Lebanon Parliamentary Elections- May 15, 2022

[NewYorkExpress]

https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/15/middleeast/lebanon-elections-polls-open-intl/index.html

Polls in crisis-ridden Lebanon opened for a high-stakes parliamentary election on Sunday morning.

The election is the first in Lebanon since a 2019 popular uprising demanded the downfall of the ruling elite, blaming traditional parties for widespread corruption and mismanagement. Several new political groups sprung out of the protest movement and are competing in Sunday's race, coming head to head with establishment parties.

Political observers view the election as highly competitive and unpredictable. Earlier this year, three-time prime minister Saad Hariri -- the leader of the country's largest Sunni Muslim parliamentary bloc -- quit politics, leaving the Sunni vote up for grabs.

Hariri urged people in his constituencies to boycott the race. But voters in Beirut's second electoral districts -- one of Hariri's main strongholds -- showed up at the polls in relatively large numbers, with many telling CNN they voted for "change."

[Walmart_shopper]

Polls are now closed. Despite high turnout among expat voters the turnout today has been incredibly dismal--maybe 40%. The highest turnout has been among Shia voters, and many Sunni are actually boycotting the vote. Reformist parties had hoped to really make a big splash and begin the long process of overhauling a corrupt system, but these numbers are pretty grim. Results will begun trickling in soon.

[Frodo]

https://twitter.com/ReutersWorld/status/1526178233368166400

[Lexii, harbinger of chaos and sexual anarchy]

So far 99 out 128 seats have been officially called for

"Nearly 24 hours since the official end of voting in Lebanon’s Parliamentary elections, Interior Minister Bassam Mawlawi on Monday announced the results of seven voting constituencies — South I, South II, Mount Lebanon I, Mount Lebanon III, Bekaa I, Bekaa II, and Bekaa III — making up 49 seats in Parliament"


https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1299767/official-results-announced-in-seven-constituencies.html

"A few hours after the first batch of Lebanon’s parliamentary election results were officially announced, Interior Minister Bassam Mawlawi announced a little after 10 p.m. the winners of the Beirut I, Mount Lebanon II, and Mount Lebanon IV constituencies, making up 29 seats. "
https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1299801/results-announced-in-mount-lebanon-ii-iv-and-beirut-i-jad-ghosn-loses-after-tight-race.html
"Just before midnight Monday, Interior Minister Bassam Mawlawi announced another set of results of Lebanon’s parliamentary elections, this time for the North III and South III constituencies, covering 21 seats in the legislature."

https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1299817/results-in-south-iii-and-north-iii-opposition-candidate-beats-out-banker-marwan-kheireddine.html

[MRCVzla]

All 128 seats has been called, international media lecture says pro-Hezbollah blocs had lost their majority in Parliament as independent opposition candidates makes notable gains, seems the conservative opposition party Lebanese Forces is the party bloc with most seats. Turnout was 41%.

Seat distribution varies according sources due to the classification of the independent candidates within the blocs
Results pages:
Interior Minister official results (PDF reports by constituency): http://www.interior.gov.lb/AdsDetails.aspx?ida=5438 (arab)
https://www.the961.com/final-results-lebanon-elections-2022/ (english)
https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1299863/legislatives-libanaises-decouvrez-les-noms-de-tous-les-candidats-elus.html (french)

Asia Elects graph with their seat results:

[Velasco]

According to Al Jazeera,  bloc results were the following:

Hezbollah and allies: 58 (down from 71)
Anti-Hezbollah (traditional parties): 47 (down from 56)
Change (anti-establishment): 22 (up from 1)es
Other: 1

● Hezbollah allies lost seats across the country, even though (the Iran-backed) Hezbollah and Amal retained the 27 seats allocated to the Shia. The Free Patriotic Movement won 18 seats and is no longer the largest Christian party. FPM and allies won some 29 seats in 2018.  Key allies, such as Druze leader Talal Arslan in Aley (LDP), and Sunni leader Faysal Karame in Tripoli, have lost their seats to anti-establishment candidates. Additionally two candidates backed by Hezbollah lost to anti-establishment candidates in the 3rd district of South Lebanon

● Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces, a movement backed by the US and Saudí Arabia,  became the largest Christian party winning 20 seats

The Future Movement, which was the largest Sunni party (backed by theSaudis), did not contest the elections after the retirement of Saad Hariri. Some Hariri supporters endorsed the boycott advocated by the former PM, while others quit the party in order to contest the elections

Some analysts feared the vacuum left by the Future Movement in the Sunni constituencies would allow the Hezbollah bloc to expand its influence in West Beirut, Tripoli or Sidon. However opposition and anti-establishment candidates broke through in Beirut II, the Hariri's stronghold

The Druze PSP retained its 9 seats, apparently


● Anti-establishment independents broke into the parliament with 16 succesful candidates,  a 15-seat increase with regards the previous elections. The Armenian Paula Yacoubian, a former TV host and the only elected civil society candidate in 2018,  was re-elected in the Beirut I constituency (East). Sunni independent Ibrahim Mneimeh was elected in Beirut II (West) winning the most individual votes.

Other candidates running on platforms critical of the status quo were elected,  including billionaire businessman Fouad Makhzoumi.

The once influential Kataeb party won 4 seats in Christian constituencies and apparently was running outside the traditional blocs

[PSOL]

The Lebanese Communist Party netted one seat, it’s first ever since its formation.

[Velasco]

Asia Elects tweeted  list results in the South Lebanon districts. I find that information useful, despite the silly ideological classification (saying the FPM is "conservative", or a Nasserist party is "leftwing ", is absolutely meaningless) Sadly I am inable to find list tesults for the rest of Lebanon

https://twitter.com/AsiaElects/status/1527454602043396096?t=H_5TQN4xnq-JU4_Z7imH...

L'Orient Today has some useful information,  particularly about the different independent, opposition and anti-establishment lists contesting the elections - by far the most interesting development. If you cross this information with the winning candidates, you can get a picture

https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1298681/feeling-lost-in-the-weeds-when-looking-at-the-different-lists-of-the-protest-movement-here-are-some-tips-to-make-things-clearer.html

Data and statistics

https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1299854/election-results-data-and-statistics.html

[Velasco]

District profile information and winning candidates (sources: L'Orient Today and The Policy Initiative)

Beirut I

This constituency covers the predominantly Christian neighbourhoods of East Beirut (Achrafieh, Rmeil, Saifi and Medawar). This part of the capital was highly devastated by the 2020 explosion in the Port of Beirut.

Beirut I elects 8 seats, all of them allocated to Christian sects (3 Armenian Orthodox, 1 Armenian Catholic,  1 Maronite,  1 Greek Orthodox,  1 Greek Catholic, 1 Christian minorites)

134886 registered voters  

Confessional distribution: Sunni 11%,  Shiite 1%, Maronite 15%, Greek Orthodox 18%, Protestant 1%, Armenian Orthodox 27%, Greek Catholic 10%, Other 11%

● The 2018 result was the following:

FPM (big tent Christian nationalist) 2 seats
Tachnag (Armenian nationalist, socialist) 2 seats
Lebanese Forces (rightwing Christian nationalist) 1 seat
Pro-LF independent (Jean Talouzian)1 seat
Kataeb (rightwing Christian nationalist) 1 seat
Opposition groups (Paula Yacoubian) 1 seat

Free Patriotic Movement and Tachnag are Aounist groups allied to Hezbollah.  Lebanese Forces and Kataeb are Anti-Hezbollah traditional parties.  Paula Yacoubian was elected on a "civil society" platform and is also against the armed militia. She resigned after the 2020 catastrophe

● 2022 results

FPM 1 seat (Nicolas Sehnaoui)
Tachnag 1 seat (Hagop Terzian)
Lebanese Forces 2 seats (Ghassan Hasbani and Jihad Pakradouni)
Kataeb 1 seat (Nadim Bashir Gemayel)
Independent 1 seat (Jean Talouzian)
New opposition groups 2 seats* (Paula Yacoubian and Cynthia Zarazeer)

* Party affiliation: Tahalof Watani and ReLebanon, respectively

Lists winning seats:

○We Are for Beirut (LF+) 13220 votes (2 seats)
○Sovereign Lebanon (Kataeb +Talouzian) 11271 votes (2 seats)
○We Were and Will Remain (FPM+Tachnag) 10950 votes (2 seats)
○Li Watani (Civil Society and Tahalof Watani) 8261 votes (2 seats)


Beirut II

This constituency encompasses all the neighborhoods of West Beirut. Beirut II has been the undisputed stronghold of the Hariri clan since the 1990s, even though that hegemony was challenged in 2018. Demographically speaking the district has a Sunni majority, alongside a large Shia minority and smaller Christian minorites. The withdrawal of the Hariri's Future Movement left the field open to all possibilities

Beirut II elects 11 seats allocated to Muslim and Christian sects (6 Sunni,  2 Shiite, 1 Druze, 1 Protestant, 1 Greek Orthodox)

371020 registered voters

Confessional distribution: Sunni 61%, Shiite 22%, Maronite 2%, Greek Orthodox 4%, Protestant 1%, Armenian Orthodox 3%, Greek Catholic 2%, Druze 2%, Other 4%

● 2018 result

Amal (Shia conservatism) 1 seat
Hezbollah (Shia Islamism) 1 seat
FPM (big tent Christian nationalist) 1 seat
Al Ahbash (linked to March 8 ) 1 seat
Future Movement  (Sunni, Hariri family) 5 seats
PSP (Druze, Jumblatt family) 1 seat
National Dialogue(Fouad Makhzoumi) 1 seat


The Amal-Hezbollah-FPM-Al Ahbash alliance managed to win 4 seats. Future Movement and the PSP won 6 seats together. The  billionaire Fouad Makhzoumi (National Dialogue) won the remaining seat.

● 2022 result

Amal 1 seat (Mohammad Khawaja)
Hezbollah 1 seat  (Amin Sherri)
FPM 1 seat (Edgard Teaboulsi)
Al Ahbash 1 seat (Adnan Traboulsi)
Jama'a Al Islamiyyah 1 seat (Imad al-Hout)
National Dialogue 1 seat (Fouad Makhzoumi)
PSP 1 seat (Faisal al-Sayegh)
Independents 1 seat (Nabil Badr)
New Opposition groups 3 seats*  (Ibrahim Mneimneh, Melhem Khalaf and Wadah al-Sadiq)


* Party affiliation: Mada, Independent and Khat Ahmar

The five seats vacated by the Future Movement were gained by the opposition list Beirut the Change (3 seats) and the Independent list This Is Beirut (2 seats).

Lists winning seats:

○ Beirut United (Amal+Hezbollah +FPM) 36952 votes (3 seats)
○ Beirut the Change (Tahalof Watani, National Bloc, Opposition) 32823 votes (3 seats)
○This Is Beirut (Independents +Jama'a Al Islamiyyah) 20439 votes (2 seats)
○Beirut Needs a Heart (Makhzoumi) 19421 votes (1 seat)
○Beirut Confronts (Fouad Siniora +PSP) 18060 votes (1 seat)
○To Beirut (Al Ahbash +Beirut Families) 14931 votes (1 seat)
○

[palandio]

In some districts the district-level electoral threshold (votes for list >= total votes / total seats) and/or the rules for proportional distribution of seats had a significant effect on the final seat count. One of the most striking examples might be South I (Saida - Jezzine):

We vote for Change (Bizri/PNO+)          31.0%   3 seats
Our Unity in Saida and Jezzine (LF+)     23.0%   2 seats
   ---    threshold (1/5 of total vote)    ---
Moderation is our Strength (Amal+)      19.3%
Together for Saida and Jezzine (FPM+) 16.2%
We are the Change (Madinati+)              8.1%
Capable (Citizens in a State)                  1.9%
The Voice of Change                               0.5%

[Velasco]

Mount Lebanon I

This overwhelmingly Maronite constituency encompasses Kersouan an Jbeil districts.  

Mount Lebanon I elects 8 seats (7 Maronite and 1 Shiite)

182103 registered voters

Confessional distribution: Sunni 2%, Shiite 11% , Maronite 75%, Greek Orthodox 4%, Armenian Orthodox 1%, Greek Catholic 4%, Other 2%

● 2018 result

FPM and Aoun's group 4 seats
Lebanese Forces 2 seats
Independents (El-Khazem bloc, linked to Marada Movement) 2 seats

Farid Haykal el-Khazen and other independent MPs joined the Sleiman Frangieh's Marada Movement to form the National Coalition bloc. El-Khazem bloc won the seat allocated to the Shia in Jbeil district.  

● 2022 result

Hezbollah 1 seat (Raed Berro)
FPM 2 seats (Nada al-Bassani and Simon Abi Ramia)
Lebanese Forces 2 seats (Ziad Hawat and Chawki Daccache)
Kataeb 1 seat (Salim al-Sayegh)
Independents 2 seats (Neemat Frem and Farid Haykal el-Khazen)

Hezbollah won the seat allocated to the Shia in a joint list with the FPM. The two outgoing Independents that were allied to the FPM, Neemat Frem and Chamel Roukoz, defected the Aoun's group. Frem allied to Kataeb

Lists winning seats:

○We Were and Will Remain (FPM+Hezbollah) 34192 votes (3 seats)
○With You, We Can Until the End (LF+) 27939 votes (2 seats)
○The Cry of a Nation (Frem +Kataeb) 25713 votes (2 seats)
○The Heart of Independent Lebanon (El-Khazem+Roukoz) 14979 votes  (1 seat)


Mount Lebanon II

This constituency encompasses the Metn district, located just north of East Beirut.  

Mount Lebanon II elects 8 seats allocated to Christian sects (4 Maronite, 2 Greek Orthodox,  1 Armenian Orthodox and 1 Greek Catholic)

183441 registered voters

Confessional distribution: Sunni 2%, Shiite 3%, Maronite 44%, Greek Orthodox 15%, Armenian Orthodox 14%, Greek Catholic 19%, Armenian Catholic 3%, Protestant 1%, Druze 1%, Other 7%

● 2018 result

FPM 3 seats
Tachnag 1 seat
Lebanese Forces 1 seat
Kataeb 2 seats
Independent (Michel Murr, died in 2021) 1 seat

● 2022 result

FPM 2 seats (Ibrahim Kanaan and Elias Bou Saab)
Tachnag 1 seat (Hagop Pakradounian)
Lebanese Forces 1 seat (Melhem Riachi)
Pro-LF independent 1 seat (Razi al-Haij)
Kataeb 2 seats (Samy Gemayel and Elias Hankach)
Independent 1 seat (Michel el-Murr*)

* Son of former minister Elias Murr.

Tachnag and the Greek Orthodox Murr family allied in this constituency,  while the FPM was running in its own. Opposition candidate Jad Goshn came close of winning a seat (Goshn ran in a list supported by the MMFD, which I think it failed to reach the threshold by a narrow margin).

Lists winning seats:

○Metn the Change (Kataeb +) 22523 votes (2 seats)
○The Free Metn (LF+) 21301 votes (2 seats)
○We Were and Will Remain (FPM +) 20533 votes (2 seats)
○Together We Are Stronger (Murr +Tachnag) 15997 votes (2 seats)


Mount Lebanon III

This constituency encompasses the Baabda district (or Metn South). There are two distinct regions in this district.  The coastal area covers the southeastern (predominantly Christian) and the impoverished southern suburbs of Beirut.(predominantly Shiite).  Tge inland upper Metn section is mostly Christian and Druze.

Mount Lebanon III elects 6 seats allocated to Christian and Muslim sects (3 Maronite,  2 Shiite,  1 Druze)

171746 registered voters

Confessional distribution: Sunni 7%, Shiite 25%, Maronite 33%, Greek Orthodox 8%, Armenian Orthodox 1%, Greek Catholic 5%, Druze 17%, Other 2%

● 2018 result

Amal 1 seat
Hezbollah 1 seat
FPM 2 seats
Lebanese Forces 1 seat
PSP 1 seat

● 2022 result

Amal 1 seat (Fadi Alame)
Hezbollah 1 seat (Ali Amaar)
FPM 1 seat (Alain Aoun)
Lebanese Forces 1 seat (Pierre Bou Assi)
NLP (March 14) 1 seat (Camille Dory Chamoun)
PSP 1 seat (Hadi Abu Al-Hassan)

Lists winning seats:

○National Accord (Amal+Hezbollah+FPM) 33962 votes (3 seats)
○Sovereignty and Decision  (LF+PSP +Chamoun) 29801 votes (3 seats)

The divided pposition lists failed to reach the threshold


Mount Lebanon IV

This constituency encompasses Chouf and Aley districts. It's the largest constituency in the country and the main stronghold of the Jumblatt family (Druze,  PSP)

Mount Lebanon IV elects 13 seats allocated as follows: 5 Maronite, 4 Druze,  2 Sunni, 1 Greek Orthodox and 1 Greek Catholic

346451 registered voters

Confessional distribution: Sunni 19%, Shiite 3%, Maronite 25%, Greek Orthodox 5%, Greek Catholic 5%, Druze 40%, Other 1%

● 2018 result

FPM and Aoun's group 3 seats
LDP (linked to March 8 ) 1 seat
Lebanese Forces 2 seats
Future Movement 1 seat
PSP and Jumblatt's group 6 seats

● 2022 result

FPM  3 seats (Farid al-Boustany, Georges Atallah and Cesar Abi Khalil)
Lebanese Forces 1 seat (Georges Adwan)
Pro-LF independent 1 seat (Raji Saad)
PSP 5 seats (Taymur Jumblatt, Marwan Hamadeh, Bilal Abdullah, Akram Chehayeb and Nazih Matta)
New opposition groups 3 seats* (Najat Khattar Aoun, Marc Daou and Halima Al-Qaqour)

* Party affiliation: Taqaddom (2) and Lana

LDP leader Talal Arslan (a Druze ally of the March8 alliance) was unseated by opposition candidate Mark Daou

Lists winning seats:

○Partnership and Will (PSP +LF) 83399 votes (7 seats)
○United for Change (Opposition) 42077 votes (3 seats)
○The Mountain (FPM +LDP) 41545 votes (3 seats)

[palandio]

[...]

Mount Lebanon II

[...]

Opposition candidate Jad Goshn came close of winning a seat (Goshn ran in a list supported by the MMFD, which I think it failed to reach the threshold by a narrow margin)

Extremely narrow:
Metn the Change (Kataeb+)                        24.33%   2 seats
The Free Metn (LF+)                                     23.01%   2 seats
We Were and Will Remain for Metn (FPM+)   22.18%   2 seats
Together We are Stronger (Murr/Tashnag+) 17.28%   2 seats
   ---   Threshold (12.50%)   ---
Towards a State (MMFD+)                             12.48%
Sovereignists of the Metn                               0.72%

If we leave everything else equal, but lower the threshold to 12.47%, then Together We are Stronger would lose a seat towards Towards a State. The new seat would be filled by Jad Ghosn. LF's Razi Al Hajj would lose his seat, because with Ghosn there would already be 4 Maronite seats filled by candidates with more preference votes. Tashnag's Hagop Pakradounian (Armenian Orthodox) would lose his seat because the one remaining seat for Together We are Stronger would already be filled by Michel Murr. This leaves one seat to be filled and the candidate would have to be both Armenian Orthodox and a candidate from The Free Metn (LF+): Ara Rafi Badakjian from the Hunchak Party would be elected with 237 preference votes.

[Velasco]

South I

This constituency encompasses Saida (Sidon) and Jezzine districts. It's the smallest constituency in terms of seats and it's characterized by feographic discontinuity,  as well demographic inconsistence.

South I elects 5 seats (2 Sunni, 2 Maronite and 1 Greek Catholic)

129229 voters

Confessional distribution: Sunni 44%, Shiite 16%, Maronite 28%, Greek Orthodox 1%, Armenian Orthodox 10%, Greek Catholic 8%, Druze 1%, Other 1%

● 2018 result

Amal 1 seat*
FPM 2 seats
PNO 1 seat (Osama Saad)**
Future Movement 1 seat


*Despite the Shia minority has not allocated seats, its demographic weight can be decisive. The Nabih Berri bloc claimed a Maronite seat in 2018 (won by Ibrahim Azar), which was hotly contested with the Free Patriotic Movement

** Since the October 2019 uprising, Osama Saad (Popular Nasserist Organization) distanced himself from the March 8 alliance

● 2022 results

Lebanese Forces and allies 2 seats  (Ghada Ayyoub and Saeed al-Asmar)
PNO 1 seat (Osama Saad)
Independents 2 seats (Abdul Rahman al-Bizri and Charbel Massaad)

Lists winning seats:

○We Vote for Change (PNO+Bizri +Independents) 18783 votes (3 seats)
○Our Unity in Saida and Jezzine (LF+Related to Future) 13948 votes (2 seats)


FPM and Amal failed to reach the threshold (see post above). The list backed by LF and former Future Movement members grabbed a Maronite and the one Greek Catholic seat. The list of the doctor Bizri and Osama Saad (We Vote for Change) won the 2 Sunni seats and the remaining Maronite seat

South II

This overwhelmingly Shia constituency encompasses Sour (Tyre) and Zahrani districts. It is the stronghold of Nabih Berri,  the speaker of Parliament. The alliance of Amal and Hezbollah is absolutely hegemonic, with voting percentages over 89% or even 90%

South III elects 7 seats allocated as follows: 6 Shiite and 1 Greek Catholic

328064 registered voters

Confessional distribution: Sunni 7%, Shiite 81%, Maronite 5%, Greek Catholic 6%, Other 1%

● 2018 result

Amal 5 seats
Hezbollah 2 seats

● 2022 results

Amal 5 seats (Nabih Berri, Ali Khreis, Inaya Ezzedine, Ali Osseiran and Michel Moussa)
Hezbollah 2 seats (Hassan Ezzedine and Hussein Jashi)

List winning seats:

○Hope and Loyalty (Amal+Hezbollah) 138742 votes (7 seats)

South III

This constituency encompasses Nabatieh,  Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun and Hasbaya districts.  It's predominantly Shiite except for the Marjayoun-Hasbaya region (Druze, Sunni and Christian minorites). The hegemony of Amal-Hezbollah is not as absolute in the non-Shia areas. Addittionally he Lebanese Communist Party has a significant base in some Shiite localities of the region.

South III elects 11 seats allocated as follows: 8 Shiite,  2 Sunni,  1 Druze and 1 Greek Orthodox

497531 registered voters

Confessional distribution: Sunni 7%, Shiite 79%, Maronite 5%, Greek Orthodox 2%, Greek Catholic 2%, Druze 4%, Other 1%

● 2018 result

Amal and Nabih Berri's group 7 seats
Hezbollah 3 seats
Syrian Social Nationalist Party 1 seat

● 2022 result

Amal 6 seats (Ali Hassan Khalil, Ashraf Baydoun, Ayoub Hmeid, Hani Kobeisy, Nasser Jaber and Qassem Hashem*)
Hezbollah 3 seats (Ali Fayyad, Mohammad Raad and Hassan Fadlallah)
New opposition groups  2 seats** (,Elias Jaradeh and Firas Hamdan)

*Depending on the source, the Sunni MP Qassem Hashem would belong to Amal Movement or the Ba'ath Party

**Party affiliation: Independent

Lists winning seats:

○Hope and Loyalty (Amal +Hezbollah +SSNP) 197822 votes (9 seats)
○Together Towards Change (joint opposition list) 30384 votes (2 seats)


The opposition groups grabbed the Greek Orthodox seat from the SSNP and the Druze from Amal

[Velasco]

Bekaa I

This constituency encompasses Zahle district

Bekaa I elects 7 seats allocated as follows: 2 Greek Catholic,  1 Maronite,  1 Greek Orthodox,  1 Armenian Orthodox,  1 Sunni and 1 Shiite

183325 registered voters

Confessional distribution: Sunni 30%, Shiite 17%, Maronite 16%, Greek Orthodox 9%, Armenian Orthodox 5%, Greek Catholic 17%, Armenian Catholic 1%, Druze 1%, Other 5%

● 2018 result

Hezbollah group* 2 seats
FPM and Aoun's group 2 seats
Lebanese Forces and allies 2 seats
Future Movement 1 seat

* Hezbollah ran its own list, that won the Shia seat with 15601 preferential votes and got elected an independent Armenian with only 77 preferential votes

● 2022 result

Hezbollah 1 seat (Rami Abu Hamdan)
FPM 1 seat (Salim Aoun)
Tachnag 1 seat (George Boujikian)
Lebanese Forces 2 seats (George Okeis and Elias Estefan)
Related to Future 1 seat (Bilal al-Hashimi)
Independent 1 seat (Michel Daher)

Independent Michel Daher is a former ally of the Aoun's bloc

Lists winning seats:

○Zahle the Message  (FPM +Hezbollah +Tachnag) 27872 votes (3 seats)
○Zahle the Sovereign (LF+Related to Future) 25646 votes (3 seats)
○Independent Sovereigntists (Daher) 15477 votes (1 seat)

The Popular Bloc list led by Myriam Skaff (member of a prominent family in the district) failed to reach the threshold


Bekaa II

This constituency encompasses West Bekaa and Rashaya districts.

Bekaa II elects 6 seats allocated as follows: 2 Sunni,  1 Shiite,  1 Maronite, 1 Greek Orthodox and 1 Druze

153975 registered voters

Confessional distribution: Sunni 49%, Shiite 15%, Maronite 7%, Greek Orthodox 7%, Greek Catholic 6%, Druze 14%, Other 1%

● 2018 result

Amal 1 seat
FPM (Aoun's group) 1 seat
Ettihad (linked to March 8 ) 1 seat (Hassan Mourad)
Future Movement 2 seats
PSP 1 seat

● 2022 result

Amal 1 seat (Qabalan Qabalan)
FPM 1 seat (Charbel Maroun)
Ettihad (linked to March 8 ) 1 seat  (Hassan Mourad)
PSP 1 seat (Wael Abou Faour)
Independent 1 seat (Ghassan Skaff)
New opposition groups 1 seat  (Yassin Yassin)

Lists winning seats:

○A Better Tomorrow  (Ettihad +Amal+FPM+Ferzli) 28920 votes (3 seats)
○The National Decision (Related to Future +PSP ×Independents) 19054 votes (2 seats)
Sahlouna Wal Jabal (opposition) 11397 votes (1 seat)


The corrupt pro-Syrian politician Elie Ferzli lost the Greek Orthodox seat to the Independent Ghassan Skaff.

Bekaa III

This constituency encompasses the Baalbeck-Hermel region. It's predominantly Shia with a sizeable Sunni minority and smaller Christian minorites.
 
Bekaa III elects 10 seats allocated as follows: 6 Shiite,  2 Sunni, 1 Maronite and 1 Greek Catholic


341263 registered voters

Confessional distribution Sunni: 14%, Shiite  72%,Maronite 7%, Greek Orthodox 1%, Greek Catholic 5%, Other 1%

● 2018 result

Amal 1 seat
Hezbollah 5 seats
SSNP 1 seat
Other (linked to March 8 ) 1 seat
Lebanese Forces 1 seat
Future Movement 1 seat

● 2022 result

Amal 1 seat (Ghazi Zeaitar)
Hezbollah 4 seats (Hussein Hajj Hassan, Ihab Hamada, Ibrahim al-Moussawi and Ali al-Miqdad)
Pro-Hezbollah Independents 2 seats ( Yanal Mohammed Solh and Melhem Mohammed Hojeiri)
FPM 1 seat  (Samer Assad el-Tom)
Other (linked to Narch 8 ) 1 seat (Jamil el-Sayyed)
Lebanese Forces 1 seat (Antoine Habshi)

Lists winning seats:

○Hope and Loyalty (Hezbollah +Amal +FPM +Independents) 154358 votes (9 seats)
○Building the State (LF+) 23308 votes (1 seat)

The Greek Catholic seat was awarded to the FPM, in exchange for the Shiite seat in Jbeil that went for Hezbollah. Two pro-Hezbollah independents won the seats allocated to the Sunni. Lebanese Forces retained the Maronite seat

[Velasco]

North I

This is a predominantly Sunni constituency, with sizeable Christian and Allawite minorites, encompassing the Akkar district. It's a rather impoverished region bordering Syria.  

North I elects 7 seats allocated as follows: 3 Sunni,  2 Greek Orthodox, 1 Maronite and 1 Allawite

309517 registered voters

Confessional distribution: Sunni 69%, Shiite 1%, Maronite 10%, Greek Orthodox 13%, Greek Catholic 1%, Allawite 5%

● 2018 result

FPM 1 seat
Other (linked to March 8 ) 1 seat
Lebanese Forces 1 seat
Future Movement 4 seats

● 2022 result

FPM 2 seats (Jimmy Jabbour and Assad Dargham)
Other (linked to March 8 ) 1 seat (Mohammad Yahya)
Related to Future 4 seats (Mohammad Sleiman, Walid al-Baarini, Sagih Attieh and Ahmed Rustom)

Lists winning seats:

○National Moderation (Related to Future) 41848 votes (4 seats)
○Akkar First (FPM+) 41741 votes (3 seats)

The list supported by former Future Movement members won 4 seats (2 Sunni,  1 Greek Orthodox and 1 Allawite). The Akkar First list (FPM and allies) won the remaing 3 (1 Sunni, 1 Greek Orthodox and 1 Maronite. LF lost the Maronite seat to the FPM. Apparently there are many votes for lists below threshold or wasted in this constituency
 
North II

This constituency encompasses Tripoli and Minyeh-Dinnieh districts.

North II elects 11 nembers allocated as follows: 8 Sunni, 1 Maronite,,1 Greek Orthodox and 1 Allawite

371711 registered voters

Confessional distribution: Sunni 84%, Shiite 1%, Maronite 4%,  Greek Orthodox 5%, Allawite 5%, Other 1%

Tripoli was the heart of a popular uprising on October 17, 2019. The withdrawals of the Future Movement and the supporters of former PM Najib Mikati £Tayyar Al Azm) added, alongside the lack of credible figures emerging from the protests,  added uncertainty to the 2022 elections

● 2018 result

Future Movement 5 seats
Najib Mikati's group 4 seats
Others (linked to March 8 ) 2 seats

● 2022 result

Other (linked to March 8 ) 2 seats (Jihad al-Samad and Taha Nagy)
Lebanese Forces and allies 3 seats (Ashraf Rifi,  Elias Khoury and Jamil Abboud)
Related to Future 3 seats* (Ahmad al-Khair, Abdul Aziz al-Samad and Abdul Karim Kabara)
Independents 2 seats** (Ihab Matar and Firas al-Salloum)
Opposition groups 1 seat (Rami Fanj)

* Elected in two different lists: Lebanon Is Ours (backed by former FM members) and For the People (supported by Najib Mikati)

** Elected in The Real Change list, backed by Jama'a Al-Islamiyah (Sunni islamists)

Lists winning seats:

○Rescue of a Nation (Rifi +LF) 30006 votes (3 seats)
○The People’s Will (Al Ahbash+Independents,  pro-Hezbollah) 29277 votes (2 seats)
○Lebanon Is Ours (Related to Future) 28041 votes (2 seats)
The Real Change (supported by Jama'a Al Islamiyyah) 16825 votes (2 seats)
○For the People (supported by Najib Mikati) 16215 votes (1seat)
○Revolt for Justice and Sovereignty (opposition) 14181 votes (1 seat)

The vacuum left by the disintegration of Hariri's and Nikati's blocs has been filled by the list of Ashraf Rifi and the Lebanese Forces, the list backed by the Islamic Group and the list of the opposition groups


North III

This large Christian constituency encompasses the districts of Batroun, Koura, Bsharri and Zgharta. It comprises the strongholds of the FPM leader Gebran Basil (Batroum) and the LF leader Samir Geagea (Bsharri), as well as the Frangieh family's fiefdom of Zgharta. The result of the battle in this constituency could determine which Christian leader is the best positioned to be elected president of Lebanon. Samir Geagea does not contest parliamentary elections, placing his wife Sethrida instead

North III elects 10 seats allocated to Christian sects (7 Maronite and 3 Greek Orthodox)

257964 registered voters

Confessional distribution: Sunni 10%, Shiite 1%, Maronite 65%, Greek Orthodox 20%, Greek Catholic 2%, Other 1%

● 2018 result

FPM 2 seats
Independence Movement 1 seat (Michel Moawad)
Marada Movement 3 seats
SSNP 1 seat
Lebanese Forces 3 seats

● 2022 result

FPM 2 seats (Gebran Basil and George Atallah)
Marada Movement 2 seats (Sleiman Frangieh and Melhem Tawk)
Lebanese Forces 3 seats (Shethrida Geagea,  Ghiath Yazbek and Fadi Karam)
Independents 2 seats * (Michel Moawad and Adib Abdel Masih)
New opposition forces 1 seat (Michel Douaihy)

*Elected in a list backed by Michel Moawad (Independence Movement) and the Kataeb party

Lists winning seats:

○Pulse of the Strong Republic  (LF+) 39844 votes (3 seats)
○Unity of the North (Marada +SSNP) 26475 votes (2 seats)
○North of Confrontation (Independence +Kataeb) 22613 votes (2 seats)
○We Will Stay Here (FPM+) 17077 votes (2 seats)
○Chamalouna (opposition) 14121 votes  (1 seat)

Samir Geagea's party appears to be the largest in this constituency. Marada and its SSNP allíy lost one seat each. The FPM retained the seats it was defending, despite losing support. The list of Moawad (allied to the FPM in 2018) won two seats. The opposition list managed to grab a seat from the feudal lords

[Velasco]

Interesting chart.  Keep in mind that, despite losing majority (60 seats out of 128), the "March 8" lists (Hezbollah,  Amal,  FPM,  etc) still got around 50% of the popular vote. On the one hand, the grip of the Amal-Hezbollah tandem on the Shia constituency is overwhelming. On the other hand, the allocation of seats to religious sects (50% Christian / 50% Muslim +Druze) is far from being proportional. The 2021 CIA Factbook estimated that Lebanese residents were distributed as follows: 33.7% Christian,  61.1% Muslim (evenly split between Sunni and Shia) snd 5.2% Druze. Christian share is likely higher among the Lebanese diaspora

https://twitter.com/TPI_lebanon/status/1527941612235628544?t=mjaF0Rgj8b5xdOOUtnE...

[palandio]

Your point about the allocation of seats to religious sects is valid under several different aspects, although I find the most obvious aspect (i.e. the pure seat allocation numbers) slightly questionable.

In fact in the past when the seat allocation already was 64:64 between Muslims (+Druze) and Christians, many Christians complained that the election by multi-seat FPTP in big constituencies meant that Muslim voters decided about which Christian representatives got elected.

Even with the current system within one constituency the underrepresented sects usually can elect their candidates of choice and have additional influence over the other seats, while the overrepresented sects tend to disperse their vote among too many candidates which then leads to candidates getting elected with very few votes over more popular candidates whose list share is exhausted.

But your point is still right, because the current repartition of constituencies tries to lock in the confessional and regional disparities created by the uneven seat allocation. It tries to create homogeneous seats or at least draw together areas that are over-/underrepresented by the seat allocation scheme to a similar degree. If you look at how many voters there are by seat in the different constituencies, you see a very clear pattern of majority Christian consituencies being overrepresented, and Muslim (particularly Shia) and rural seats being underrepresented:


Beirut I (Christian-dominated, urban) 5.9 seats/100k registered voters


Mount Lebanon I (Christian-dominated) 4.4
Mount Lebanon II (Christian-dominated) 4.4

Bekaa II (Mixed, almost half Sunni) 3.9
North III (Christian-dominated) 3.9
South I (Mixed, mostly Sunni and Christians) 3.9
Bekaa I (Mixed) 3.8
Mount Lebanon IV (Mixed, plurality Druze) 3.8
Mount Lebanon III (Mixed) 3.5

   ---   National average 3.2   ---

Beirut II (Majority Sunni) 3.0
Bekaa III (Majority Shia) 2.9
North II (Sunni-dominated) 2.9


North I (Majority Sunni, rural, poor) 2.3
South III (Shia-dominated) 2.2
South II (Shia-dominated) 2.1


The Hezbollah/Amal bloc was still quite happy about the new system introduced in 2017 because proportional representation combined with the solid grip on the Shia vote meant that they would still control all the Shia seats while Hariri (in 2018) would lose some seats to Hezbollah-friendly candidates.

[Velasco]

The Hezbollah/Amal bloc was still quite happy about the new system introduced in 2017 because proportional representation combined with the solid grip on the Shia vote meant that they would still control all the Shia seats while Hariri (in 2018) would lose some seats to Hezbollah-friendly candidates.

Leaving aside seat allocation to sects and electoral districts, I think there's a huge disparity (or anomaly) in the election results. I think you already outlined it. While the grip of Amal-Hezbollah tandem on the Shia vote is nearly absolute (perhaps >90%), the Christian vote is dispersed among several factions and local bosses ( see Za'im system). Addittionally the withdrawal of the Future Movement has created further dispersion among the Sunni constituency (the Tripoli results are particularly chaotic). Such disparities must have an impact in the broken polical system that I'm not able to evaluate (let alone the Hezbollah arsenal and its "State within the State ").

 Clearly the electoral influence of Hezbollah goes beyond the Shia seats, particularly in mixed constituencies. However,  the "March 8" bloc lost the majority because its main Christian allies (FPM, Marada) lost seats in electoral districts like Beirut I and North III (among others). Addittionally we have the strange results in South I, or the the unprecedented election of two opposition candidates in South III

But the anti-Hezbollah groups can hardly claim victory,  for they are neither homogeneous nor conforming a consistent alternative. Analysts point the election results will likely lead to endless negotiations to form government and paralysis, even though the success of some anti-establishment candidates is seen as a bright spot by those hoping for changes 

[palandio]

What you are outlining are several different levels of election results and their implications.

On the first level there are the party/bloc political preferences of the electorate. These are not that easy to analyze because alliances may be different from constituency to constituency (like in 2018 when FPM was allied with Future in some constituencies and Hezbollah/Amal in others) and locally popular independents cannot always be counted as parts of their blocs (in 2018 e.g. Boutros Harb, a March 14-aligned politician, ran together with Marada and the SSNP). What can be said is that Hezbollah/Amal have kept their grip on the Shia vote, that there is some support for Hezbollah-friendly groups (e.g. Karami, al-Ahbash) among the Sunni vote but these groups have generally not profitted from the disintegration of Hariri's Future Movement, and that among Christians FPM has lost votes and others, particularly the LF, have won votes.

The next level that you have extensively analyzed is the seat level. Analysis on this level avoids some of the difficulties of the level I described above, although it should be noted that due to the intricacies of the seat distribution mechanism, the seat allocation and seat shifts do not always correspond to political preferences. Anyways on the whole the trends have been similar to those described in the first paragraph. I would not read too much into single vote distribution events. South I is due to the effects of the threshold and a locally influential party/politician (PNO/Saad) changing political allegiance. South III is in the end not that surprising because the constituency is 20% non-Shia and the two seats for the opposition lists are arithmetically much closer to one seat than to three seats. North I seems to run against the general trend, but I think that Mohammad Yahya is probably a locally popular politician that allied with the FPM for strategic reasons.

Then there is the level of political arithmetics in the Parliament. As you rightfully pointed out March 8 losing its majority is significant, but does not at all mean that there is a viable alternative.

And then there is the calculus of power that you alluded to. Even if there is an alternative majority, how can you rule against a group like Hezbollah that has the arsenal it has and acts like a "State within the State"? How can you rule against a bloc that has a near complete grip on a ca. 30% group in you country? How can you rule against an organization that is not just supported and paid by foreign powers like many others are, but that is the creation and right fist of an ideologically hardened foreign regime? If you look at the other Lebanese parties you can see the whole spectrum of possible responses to this dilemma.

[Velasco]

South III is in the end not that surprising because the constituency is 20% non-Shia and the two seats for the opposition lists are arithmetically much closer to one seat than to three seats. North I seems to run against the general trend, but I think that Mohammad Yahya is probably a locally popular politician that allied with

The result is still significant, because it's the first time in decades the Amal-Hezbollah tandem loses seats there. I found an article that explains well the mood of some Shiite voters usually "loyal to the resistance", but outraged by the incorporation of corrupt candidates in the Hope and Loyalty list. Most of the people interviewed in the article were still distrustful of the Independent candidates, so they decided not to vote. However, one or two said (not without trepidation) they voted for the opposition list. Little cracks in the rock-solid grip

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/lebanon-elections-hezbollah-amal-court-bitter-southerners

 In the constituency of South III, which includes Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, and Marjayoun-Hasbaya, Hezbollah and Amal’s list isn’t helping to detoxify the parties.

The choice of two candidates on their Hope and Loyalty list, former finance minister and senior Amal member Ali Hassan Khalil and Marwan Kheireddine, chairman of al-Mawarid Bank and a leader of the Druze Lebanese Democratic Party (LDP), has left many heads shaking.

Khalil, Amal leader Nabih Berri’s right-hand man, was finance minister between 2014-2020 and is seen as contributing to the economic collapse through corruption and mismanagement.

(...)

The real surprise, however, is the inclusion of Kheireddine.

As the economy unravelled in late 2019, Kheireddine’s al-Mawarid Bank was among the first banks that imposed capital controls and restrictions on depositors. Coupled with the steady collapse of the lira, the restrictions have meant that Lebanese were only allowed to withdraw small amounts from their accounts in local currency, while their savings steadily lost value.

The banker was defeated

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/lebanon-elections-who-are-major-winners-and-losers

 
Most notably, two independent candidates managed to penetrate a Hezbollah-Amal dominance in the South III constituency for the first time in three decades: Firas Hamdan and Elias Jrade.

Hamdan, a lawyer who sustained a chest wound during 2020 protests, won the Druze seat in Hasbaya, beating Marwan Kheireddine, chairman of Lebanon's AM Bank.

Kheireddine was one of many that restricted depositors' access to savings during the financial meltdown. Hamdan's win reflected the resentment felt by many in the south regarding the banker’s candidacy.

Jrade, a renowned eye doctor, unseated veteran MP Assaad Hardan of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party for the Greek Orthodox Christian seat in the South III constituency, where independents unified under the Together For Change list.

"No one believed in any time that in this part of Lebanon any change could happen. We are telling them ‘this is the symbol, I gave you the torch and we hope you can continue’," Jrade told Middle East Eye from his home in the village of Ebil al-Saqi, several hours after his win on Monday.  

[palandio]

You are of course right that the state of things until now is a very important criterion to tell if a development is significant. Under this perspective two seats in South III going to the opposition list is an absolute first and hence definitely significant.

The two elected opposition candidates were actually the two most voted candidates on the opposition list. This is not self-evident, because the electoral law often leads to the "later" seats being assigned "by lottery", particularly to political and confessional minorities. Just that in this case the most voted candidates of the political minority were also confessional minorities, i.e. Elias Jarada (Greek Orthodox) 9218 votes and Firas Hamdan (Druze) 4859 votes. Which indicates that a lot of the opposition support came from confessional minorities, particularly Christians.

One phenomenon that your post made me aware of is that under certain circumstances it is possible to vote against a certain candidate. I.e. if you vote for the opposition and you particularly dislike Kheireddine, then you should give your personal preference vote to Hamdan, so that he places high enough within the opposition list to take the Druze seat away from Kheireddine. Maybe some voters did this.

[Velasco]

Preferential vote breakdown (source: The Policy Initiative)

Total preferential votes: 1807818
Preferential votes for winning candidates: 1223650 (67.7%)

Preferential votes by party

● Hezbollah 335466 (18.6%) / winners 335466 (100%)
● Lebanese Forces 198819 (11.0%) / winners 161970 (81.5%)
● Amal Movement 185596 (10.3%) / winners 177702 (95.4%)
● Free Patriotic Movement 134166 (7.4%) / winners 104458 (77.9%)
● Progressive Socialist Party 75566 (4.2%) / winners 74634 (98.8%)
● Ex-Future Movement 63333 (3.5%) / winners 26304 (41.5%)
● Jama'a al Islamiyyah 27861 (1.5%) / winners  7362 (26.6%)
● Al Ahbash 23139 (1.3%) / winners 15870 (68.6%)
● Marada Movement 17467 (1.0%) / winners 8945 (51.2%)
● Tashnag 12499 (0.7%) / winners 10188 (81.5%)
● Ettihad 9157 (0.5%) / winners 9157 (100%)
● Ba'ath Party 3845 (0.2%) / winners 1215 (31.6%)
● National Liberal Party 3637 (0.2%) / winners 1876 (51.6%)
● Establishment independents 210805 (11.7%) / winners 98574 (46.8%)
○ Lebanese Democratic Party 12905 (0.7%)
○ Syrian Social Nationalist Party 11726 (0.6%)
○ Tawhid 10228 (0.6%)
○ Arab Liberation Party 6494 (0.4%)
○ Popular Bloc 4825 (0.3%)

- Establishment groups: 1347534 (74.5%)

● Kataeb 36804 (2.0%) / winners 24516 (66.6%)
● Independence Movement 11339 (0.6%) / winners 9261 (81.7%)
● National Dialogue 10021 (0.6%) / winners 10021 (100%)
● Popular Nasserist Organization 7341 (0.4%) / winners 7341 (100%)
● Traditional opposition independents 111616 ( 6.2%) / winners 56068 (50.2%)

- Traditional opposition groups: 177121 (9.8%)

● Taqaddom 20988 (1 2%) / winners 20988 (100%)
● Communist Party 19636 (1.1%) / winners 9218 (46.9%)*
● Mada 18238 (1.0%) / 13281 (72.8%)
● Tahalof Watani 10408 (0.6%) / winners 3524 (33.9%)
● Khat Ahmar 6979 (0.4%) / winners 3760 (53.9%)
● Lana 6684 (0.4%) / winners 6684 (100%)
● ReLebanon 1064 (0.1%) / winners 486 (45.7%)
● Anti-establishment independents 98476 (5.5%)  / winners 24781 (25.2%)
○ Citizens of a State 25529 (1.4%)
○ National Bloc 11016 (0.6%)
○ Madinati 6564 (0.4%)
○ Saba'a 5001 (0.3%)
○  Al-Marsad al-Shaabi 4895 (0.3%)
○ Amiyet 17 Teshrin 4012 (0.2%)

- Anti-establishment groups: 239490 (13.2%)

- Not affiliated: 43673 (2.4%)


* Elias Jarade, who won the Greek Orthodox seat in Marjayoun (South III)

[Velasco]

With regards vote for the different lists contesting the elections,  I tried to calculate nationwide bloc totals. It's not easy, lacking in-depth knowledge of the intricate Lebanese politics. I got these approximate results (errors likely)

● Pro-Hezbollah establishment (Amal, Hezbollah, FPM and allies) 876424 (46.8%) and 59 seats*

_{*Including El-Khazem and Murr-Tashnag lists: 907400 (48.4%) and 62 seats}

● Anti-Hezbollah establishment (LF, PSP, Ex-Future...) 502285 (26.8%) and 42 seats

● Anti-establishment opposition 247582 (13.2%) 13 seats

● Traditional opposition (Kataeb, Independents and others)  187204 (10.0%) and 14 seats*

<sub>*Excluding El-Khazem and Murr-Tashnag: 156228 (8.3%) and 11 seats.

MPs Murr and El-Khazem could possibly be labelled "traditional opposition", while the Tashnag one would be in the "pro-Hezbollah" camp</sub>

○ Other lists  61180 (3.3%)

Total: 1874675 / 128 seats