the owner's. My point is, unless the US enters a dark age of massive poverty and economic decline, there will always be a base for right-wing economics, even if it's less orthodox than it used to be.

2. Another factor is family situation. Both in America and comparable western democracies, married people invariably vote to the right of single people. Family size is also a predictor, with larger families generally correlating with social conservatism and religiosity. But make no mistake, this also factors into economics. Married people are more likely to own a house, have more savings, etc even if their individual incomes are less than that of a college-educated professional who is single. Not only that, big families are an economic support system in their own right, reducing the appeal of a state-funded social safety net. It also creates a more inward focus. Again, a single, childless person living in the city may be more concerned about social welfare, but a married couple with three kids is more focused on the welfare of their own kids. So whereas person 1 might say "we need to spend more to help the homeless", person 2 might say "we need to tax less so I can better provide for my kids".

So given all that, I don't see a case for how Democrats would shift right economically. People who are economically left, more often than not, are also socially left; ditto for the right. It's not just a matter of "how much money I have" and "how much do I love Jesus", things like household size can definitely influence both economic and social views. Republicans will probably move a bit left on economics, but a party switch seems implausible.

[The Right Honourable Martin Brian Mulroney PC CC GOQ]

2. Another factor is family situation. Both in America and comparable western democracies, married people invariably vote to the right of single people. Family size is also a predictor, with larger families generally correlating with social conservatism and religiosity. But make no mistake, this also factors into economics. Married people are more likely to own a house, have more savings, etc even if their individual incomes are less than that of a college-educated professional who is single. Not only that, big families are an economic support system in their own right, reducing the appeal of a state-funded social safety net. It also creates a more inward focus. Again, a single, childless person living in the city may be more concerned about social welfare, but a married couple with three kids is more focused on the welfare of their own kids. So whereas person 1 might say "we need to spend more to help the homeless", person 2 might say "we need to tax less so I can better provide for my kids".

To this point btw, I think one of the genuinely worrying social trends is a decline in both romantic cohabitation and fertility among millennials and Gen Z, compared to previous generations. Ostensibly, this is bad for conservatives, if you accept my premise that married people with children are more right-wing than their single, childless counterparts. But what I worry more about is that this will just worsen polarization, particularly on gender lines. The stereotypical example (thinking especially about zoomers) would be like Andrew Tate fans who think women are stupid or whatever, and blue-haired feminists who think all men are horrible. If that's how single and childless people end up in this generation, it won't shift politics to the left or the right, it will only pour fuel on the culture war fires.

[ملكة كرينجيتوك]

2. Another factor is family situation. Both in America and comparable western democracies, married people invariably vote to the right of single people. Family size is also a predictor, with larger families generally correlating with social conservatism and religiosity. But make no mistake, this also factors into economics. Married people are more likely to own a house, have more savings, etc even if their individual incomes are less than that of a college-educated professional who is single. Not only that, big families are an economic support system in their own right, reducing the appeal of a state-funded social safety net. It also creates a more inward focus. Again, a single, childless person living in the city may be more concerned about social welfare, but a married couple with three kids is more focused on the welfare of their own kids. So whereas person 1 might say "we need to spend more to help the homeless", person 2 might say "we need to tax less so I can better provide for my kids".

To this point btw, I think one of the genuinely worrying social trends is a decline in both romantic cohabitation and fertility among millennials and Gen Z, compared to previous generations. Ostensibly, this is bad for conservatives, if you accept my premise that married people with children are more right-wing than their single, childless counterparts. But what I worry more about is that this will just worsen polarization, particularly on gender lines. The stereotypical example (thinking especially about zoomers) would be like Andrew Tate fans who think women are stupid or whatever, and blue-haired feminists who think all men are horrible. If that's how single and childless people end up in this generation, it won't shift politics to the left or the right, it will only pour fuel on the culture war fires.

Part of why I want kids someday is not wanting the next generation of US citizens (and voters) to be dominated by religious conservatives a la Israel. I doubt any of my close (male, nonwhite, US-raised) friends feel the same way, but that might partly have to do with them not being the kind of person who would be part of this forum.

[RINO Tom]

2. Another factor is family situation. Both in America and comparable western democracies, married people invariably vote to the right of single people. Family size is also a predictor, with larger families generally correlating with social conservatism and religiosity. But make no mistake, this also factors into economics. Married people are more likely to own a house, have more savings, etc even if their individual incomes are less than that of a college-educated professional who is single. Not only that, big families are an economic support system in their own right, reducing the appeal of a state-funded social safety net. It also creates a more inward focus. Again, a single, childless person living in the city may be more concerned about social welfare, but a married couple with three kids is more focused on the welfare of their own kids. So whereas person 1 might say "we need to spend more to help the homeless", person 2 might say "we need to tax less so I can better provide for my kids".

To this point btw, I think one of the genuinely worrying social trends is a decline in both romantic cohabitation and fertility among millennials and Gen Z, compared to previous generations. Ostensibly, this is bad for conservatives, if you accept my premise that married people with children are more right-wing than their single, childless counterparts. But what I worry more about is that this will just worsen polarization, particularly on gender lines. The stereotypical example (thinking especially about zoomers) would be like Andrew Tate fans who think women are stupid or whatever, and blue-haired feminists who think all men are horrible. If that's how single and childless people end up in this generation, it won't shift politics to the left or the right, it will only pour fuel on the culture war fires.

Part of why I want kids someday is not wanting the next generation of US citizens (and voters) to be dominated by religious conservatives a la Israel. I doubt any of my close (male, nonwhite, US-raised) friends feel the same way, but that might partly have to do with them not being the kind of person who would be part of this forum.

I get what you're saying, but it's not like kids always take up their parents' politics.  I'm sure a lot of good old fashioned Congregationalist Yankee Republicans thought their Puritan values would be passed on to their kids in the mid-20th Century.

[ملكة كرينجيتوك]

2. Another factor is family situation. Both in America and comparable western democracies, married people invariably vote to the right of single people. Family size is also a predictor, with larger families generally correlating with social conservatism and religiosity. But make no mistake, this also factors into economics. Married people are more likely to own a house, have more savings, etc even if their individual incomes are less than that of a college-educated professional who is single. Not only that, big families are an economic support system in their own right, reducing the appeal of a state-funded social safety net. It also creates a more inward focus. Again, a single, childless person living in the city may be more concerned about social welfare, but a married couple with three kids is more focused on the welfare of their own kids. So whereas person 1 might say "we need to spend more to help the homeless", person 2 might say "we need to tax less so I can better provide for my kids".

To this point btw, I think one of the genuinely worrying social trends is a decline in both romantic cohabitation and fertility among millennials and Gen Z, compared to previous generations. Ostensibly, this is bad for conservatives, if you accept my premise that married people with children are more right-wing than their single, childless counterparts. But what I worry more about is that this will just worsen polarization, particularly on gender lines. The stereotypical example (thinking especially about zoomers) would be like Andrew Tate fans who think women are stupid or whatever, and blue-haired feminists who think all men are horrible. If that's how single and childless people end up in this generation, it won't shift politics to the left or the right, it will only pour fuel on the culture war fires.

Part of why I want kids someday is not wanting the next generation of US citizens (and voters) to be dominated by religious conservatives a la Israel. I doubt any of my close (male, nonwhite, US-raised) friends feel the same way, but that might partly have to do with them not being the kind of person who would be part of this forum.

I get what you're saying, but it's not like kids always take up their parents' politics.  I'm sure a lot of good old fashioned Congregationalist Yankee Republicans thought their Puritan values would be passed on to their kids in the mid-20th Century.

I'm aware of how partisan realignments work, and I won't pretend to know what the parties will look like in 20-40 years time. I expect my hypothetical future children to disagree with me on some things by the time they're my age.

Re: laddicus finch's point- having and caring for children is probably a conservatizing force on the individual level, but given how strong polarization along educational attainment and population density is right now, I'm not sure how much this will affect partisanship among newer and future parents. The green urbanist in me would like to see a resurgence of families moving into denser, more walkable urban communities, regardless of what effect this might have on electoral trends in big city urban cores.

[Ragnaroni]

Switch? No. Exchange planks? Yes.
The GOP seems to pay more attention to working class people than they used to. They might shift in favor of them. Ever since 2016, some of their rhetoric has changed and they will probably continue to appeal to them. The Democrats are seeming more corporate in ways. They got the support of big tech and appear quite favorable towards big tech. The traditionally big business party seems to despise big tech.

The Republicans are still the party of the energy companies and more established businesses, the Democrats still back unions and working class policies.

[RussFeingoldWasRobbed]

No and I'll echo RINO Tom said, they don't have to to appeal to non college whites. What is not popular to these voters is far right economic policy like abolishing SS, as evidenced by Rojos underpwrformance and Blake Masters getting demolished.