Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[President Johnson]

All those voting against this or present should be ashamed of themselves.

https://twitter.com/dwnews/status/1628859900666191873

[Storr]

Despite being 28 minutes long, it's worth a listen in my opinion. It shows just how much of a vitriolic and warmongering echochamber of nationalism fascism the Russian media and cultural landscape has become.

https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1628834951255756801?s=20

[lfromnj]

All those voting against this or present should be ashamed of themselves.

https://twitter.com/dwnews/status/1628859900666191873

Interesting. Mali opposed it. Russia has been slowly buying influence in Francophone Africa by pushing France out as wel.

[Storr]

All those voting against this or present should be ashamed of themselves.

https://twitter.com/dwnews/status/1628859900666191873

Interesting. Mali opposed it. Russia has been slowly buying influence in Francophone Africa by pushing France out as wel.

Yep, Nicaragua and Mali switched from abstentions last year to "against" this year.

Compared to last year's vote on a resolution calling for Russia to leave Ukraine:

For: 141

Against: 5 (Russia, Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, Syria)

Abstain: 35

Absent: 12

Blank means the country's delegation was absent during the vote:
https://twitter.com/UN_News_Centre/status/1628858093072224256

[Хahar 🤔]

When it comes to Transnistria, I personally doubt anything will happen. Everything that's been released all seems like information messaging, probably from intelligence services.

Reading this thread has been a frustrating experience the last few days for people looking for real discussion of this question because it's all been sniping about one particular poster's opinions instead of discussion about Transnistria. The way I see it, there are three possible ways for Transnistria to be incorporated into the Moldovan state:

1) Russian fuel subsidies to Transnistria end, leading the government to collapse.
2) Sheriff voluntarily agrees to dissolve the Transnistrian government and subordinate itself to the Moldovan state.
3) Transnistria is incorporated into Moldova by force.

The first option is certainly possible, and it's difficult to get reliable up-to-date sources on this subject, but it does not appear that Russia has stopped sending free natural gas to Transnistria. This in turn means that it is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. Transnistria has not been an ideal partner from the Russian perspective in this current war, but as long as Russia is continuing its offensive war it makes no sense to abandon Transnistria, especially considering how marginal the costs are.

I just don't see how the second option is plausible; even if the Moldovan government is somehow able to offer Sheriff a deal as good as the one it has now (which is hard to conceptualize, given that Sheriff operates by exporting cheap Russian products to the West), what happens when a new government alters the deal? Independence gives Sheriff security.

The third option is probably not inconceivable now, since Moldova appears to have significantly reduced its dependence on cheap Transnistrian electricity over the last year, but I'm not sure whose interests it would be in. Is the propaganda value of a victory over Russians for the Ukrainian government worth the cost of opening up a second front? Would an offensive war have propaganda value for the outside world? Would the Moldovan government really want to try to integrate this territory into its state at this time, especially if it was just the site of a war? It makes a lot more sense for all of this to just be saber-rattling.

[Storr]

https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1628871639252312064?s=20

https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1628872049107116034?s=20

[icc]

All those voting against this or present should be ashamed of themselves.

https://twitter.com/dwnews/status/1628859900666191873

Interesting. Mali opposed it. Russia has been slowly buying influence in Francophone Africa by pushing France out as wel.

Yep, Nicaragua and Mali switched from abstentions last year to "against" this year.

Compared to last year's vote on a resolution calling for Russia to leave Ukraine:

For: 141

Against: 5 (Russia, Belarus North Korea, Eritrea, Syria)

Abstain: 35

Absent: 12

Blank means the country's delegation was absent during the vote:

Changes from the first vote in the UN on 2nd March 2022:

For to Absent: Dominica, Grenada, Lebanon
For to Abstain: Gabon

Absent to For: Morocco
Abstain to For: Madagascar, South Sudan, Iraq

Abstain to Absent: Tanzania, Equatorial Guinea, Senegal
Absent to Abstain: Ethiopia, Togo, Guinea, Uzbekistan

Abstain to Against: Nicaragua, Mali

Note: Venezuela and Lebanon were unable to vote as they are in arrears on their membership fees. I'm not sure what the position was in March 2022.

Note 2: the Afghanistan and Myanmar delegations are still controlled by their deposed governments.

[Middle-aged Europe]

All those voting against this or present should be ashamed of themselves.

https://twitter.com/dwnews/status/1628859900666191873

Interesting. Mali opposed it. Russia has been slowly buying influence in Francophone Africa by pushing France out as wel.

Yep, Nicaragua and Mali switched from abstentions last year to "against" this year.

Compared to last year's vote on a resolution calling for Russia to leave Ukraine:

For: 141

Against: 5 (Russia, Belarus North Korea, Eritrea, Syria)

Abstain: 35

Absent: 12

Blank means the country's delegation was absent during the vote:
https://twitter.com/UN_News_Centre/status/1628858093072224256

Rank of the seven nay-voting countries in The Economist's Democracy Index:



Mali - 119 out of 167

Nicaragua - 143

Russia - 146

Eritrea - 152

Belarus - 153

Syria - 163

North Korea - 165



All seven are currently classified as "authoritarian regimes" among the Democracy Index's four regime types (full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid regime, authoritarian regime).

For the record, Ukraine ranks 87th (hybrid regime).



Freedom House scores (unlike the Democracy Index' new numbers these are from last year, covering 2021):

Ukraine - 61

Mali - 32

Nicaragua - 23

Russia - 19

Belarus - 8

Eritrea - 3

North Korea - 3

Syria - 1


The FH score ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 meaning "most free".

[Storr]

https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1628886058149597184?s=20

[Torie]

Reading this, and the only rational hope is that Putin needs and gets a good killing.

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-what-lies-ahead-49dbadd8959284729b74b26b7db78fc1

And then all the articles about Ukraine running out of ammo, even as its mechanized brigades get ready for an offensive. The fog of war on its anniversary has become very dense.

https://www.tbsnews.net/bloomberg-special/ukraine-wars-big-question-who-will-run-out-missiles-first-549158

Nobody planned for a long war.  They are now. It then will really become a test of wills, in a situation where the warring parties from their perspective cannot afford to lose. But someone has to lose.

Well, not quite. Stephen Kotkin has a vision of Ukraine trading territory for the EU and NATO. Good luck with that. But then where are we?

https://www.hoover.org/research/historian-future-five-more-questions-stephen-kotkin

And then there is this guy nattering away that the Russian economy is really tanking, Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, on German DW TV, and it is all hidden with agitptop and phony stats. Keep hope alive. That would be grand. I wish he was part of a chorus rather than more of a solo performer.

https://fortune.com/2023/02/20/russia-economy-self-immolated-one-year-putin-invaded-ukraine-sanctions-energy-finance-europe-sonnenfeld-tian/

[Virginiá]

Well, not quite. Stephen Kotkin has a vision of Ukraine trading territory for the EU and NATO. Good luck with that. But then where are we?

https://www.hoover.org/research/historian-future-five-more-questions-stephen-kotkin

Good discussion on some points, like this:

Stephen Kotkin: And then there's the uncertainty for the military contractors. If they ramp up now, will the demand still be there in three years or in five years? What if the war is over by then? They need some type of guaranteed contracts to invest in massive expansion of their production capacity. And so we are not expanding production capacity. So we're gonna run outta stuff. How soon? It's hard to say. The entire time, we've assumed that we can just, there's stuff we can just send it. Here it is. There's more, there's this. First, no HIMARS, then we send the HIMARS and those HIMARS rockets, which are just fabulous because they have precision guided capability. And then now it's up to the tanks and we're fighting over the fighter jets. The point being is that we're sending the stuff that's already there in Europe, in the warehouses that NATO owns, or stocks from the individual members of NATO or stocks that we have back here in the US. We didn't ramp up production massively on our side. In part because we said, "Well, we have sanctions. That's our secret weapon. And we're gonna degrade the Russian economy and they're gonna run out of stuff on their side. And so at some point, they're gonna be unable to continue the war because they're not gonna have stuff." And so we heard that in March 2022, and we heard that in April 2022. And there were stories about how Russian missiles and tanks were using chips, computer chips from washing machines because they were running out of production of computer chips. And look at this, this is gonna end at some point because they can't keep up production. So this morning there was a massive barrage of cruise missiles and other missiles of Ukraine from the Russian side. So the stuff that they ran out of six months ago, they're still using it to destroy civilian infrastructure, the energy grid, kill people, murder them actually. Hospitals, schools being destroyed. So, evidently, the Russians still have a lot of stuff. They're able to produce stuff. And so we are not degrading their ability to fight with the sanctions. So we're in a war of attrition where we're not destroying, as we did in World War II, their production capacity the way we did to the Germans and the Japanese because we're not hitting Russian territory.

Peter Robinson: We're not permitting the Ukrainians to go over the border.

Stephen Kotkin: Correct. And we're not ramping up production on our side. So you tell me how you win a war of attrition where you're not attriting? You're not actually destroying their capability to fight and you're not ramping up your capability. So I'm not confident that we have a good strategy for this phase of the war. You see, success is a problem. We were successful in enabling, facilitating the Ukrainian's defense of their country. That has produced a new situation. That's produced a new version of the war that wasn't there at the beginning. We were prepared for supporting the Ukrainians in an insurgency. Russia would conquer Ukraine. That was the pessimistic thinking. Remember, we've evacuated the embassy,

The bolded text especially. NATO/Ukraine are in a tricky position right now. Ukraine doesn't have much in the way of domestic-made long range strike capabilities, and NATO is still debating giving it to them, and so Ukraine has no reliable way to degrade or destroy the Russian defense industry while Russia has, and did, significantly degrade Ukraine's own industry. Sanctions hurt Russian industry significantly at the beginning, but it's clear now they have mitigated that damage somewhat via import schemes and through Chinese help.

This is one area where I have reservations about the future, and why I think there is a point to be made when people say NATO "has no plan." They seem to have part of a plan, but aren't really appreciating the situation Ukraine and NATO will be in if this war settles into a long war of attrition where Russian industry remains untouched and NATO allies largely refuse to massively expand their defense industries. They are expanding somewhat, but maybe not what would qualify as "war footing" but something close to it. Right now it's just a patchwork of large investments in expanding production lines but not the level of expansion you would need for a war like this.

Russia is a major nuclear power, so there are risks in hitting its mainland industry, and so the hesitancy to deliver to Ukraine long range strike capabilities is understandable, but perhaps NATO needs to rethink the long game here, and perhaps draw some conclusions for future hypothetical wars involving nuclear powers and what to do in this situation, because right now, the way things are currently going is not exactly a recipe for success, even if Ukraine does end up winning or at least significantly turns the tide.

[NOVA Green]

Not sure if this has been discussed much here, but apparently Bulgarian munitions factories have been helping to fill the gap for Ukraine when it comes to sourcing Soviet era artillery shells.

Lots more in the article...

The job is straightforward, dangerous and will soon be open to applicants: filling a 122-millimeter Soviet-style artillery shell with explosives that will turn it into a lethal projectile.

For the residents of Kostenets, a dying mountain town in western Bulgaria, it’s a welcome opportunity despite the risk of death. It means more jobs at the Terem ammunition plant on the outskirts of town.

The factory stopped making the 122-millimeter shells in 1988 as the Cold War came to a close. But soon the assembly lines will be running again.

And so in January, 35 years after the last 122-millimeter shells left the Terem plant, the company recommissioned production.

That has Western countries scrambling to find alternative sources, pouring millions of dollars into workarounds that keep the transactions quiet and avoid political fallout and Russian retaliation. And that brings them to some of the more remote areas of Eastern Europe, like Kostenets, and the small town of Sopot, roughly 50 miles to the northeast, which is home to another state-run arms factory.

Bulgaria’s projected arms exports last year soared, exceeding $3 billion, around five times the sales abroad in 2019, according to government estimates from data gathered in October.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/23/world/europe/ukraine-weapons-ammunition-bulgaria.html

[NOVA Green]

I don't believe it has been mentioned here yet, but Ukraine has somehow found a way to hit Russian positions in Mariupol hard and circumvent Russian air defense systems...

Here's the section of the story focusing on the Mariupol, with a bunch of other stuff focusing on the Russian Air War terrorism against civilian targets in Ukraine.

Ukraine found a way to hit deep behind enemy lines with a series of mysterious explosions in Russian-held territory early Wednesday, even as Ukrainians themselves were warned that Moscow appears poised to unleash a new barrage of attacks.

Half a year after the southern port city of Mariupol fell to a fierce Russian siege, nearly a dozen explosions were reported there overnight into Wednesday. Russian-occupied areas of the Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson regions were also hit, according to reports and video.

What targets were struck was perhaps less intriguing than how Ukrainian forces had managed to hit them.

After taking control of Mariupol in the spring, Moscow gradually turned the city into a major garrison, apparently because it was thought to be out of the range of powerful U.S.-provided missiles in the nearest Ukrainian stronghold, near the ruined mining town of Vuhledar.

But at least 11 explosions were reported Wednesday by the exiled City Council. One of them destroyed a Russian ammunition warehouse in the district near the airport, the council said.

It was not the first time explosions have been reported deep behind enemy lines during the war, but questions swirled on Wednesday about what had happened. In the past, the Ukrainians have used drones, special operators working behind enemy lines and a vast network of partisans loyal to Kyiv to wage war on the occupiers.

The Ukrainian General Staff said only that Ukraine’s air force had launched eight attacks on the temporary bases of Russian troops and two strikes on the positions of Russia’s antiaircraft missile systems.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/22/world/europe/ukraine-mariupol.html


More strikes in Mariupol.... 2nd day in a row. (Non-Paywall link below).

This also includes some social media video links.

Far behind the front lines, the attack on Mariupol raises questions about whether Ukraine is using a new type of munition, either provided by allies like the U.S. or domestically produced.

"Explosions were heard in the Kalmius district," the Mariupol City Council Telegram channel reported Wednesday night local time. "Meanwhile, two explosions are reported at 10:51 p.m. and 10:53 p.m. in the area of the plant named after Ilyich. We hope that our Defenders will continue to hit the positions of the Russian occupiers."

These latest attacks follow about a dozen strikes on Mariupol Tuesday night into Wednesday morning, according to Ukrainian Telegram channels

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/mariupol-strikes-raise-questions-about-possible-new-ukrainian-long-range-weapons

[Ⓐnarchy in the ☭☭☭P!]

When it comes to Transnistria, I personally doubt anything will happen. Everything that's been released all seems like information messaging, probably from intelligence services.

Reading this thread has been a frustrating experience the last few days for people looking for real discussion of this question because it's all been sniping about one particular poster's opinions instead of discussion about Transnistria. The way I see it, there are three possible ways for Transnistria to be incorporated into the Moldovan state:

1) Russian fuel subsidies to Transnistria end, leading the government to collapse.
2) Sheriff voluntarily agrees to dissolve the Transnistrian government and subordinate itself to the Moldovan state.
3) Transnistria is incorporated into Moldova by force.

The first option is certainly possible, and it's difficult to get reliable up-to-date sources on this subject, but it does not appear that Russia has stopped sending free natural gas to Transnistria. This in turn means that it is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. Transnistria has not been an ideal partner from the Russian perspective in this current war, but as long as Russia is continuing its offensive war it makes no sense to abandon Transnistria, especially considering how marginal the costs are.

I just don't see how the second option is plausible; even if the Moldovan government is somehow able to offer Sheriff a deal as good as the one it has now (which is hard to conceptualize, given that Sheriff operates by exporting cheap Russian products to the West), what happens when a new government alters the deal? Independence gives Sheriff security.

The third option is probably not inconceivable now, since Moldova appears to have significantly reduced its dependence on cheap Transnistrian electricity over the last year, but I'm not sure whose interests it would be in. Is the propaganda value of a victory over Russians for the Ukrainian government worth the cost of opening up a second front? Would an offensive war have propaganda value for the outside world? Would the Moldovan government really want to try to integrate this territory into its state at this time, especially if it was just the site of a war? It makes a lot more sense for all of this to just be saber-rattling.

There are many very strong military reasons for the Ukrainians to take out Transnistria soon. It would immediately free up several thousand Ukrainian soldiers currently tied down guarding the border. Additionally, Transnistria is home of the Cobasna ammo depot, the former supply hub of the Soviet 14th Guards Army and by some measures the single largest such depot in Europe. That huge supply of crucial artillery and tank rounds could provide the Ukrainians a huge boost at a time when NATO is having a tough time sourcing Warsaw Pact ammunition.

Perhaps most importantly (and a factor I don't see discussed nearly enough) is that right now Moldova has a pro-NATO government, but the next presidential election is next year and if the polls are of any indication the pro-Russian parties are on track for a big win. While 1,500 Russian regulars in Transnistria plus just under 10,000 local militiamen can't do anything so long as they're stuck in landlocked, unrecognized Transnistria, the situation could change rapidly with a Putin friendly regime in Chișinău. At that point Putin's options open up drastically: he could start moving that ammo to Moldova to bring back for his own use, he could offer the Communists Transnistrian integration in exchange for local control (ie. the status quo, but every election Putin's friends mysteriously gain several hundred thousand extra votes) and he could even try using Moldova as a staging ground to send saboteurs and troublemakers across the Carpathians.

The range of responses available to the Ukrainians, in turn, drop dramatically in the face of a hostile but democratically elected Moldova. To avoid such a nightmare scenario I'd imagine nearly any Ukrainian general would be pushing to liquidate the Transnistrians as soon as possible. For the Moldovans the situation is more complicated but the Sandu government frankly doesn't have much to lose and if Transnistria is integrated on Russian terms they'll be politically doomed for the foreseeable future. They'll probably start with a blockade but if that doesn't cut it they'll just have to bite the bullet and call for Ukrainian aid.

[Storr]

And they say Russians don't have a sense of humor:

https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1629025586797486080?s=20

[jaichind]

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/24/china-calls-for-russia-ukraine-cease-fire-proposes-peace-talks

"China calls for Russia-Ukraine ceasefire, proposes path to peace"

The PRC peace plan seems to be
a) End to fighting ASAP
b) End all sanctions
c) Talks to resolve issues

The PRC seems to have came up with this plan to get to the following result
Russia: Interesting, we are thinking about it
Ukraine: NO!!!
Collective West: NO!!!

PRC to Global South: See, Russia is being reasonable while Ukraine and the collective West are not.  We tried.

[Meclazine for Israel]

I predicted Covid 19 and the Ukrainian invasion to both be over within two weeks.

Man, did I get that wrong. 1 year on, Russia have made very little progress. The fight inside the Ukrainian people is unbelievable.

[Storr]

How it started:

https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1629042293008224262?s=20

How it's going (if it turns out this is incorrect, I'll edit this):

https://twitter.com/MarQs__/status/1629062965633720325?s=20

[jaichind]

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-24/poland-to-deliver-first-leopard-tanks-to-ukraine-on-friday

"Poland to Start Tank Deliveries to Ukraine at One-Year Mark"

First Leopard 2 to be sent to Ukraine from Poland today

[jaichind]

Economic scoreboard.  Average investment bank surveys GDP (2022 and 2023) and CPI 2022 for key economies
 
2022 GDP growth
              Russia     Eurozone        USA            UK           PRC            Japan
Feb         +2.6%       +4.0%       +3.7%      +4.4%*     +5.1%         +2.8%
March      -9.6%        +3.3%      +3.6%       +4.0%*    +5.0%          +2.4%
April      -10.0%        +2.9%       +3.3%      +3.9%*    +4.9%          +2.2%
May       -10.0%        +2.8%       +2.7%      +3.8%*    +4.5%          +1.9%
June        -9.6%        +2.6%       +2.6%      +3.7%*    +4.1%          +1.8%
July         -8.4%        +2.7%       +2.1%      +3.4%*    +3.9%          +1.6%
Aug         -8.0%        +2.8%       +1.6%      +3.4%*    +3.5%          +1.5%
Sept        -6.0%        +2.9%       +1.6%      +3.5%*    +3.4%          +1.6%
Oct          -4.5%        +3.0%       +1.7%      +4.1%      +3.3%          +1.6%
Nov         -3.6%        +3.2%       +1.8%      +4.2%      +3.3%          +1.5%
Dec         -3.3%        +3.2%       +1.9%      +4.3%      +3.0%          +1.4%
Jan          -3.0%        +3.3%       +2.1%      +4.2%     +3.0%           +1.3%
Feb          -2.1%        +3.4%       +2.1%      +4.1%     +3.0%           +1.1%

* - pre-adjustment. In early Oct UK adjusted its 2020 and 2021 GDP downward lowering the total GDP for both years.  The base effect of that change shifted the 2022 UK GDP growth upward.  All the 2022 GDP projections for the UK before Oct should really be something like 0.6% higher for a like-for-like comparison.

2023 GDP growth
              Russia     Eurozone        USA            UK           PRC            Japan
Feb          +2.1%      +2.5%        +2.5%       +2.1%     +5.2%        +1.7%
March       -1.5%       +2.5%       +2.3%        +1.9%     +5.2%        +1.8%
April         -0.6%       +2.4%        +2.2%       +1.7%     +5.2%        +1.8%
May          -0.6%       +2.3%        +2.1%       +1.4%     +5.2%        +1.8%
June         -1.5%       +2.1%        +2.0%       +1.2%     +5.3%        +1.8%
July          -2.5%       +1.3%        +1.3%       +0.7%     +5.2%        +1.8%
Aug          -2.7%       +0.9%        +1.1%       +0.5%     +5.2%        +1.7%
Sept         -3.0%       +0.3%        +0.9%       -0.2%      +5.1%        +1.5%
Oct           -3.0%       -0.1%         +0.5%       -0.4%      +4.9%        +1.4%
Nov          -3.0%       -0.1%         +0.5%       -0.7%      +4.9%        +1.3%
Dec          -2.7%       -0.1%         +0.3%       -1.0%      +4.8%        +1.3%
Jan           -2.9%        0.0%         +0.5%       -0.9%      +5.1%        +1.3%
Feb          -2.5%       +0.4%        +0.8%       -0.7%      +5.2%        +1.2%
 
2022 CPI growth
              Russia     Eurozone        USA            UK           PRC            Japan
Feb         +7.1%       +3.8%       +5.0%      +5.3%       +2.1%         +0.9%
March    +20.0%       +5.2%       +6.1%      +6.3%      +2.2%          +1.3%
April      +21.3%       +6.4%       +6.9%      +7.1%      +2.2%          +1.5%
May       +17.2%       +6.7%       +7.1%      +7.5%      +2.2%          +1.7%
June      +15.7%       +7.0%       +7.5%      +8.1%      +2.2%          +1.9%
July       +14.6%       +7.5%       +7.9%      +8.5%      +2.3%          +2.0%
Aug       +14.2%       +7.9%       +8.1%      +9.0%      +2.3%          +2.0%
Sept      +14.0%       +8.2%       +8.0%      +9.2%      +2.3%          +2.1%
Oct        +13.9%       +8.2%       +8.0%      +9.0%      +2.2%          +2.2%
Nov       +13.8%       +8.5%       +8.1%      +9.0%      +2.2%          +2.3%
Dec       +13.8%       +8.5%       +8.0%      +9.1%      +2.1%          +2.4%
Jan        +13.8%       +8.4%       +8.0%      +9.1%      +2.0%          +2.5%
Feb       +13.8%       +8.4%        +8.0%      +9.1%      +2.0%          +2.5%

2022 CPI numbers are pretty much official.
Russia and Japan 2022 GDP came in.  Russia at -2.1% which is better than consensus and Japan at 1.1% which is worse than consensus.   Germany just revised down its 2022 numbers so I suspect the 2022 GDP number for Eurozone will be worse than consensus.

For 2023 the picture is getting brighter for everyone except for Japan where consensus is getting worse.

UK adjusted its 2020 and 2021 GDP downward while Russia adjusted their 2021 GDP upward.  Taking them into account one can then construct a total cumulative 2022-2023 GDP loss based on current consensus/result vs 2022 Feb consensus as a percentage of 2021 GDP


Russia      -8.4%
Eurozone  -2.8%
USA         -3.4%
UK           -3.8%
PRC          -2.2%
Japan       -2.2%

PRC actually benefited from the war and their underperformance of 2022 Feb consensus has more todo with them popping their real estate bubble and their moronic COVID lockdown.  Eurozone will most likely be worse than this given Germany revision downward of 2022 GDP which is not factored into the consensus yet.

Given that in PPP terms the collective West GDP is around 9-10 times bigger than Russia, an eyeball of the results so far seems to indicted that the collective West is burning around 3.6 units of GDP to inflict 1 unit of GDP loss for Russia.  Whether that is a good deal for the collective West will be in the eyes of the beholder.  But Russia is taking real damage and for now is talking inflicting damage on the collective West for that privilege.

[The Dowager Mod]

https://twitter.com/lesiavasylenko/status/1629077631441285120

[Hindsight was 2020]

https://mobile.twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1629045914139602945

[Antonio the Sixth]

https://mobile.twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1629045914139602945

So this is where the West makes the difference. As long as Western support continues, the attrition game will work to Ukraine's advantage. I mean, we can clearly see that Ukraine now is better armed and equipped than it was one year ago. If Western support dries up, then the trend could eventually reverse (though whether that actually allows Russia to make advances remains to be see).

Fundamentally, we've known that this was the war's dynamic all along. The point is to act on it and stay focused on the end goal.

[Torie]

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/02/24/russia-ukraine-war-oral-history-00083757

On the one side, Russia, it’s a one man show, the Putin show. Most of the key players on his string really don’t know what is going on, and Putin’s true intentions, including the lugubrious Lavrov of all people. On the other hand, next to Putin himself, two of the “eyes” in particular knew better as to what was going on than Putin's stringed puppets.  Reacting to the Putin show of course entailed a much larger cast of characters, needed, uncharacteristically for them as it may be, to coordinate in real time, and do it as seamlessly as possible.

So thus we have a very long article about how the various departments and key players in the West (mostly the US and the UK, the two key eyes of the five (yeah, had never heard the term Five Eyes before or even knew it existed), coordinated as the odds of Putin’s invasion gradually morphed into a near certainty, with the imperative being to avoid having a redux of the cf that attended Putin’s near bloodless snatch of Crimea, along with the infusion of little green men into the Donbas).

Of  primary interest to me is what comes at the end, as to what those in the know thought would happen, despite all the foreknowledge and exhaustive planning:

AMB. JOHN SULLIVAN: It was going to be messy and ugly and horrific. I was pretty confident that Russians were going to capture a lot of territory, including Kyiv. The Russian nationalists, the propagandists, and Russian media, were saying, “Well, we’re looking forward to the big May 9 Victory Day parade in Kyiv this year.

We all know what actually happened, and got a hint that it would be different beforehand:

GEN. MARK MILLEY: The Ukrainians, at the very end — probably about two weeks prior — really begin to mobilize their country into a nation at arms. They really got into full swing, where you started seeing all the men — and a lot of the women — learning how to use weapons, mines, hand grenades, explosives and all that stuff. Then you also saw a significant mobilization of Ukrainian people into the army — reservists — and you saw the disposition of the Ukrainian forces to begin to change into their wartime locations.

Meanwhile, the typically irritating and way too mouthy but colorful Lindsay Graham proved this once to be spot on, when he told the once upon a time boxer Mayor of Kyiv:

“Listen, I don’t know if we’ll act in the way you’re asking in time to make a difference. But if it does come, if you can defy the narrative that you’re going to be walked all over and not a lost cause, then it will be much easier to rally Congress to your side.”

I told the mayor, I said, “If you can hold out, and two weeks after the invasion you’re still standing, still fighting — it’s like Rocky, you’re a fighter, right? Just show us that you’re Rocky.”

And so it came to pass. Kyiv survived, and Ukraine survives, albeit at a horrific cost to its people, consigned to a state of utter misery that may long endure, the planet rendered into a far more dangerous place, with much higher odds of a catastrophe, and a chain of events that can lead to a substantially lower standard of living for the planet, and for a long time - decades perhaps, long standing economic and other ties shattered.

Freedom is not free. It seems that each generation has to endure a painful reminder of that, and to make their own choices as to what matters most to them.

And so it goes, on this anniversary of a most infamous day that moved this particular old man to reflect - inspired yes, but in sadness.  

[Middle-aged Europe]

First Polish Leopards have arrived in Ukraine. Germany bumps its number of Leopards up to 18. Sweden commits to sending 10 Leopards.



https://twitter.com/TVPWorld_com/status/1629137825873670144



https://twitter.com/dw_politics/status/1629139911910780929



https://twitter.com/FinancialTimes/status/1629137691156553728