Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[Oleg 🇰🇿🤝🇺🇦]

Naturally, with the most rough assumption, it is easy and convenient to just smear a confident straight line, but in reality there are no such straight lines of GDP growth, especially over such a large interval.

[Stand With Israel. Crush Hamas]

If you hate Israel so much, why the hell do you want their weapons?

I actually don't hate Israel (as opposed to Likudism, perhaps) but I really don't see what they have to gain from being pro-Russia in even a utilitarian sense - especially with the pervasive AS there.

It was pretty clear that Bennett and Lapid were just trying to keep Putin from retaliating, while Netanyahu is actually pro-Russian due to seeing a fellow authoritarian. Thing is, though, they get absolutely nothing out of either side - both countries have a pretty anti-Israel foreign policy.

My general belief is that Israel should help Ukraine to the best of its ability, but I become less firm in that with every lecture from a former Holocaust nation.

[Annatar]

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-05/russia-risks-bigger-longer-sanctions-hit-internal-report-warns

"Russia Risks Bigger Sanctions Hit, Internal Report Warns"

Bloomberg says it got an internal Russian report that indicated that the road to Russian recovery will be arduous.

The report says that while the "Target" scenario in the chart below is possible the "Inertial" scenario is more likely with a chance of a disastrous "Stress" scenario.  All 3 scenarios assume that the war will go on indefinitely and that the sanctions are here to stay and could grow.  Everything, it seems, comes how to how quickly Russia can shift its exports away from the collective West.


Certainly, most of the Western investment banking GDP projections for 2022 and 2023 tend to align with the "Inertial" scenario.  It certainly makes sense for the Russian government to plan on that taking place versus the rosy and ideal "Target" scenario which I think Russia will be lucky and unlikely to hit.

Looking at this report now with Russia's GDP contraction in 2022 at -2.1% (and that is AFTER a large upward adjustment of Russia's 2021 GDP which artificially increases the base where 2022 will be compared against) and 2023 now expected to be positive territory the Russia economic path is now going to be above the "Target" or best case scenario and way above any default or worst-case scenario laid out in the Sept 2022 Russia report that Bloomberg claimed they got a hold of. 

Russian GDP grew 5.4% in May which means it is already above May 2021 since it fell by 4.3% in May of 2022, means Russian GDP has already begun to exceed 2021 levels. https://tass.com/economy/1640037

[PSOL]

Russian foreign policy has turned into a carbon copy of the American doctrine of the last 20 years; just replace the Middle East with Africa, Caucasus with LatAm, and I fully expect Belarusian-Russian relations to go the way or Canadian-American relations with time.

The past is the past.

[jaichind]

Russian GDP grew 5.4% in May which means it is already above May 2021 since it fell by 4.3% in May of 2022, means Russian GDP has already begun to exceed 2021 levels. https://tass.com/economy/1640037

Just to be clear.  That 5.4% number came from Putin and is not official since it will be a while before 2023 Q2 GDP numbers come out.  Still, clearly, Putin will know what he is talking about. 

What I would say is that Putin is cherry-picking economic data to give too rosy a picture.  May 2022 was the bottom of economic activity in the aftermath of the collective West sanctions so a May 2023 vs May 2022 5.4% growth overstates the underlying Russia economic momentum.  Still, it is clear that 2023 will see positive economic growth after overperforming in 2022 and on top of a higher base by readjusting 2021 GDP upward.   

[Storr]

https://twitter.com/pravda_eng/status/1675066722322358274?s=20

[NOVA Green]

Yet another likely demonstration of the effectiveness of HIMARS courtesy of "Uncle Sam":

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1675133004614696962?s=20

[NOVA Green]

Meanwhile within the context of surprising Ukrainian gains around Bakhmut, which most military analysts had considered to be a bit of a feint to tie down Russian troops to prevent reinforcements from what was presumed to be the two main offensive points in Southern Ukraine, talk of even the possibility of a significant encirclement of Russian forces is starting to increase.

https://twitter.com/JimmySecUK/status/1674823927049207828?s=20

[pppolitics]

This is most certain to invite direct NATO invention.

Could Putin be that stupid?

https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1675148540887040003

[Torie]

Russia has 50,000 freaking troops in Bakhmut? I guess they think the southern front is secure via trenches and land mines.

[jaichind]

https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-needs-more-weapons-counteroffensive-top-general-zaluzhny-2023-6

"Angered by counteroffensive complaints, Ukraine's top general says the expected mission is 'not feasible at all' with just the weapons his army has now"

Zaluzhny clearly upset with how the counteroffensive is going

"The enemy is using a different generation of aviation," Zaluzhnyi  told the Post. "It's like we'd go on the offensive with bows and arrows now, and everyone would say, 'Are you crazy?'"

[jaichind]

https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-isnt-going-run-out-missiles

"Russia Isn’t Going to Run Out of Missiles"

[Badger]

https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1674080451181289474?s=20

https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1674080500221202433?s=20

Jaichind in shambles.

[Badger]

So the restaurant was the target

https://twitter.com/insidermildef/status/1674094367781339136

I am skeptical that Putin's Russia has the technical capability to reliably hit a target the size of a restaurant with a long-range missile strike.  

It doesn't mean that they, a, did in fact Target the restaurant, and b, got somewhat lucky in their targeting.

[Badger]

No, wrong chart, and comparing US and RU deficit percentages as a percentage of GDP is an errant apples to oranges exercise (as you yourself alluded to). Here is the link to examine the right one, and Russia's feeling the need to cover it up now. Enjoy.

https://talkelections.org/FORUM/index.php?topic=469771.msg9112170#msg9112170

But yes, the West should be doing more to BK Russia more quickly. In that regard, more forays into Russia by land and air to destroy military assets should be encouraged, including factories that produce the ordinance.

They are actually pretty consistent.  From the article

The federal budget deficit meanwhile reached 3.41 trillion rubles ($41 billion) in the first five months of 2023, narrowing slightly in May but still exceeding the full-year plan by almost a fifth.

By my calculation, a 3.41 trillion RUB deficit would work out to around 1.9% of 2023 GDP.  If so just extrapolate that to all of 2023, it works out to 4.8% of GDP which is higher than the current Bloomberg estimate of 3.5% but not disastrously so and still below the USA deficit of 5.7% of GDP.  And if Russia's deficit ends up being higher it will just translate into higher inflation which so far seems fairly under control from a MoM point of view.

Unlike the US, with its ability to borrow, and having the reserve currency, Russia can't borrow (nobody will lend to it), and when it runs out of cash, the war stops or it stops paying pensions, etc. Follow the cash. Surely you know all of this. When Putin runs out of cash the whole system collapses like a cheap suit. The draft exempt elites in St. Pete and Moscow will not tolerate their standards of living being cratered to boot.

Addendum: I wonder without Western maintenance assistance and exploration how much the cost to Russia of pumping out the oil and gas is going up. When it gets close to the market price, that source of cash is gone. I am still pissed that the Dems were and are so hostile to creating huge oil reserves, that can flood the market when the need arises. Idiots.

Yeah, even I as someone ardently in favor of weaning ourselves off of fossil fuels understands that the Strategic oil Reserve is for the foreseeable future a necessary thing. We should have taken advantage of low crude prices to restock it when the market crashed, not to mention earning perhaps a little bit of political capital.

[Badger]

The US should buy them and give them to Ukraine, or build them itself.

We don't have to buy them.

We already paid for them.

Except they are being used for other purposes I believe.

My surmise is that if Biden told Israel to sell them or else, it would. Biden for whatever reason has not played that card yet.

The US bought 2 Iron Dome batteries to integrate into its broader air defense network, and almost scrapped those plans because they found ID's software didn't play well with the US's. Israel has since signaled they would cooperate on integration of those, and the US now appears to be holding them in reserve re: China (link).

The 2 batteries the US purchased was never really an option for Ukraine, and Israel's approval wasn't the dominating factor, either.

There appears to be some confusion and disagreement in the DoD about what to do with the Iron Dome batteries, but they do appear to want to do something with them.

So I guess my possible dumb question is why can't the US develop and provide Iron Dome systems for Ukraine directly? I hear what Tori said about a lot of it being Israeli ip, but surely given our helping create the Genesis of the project we can provide something at least similar?

[Absentee Voting Ghost of Ruin]

https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-isnt-going-run-out-missiles

"Russia Isn’t Going to Run Out of Missiles"

From the fine article you have generously shared:

As early as March 2022, there was much conjecture that Russia’s supply of precision-guided missiles was dwindling. These reports may not have been entirely off the mark. Russia probably did quickly expend the portion of its long-range missile that it had initially allocated to its “special military operation.” Nevertheless, Russia maintained a steady drumbeat of missile strikes against Ukraine, likely by pulling munitions allocated to other theaters and drawing down its strategic reserves. Moreover, Russia has repurposed various surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles for land attack roles. Russia has also continued to manufacture missiles throughout the war, and evidence suggests that most (possibly all) Russian cruise missiles it has in its current inventory come from postwar production.

The exhaustion of prewar missile stockpiles has impacted the composition of current Russian strike salvos. Compared with previous phases of Russia’s air war, the composition of Russian missile attacks has trended away from high-end missile systems like cruise missiles toward cheaper, less capable “low-end” systems like Shahed-136 one-way attack munitions (see below). In the first three months of 2023, during the tail end of Russia’s strike campaign against Ukraine’s electric grid, Shahed-136s accounted for around 40 percent of long-range projectiles fired at Ukraine. Since April, 61 percent of long-range munitions Russia has employed have been Shahed-136 one-way attack munitions. Compared to cruise and ballistic missiles, Shahed-136 are generally easier to shoot down and more vulnerable to cheaper defenses like the German-made Flakpanzer Gepard and other gun-based systems. The Shahed-136’s warhead weight is also only between that of a cruise missile like Kh-101, and therefore causes less damage when they do make it through defenses.

However, the decline in the quality of Russian long-range strike salvos is unlikely to continue. Rather, the overall composition of Russian strike packages will likely level off as Russian missile use becomes fully tethered to how many missiles it can produce. But it is improbable that Russian production of higher-end cruise and ballistic missiles will ever fall to zero. Despite Western sanctions and export controls of key microelectronic components, Russia has been able to find workarounds to continue producing missiles. In May, Ukrainian intelligence estimated that Russia currently manufactures around 60 cruise missiles, five Iskander ballistic missiles, and two Kinzhals monthly. In June, President Zelensky noted that Ukraine continues to find Western-made microelectronic components amongst the wrecks of Russian missiles. These components are likely finding their way into Russia via friendly third parties such as China.

In short, Russia was never going to "run out of missiles", but it has blown through its stocks, can produced only limited numbers of new missiles, and, while its missile striking power is still significant, it is much diminished compared to the earlier phases of the war.

[Storr]

This is most certain to invite direct NATO invention.

Could Putin be that stupid?

https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1675148540887040003

In my opinion, if Putin thinks it will benefit his forces, he will blow up ZNPP. We saw it with the Kakhovka Dam. He doesn't care if people in the West think he's evil or how many Ukrainians his actions kill. If blowing up the nuclear power plant would slow or even halt a Ukrainian advance, why wouldn't Putin blow it up? Especially if he knows NATO won't get involved because NATO leaders have gone out of their way to not threaten a military response (like in February 2022); why not do it?

At home the narrative will, once again, simply be blaming Ukraine for it. Despite being such a weak claim, it would be enough to avoid unrest at home.

That's why I feel the West needs to make it clear that destroying ZNPP would result in NATO intervention. I doubt Putin would care if threats given by the West in case of a nuclear disaster at ZNPP only involve giving Ukraine more weapons or more sanctions on Russia.

https://twitter.com/Prune602/status/1675010215610052609?s=20

[pppolitics]

In my opinion, if Putin thinks it will benefit his forces, he will blow up ZNPP. We saw it with the Kakhovka Dam. He doesn't care if people in the West think he's evil or how many Ukrainians his actions kill. If blowing up the nuclear power plant would slow or even halt a Ukrainian advance, why wouldn't Putin blow it up? Especially if he knows NATO won't get involved because NATO leaders have gone out of their way to not threaten a military response (like in February 2022); why not do it?

At home the narrative will, once again, simply be blaming Ukraine for it. Despite being such a weak claim, it would be enough to avoid unrest at home.

Of cause, Putin doesn't care. He doesn't even care about the Russian people, let alone the Ukrainian people.

That's why I feel the West needs to make it clear that destroying ZNPP would result in NATO intervention. I doubt Putin would care if threats given by the West in case of a nuclear disaster at ZNPP only involve giving Ukraine more weapons or more sanctions on Russia.

Another way to think about it: Putin blowing Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant will finally give Western leaders cover (in terms of public support) to directly intervene in the war.

[Oleg 🇰🇿🤝🇺🇦]

The West is afraid of Russian nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, if Putin frames an unprovoked nuclear attack through the ZNPP explosion or through nuclear weapons of Belarus as an alleged act of a terrorist organization absolutely independent from the Kremlin, suchlike the allegedly disbanded Wagner, the West will grasp at this straw, just not to enter into a straight war against Russia.

[NOVA Green]

https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1674080451181289474?s=20

https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1674080500221202433?s=20

Jaichind in shambles.

Yeah... Phil's on the mark here.

Overwhelming majority of Americans don't like what they see when it comes to Russian Invasion and Occupation 2.0.

Sure we might have a chunk of Hardcore PUBs rooting for candidates for PREZ '04, including a couple "Cheerleaders" on this very Forum.

Reality is that even the "Cray Cray" PUBs in the US-House, likely won't be able to block additional $$$ for Ukraine come FY '24.

"Power of the Purse", also extremely likely to fail in the US-SEM. regardless of '24 elections.

So yeah, basically looking like crazy repubs trying to block weapons shipments to UKR aren't really representative even with their own constituents.

[Mr. Smith]

Russian foreign policy has turned into a carbon copy of the American doctrine of the last 20 years; just replace the Middle East with Africa, Caucasus with LatAm, and I fully expect Belarusian-Russian relations to go the way or Canadian-American relations with time.

The past is the past.

You expect Canada to lose its borders, and Quebecois French to go the way of the Belarussian?

And what's America's China?

[jaichind]

https://au.news.yahoo.com/ukraine-swipe-albo-surplus-011600894.html

"Ukraine’s swipe at Albo’s surplus"

Ukraine’s ambassador to Australia has signalled he’d like to see more military aid funnelled into his war-torn nation, given the federal budget had inadvertently benefited from Russia’s invasion.

[Red Velvet]

https://au.news.yahoo.com/ukraine-swipe-albo-surplus-011600894.html

"Ukraine’s swipe at Albo’s surplus"

Ukraine’s ambassador to Australia has signalled he’d like to see more military aid funnelled into his war-torn nation, given the federal budget had inadvertently benefited from Russia’s invasion.

It’s not that they really need Australian equipment - the US by itself can suffice Ukraine’s demands - it’s more about the symbolic meaning of forcing a position from these fence-sitting nations like Australia.

Australia is clearly on the Western-leaning side but less committed than USA or Europe. Interesting how the exact demands change depending of the country positioning and situation.

[jaichind]

https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2023/07/02/64a1084b9cff3300266a99b7-directo.html

"A Ukrainian officer says that French armor is "unsuitable" for the attack"