Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[windjammer]

Is it going to be significant if Ukraine gets new tanks?

[Virginiá]

Is it going to be significant if Ukraine gets new tanks?

If they get a lot of them, maybe. It really depends how well they use them. I don't personally think it will be a game changer, as the Leopard 2A4-2A5 are still older tanks from the 90s and best case scenario, Ukraine might only get around 90 - 120 of them. If anything, they might serve as more of an equalizer considering Ukraine has to break through a lot of fortified lines that have been built over the past 4+ months.

[Torie]

Things seem to have been blown up with Germany, with its new defense minister cut off at the knees. And it seems serious.

“Allies Fail to Agree on Sending Tanks to Ukraine

Officials tried to play down the rift. But Germany is still insisting it will not be the country to take the first step alone, for fear of incurring Moscow’s wrath.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/20/world/europe/ukraine-germany-us-tanks.html

Meanwhile team Biden says that the Abrams tanks are not viable in Ukraine, and even if the US sent some anyway, one might suspect that Germany will just say no anyway. Their word does not seem worth much, particularly inasmuch as its position of Abrams first makes zero first.

Is there anyway to facilitate the collapse of the German government or otherwise punish it? Somehow, Germany as a freeloader who does not do its share needs to be brought to an end, and they need somehow to know that.

A couple of more sentences from the article:

“There must be something in their heads about Germany being targeted in retaliation for sending this kind of signature German main battle tank — what that is, Scholz hasn’t spelled it out.”

One slight silver lining:

“His German counterpart, Boris Pistorius, said his country would begin an inventory of its vehicles, in case of a future deal, and would begin training Ukrainians on how to use the tanks.”

And watching France 24 TV in English, a reporter said just now that Poland was making noises of sending the Leapards to Ukraine without a German license to do so. That would be an interesting development.

[NOVA Green]

Package details dropped

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3272866/biden-administration-announces-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/



In addition to Europe, with the Tallinn Pledge:

(copied someone else's list):

Sweden: including Archer 155mm SPGs, 50 CV90 IFVs, NLAWs and demining equipment

Denmark: 19 CAESAR 155mm SPGs

Estonia: 10s of FH-70 155mm howitzers, 10s of D-30 122mm howitzers, thousands of 155mm shells, support vehicles, 100s of Carl-Gustaf 84mm recoilless rifles

Latvia: 2 Mi-17 helicopters, Stinger missiles, 10s of machine guns, 10s of UAVs and spare parts

Lithuania: 2 Mi-8 helicopters, dozens of Bofors L-70 40mm AA guns, anti-drone systems, optics, night vision devices and UAVs

Poland: S-60 57mm AA guns, 70,000 57mm shells

UK: 14 Challenger 2 MBTs, 30 AS90 155mm SPGs, 100 APCs, 100s of other armored vehicles, a maneuver support package, dozens of UAVs, 100,000 artillery shells, hundreds of precision missiles, 600 Brimstone anti-tank missiles and spare parts.

We're approaching >= 1,000 armored vehicles (IFVs, APCs, armored Humvees, MRAPs, etc) from the US alone over the past 30 days. And over 100 howitzers of various types as well from US/EU.

Possible tanks tomorrow but ultimately hinging on Germany, who appears to have again shot down Leopard exports, only for the new Defense Minister to say the opposite later today, so we'll see.

So since US / German tanks are, at least not as of today, on the table I thought I would add a few other recent donations of military hardware not included on your list above.

I suspect there are more as well from other countries so might be interesting to look at getting an even more comprehensive list of recent military aid to Ukraine.

Canada is sending 200 personnel carriers. Britain will donate 600 missiles. Sweden is giving artillery systems and armored vehicles.

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/01/20/world/russia-ukraine-news

[Storr]

Red tracers means that it's NATO ammunition

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1616594837234409472?s=20&t=zZafvL4...

[NOVA Green]

Is it going to be significant if Ukraine gets new tanks?

If they get a lot of them, maybe. It really depends how well they use them. I don't personally think it will be a game changer, as the Leopard 2A4-2A5 are still older tanks from the 90s and best case scenario, Ukraine might only get around 90 - 120 of them. If anything, they might serve as more of an equalizer considering Ukraine has to break through a lot of fortified lines that have been built over the past 4+ months.

I guess the a couple of the key questions are:

1.) What will Ukraine use them for?

2.) Will there be enough for a major breakthrough on any of the current fronts?

Spring is anticipated to bring about both Ukrainian and Russian offensive activity on what is already an extremely large battlefield, with Russia leaning more on mass mobilization of infantry units and possibly trying to rope Belarus into the war, which although it might be a feint if real might well create a potentially revolutionary scenario within Belarus, but still is not to be dismissed from the Ukrainian perspective considering the relative size of the total number of active troops involved.

As Ukraine builds up its armor, its military leaders have shown professionalism and discipline by not overcommitting resources too soon, said Ben Hodges, a retired lieutenant general and former commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe. The main effort for Ukraine, he said, is likely to be an attempt to cut off and then take back Crimea, the Ukrainian peninsula that Russia seized and annexed in 2014.

Ukraine, Hodges said, wants to build the equivalent of a full armored division, a formation that typically includes 10,000 to 15,000 troops. It must be trained and prepared to serve as the “breakthrough formation” in the next major counteroffensive, he added.

Ukraine in the next few months will probably attempt to set the conditions for the liberation of Russian-occupied Crimea, first through long-range strikes and then with an armored offensive designed to cut ground routes from the Black Sea peninsula back to Russia, Hodges predicted.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/01/20/austin-ramstein-ukraine-tanks/

Needless to say that the Western allies of Ukraine might well be split on how these items might be used...

For example if Ukraine ends up with a full armored division (How many tanks does that take?) as part of a combined arms operation to retake Crimea is that something that might be dividing NATO behind the scenes?

[Storr]

https://twitter.com/christogrozev/status/1616622488158613505?s=20&t=zZafvL4L...

[jaichind]

Everything should be relative to an alternative world w/o a price cap.

Oil prices have gone down because
a) Mild winter so far - for sure a defeat for Putin's plans
b) Likely economic recession in many parts of the world

There has been a slight resurgence in betting on a V-shaped PRC economic surge in 2023 on top of the end of the COVID-19 lockdown but that is a crapshoot right now.

The fact that Russia will not sell oil on any tanker with an oil cap means the collective west is buying energy at a higher rate than a rate without a price cap.  Just like Russia is now selling oil at a price below the price that it would sell without a price cap.  So the best way to think about that would be "collective West burns cash to make Russia burn cash"

That's the idea. The West has more cash to burn. The idea is to find as many ways to burn Russia cash as possible, and if it can't be burned, to freeze it for war reparations. We will know that the job is done when Putin is on the streets holding a sign, "will work for food."

I agree that is the collective West plan and in this case, I would agree has had limited success.  At this stage, Russian oil is selling for around $6 below non-Russian oil so the impact is real.  On the other hand, the price Russian energy is being sold for is far above what Russia needs for its historical fiscal needs although it is clear Russia will need to spend more on the war.  A much deeper world recession is necessary to drive oil prices to a level that will have a large impact.  In that sense, the likely V-shaped PRC economic recovery in 2023 is coming at a good time for Russia.  So the best way to describe the collective West price cap is that it has real but limited success which is more effective then I would expect.

[CumbrianLefty]

For example if Ukraine ends up with a full armored division (How many tanks does that take?) as part of a combined arms operation to retake Crimea is that something that might be dividing NATO behind the scenes?

They surely won't even think about trying to recapture Crimea until they have regained pretty much everything else, and that still seems some way off right now.

So let's worry about that eventuality if it ever happens, would be my advice.

[Storr]

Bakhmut has a new fire truck

https://twitter.com/RaduHossu/status/1616791393048870918?s=20&t=9Tgbwz4I3I6v...

https://twitter.com/RaduHossu/status/1616791399482925056?s=20&t=9Tgbwz4I3I6v...

[Storr]

source: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ukraine-krieg-diese-leopard-panzer-koennte-die-bundeswehr-abgeben-a-5df41a86-3110-4152-82c9-02afb552d5dd

Google translate says the headline is: "The Bundeswehr could hand over these Leopard tanks"

https://twitter.com/clashreport/status/1616866481651814400?s=20&t=2OMym5NcdX...

[2952-0-0]

I agree that is the collective West plan and in this case, I would agree has had limited success.  At this stage, Russian oil is selling for around $6 below non-Russian oil so the impact is real.  On the other hand, the price Russian energy is being sold for is far above what Russia needs for its historical fiscal needs although it is clear Russia will need to spend more on the war.  A much deeper world recession is necessary to drive oil prices to a level that will have a large impact.  In that sense, the likely V-shaped PRC economic recovery in 2023 is coming at a good time for Russia.  So the best way to describe the collective West price cap is that it has real but limited success which is more effective then I would expect.

The spread between Brent and Ural is almost 50%. In other words, almost half of Russia's oil revenues in a hypothetical absence of a cap have gone missing. If Putin wants this special-military-operation-effort to continue much longer, he will have to look for revenue from within, and it's doubtful how far he can go.

https://www.ft.com/content/8a5f4681-9592-469f-b223-a939dcbbf3f3

Also, don't bank on a V-shaped recovery in China. More likely, it will be L-shaped. Unlike in the rich world, where government handouts meant consumers were sitting on vast amounts of excess cash that were bound to overheat the economy, China's constant lockdowns and a lack of government handouts mean there's no excess cash to drive a quick recovery. Most recently, there are plenty of anecdotes of Chinese local governments simply running out of cash and using absurd methods to keep the lights on. If the markets were expecting a V-shaped recovery in China, then oil futures would have already surged - and there's simply no sign of that at all.

[Woody]

https://mobile.twitter.com/Suriyakmaps/status/1616765262203871232?cxt=HHwWgIDTrZ...
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1616844109075054592

[Filuwaúrdjan]

Is there anyway to facilitate the collapse of the German government or otherwise punish it? Somehow, Germany as a freeloader who does not do its share needs to be brought to an end, and they need somehow to know that.

I should think that interfering in the internal politics of another country in order to pursue wider geopolitical objectives had been rather thoroughly discredited (to the extent that it ever had credit) by this invasion.

In any case, the German government has actually contributed a significant amount - and vastly more than anyone would have expected at the start of the war - to the Ukrainian war effort so far, even if they've not done a very good job of selling that fact.

[Storr]

The funeral for the members of the Ukrainian Interior Ministry killed in the Brovary helicopter crash was held today:

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1616877711238246401?s=20&t=BJT66Y...

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1616788355987148800?s=20&t=BJT66Y...

[Woody]

https://twitter.com/narrative_hole/status/1616861463888396299

[NOVA Green]

Looks like the (3) UK provided Sea King Helicopters have arrived in Ukraine:


https://twitter.com/BarracudaVol1/status/1616865960299724803?s=20&t=k9Mevlhj...

[President Johnson]

source: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ukraine-krieg-diese-leopard-panzer-koennte-die-bundeswehr-abgeben-a-5df41a86-3110-4152-82c9-02afb552d5dd

Google translate says the headline is: "The Bundeswehr could hand over these Leopard tanks"

https://twitter.com/clashreport/status/1616866481651814400?s=20&t=2OMym5NcdX...

Yeah, correct, though the article is paywalled.

I'm really getting mad that Scholz continues to stonewall here despite his coalition parties and foreign partners pressuring the government to deliver tanks or at least issue formal approvals for others to ship Leopard tanks to Ukraine. I don't get what's holding them back. It's almost shameful at this point.

[NOVA Green]

Looks like (1) of the ( Canadian donated Roshal Senator IFV's currently in Ukraine was destroyed recently.

There are (200) more which Canada will be delivering in the near future....


https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1616782723279978498?s=20&t=k9MevlhjYSiU...

[Storr]

So possibly some German Tanks might end up in Ukraine without German approval?

Personally believe tanks might be over-rated in this current war, mainly because of mobility, but whatever...

https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1616149727061344293?s=20&t=Xxdi2d...

Scholz will probably "approve" it IMO for this very reason... as a face-saving measure and all.

Can someone explain to me what the hell Scholz's problem is?
There is a war of conquest in Europe.
Why does Germany even have a defense industry if not for this?

Politically speaking, Olaf Scholz is a master of sitting things out. This is his way of covering his own ass, or at least he thinks so. For him, the first and best course of action is always non-action. Only when he is left with no other choice, he does something. This applies both to foreign affairs and domestic matters, and was often a point of criticism against him in German media these past 13 months.

The thing is, it often seemed to work in his political career in his favour and arguably helped facilitating his ascension to the Chancellorship. For instance, in the 2021 election, all three major candidates - Laschet, Baerbock, Scholz - had their baggages and scandals, but in Scholz' case he and the SPD simply chose to completely shut up about it and as a result they stealthed their way to the top job this way while everyone was distrcted by Laschet and Baerbock.

If anything, Germany and Scholz's problem is a public relations issue. The public perception (especially outside Germany) is that Germany hasn't provided all that much to Ukraine, when the country has actually provided more arms to Ukraine than any other country sans the US and UK.

I'm guessing some of that perception is due to Scholz not wanting talk about and emphasize arms and equipment deliveries to his domestic audience (particularly the SPD electorate). An audience that doesn't want Germany to be seen as any sort of aggressor, and prefer Scholz's "cautious, careful, and thoughtful" decision making about Ukraine, even if it's really just him dragging his feet.

[NOVA Green]

Looks like the (3) UK provided Sea King Helicopters have arrived in Ukraine.

Edit: Also looks like (6) pledged helicopters have now been delivered from Portugal, and Latvia has pledged (2) helicopters.


https://twitter.com/BarracudaVol1/status/1616865960299724803?s=20&t=k9Mevlhj...

https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1616672470756384773?s=20&t=k9Mevlhj...

[Torie]

Is there anyway to facilitate the collapse of the German government or otherwise punish it? Somehow, Germany as a freeloader who does not do its share needs to be brought to an end, and they need somehow to know that.

I should think that interfering in the internal politics of another country in order to pursue wider geopolitical objectives had been rather thoroughly discredited (to the extent that it ever had credit) by this invasion.

In any case, the German government has actually contributed a significant amount - and vastly more than anyone would have expected at the start of the war - to the Ukrainian war effort so far, even if they've not done a very good job of selling that fact.

I don't follow the logic of your first paragraph. The predicate of the German government falling would be a majority of its parliament want to be more aggressive in supporting Ukraine. The issue arises since it appears that the SPD's coalition partners do want to be more aggressive. I do admit that I not necessarily a fan of papering over differences where differences exist.

I also don't know what is going on behind the scenes obviously. If Germany is really going to train Ukraine troops to use the tanks during this hiatus period, the hiatus may not interfere much with outcomes on the battlefield.

[NOVA Green]

Meanwhile for anybody on here believing that the fall of Bakhmut is imminent, the ISW would beg to differ:

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1616637492563689472?s=20&t=k9Mevlhj...

[jaichind]

I agree that is the collective West plan and in this case, I would agree has had limited success.  At this stage, Russian oil is selling for around $6 below non-Russian oil so the impact is real.  On the other hand, the price Russian energy is being sold for is far above what Russia needs for its historical fiscal needs although it is clear Russia will need to spend more on the war.  A much deeper world recession is necessary to drive oil prices to a level that will have a large impact.  In that sense, the likely V-shaped PRC economic recovery in 2023 is coming at a good time for Russia.  So the best way to describe the collective West price cap is that it has real but limited success which is more effective then I would expect.

The spread between Brent and Ural is almost 50%. In other words, almost half of Russia's oil revenues in a hypothetical absence of a cap have gone missing. If Putin wants this special-military-operation-effort to continue much longer, he will have to look for revenue from within, and it's doubtful how far he can go.

https://www.ft.com/content/8a5f4681-9592-469f-b223-a939dcbbf3f3

Also, don't bank on a V-shaped recovery in China. More likely, it will be L-shaped. Unlike in the rich world, where government handouts meant consumers were sitting on vast amounts of excess cash that were bound to overheat the economy, China's constant lockdowns and a lack of government handouts mean there's no excess cash to drive a quick recovery. Most recently, there are plenty of anecdotes of Chinese local governments simply running out of cash and using absurd methods to keep the lights on. If the markets were expecting a V-shaped recovery in China, then oil futures would have already surged - and there's simply no sign of that at all.

Thanks for correcting me on where Ural is trading relative to  Brent.   I got my facts wrong.  There was a large spread between the two right after the war started but Russia managed to close that spread during the summer.  Now the spread is back up to where it was right after the war.  This is a fairly negative signal for Russia's fiscal position in 2023.  So far the estimate for Russia's fiscal deficit in 2022 is -1.5% of GDP and in 2023 -2.6% of GDP.  If these trends hold the -2.6% might be optimistic.  Still, such levels of deficit are similar to the 2015-2017 period and I do not see any short or medium problems for Russia to finance it.

As for PRC economic recovery, it is a crapshoot.  We will know more in Q2 2023.  But financial markets are already starting to price in a strong recovery starting in Q2 including oil prices as well which have surged since early Dec 2022.

[2952-0-0]

I don't follow the logic of your first paragraph. The predicate of the German government falling would be a majority of its parliament want to be more aggressive in supporting Ukraine. The issue arises since it appears that the SPD's coalition partners do want to be more aggressive. I do admit that I not necessarily a fan of papering over differences where differences exist.

I also don't know what is going on behind the scenes obviously. If Germany is really going to train Ukraine troops to use the tanks during this hiatus period, the hiatus may not interfere much with outcomes on the battlefield.

No one likes foreign powers interfering in what should be their internal decision. If Germans feel that their government wasn't formed as a product of their decisions, then that would fatally undermine the meaning of democracy. And besides, Germany is an open democracy: it doesn't cost anything to openly advocate for approving the tanks, especially when the large majority of all Germans outside AfD voters support it. If the cause of German reluctance is its historical trauma from 80 years ago, then that should be viewed in its context. It should be noted that the Japanese seem to have had an easier time overcoming their even greater historical trauma, perhaps because they have been more aware of the geopolitical threats they face.

The Poles have openly stated they will force German hands, one way or the other. German dithering might not matter much in the short term, but it will rekindle suspicions about fecklessness.

As for PRC economic recovery, it is a crapshoot.  We will know more in Q2 2023.  But financial markets are already starting to price in a strong recovery starting in Q2 including oil prices as well which have surged since early Dec 2022.

Yes, there will be some recovery in China in the coming months. But, the early signs are not optimistic, given the rock-bottom consumer and producer sentiment levels even after the end of the lockdown. Oil has recovered slightly, but only back to early 2022 levels, and still sharply down from when fears about war-related disruption were at their worst. There *might* be more recovery if there's more confidence that inflation can be restrained without provoking a recession.