2022 French legislatives

[Oryxslayer]

So there is a lot more moving parts here than in the presidential contest. All this assumes Macon wins round 2 by between 2 and 12%.

Lets start with the most simple, LREM holds a lot of the territory 'natural' for the urban Left parties after 2017. The main opposition right now is LR/UDI. Macron's identity shift towards the traditional right, while still retaining a good chunk of those who once voted PS, has weakened LR. They attempted to counter this by trying to draw from the Far Right's pool of voters, but failed and ended up much weaker and looking like an inferior LREM. In a quest to retain their majority, LREM should be playing for gains and an attempt to repeat what they did to PS in 2017, only now with LR.

That said, a lot of the territory held by LR was won by Le Pen. FN will also be looking for a breakthrough. In their favor is an increased poll of far right voters, and a somewhat normalization when it comes to the right. Working against them is the disgust the majority of the electorate in many seats still holds. In a good chunk of seats, voters will line up against FN no matter the opponent. LREM holds a good chunk of their seats cause FN was their opponent. FN are in a better position to make gains, but these might be limited.

Similarly, the left Parties will be looking for gains at LREM's expense. There are two issues. One, Melenchon is in the strongest position electorally, but he is not a good legislative campaigner when compare to the national presidential elections. Other left options might appear more attractive the goals are more limited and the focus more local. This could lead to a potential failure when it comes to voter energy, electability arguments, and general issues stemming from disunity. Two, they face an incumbent LREM which will unite the voters to the right of whatever party makes it to the runoff with them. So their gains also might be limited.

So right now, I expect LREM+ to remain similarly size, with their opposition fragmenting. The left and the far right might make some gains, but LR will see further losses.

[Oryxslayer]

Is there any chance some parties on the left may work together and make deals like PS&EELV, FI&PCF for the legislative election, or will each of them all present their own candidates in all those districts and fight each other?

Yes and no. Yes, the PS and EELV were fully running their presidential candidates with the intention of gaining leverage over the other in legislative negotiations, so one assumes they and maybe a few others will come together. No in that Melenchon probably won't work with anyone given how he does things, so there will probably be fragmentation between the parties who wouldn't work with PS, but are blocked from working with him, leaving the field with several 'socialistic' tickets.

[Oryxslayer]

LR have, errr, ran out of money and will likely run a skeletal campaign.

Furthers my belief that LR will see their 2017 results will get eaten from both sides, look to find some accommodation with Macron and run LR politicians alongside the presidential majority, or a bit of both.

Also from that tweet chain is: "When we are in favor of proportional representation in the elections, we propose to apply it for the legislative elections." So essentially this means that if all the Left parties band together with Melenchon, the endorsed candidate list would be about 2/3's LFI. And who knows yet if these would be equitably distributed, with LFI taking all the realistic gains not already held by one or another left party's incumbents.

[Oryxslayer]

Time to bump this. Apparently there is serious talk about a full "Union Populare" on the left, and a potential enjoining at least some of the parliamentary majority to the Presidential majority ticket.

[Oryxslayer]

1st poll for the legislative elections, from Harris Interactive:

Vote share %:

24% LREM and allies
23% RN
19% LFI
 8% Les Verts
 8% LR and allies
  7% Reconquête!
 5% PS and allies
 3% PCF
 1% LO/NPA
 1% DFL
 1% Others
  
Seats:

328/368 LREM and allies
 75/105 RN
   35/65 LR and allies
   25/45 LFI
   20/40 PS and allies
     5/10 PCF
       1/5 Les Verts
       3/7 Others

From here: https://twitter.com/mathieugallard/status/1518631584676593665

To add on, they tested a 'three-pronged' alignment, something that many not be so hypothetical depending what the future holds.




326-366 for LREM+LR and allies
117-147 for RN and allies
73-93 for Left Union

I have much more to say in the coming weeks, but suffice to say that the poll reflects my starting point for this contest. LREM+ either cleans up or absorbs the clutter of the old pillars. The Far right now has so many 'free' seats where they got thumping plurality/majority in round 1 that they could make numerous gains even with their traditional barriers. Meanwhile the left vote is much more concentrated - allowing for easier gains - but imposes a thick ceiling even under a unified ticket.

[Oryxslayer]

It’s not gonna happen but it would be great if it did.
https://twitter.com/2022elections/status/1519731556562186240?s=21

Would be great, but this likely still produces a LREM+ majority or plurality in the end. Left and Far Right vote is comparatively concentrated, LREM vote dispersed. So the vast, vast majority of contests end up as LREM vs FN or LREM vs Left front, and LREM+ wins enough of those engagements through enough local voter consolidation of the opposing side of the spectrum to become the largest group by far. Which is one large reason why the Harris poll has 24% LREM vote equaling a majority of seats. Hell, the finding are essentially the same as the Harris poll's hypothetical percentages, just with LR+ separated from LREM+.

Now "Left-aligned" consolidation is still valuable. It informs voters to not stay home or vote for a different candidate if their chosen factional leftist party did not advance. It expands the playing field notably, based off round 1 data. Finally, you are just going to see a lot more socialists in runoffs with LREM, rather than LR and FN.

For there to be a rejection of History and LREM+ to not get a majority or a near-majority, there would need to be a reversal of the traditional turnout variables that favor the presidential party, something we have no evidence yet to suggest will happen.

[Oryxslayer]

Seats:
 75/105 RN

That RN is now capable of 75-105 is insane & a bad breakthrough in the 2-round system that's meant to block extremists.

Also speaks to the collapse of the traditional parties that benefited from the system. There are around 100 seats where the far right won large pluralities based on round 1 data, and most of these  seats lacked a viable alternative. In 2017, even in places that they won like Aisne, the extreme right was blocked by strong LR+ vote that would consolidate against them, no matter who advanced. That is basically gone now and most of FN's best seats will end up as FN-LREM runoffs based on the size of both parties initial base vote. This situation is now sadly likely to give FN seats, though thankfully it only predominates in a limited number of seats.

[Oryxslayer]

It’s not gonna happen but it would be great if it did.
https://twitter.com/2022elections/status/1519731556562186240?s=21

Would be great, but this likely still produces a LREM+ majority or plurality in the end. Left and Far Right vote is comparatively concentrated, LREM vote dispersed. So the vast, vast majority of contests end up as LREM vs FN or LREM vs Left front, and LREM+ wins enough of those engagements through enough local voter consolidation of the opposing side of the spectrum to become the largest group by far. Which is one large reason why the Harris poll has 24% LREM vote equaling a majority of seats. Hell, the finding are essentially the same as the Harris poll's hypothetical percentages, just with LR+ separated from LREM+.

Now "Left-aligned" consolidation is still valuable. It informs voters to not stay home or vote for a different candidate if their chosen factional leftist party did not advance. It expands the playing field notably, based off round 1 data. Finally, you are just going to see a lot more socialists in runoffs with LREM, rather than LR and FN.

For there to be a rejection of History and LREM+ to not get a majority or a near-majority, there would need to be a reversal of the traditional turnout variables that favor the presidential party, something we have no evidence yet to suggest will happen.

Do we have any idea how the FN vote is likely to go in Left/LREM contests?

No, hopefully we get polling. One could imagine them casting spiteful votes against LREM+, or one can imagine them going against the ideologically distant FI. Or abstention just dominates, like it did with leftists in the Le Pen - Macron round. That might be the safer bet, but in the end it is probably a case of local peculiarities and candidates.

In 2017 there were some seats that RN (then FN) got decent results but failed to advance in. Most of these were LR+ vs LREM+ runoffs - cause said seats were in the rural north and south coast where LR+ was historically strong - and RN voters consistently gave the runoff victory to LR+ even when LREM+ finished first in round 1. Though one can imagine such transfers easier than to LREM or the Left, given ideological, cultural, and spite all aligning in favor of LR+.

[Oryxslayer]

Three tested Custer 17 scenarios:



No pacts



FI-EELV-PCF pact



Full Left pact and Far Right pact.


Suggests that both transfers between alliances are near perfect and the 33-33-33 split seen in round 1 isn't going anywhere. The one exception appears to be whatever Zemmour ends up doing, which could send some voters unsurprisingly to LR. I wonder how many candidates Reconquete will actually be able to muster.

[Oryxslayer]

Well, because doing that would basically mean confining the PS to its grave. And even the most centrist of the PS remaining stragglers don't really want to support a right wing party implemented a right wing programme in the hope that some day the will get crushingly defeated in the succession battle. Anyone can see how little influence the ex-PS defectors in Macron's set up have actually had over the last five years.

What is worth mentioning though re-the fail(ing) negotiation - it already does seem to be in the process of tearing the party apart. With on the one side the most rabid anti-Mélenchon types like Cambadélis and Occitanie president Carole Delga; and others like the mayor of Nantes Johanna Rolland and Rennes mayor Nathalise Appéré siding with Faure in supporting an FI alliance. The pro-alliance seemingly are in the majority in the party and among the 12 people who still vote for it, but it doesn't seem too far fetched to imagine that by the end of the legislatives the PS have in essence ceased to exist as an autonomous entity. Will likely be a UDI type shell for various notables that eventually withers away as they retire or move on.
 

Something else that is probably on the minds of these 'local barons' is well...the situation is reverse outside of national politics. PS (and LR/UDI on the other side) remains dominant and LFI councilors are essentially nonexistent. They don't want to kneecap their own future prospects, whereas the national party needs some allies to survive.

Its a weird bifurcation of party power, and if the national scene is going to continue to be dominated by personalistic parties and candidates, then it might be best to separate. Getting tied to a persistent total national loser will eventually bring local consequences just like alliances with parties that are perceived to be tainted. Local party stability might be best preserved by having a degree of  separation between the local and the national, similar to a number of other countries.

[Oryxslayer]

Any analysis of the state of play has to begin with first the history of presidential majorities, that initial projection from Harris, and this initial table. What we see here is that the most common set type, by far any away is the seat won by a narrow plurality versus multiple opponents. There are only a comparative handful of seats one might designate as overwhelming strongholds for one particular faction of the other. This means that in an environment favorable to the president’s supporters it becomes easy for the presidential alliance to sweep up over 300 seats, even if they are a newcomer. With LREM already holding the vast majority of the divided seats, and likely guaranteed to advance to the runoff in almost every seat, it therefore becomes a theoretically simple task for the Presidential majority to retain their majority.

So why does Harris, and me personally, view the baseline outcome to be a LREM+ majority comparative to the one won in 2017, despite the fact that LREM holds a bunch of unfavorable territory. The answer lies in the parties of the parliamentary right, and what seats they hold. If the Right does not align with LREM, they will likely get eaten by both the Far Right and LREM+. If the right does align with LREM however, Harris suggests the new alliance will win the same number of seats, despite the larger number of answers. This will be examined in more detail later, but the short answer is that tying their brands together benefits neither overall when it comes to seat counts.

Let us first examine those seats that are seemingly poised to fall to either the Left or the far Right – both suggested by the chart to be around 100. The Left’s number is inflated by the overseas territories which for the rest of the analysis are set aside because of their peculiar parochial nature. The parties to Macron's left have the additional issue that in many of their supposed targets the Far Right gets few votes, making it a two-pole race. Many of these seats that could be part of the Left’s column had divided races in 2017. These divisions led to one of the more radical left-aligned parties advancing vs LREM, and then losing as LREM used its prior significant support among urban left-aligned voters to win the runoff. Theoretically there are no institutional limiting factors on any left aligned party from advancing in these seats, but alliances or lack thereof will likely play a huge factor in the efficiency of vote transfers against LREM.

Which is important when we look at total party support in both of the polls done so far. Compared to Round 1, PS, EELV, and LR+ are all slightly up and LFI, LREM+, and RN+ are all slightly down. The resulting changes though seemingly maintain the near 33-33-33 split between the three larger tents, before factoring in expected turnout differentials.  It also suggests there are some Macron voters who prefer the minor left parties, and they could be willing to stick with said parties under an alliance, but a hostile inter-factional relationship could send them to LREM+ in the runoffs. This is one example why unity, or lack thereof, among those to LREM+’s left is key to the electoral circumstances.

The parties that consider themselves to be “left” aren’t behind a cordon. This is not the case for RN and any other parties they could rope in. It is still likely that the rest of majority of the rest of the electorate gangs up on or abstains from a runoff scenario with FN. Their ceiling is perhaps lower than what the chart suggests, since the Far Right is only in a situation to exploit existing bases at the moment – not foster new ones.



Which brings me to this map. Seats are segregated into three categories for each of the three blocks: First round margins greater than 20 points and >45% of the vote, first round margins between 20 and 10 points and >40%, and whatever else did not meat those thresholds. Even if the parties do not end up in these alliances, the map is valuable to showing what areas are seemingly viable territory for the insurgent opposition. The other thing the map conveys is the structural weakness of the LREM+ block, but given their dominant position, LREM should at the moment be expected to win the vast majority of the seats that did not favor a party.

In the unlikely event the legislative contests structurally favor a different block then LREM’s, there may be an issue with LREM+ winning a majority on its own. That is however a topic of future analysis. This analysis hopes to capture the present starting point, and why it expects a presidential majority accompanied by gains made by the other insurgent factions that flank LREM on either side.
 
RN+ Seats

There are 108 seats, that are not overseas, which met one of the two map thresholds for the combined Far Right parties based on round one data. 22 of these seats met the highest thresholds. All but one of the 10 seats won by the far right in 2017 - Dupont-Aignan’s seat of course which is not in the 108 at all – is either in this group of 22 or very close to it.

We can further subdivide these seats into three rough categories based on the 2017 elections. There is the small number of seats that RN+ (then FN) won in 2017. There is next the large body of seats where RN advanced to the second round, most often alongside LREM+, and proceeded to lose to voter consolidation around their opponent. About 60% of the seats above one of the two thresholds fit into this category. Sometimes RN candidates barely lost the runoff, sometimes they lost it more convincingly. Then there is the final smaller category of seats where RN failed to advance in 2017. Usually this resulted in LREM+ versus LR+ runoffs, with RN receiving varying types of third places. Consistently, even when LREM+ finished first, LR+ won these contests – off unintentional support from FN.

This shows that in spite of disorganized local presence of FN, and despite the psychological cordon which will unite their opposition in runoffs, FN+ is in a position to make gains. In these areas, the electoral scorecard is now so slanted in their favor that it would be hard not to win. The decline of LR+, partially to FN and partially to LREM, will mean that these seats will overwhelmingly feature LREM+ vs FN+ runoffs – even many of the ones with LR+ incumbents. Abstention and changing loyalties mean that RN candidates would just need to walk Le Pen’s presidential path – even imperfectly – to win the seat.

The opportunity for RN+ beyond these seats though is limited. The main reason is that in the majority of France, voter consolidation should still easily quash a RN candidate. Their voter support though is such that many contests will end up with them advancing. The concentration of the Left and Far Right in different areas means that (excluding chance randomness and incumbents) there are only in a few areas where LREM+ wouldn’t be RN’s runoff opponent. LREM incumbents benefit from these engagements. RN opportunity additionally shows why an alliance between LR and LREM might not help LR. LR+ are comparatively exposed in this block of seats, and tying the party to the locally unpopular Macron will wipe away any remaining goodwill and opportunity at winning runoffs.
 
Left Seats

There are only 64 non-overseas seats above the thresholds that favored the combined left based on the Round 1 results. There are two main reasons for these limited results. One, many of their seats as previously explained, are two-pole contests whereas comparatively FN’s best seats have meaningful results for all three alignments. The second reason though is the concentration of margins in urban seats that are won by immense margins. Despite these two reasons, the left presently only won a third of the 64 seats in 2017. We could say that a chunk of these seats abre gentrified left, which backed LREM and then FI both by large margins. Another chunk fell victim to parliamentary discord – either cause divisions failed to send a Left candidate to the runoff, or sent one there who could not appeal to all 2017 legislative “left” party voters. Finally, the lack of direction among Left parties and their voters in 2017 did not benefit turnout among favorable voters and shifted seat baselines in favor of LREM+.

This is unlikely to happen again in 2022, just because of the dissatisfaction with LREM among those to their Left. Some candidate will rise to round 2, and the lack of conservative voters to consolidate behind LREM+ in these seats will give the victory to whatever other candidate is on the ballot – be they radical or PS. No consolidation or alliance should be needed in these situations.

There are however possibilities beyond these seats, as well as seats one or another of the parties to LREM+’s left is defending. However, serious expansion into the marginal categories requires several things to go right. Unity is a clear goal. It should reduce the number of drop-off votes in runoffs, potentially will energize turnout, and will send more candidates to more runoffs meaning more opportunity.  Another potential favorable event would be a LREM-LR alliance, since that would bury LREM’s brand in these urban areas. Such an alliance would guarantee round 1 majorities of the vote in favored quarters, but voters in areas that favored LFI in round 1 would now have absolutely no reason to distinguish LREM from conservatives. This is the other reason why LREM+’s projected seat total does not rise in Harris’s hypothetical alliance projection.

Overall, the parties of the Left have more potential in this starting alignment than the Far Right. The Far Right appears to have a high ceiling but low floor. The left will either be constrained to a lower ceiling, or push past it for a more fluid and fluctuating total. A ceiling still exists thanks to vote concentration, and it is still well below the majority wanted by Melenchon, but its precise location is fluid based on local and inter-party factors.

The Other Seats

The remaining mainland seats that are neither fiercely for the Left or Far Right based on round 1 results constitute a majority of the electorate. Either LREM+/Macron won them, or one of the other factions won them by a close enough margins that the normal process of block divisions and turnout favors LREM and their allies. The vast majority of these seats are presently held by LREM+. The next largest group is that of 2017’s political Right. These seats were either won in tight contests, most often against LREM, or blowouts caused by local incumbents and circumstances. A slight adjustment in turnout, or in conservative voter alignment, would swing many of these seats to LREM. What is currently happening and expected to happen to LR goes beyond slight into the realm of significance. Just as LR faces large losses to FN in the north and south, they face the potential of even more losses to LREM in the geographic “centre.” It is these seats which would be preserved by a LREM-LR accord.

LREM and their allies are likely guaranteed runoff positions in these seats, just through the nature of the contest. They are the party that appeals everywhere – even though they may lack roads to 50 percent everywhere – and the anticipated favorable turnout will slant the electorate. Depending upon where the seat is on the map, Macron’s allies my advance alongside one of parties of the extremes, guaranteeing victory over candidates which lack the numbers to win a runoff. In other cases, there will be the question if the electorate would favor whomever is the other party to advance – be it leftists and LR+, or the far right and a socialist candidate – to stop LREM. At the moment it is hard to imagine this type of voting taking place en masse in these divided seats. Rather, it is easier to imagine voters to LREMs left or right consolidating behind them against a candidate to their right or left respectively. It is far, far, easier to imagine surging abstention among groups without a runoff candidate. As long as LREM+ candidates advance, and there are few competitive seats where this could be said to be unlikely, then consolidation in the runoff will bring victory. That is an environment in which works to LREM’s advantage.

Finally, a note on triangulaire or tri-party runoffs. However, the rules do not incentivize this, as shown by 2017 only having one triangulaire. Three parties need to get 12.5% of total voters, and with turnout likely to be around 50%, the vote would need to be perfectly distributed given the presence of other parties which will syphon a chunk of the vote. That one 2017 three-way was close to 25-25-25. Given that most of the map is not perfectly divided but instead noticeably favors LREM and one other faction, a favorable triple-split is less likely. If, however party alliances are perfect, then such runoffs potentially become more common, though still should not predominate.

[Oryxslayer]

The Republicans had problems in presidental elections, but your map show them great results in legistative elections. No brown seats, so RN will have no seats, strange.

Your anger should be directed then towards the color wheel and the colorblind, for a multi-hue brown against a backdrop of yellows and reds is a recipe for visibility issues. That's just contrast vs homogeneity.

[Oryxslayer]

Well done to the PS for (finally) making a good decision.

The PS I don't believe have actually signed on yet, though there is now an expectation and public pressure for them to do so. 

[Oryxslayer]

Harris poll has

LREM   338-378
RN        65-95
LR        35-65
FI         25-45
PS+     20-40
EELV     1-5

I assume RN will get a lot of seats due to a second-round alliance with RI?

Less that and more the case that, as I hope I have shown, the Far Right now has around 100 seats with massive pluralities/majorities based on round one. Normalization, voter concentration, and perceived abandonment by the metropole all mean that RN would have to work overtime to lose these seats.

Said Harris poll can be found here. They did not test the appropriate Left Front Unity list, likely because of the fluidity during response sampling.







Note the near 33-33-33 split, which is essentially the same as round 1. The formation of a full left unity list also pushes some Macron -> Minor Left back to LREM.

[Oryxslayer]

Also for some reason, I guess cliental, Harris polled the PACA region - aka Provence. The numbers here are near-identical to round one. There are 42 seats here, and if the numbers resemble round 1 like suggested, then RN+ will win around half the seats.

[Oryxslayer]

The Socialist Party has reached a tentative agreement with the LFI Unity List. PS will have an internal party vote tomorrow to accept or reject it.

[Oryxslayer]

When we can expect to see candidate's lists?

Single member constituencies, so not lists. But...

https://twitter.com/2022Elections/status/1521883162950918146

This is a map of the constituncies agreed with the PS, PCF, EELV and others.

Lots of the choices are sensible - eg lots of green ones in Bordeaux, Lyon, or around Grenoble which all have Green mayors therefore better local networks. But none in say, Toulouse, which has a right wing mayor bit was very strong for Mélenchon. Similarly, lots of PCF where they have incumbents in the 93 or Puy-de-Dôme; or areas of traditional strength.

Based on Tony's map on the presidential election thread, I tend to think they should have given more to EELV in the Savoies - strong territory for a pro-European and ecologist left. But well, a few changes might come but this seems to be the decision

I mean, that's one way to look at it. How I see it is Melenchon/LFI looking to lock up some of the likeliest opportunities for themselves in case this thing doesn't pan out, like Harris suggests. The urban Lyon, Marseilles, Toulouse, Nantes, and Grenoble seats - among others - presently held by LREM+ which Melenchon won by substantial margins - are mostly reserved for LFI. Same with a good chunk best target seats not held be the left in the Ile-de-France, such as 3/4 non-left-held S-S-D seats. EELV are getting a areas that should be safe for LREM+, and I'm not sure what the point of negotiating for seats in Aisne or Aude for example given that the Far Right is likely to be sweeping those areas.  

[Oryxslayer]

I mean, that's one way to look at it. How I see it is Melenchon/LFI looking to lock up some of the likeliest opportunities for themselves in case this thing doesn't pan out, like Harris suggests. The urban Lyon, Marseilles, Toulouse, Nantes, and Grenoble seats - among others - presently held by LREM+ which Melenchon won by substantial margins - are mostly reserved for LFI. Same with a good chunk best target seats not held be the left in the Ile-de-France, such as 3/4 non-left-held S-S-D seats. EELV are getting a areas that should be safe for LREM+, and I'm not sure what the point of negotiating for seats in Aisne or Aude for example given that the Far Right is likely to be sweeping those areas.  

Of their three Lyon constituencies, they've got the 2nd and 3rd which cover the 1st; 4th and 9th Arrondissements for the former and the 8th and most of the 7th - which were the parts of the city that Mélenchon won. Notably, neighbourhoods like the 1st, the Croix-Rousse (in the 4th) and La Guillotière in the 7th are the hipster/gentrification neighbourhoods. Overall a good fit for the Greens.

In IdF it wouldn't have made much sense to give them much in the 93 as Jadot underperformed his national result there. However they've got a lot in Paris intra-muros, which is more friendly territory. Including notably the likes of Paris-5 which covers the very green friendly and hipster 10th arrondissement; or Paris-9 where Sandrine Rousseau and where both LFI and EELV are strong

Their one in Nantes in Loire-Atlantique 6, which is the South of the city; a bit more working class / socially mixed but is one of the stronger parts of the city for the left even if not instinctively the most Green aligned. They've also been given some pretty OK rural ones, like néo-ruraux central in the Drôme or the old Trégor Rouge in Côtes-d'Armor.

So overall, they have been given a lot of ones that make sense for their profile. A few choices that aren't so obvious but presumably have their reasons; and lots of no hopers because lots of seats just simply are no hopers. I don't get the feeling that they have been particularly parked in the most useless ones overall.

All I'm saying is that of the 86 seats Melenchon won in Round 1 that are not part of an overseas department or territory, LFI is allotted 58 of them based on this map.

Of the 64 mainland seats that a combined left alliance should not be losing under any circumstances, LFI is taking 42.

Obviously some of this is cause of incumbents, both for LFI and the other parties. However, of the 60 Melenchon round 1 mainland seats that a left party did not win in 2017 - even if said incumbent defected later - 43 are for LFI.

In these areas, it shouldn't really matter if you have a base or not - if you are cross-endorsed by the rest of the Left then there should be the votes for anyone to defeat LREM+.

[Oryxslayer]

My main interest at the moment which I'm surprised no one else has discussed is how many dissident candidates (mostly PS) there will be and what their weight in their constituencies is. - I imagine there will be quite a few.

There's already some dissent within PS - some from the expected places like Hollande, some from those who fear a irreversible loss of power - but this should pass the internal party vote tomorrow given that said same body approved talks in the first place. I'll let others more in tune with internal factions discuss PS intrigue.

[Oryxslayer]

Anyone know how/why FI got all of the colonies?

Wondering if theres any rhyme or reason for GE and G.s's seats, also.

Not sure if the overseas are part of the deal or not: in any case, there are two PS incumbents (in Guadeloupe and Réunion) as well as one clearly LFI-affiliated incumbent (Ratenon in La Réunion). But a lot of overseas politics revolve around local parties which have more or less defined affiliations with national parties or at least parliamentary groups (Martinique's MIM, PPM, BPM, Péyi-A etc., Gabriel Serville's Péyi G or the PSG, MDES in Guiana's, La Réunion's old Communists and Huguette Bello's PLR), and of course New Caledonia and French Polynesia are even more sui generis with no real presence of the national left-wing parties, although the nationalists in both countries are close to the national left (the Tavini's deputy, Moetai Brotherson, sits with the GDR group). Given local politics and tensions between the different left-leaning groups in many places, notably Martinique, I'd imagine there will be no alliance (in the form a single leftist candidate) in many places.

My thoughts as well on the overseas vote. While there does seem to be some genuine swings towards a viable Left ticket, a lot of Melenchon's and then later Le Pen's support there can be blamed on local issues that stem from local problems that all trace their roots back to a perception that the metropole doesn't care about them or their problems. Sometimes this perception is correct, sometimes it isn't, but Macron was the face of such perceptions and therefore lacked any appeal there.

If I was to bet on any one thing happening in the territories and overseas regions, and obviously putting a bead on any single thing happening is likely a fools errand, it would be a mass vote against any party closely tied to a national alliance, or any established national party that puts up candidates. Grassroots-aimed candidates and parties that clearly care about the local issues of their department are well poised to capture the angst that we saw in the presidential vote, and I don't think we can really get a clear idea right now of who such candidates would align with.

[Oryxslayer]

https://twitter.com/Taniel/status/1522230924674576387?s=20&t=Rsf9wZRwsEq0TqQ...

REM is dead, long live REM.

[Oryxslayer]

There's a good list and map here: https://www.lejdc.fr/paris-75000/actualites/quels-sont-les-candidatures-deja-validees-par-renaissance-horizon-et-le-modem-pour-les-legislatives_14125795/

Notable to me is the utter lack of immediately announced candidates along the Mediterranean coast. REM+ won a bunch of seats there in 2017 and has incumbents, but they won a lot of these seats through closer runoffs versus to Far Right, and said deputies may no longer like their chances in seats Le Pen won quite convincingly...

Also, the PS right now is voting to approve or reject the alliance, a vote that promises dissidents no matter the outcome. EDIT: and that outcome was unsurprisingly favorable to the Unity list.

[Oryxslayer]

https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1522517721560358913?s=20&t=5rzXZLcZO...

https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1522511717875564545?s=20&t=5rzXZLcZO...

Cluster17 tests the new left alignment versus divisions elsewhere on the spectrum. The result though suggests the new alliance is getting the support of those 33% who backed the left, and not disturbing the other two pillars third's of the vote.

[Oryxslayer]

I wonder who RN voters support in the second round if they face a runoff between the left and a Macronist

In the first round, it was Macron if the alternative was melenchon. Sounds weird given what happened in the end,  but this was what round 1 polls suggested. Macron in these was defeating melenchon by a bit more than he was defeating Le Pen. There was no breakdown, but given how easily the left has aligned with Melenchon, we can reasonably expect that his and LRs 33% was complimented by some of the far right after abstentions, so that the projected outcome was a 15 or 20 point margin over the lefts 33%.

That all said, the fact that the presidential race is over changes many things of course.  And abstention is always easier than voting. So we can't really say for certain, but nobody should be surprised if Macrons pivot right allows him to win these voters who self-identify as right, even though the two factions are supposedly 'rivalrous.'

[Oryxslayer]

Lots of talk on twitter now that Taha Bouhafs is giving up his candidacy for the seat. Haven't seen anything official yet though.

Edit: found a more official story on it. https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/elections/legislatives/j-ai-essaye-mais-je-n-y-arrive-plus-taha-bouhafs-ouvre-la-porte-a-son-retrait-aux-legislatives_AN-202205100074.html

Good, he's sexist and racist and almost certainly homophobic. Pretty much a leftwing Zemmour. What the hell was LFI thinking by keeping him? Just because he's Arab?

Anyway all this shows that NUPES is a marriage of convenience for everyone with zero ideological consistency.

We didn't get a Harris poll and projection this week, likely cause they were adjusting the methodology for NUPES, but so far their results have not been good for the united left. I would however be shocked to see a dramatic surge in the seat count whenever it appears. Their results suggest that the United front struggles to pass 100 seats, likely with a ceiling far below the majority line. The model seems to suggest the NUPES is just taking Le Pens place in the presidential contest: wining a bunch of areas in round 1, but doomed in round 2 when voters replicate their earlier consolidation.

To that end, we are seeing the natural dissonance between the banner message of denying Macron his majority and getting a new PM, and the internal knowledge that this is unreachable. To that end, LFI would prefer to hold tightly to any seat that shouldn't be a struggle to win, since surrendering these to their allies is in effect -1 to their parliamentary grouping.