2024 ROC Prez and Legislative elections Jan 13th

[jaichind]

Now that Taipei 3rd by-election we can view any future ROC political developments as part of the 2024 Prez/Legislative elections and not part of the 2022 ROC unified local elections.

The first up would be March 4th Nanto County(南投縣) (PVI Blue +5) 2nd by-election.  It is a Blue +2 district. The sitting KMT MP was elected county magistrate in Nov 2022.  The DPP will nominate the losing DPP candidate for county magistrate and the KMT will run the retiring KMT county magistrate.  With two heavyweight candidates (both are at the county level) but with candidate quality somewhat on KMT's side I expect a KMT 55-45 win.

[jaichind]

For Prez election

On the KMT side realistically it will be just re-elected KMT sitting mayor of New Taipei City (新北市)  (PVI Blue +1) 侯友宜 (Hou Yu-Ih) or  Foxconn CEO 郭台銘 (Terry Gou).  Guo fan of the KMT nomination in 2020 and lost in a bitter race against Han leading to a break between Guo and KMT.   It does seem that Guo wants to come back although the rumor mill is that he will come back to support Hou himself as a kingmaker.  In theory, KMT chairperson 朱立倫(Eric Chu), who was mayor of  Taoyuan City (桃園市) (PVI Blue +4) and then mayor of New Taipei City (新北市)  (PVI Blue +1) himself ran in a disastrous campaign against DPP Tsai in 2016, might run but bitter memories of 2016 pretty much mean he cannot win a KMT primary and he will mostly focus on being a kingmaker. 

On the DPP side, it is clearly DPP VP 賴淸德 (Lai Ching‑Te).  Lai who was mayor of Tainan City (臺南市) (PVI Green +11) and then DPP PM before challenging DPP Prez Tsai in 2020 for the DPP nomination lost and was forced to take the DPP VP spot.  The relationship between Tsai and Lai continues to be poor.  It is said that in the 2020-2022 period, DPP VP Lai worked one floor away from DPP Prez Tsai in the ROC presidential office but neither person ever walked over to visit the other with both meetings only in formal settings.  Lai's chances of being the DPP candidate are very high but it is also very likely he will not have the full support of DPP Prez Tsai and her faction.

On the TPP side, it will of course be 柯文哲 (Ko Wen-Je) who just stepped down as TPP mayor of Taipei City (臺北市) (PVI Blue +4).  Ko was deep Green and won in 2014 with DPP support but over the last 5-6 years has shifted dramatically to the Blue side and if he were to run he will most likely draw more Pan-Blue votes than Pan-Greens with heavy bias toward the youth vote.  TPP mostly underperformed in 2022 despite winning Hsinchu City(新竹市) (PVI Blue +3) mayor through KMT tactical voting.  If Ko were to run I suspect he will end up with less than 10% of the vote through tactical voting on both sides.

[jaichind]

As for legislative elections even though DPP has a good shot at winning the Prez race it is fairly likely the Pan-Blue will recapture the legislative majority.  The ROC legislative election has 73 FTPT seats, 6 Aborigine seats, and 34 PR seats.

2008 to 2020 results are (FPTP and Aborigine I just use Blue/Green balance) while PR I will break out by the party

                          Blues   KMT   PFP   TPP        Greens  DPP   TSU    NPP
2008 FPTP             60                                      13
2008 Aborigine        6                                        0
2008 PR                          20                                       14
2008 Total            86                                       27

2012 FPTP             46                                      27
2012 Aborigine        6                                        0
2012 PR                          16       2                               13       3
2012 Total            70                                       43
 
2016 FPTP             20                                      53
2016 Aborigine        5                                        1
2016 PR                          11       3                               18                  2
2016 Total            39                                       74

2020 FPTP             23                                      50
2020 Aborigine        4                                        2
2020 PR                          13              5                         13                 3
2020 Total            40                         5            68

For 2020 TPP leaned Blue but should not really be viewed as part of the Pan-Blue bloc

This time around with TPP really part of the Blue bloc I think the result will most likely be

2024 FPTP             41                                      32
2024 Aborigine        4                                        2
2024 PR                          15              3                         14                 2
2024 Total            63                                       50

[jaichind]

One interesting thing about the DPP power transition in 2024 is that DPP Prez Tsai is the longest-serving leader of a major party since Chiang Kai-Shek.  DPP and proto-DPP had no strong leader until Chen in 1999 when he took over the party and then became ROC Prez in 2000.  Also after 2016, KMT has no strong dominant leader. So if you look at the ROC world after Chiang Kai-Shek's death in 1975 you had tenure of leaders of major parties

KMT Chiang junior 1975-1988 -> 13 years
KMT Lee 1988-2000 -> 12 years  (frankly Lee was not really in charge of KMT until 1990)
DPP Chen 1999-2008 -> 9 years
KMT Lien 2000-2005 -> 5 years
KMT Ma 2005-2016 -> 11 years
DPP Tsai 2008-2024 -> 16 years

Given the fact that Tsai was de facto in charge of DPP for 16 years, it will be hard for her to give it up.  Because of this dynamic even if her rational side wants to help Lai win in practice she will view every Lai move to lead the DPP for the 2024 campaign as an attempt to marginalize her.  At a conscious or subconscious level, I am sure Tsai would rather DPP lose in 2024 if it means she continues her de facto leadership role of the DPP.

On the KMT side if Hou wins the ROC Prez it will start a Hou era where KMT will finally have a dominate leader which would be a first since 2016.

[jaichind]

Are the Chinese threats from the time Pelosi visited Taiwan having an effect on the election?

With Biden clearly trying to leverage his record on the Russia-Ukraine War for his re-election in 2024 I expect the GOP to try to outflank the Dems on the PRC issue in 2023.  I wonder if GOP Speaker McCarthy will repeat Pelosi's visit to ROC in 2023.  

If so I am not sure if the DPP regime will be so hot on that.  Some DPP post-mortem of the 2022 ROC local elections did report that Pelosi's visit followed by the PRC reaction mostly hurt the DPP in the elections in Nov 2022.  On the flip side if the DPP finds itself behind the KMT in Fall 2023 for the Jan 2024 Prez elections I can see DPP taking the bet and asking GOP Speaker McCarthy to visit.

If anything DPP  post-mortems of 2022 seem to indicate that PRC Pelosi's visit and PRC counteractions mostly helped the relatively pro-PRC KMT.

[jaichind]

Are the Chinese threats from the time Pelosi visited Taiwan having an effect on the election?

With Biden clearly trying to leverage his record on the Russia-Ukraine War for his re-election in 2024 I expect the GOP to try to outflank the Dems on the PRC issue in 2023.  I wonder if GOP Speaker McCarthy will repeat Pelosi's visit to ROC in 2023.  

If so I am not sure if the DPP regime will be so hot on that.  Some DPP post-mortem of the 2022 ROC local elections did report that Pelosi's visit followed by the PRC reaction mostly hurt the DPP in the elections in Nov 2022.  On the flip side if the DPP finds itself behind the KMT in Fall 2023 for the Jan 2024 Prez elections I can see DPP taking the bet and asking GOP Speaker McCarthy to visit.

If anything DPP  post-mortems of 2022 seem to indicate that PRC Pelosi's visit and PRC counteractions mostly helped the relatively pro-PRC KMT.

I'm sorry why did China threatening Taiwan turn the Taiwanese into a pro-PRC people?

Not really.  According to some DPP post-mortem of the 2022 ROC local elections after the Pelosi visits the PRC pushed the military boundaries of what the PLA will do (missiles over ROC, planes, and military craft much closer to the main Taiwan Province island) without really having a reaction from ROC nor USA.  This non-response served the demoralized the anti-PRC DPP youth vote which added to lower youth turnout allowing the relatively more pro-KMT base turnout to be relatively higher in 2022 ROC local elections which in turn led to the DPP rout.

[jaichind]

KMT/Pan-Blue views on the Mainland ranges from unification now to do-not-rock-the-boat and don't anger PRC.

Fair statement. For ROC-PRC relations the best way to think about it is

Deep Blue - Pro-Unification but many factions on nature and conditions of said unification
Light Blue - Open to Unification or independence but decide later and most importantly do not rock the boat.
Light Green - Status quo for as long as possible
Deep Green - Independence with many factions on timing and condition

I am Deep Blue but my extended family, like most extended families on ROC, have people in all 4 camps.

Likely 2024 KMT Prez candidate Hou by coming out against ROC being used as a pawn by "Great Power" (read USA) is trying to unify the Deep Blue and Light Blue camps while not provoking the Light Green camp.

BTW, if and when the USA questions Hou on "what do you mean by "Great Power"?" Hou will say: "I was talking about PRC"  And if and when PRC questions Hou on "what do you mean by "Great Power"?" Hou would say "clearly I was talking about the USA".  The key benefit for Hou is that both USA and PRC will not be in the room at the same time with Hou

[jaichind]

The KMT post-mortem on the closer-than-expected Taipei 3rd by-election was that the DPP candidate cleverly ran a low-key campaign so as to not provoke anti-DPP swing voters to turn out and gamble that the DPP base would turn out.  He won the bet as the election became a KMT vs DPP base turnout which for this Blue +3 district translated into a 5% vote share victory for the KMT versus a 10%-15% gap in pre-election polls. 

This result again shows the 2022 local election was an anti-DPP wave and not a pro-KMT wave.  If DPP Lai can maintain the core DPP base and the pan-Blue camp factures in 2023 there is a good chance DPP Lai can win in 2024 despite clear anti-DPP headwinds.

[jaichind]

Historical ROC Prez election Blue/Green split

              Blue        Green
1996     65.41%     34.59%  (estimated as part of the KMT Lee's vote was Pan-Green)
2000     60.07%     39.93%  (DPP Chen wins as the Pan-Blue vote was split)
2004     49.89%     50.11%
2008     58.45%     41.55%
2012     54.37%     45.63%
2016     43.88%     56.12%
2020     42.87%     57.13%

As a % of VAP

              Blue        Green
1996    49.20%     26.02%
2000    49.20%     32.71%
2004    39.03%     39.21%
2008    44.22%     31.43%
2012    40.14%     33.69%
2016    28.70%     36.71%
2020    31.75%     42.31%

2016 was a breakout year for DPP but looking at it from a % of VAP 2020 was the real DPP breakout year where their 42.31% vote share as a % of VAP broke through their 2004 performance.  DPP re-elections are very strong in terms of vote share as a % of VAP (2004 and 2020).

The Pan-Blue and Pan-Green core votes both are around 31% of VAP (2008 for Pan-Green and 2020 for Pan-Blue.)  2016 part of the Pan-Blue core vote failed to turn out to protest KMT candidate Chu replacing the struggling Deep Blue KMT Prez candidate Hung so I would discount that data point.

[jaichind]

Historical ROC legislative PR vote (since 2008)

              KMT   Minor Blue  Total Blue      TPP        DPP     Minor Green Total Green
2008    51.23%    5.67%       56.90%                 36.91%     6.19%       43.10%
2012    44.55%    8.36%       52.91%                 34.62%   12.47%       47.09%
2016    26.91%   16.09%      43.00%                 44.06%   12.94%       57.00%
2020    33.36%    6.37%       39.73%   11.22%   33.98%   15.07%       49.05%

In 2020 TPP was mostly 2/3 light Blue and 1/3 light Green although most of the light Blue voters that voted for TPP also voted for DPP Prez Tsai as the moderate candidate over the radical KMT Han.  In 2022 TPP is now mostly 90% light Blue and 10% light Green with almost all its 2022 candidates having a Pan-Blue background and the couple that has light Green background did poorly as most of their light green voters gone back to the Pan-Green candidates.

If we view the 2020 TPP as 2/3 Blue and 1/3 Green then the 2020 Blue/Green balance would be 47.21%/52.79% which would make sense as the 2020 Pan-Blue legislative district vote share improved a lot from 2016 levels even though it made a minor difference in terms of seats won by the Pan-Blue camp.  At the district level, 2020 really looks a lot like 2012 only with the Blue and Green camps reversed which seems to be born out in the PR vote levels comparisons between 2012 and 2020.

[jaichind]

DPP PM Su resigns.   It seems former DPP VP Chen will take over as the new PM.   Chen is very close to DPP Prez Tsai and will clearly to used to counter Lai's influence in the party once Lai becomes DPP Chairperson.   Question is will Chen also seek the DPP nomination.  Note that Chen just does not have the same clout within DPP as Su so he will be less effective at countering Lai.  But if the vision is for Chen to see the DPP nomination to stop Lai then this move makes sense. 

[jaichind]

The 2020 legislative election PR vote distribution points to a clear problem ahead for the Pan-Green camp as far as vote distribution is concerned.   The 2020 PR vote was

DPP       33.98%
KMT       33.36%
TPP        11.22%
NPP         7.75%
PFP         3.66% (de facto light blue and friendly with TPP)
TSP         3.16% (radical independence)
GP          2.41%  (Green party)
NP          1.04%  (Radical Right unification)
TPAP       1.01% (anti-Tsai Right independence) (defunct)
SFP         0.67% (social conservative) (de facto merged into KMT)
TSU         0.36% (right lean independence, old pro-Lee pro-independence KMT splinter)
CPA         0.28% (light blue) (de facto merged into KMT)
UP           0.23% (Right unification)
IU           0.22% (religious conservative)
FA           0.21% (anti-Tsai Right independence)
LP           0.14% (Left unification)
UAA        0.12% (far right)
TRP         0.08% (light green)
SSFPP     0.08% (radical independence)

Even though DPP Prez Tsai won by a landslide the DPP PR vote underperformed.  This is because Tsai's moderate position on PRC-ROC relationships got her a bunch of light blue voters (many of which voted TPP on the PR ballot) and turned off a bunch of Deep Green voters that voted for NPP and TSP.

This time around the situation on the Pan-Blue side is simple.  With Soong de facto retired the PFP PR vote is most likely going to flow to KMT or TPP.  So beyond KMT and TPP, there is zero chance of any pan-Blue minor getting past the 5% threshold for PR.  This makes it very easy for the Deep Blue and Light Blue voters.

On the Pan-Green side, I foresee trouble.  With DPP Lai on the top of the ticket, he will draw back a lot of Deep Green voters back to voting for DPP on the PR ballot.  Worse, among the Deep Green minors it is clear that TSP has gained on NPP.  So for the Deep Green voter, there is a strategic dilemma of figuring out which party to vote for on the PR ballot (DPP NPP, or TSP) without wasting their vote.  If fact I can see the nightmare scenario for the Pan-Greens of NPP 4% and TSP 4% with both eating up a lot of potential DPP votes without getting any PR seat.   In Japanese science jargon, they call something like this 共倒 (coupled and coordinated joint fall).  My default scenario is still NPP gets by 5% and not TSP but I can definitely see a situation where TSP is above 5% but not NPP or both do  not cross 5%.

[jaichind]

Some KMT MPs are advocating for a Pan-Blue primary to come up with a united front Pan-Blue candidate.  What they have in mind is a Hou vs Guo vs Ko Pan-Blue primary with the winner becoming a joint KMT-TPP grand alliance anti-DPP candidate to take on DPP Lai 1-on-1.

[jaichind]

DPP PM Su resigns.   It seems former DPP VP Chen will take over as the new PM.   Chen is very close to DPP Prez Tsai and will clearly to used to counter Lai's influence in the party once Lai becomes DPP Chairperson.   The question is will Chen also seek the DPP nomination?  Note that Chen just does not have the same clout within DPP as Su so he will be less effective at countering Lai.  But if the vision is for Chen to see the DPP nomination to stop Lai then this move makes sense.  

There is still no official confirmation of this but it seems so many media outlets are saying this and it is not being contradicted making this almost 99% true.  It seems this will be done after the Chinese New Year break.

This brings us to former DPP VP 陳建仁(Chen Chien-Jen) who is likely to be the new PM.  Note that 陳建仁(Chen Chien-Jen) comes from a prominent KMT political family with his father 陳新安 (Chen Shin-An) being the KMT county magistrate of 高雄縣(Kaoshiung County) (this is well before the 高雄縣(Kaoshiung County)  merged into 高雄市(Kaoshiung City) in 2010) in 1954-1957.  高雄縣(Kaoshiung County) politics were always about the pro-KMT White, pro-KMT Red, and anti-KMT Black factions.  The Black faction was really proto-DPP in 高雄縣(Kaoshiung County).  陳新安 (Chen Shin-An) was the leader of the White faction but often did deals with the Black faction to counter the Red faction in some cases.  陳建仁(Chen Chien-Jen) was non-political and became an academic but did have connections to both KMT and DPP politicians due to his father's connections to the KMT as well as his personal friendship with the proto-DPP Black faction.

As an academic 陳建仁(Chen Chien-Jen)'s views drifted to a more pro-DPP position later in his life and were selected by Tsai to run in 2016 as her VP candidate as an independent.  He stepped down in 2020 to make way for Lai to be the DPP VP candidate to ensure a united DPP in 2020.  He was and remains close to DPP Prez Tsai.  This makes sense since both Tsai and Chen are
a) Non-political background and mostly involved in the academic world earlier in their career
b) Had mostly pro-KMT light blue views as academics
c) Drifted to the DPP position mostly due to being involved in politics
d) As a result are not really thought of as "core" DPP



陳建仁(Chen Chien-Jen) joined DPP in 2021 which was always read as DPP Prez Tsai making plans for 陳建仁(Chen Chien-Jen) to either become the DPP PM and/or run for DPP Prez nomination in 2024.   It seems even in her weakened state DPP Prez Tsai still wants to try to get Chen's political career forward including possibly running for DPP Prez nomination as the Tsai faction candidate against DPP VP Lai.

[jaichind]

陳建仁(Chen Chien-Jen) being made PM will "trigger" DPP VP and almost certainly the new DPP chairperson Lai.  The reason Lai was a known critic of Tsai and had reservations about her 2012 and 2016 Prez runs as DPP Prez candidate was mostly "Tsai was not even a member of the DPP until 2001 and until 2000 when she joined the DPP administration she was clearly light blue pro-KMT and has some Chinese nationalist views. Her ideological loyalty to DPP is suspect, she has done nothing to build the DPP when the DPP was in opposition in the 1990s.  Why should she jump the queue to become the DPP Prez candidate?"

Now, this statement can be said about former DPP VP 陳建仁(Chen Chien-Jen) as well especially if Lai sees Chen's likely appointment as PM as Tsai wanting Chen to use that office to gather the resources and power to run for the DPP nomination against Lai later in 2023.

[jaichind]

DPP Chairperson election today.  DPP VP Lai is the only candidate so the only real issue is the turnout of DPP members.  The higher the turnout the more excited the DPP base is about Lai.

[jaichind]

DPP VP Lai wins 1 person DPP Chairperson election with 99.65% of the vote on a 17.6% turnout.  Around 42K voted.  In early 2019 when DPP Prez Tsai also stepped down to the DPP defeat in the 2018 local elections the contested DPP Chairperson election was 16.9% with around 34K voted.  DPP has since gained more party members.  This result is about par.  Lai being a political superstar on the DPP side clearly will push up turnout in a one-person race.

These turnout numbers are still small when compared to KMT leadership races which were all very contested

             Turnout   Total vote 
2016        41.6%    140K
2017        58.1%    276K
2020        35.9%    123K
2021        50.7%    188K

The fact is that in 2019 it was a Tsai proxy candidate that ran and won and in 2022 it is Lai all the way so turnout is just going to be lower than contested KMT races.  The 2016-2021 contested KMT leadership races speak to a lack of a dominant leadership personality for the KMT which clearly has hurt the KMT in Prez level elections against DPP.

[jaichind]

One thing Chinese politicians like to do is to deliver messages indirectly through references to history when it might be too blunt for them to do so indirectly.  There are examples of this that goes back at least a couple of thousands of years.

We saw this again yesterday when DPP PM Su spent time in an interview praising Ming general 袁崇煥 (Yuan Chonghuan) (1584-1630).   Su said that had Yuan not been executed in 1630 most likely the Ming dynasty would have survived.



 Yuan was a general that fought in the Ming-Ching conflict that started in 1618.  He outperformed in a battle in 1626 and was promoted to COC of all Ming forces fighting against the Ching by the young Emperor 崇禎(Chongzhen) (1611-1644). 



From 1626 to 1630 Yuan fought the Ching forces to a draw but was accused of treason and executed in 1630 by Emperor 崇禎(Chongzhen)  mostly due to distrust that Yuan was amassing too much political and military power by both the Emperor and various court factions. 

After 1630 the Ming-Ching war continued but ate up more and more Ming resources which in turn led to massive Ming peasant rebellions.  The peasant rebels entered the Ming capital of Beijing in early 1644  and Emperor 崇禎(Chongzhen) committed suicide.  In the chaos of the fall of the Ming, the Ching forces were able to defeat the peasant rebels and remaining Ming forces to unify China under the Ching. 

Su clearly is using this story to portray himself as a loyal general fighting on behalf of the Emperor (read DPP Prez Tsai) fighting against a rival empire (read KMT and PRC) and freeing the Emperor to deal with internal rebellions (read DPP VP Lai).  Now that Su is being dismissed as PM he is comparing his soon future removal from office as the same as the mistake Emperor 崇禎(Chongzhen) made by executing 袁崇煥 (Yuan Chonghuan).

The best way to read Su's interview is despite any polite words from him about respecting DPP Prez Tsai's decision on who should be PM, Su is clearly very upset about being removed from office and thinks it is a big mistake.  He also implies that the likely outcome of him being removed is that DPP Prez Tsai will lose her empire to the KMT in the upcoming election in 2024.

[jaichind]

Renegade DPP pollster TPOF poll on best 2024 Prez candidate for KMT

Hou     36.7
Guo     28.6
Chu       7.9% (current Chairperson of KMT and 2016 KMT candidate)
Chao     4.0% (co-founder of NP in 1993 and now media personality, recently rejoined KMT)


On the DPP side it is
Lai      57.7
Chen   16.7 (former DPP VP)
Su        5.9 (current DPP PM)

[jaichind]

Part of Lai's Chinese name (賴淸德) has the same character as the Qing Dynastic name (淸) so it is a double entrende as well.

Yeah.  Various political commentators have used that connection in saying that Su was referring to Lai as the "Ching armies" that he was blocking.  Others use my theory that he was talking about KMT or PRC.  Or maybe he meant all 3 of them.  One way or another this analogy is totally unflattering to DPP Prez Tsai.

[jaichind]

Just to hammer the point go that he does not want to go as PM, DPP PM Su once again, in an interview, talked about how it was critical that  Ming general 袁崇煥 (Yuan Chonghuan) and Emperor 崇禎(Chongzhen) need to stay united to keep the Ming Dynasty alive.  At this stage, it is no longer just a suggestion.  He is outright threatening DPP Prez Tsai that if she removes him as PM then she will go down as the person that loses the DPP hold on power in 2024.

The entire ROC political system is sort of warped.  On paper, the ROC Prez has little power and the ROC PM has tons of administrative power.  But what the Prez does have is the power to appoint the PM which means that in de facto terms the Prez is in charge by acting through the actions of the PM.  It also means a PM with a mind of his or her own does create conflict.  Also on paper while the Prez can appoint the PM the Prez cannot legally remove the PM.  It is a merely political tradition that the PM serves at the pleasure of the Prez. 

Traditionally the PM can sense that things are not going well politically and offer to resign for the Prez to appoint a new PM.  DPP PM Su seems to be different.  He seems not to get the message that he has to go and seems to insist that DPP Prez Tsai openly ask him to resign.  He then preemptively threaten DPP Prez that if she formally asks him to resign she will lose the DPP in the 2024 election with him going down as a martyr for the DPP.

[jaichind]

On the topic of Chinese politicians using historical stories to indirectly send their political message the most famous one has to be the Maoist faction led by Mao's wife Jiang Chin in the fall of  1976. 

As Mao was nearing death the Maoist faction-controlled People's Daily published an editorial that was "劉邦之後 吕后接班" or "After Liu Bang, Empress Lu proved a worthy successor to carry out his work" which refers to the fact that after the death of the Han Dynasty founder 劉邦(Liu Bang) his wife 吕后(Empress Lu) was in charge for a while.  吕后(Empress Lu) also carried out a bloody purge of her political opponents after she took over.   劉邦(Liu Bang)  and Mao is very similar as both were from commoner background and won power in a protracted civil war. 

So having that particular editorial in the People Daily is like having the NY Times, Washington Post, and other key papers publishing a headline on the same day "Jiang Chin led Maoist bloc to launch coup after Mao's death and purge their opponents" right around the time that Mao is likely to pass away.

BTW, right after Mao's death a grand alliance of anti-Mao factions launch their own preemptive coup and arrested the Jiang Chin and her Maoist faction also known as Gang of Four.

[jaichind]

TVBS Prez poll

3 way

KMT Hou  34
DPP Lai    25
TPP Ko     21

KMT Guo  34
DPP Lai    25
TPP Ko     20

DPP Lai    31
TPP Ko     30
KMT Chu  14

Guo and Hou pretty much perform the same in 3-way battles.

2 way

KMT Hou  51
DPP Lai    32

KMT Guo  47
DPP Lai    34

DPP Lai    44
KMT Chu  25

Hou is stronger than Guo in 2-way fights.

Hou vs Lai vs Ko cross-tabs

             DPP       KMT        TPP      NPP     TSP     Ind.      Other
           (22%)     (24%)   (11%)   (4%)   (1%)   (28%)    (10%)
Hou        11         74          30       19        14       29         21
Lai          73          2            2       25         67      17         18
Ko            6        14           61       41         0        21         19


Gou vs Lai vs Ko cross-tabs

             DPP       KMT        TPP      NPP     TSP     Ind.      Other
           (22%)     (24%)   (11%)   (4%)   (1%)   (28%)    (10%)
Gou        17         66          40       13          4       26         23
Lai          68          4            3       24        77       19         19
Ko            6        17           51       45         0        20         15

Hou is better at keeping the KMT base and eating into the NPP vote than Guo.  But Guo is better at eating into DPP and TPP voters than Hou.   Hou is better at taking light green while Guo is better at taking the youth vote.

[jaichind]

Renegade DPP pollster TPOF did a poll on the back of KMT Hou's comment about "we should not be a pawn of a superpower."     

The poll question is "There are reasons to be suspicious of the USA's intentions when they want to increase defense and political connections with us.  The USA might be pushing us into conflict with PRC for their benefit.  Do you agree or disagree?"

The result was agreed/disagree 38/53

This is not as bad for KMT Hou as it appears.  What is interesting is agree of youth voters was 52.  Many older pan-Blue voters mainly disagreed due to their memories of the USA-ROC alliance during the Cold War even as they embrace more constructive relationships with PRC.  It seems the youth vote is not anti-PRC per se but anti-superpower.  Post-2012 the DPP was able to effectively portray the PRC as the superpower to be against and this poll shows an opening for the KMT to try to get the youth anti-superpower views to turn against the DPP and their links to the USA.

Some DPP postmortems of the 2022 local elections indicated attitudes toward the USA among pro-DPP anti-KMT youth got more negative toward the USA after the Pelosi visit in the Summer of 2022.  This poll seems to confirm that narrative.

[jaichind]

https://www.ft.com/content/073c1abc-b230-48df-986e-42002b817e6a

"Taiwan presidential contender sparks US concerns over China tensions"

Note this FT article came out just as DPP VP Lai becomes the Chairperson of DPP.  DPP Prez Tsai is behind this.  She is feeding her concerns about Lai to USA using the excuse that Lai might be a radical on the Taiwan Independence issue.  This article is a warning to Lai that he still has to pass the USA "interview" before he can become ROC Prez.  Spoiler alert: Lai's position on Taiwan Independence is not the real issue from DPP Prez Tsai point of view.  It is really a personality conflict between the two.