Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[Antonio the Sixth]

As someone who voted to Remain, the absolute inertia by the EU against countries like Hungary for it's democratic backsliding is a a disgrace, particularly given the pressure (and reciprocation) exerted against Balkan members. Hungary (and to some extent Poland) have been given preferential treatment on account of them being perceived to be... more 'western.'

This is wrong on so many levels. First of all, it makes no sense to compare the situation of actual EU members vs prospective members. The latter are subject to harsh conditions and always have been (the standards have arguably been raised in the past decade, but that's mostly because many countries look back critically on the 2004-2007 enlargements and want to proceed more cautiously). Sanctioning a EU member is a completely different process, and one where the deck is stacked against such efforts (for understandable if flawed reasons). Violations of the rule of law weren't even contemplated as grounds for sanctions until recently, a consequence end-of-history hubris on the part of the EU's founders which is easy to mock in retrospect but was universal back then.

It's also patently false to say there's been "absolute inertia" in this area. Both the Parliament and the Commission have been making the case for sanctioning Hungary (with the, again, very limited and ad hoc mechanisms available) for years at this point. In all cases, the only real roadblock has come from member states, especially since most of the proposals so far have required unanimity, and Hungary always had its Visegrad allies to count on. Now, the commission has finally come up with a proposal that only requires a qualified majority, so hopefully we can finally expect this to go somewhere, but one way or the other, the ball now is clearly in the member states' court.

I also have no idea where this notion that Hungary is seen as "more Western" comes from. I've never met a Western European who thought Hungary was Western but Bulgaria wasn't, or something. Maybe that's a thing in Britain but not over here.

At the end of the day, it's all well and good to criticize the EU (I certainly do it plenty!), but it would be better to criticize it for the right reasons, and with a modicum of knowledge about how its internal mechanisms actually work. These lazy intellectual shortcuts are how you people ended up with Brexit, and I expected better of a poster like you.

You claim that "this is wrong on so many levels" and then you say nothing at all to actually dispute any of what afleitch said, and then you blame him for Brexit and impugn him as a poster. He's not the one who comes off as being in the wrong here.

You might want to read my post again. I've refuted every single point Afleitch made, sometimes word for word. I've also never blamed him for Brexit, and if having high expectations of a poster is "impugning" them, then guilty as charged I guess. This is the sort of post I would have shrugged off coming from a generic US poster, because I know they rarely have a chance to keep up with EU politics, but from Afleitch it genuinely surprised me.

What a bizarre reaction.

[Hindsight was 2020]

https://mobile.twitter.com/WarMonitor3/status/1571908350832709639

[afleitch]

As I don't want to go off topic...

Has the EU been 'inert'? Yes. Of course there is delay and internal politics at play. That there is now targeted movement does not erase that. There were fast sanctions against Austria, five years after entry for Haider entering government. There were restrictions to even Slovakia entering until Meciar was gone.

Is Hungary backsliding? Yes. Has it been able to do so under EU oversight? Yes.

Are Romania and Bulgaria under continued targeted scrutiny 15 years after entry for judicial reform and corruption linked to organised crime (whistle)? Yes. Orban has fattened his supporters wallets with EU funds, and it's only now that targeted action is being taken against Hungary, it's corruption and it's judicial independence.

You could have just asked me to elaborate.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Has the EU been 'inert'? Yes. Of course there is delay and internal politics at play. That there is now targeted movement does not erase that.

No, EU institutions have not been inert - as I pointed out they have been active on the Hungary issue for several years, but have been stymied by Hungary-allied member states. Blaming the EU for that would be like blaming Congress for passing a law that was vetoed by the President.

There were fast sanctions against Austria, five years after entry for Haider entering government. There were restrictions to even Slovakia entering until Meciar was gone.

What kind of sanctions specifically? That matters here. Iirc Hungary has also received cutbacks on a number of EU funding it would otherwise receive. It's still far from enough, of course, but that's because different funding is tied to different rules. What is currently in the works in terms of sanctions for Hungary is unprecedented as far as I can tell, cutting Hungary's funding by a third. The rule-of-law procedure that was blocked by Hungary's allies would have gone even further, essentially freezing its EU membership altogether.

Also, if your explanation is that Hungary is being treated more gently seen as more Western, why are you bringing up Slovakia and Austria? Do people see Austria as "Eastern" now??

You could have just asked me to elaborate.

I'm not trying to be confrontational. You know I agree that it's a travesty that Orban has been allowed a free rein for so long. But your analysis of how and why this has happened just doesn't hold water. It's important to understand why problematic outcomes occur, which institutional actors are to blame, and what motivates them. Failure of analysis on each of these points makes it impossible to actually fix the problem.

[Хahar 🤔]

You might want to read my post again. I've refuted every single point Afleitch made, sometimes word for word. I've also never blamed him for Brexit, and if having high expectations of a poster is "impugning" them, then guilty as charged I guess. This is the sort of post I would have shrugged off coming from a generic US poster, because I know they rarely have a chance to keep up with EU politics, but from Afleitch it genuinely surprised me.

What a bizarre reaction.

Your argument is that the EU hasn't been inert, it just hasn't actually done anything of any substance, which is totally different. That's not as obvious an argument as you think it is, and the condescension here is unwarranted.

Has the EU been 'inert'? Yes. Of course there is delay and internal politics at play. That there is now targeted movement does not erase that.

No, EU institutions have not been inert - as I pointed out they have been active on the Hungary issue for several years, but have been stymied by Hungary-allied member states. Blaming the EU for that would be like blaming Congress for passing a law that was vetoed by the President.

No, it's like blaming the US government for failure to act when a bill is vetoed by the president, which is an entirely reasonable reaction.

[Lord Halifax]

Could y'all please stop derailing this thread.

[windjammer]

Is Crimea really going to be difficult to reconquer? Any other territories that could be difficult too?

[AndyHogan14]

Is Crimea really going to be difficult to reconquer? Any other territories that could be difficult too?

The problem is getting there. If they are able to establish a "beach head" of sorts, it won't be any more difficult than anywhere else that the Russians are. This issue is establishing a defensible position on the peninsula. The small bit of land that connects Crimea with the mainland is not very wide and extremely exposed—the key is getting beyond that point.

[Person Man]

Could y'all please stop derailing this thread.

Seconded. We want to play the ball as we found it.

[I spent the winter writing songs about getting better]

https://twitter.com/nycjim/status/1571989934554357760?t=AIOuUwwQsvXZYu5IrEp-xw&a...

[Sol]

Is Crimea really going to be difficult to reconquer? Any other territories that could be difficult too?

The problem is getting there. If they are able to establish a "beach head" of sorts, it won't be any more difficult than anywhere else that the Russians are. This issue is establishing a defensible position on the peninsula. The small bit of land that connects Crimea with the mainland is not very wide and extremely exposed—the key is getting beyond that point.

IMO I do think there's the inconvenient truth that public opinion in Crimea is probably pretty genuinely against returning to Ukraine, unlike the Donbass. Reconquering Crimea almost certainly means partisan fighting similar to what we've seen in the rest of Ukraine, but in the pro-Russian direction.

[Storr]

On the lighter side of things, DPR propaganda continues to have very high quality acting:

https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1571926431613026314?s=20&t=j-BVkM9F...

[Frodo]

Could y'all please stop derailing this thread.

Thanks -I don't see why a mod can't just move that entire conversation regarding Hungary and move it to the European Union megathread where it belongs.  

[Storr]

https://mobile.twitter.com/WarMonitor3/status/1571908350832709639

From the horse's mouth:

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1571974705112031232?s=20&t=Qswr4RRB...

[I spent the winter writing songs about getting better]

https://twitter.com/PaulFox50854324/status/1571915140458598405?t=0O_GM54I-1Y5e58...

[HillGoose]

putin getting his demonic ass handed to him, u gotta love it

will NATO let Ukraine in once they push the damn russkies out u think

[Oryxslayer]

Is Crimea really going to be difficult to reconquer? Any other territories that could be difficult too?

The problem is getting there. If they are able to establish a "beach head" of sorts, it won't be any more difficult than anywhere else that the Russians are. This issue is establishing a defensible position on the peninsula. The small bit of land that connects Crimea with the mainland is not very wide and extremely exposed—the key is getting beyond that point.

IMO I do think there's the inconvenient truth that public opinion in Crimea is probably pretty genuinely against returning to Ukraine, unlike the Donbass. Reconquering Crimea almost certainly means partisan fighting similar to what we've seen in the rest of Ukraine, but in the pro-Russian direction.

The question of Crimea arguably gets to the fundamental questions about the nature of the conflict and the nature of peace. Yes, there is this possibility if Ukrainian soldiers struggle to advance into the region and Russia has full intention of defending the peninsula. There however is also the possibility that we see a repeat of Kharkiv and a full route here or elsewhere leads to rapid movement into the region. There is the possibility that those who identify with Russia pack their bags and flee if resistance or living under Ukraine seem like unenviable prospects - more likely if Ukraine intends to treat Crimean residents differently for their 8 years of disloyalty. There is the possibility that Moscow sees Crimea as a bridge too far and believes it can use the attacks on 'Russian Soil' as justification for mobilization or dirty bombs or something else.

But all this still depends upon how Ukrainian leaders think they can end the war. Because this question differs immensely based on whether Putin is still in power, and what his war aims at this point remain. Ukraine's war aims have not changed since day 1: this is her war of independence. Kyiv desires the freedom to move both economically and politically without interference from Russian nationals or their government, recognition of the indivisibility of their territory, the restoration of Ukrainian people to their homes, and the dignity to not be demeaned as 'Little Russians.' These goals are all somewhat intangible but also recognizable - territory is secondary and reparations or other compensation are not priorities. If, like other previous independence wars, some parts of claimed territory steadfast do not want independence, then the breakaway nation may not demand them as recognized parts of their new indivisible state. There is the question of if Moscow would still need an 'off-ramp' as justification for the war, and a process of international recognition over Crimea could be such a route.

What everyone wants to avoid is putting Russia in a position where peace is impossible. Essentially a situation where Ukraine has all her pre-2014 lands, but Russian leaders still see more value in keeping the border hot and launching missiles every now and again like some kind of oversized Hamas. This situation denies Ukraine all of her war aims. It would also likely mean that temporarily holding cities like Belgorod to force a settlement would anger the Kremlin not force her hand. Avoiding this situation is key, and it likely all depends upon who is in power and what is their policy towards Crimea and the progress of the war in the future.

[Virginiá]

Germany traded around 40 heavy trucks for Slovenia's 28 M-55S tanks (to be sent to Ukraine)

https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1571958523898241024

These are T-55 tanks that were heavily modernized 20+ years ago. It sounds useless but it has had a large amount of upgrades, such as reactive armor, new engine, new optics, firing control system, new comms, etc. It's actually reasonably capable, at least compared to some of the decrepit tanks Russia has been pulling out of storage.

Also, apparently NATO is open to sending modern tanks to Ukraine at some point:

https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1571949385080254465

Not something I would expect until next year, though, particularly with winter coming up. That would be an ideal time to train new soldiers on these systems.

In addition to these, Ukraine should be seeing deliveries of significant quantities of BMPs and other armored vehicles within the next month, given what has been announced recently.

[NOVA Green]

https://twitter.com/PaulFox50854324/status/1571915140458598405?t=0O_GM54I-1Y5e58...

You narrowly beat me to it!

Here are a few snippets from a Wall Street Journal story today along the same lines:

Ukraine has shot down 55 Russian planes during the nearly seven-month conflict, precluding Moscow from achieving air superiority, the top U.S. Air Force commander for Europe said Monday.

But Ukraine’s small air force lacks the capability to seize control, creating a situation in which the two sides are embroiled in a prolonged casualty-producing struggle on the ground, according to Gen. James Hecker, who commands the U.S. Air Force in Europe and Africa.

“That’s what’s playing out in Ukraine right now. A lot of casualties because there’s not air superiority on either side of the house,” said Gen. Hecker, providing a rare public look at the struggle for control of the skies over Ukraine.

At least 80% of Kyiv’s air force is intact, according to Gen. Hecker, who said that he speaks with the head of Ukraine’s air force every two weeks.

Air Force officials said that it could take two to three years to provide the Ukrainians with American-made F-16 aircraft, if a political decision was made in Washington to send them.

“This is a much longer duration thing,” said Gen. Hecker. “But you know as we now pass 200 days in the war, I think folks are starting to think more long term.”

https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-war-for-ukraine-neither-side-controls-the-skies-but-russia-has-lost-55-planes-11663627715?mod=hp_lead_pos7

[NOVA Green]

Good read from Foreign Policy on how the Ukrainian Armaments Industry has continued to survive despite there not really being any time of "rear base" that in theory Russian guided missiles couldn't hit, regardless of what appears to be an increasingly dwindling supply.

I believe you should get one free article / month without having to hit the paywall, which is a $19.99 month subscription, but much cheaper discounts for an annual subscription.

Russia has targeted Ukraine’s defense industry, from tank plants to logistics facilities, with more than 100 missile strikes since Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February. Ukraine’s GDP is set to fall by more than one-third. And all the while, Ukraine has needed to learn how to maintain and service new NATO-grade weapons coming into its arsenal from Western countries.

But nearly seven months after the invasion aimed at toppling Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government, the country’s defense industry—one of the most robust in the former Soviet Union—has continued to chug along, according to experts and Ukrainian officials. That’s partly by relocating defense production facilities to secure locations, ordering new defense production agreements with European allies like Poland, and the government’s mandated creation of new defense production jobs.

Yuriy Gusev, the head of Ukraine’s state-run weapons manufacturer Ukroboronprom, told Foreign Policy in an interview that Ukraine is working with some companies from abroad to offshore production. But as Kyiv is increasingly given NATO-level weapons—more than $15 billion worth from the United States alone since February (nearly three times last year’s defense budget)—Ukraine is looking to build facilities to service those weapons and increasingly becoming a part of the Western military supply chain.

Even with Ukraine under attack, taking some facilities offline, the country has cleverly adapted, using small-scale workshops and offshoring production to avoid Russian strikes. Gusev also said companies have tried to hire more and increase salaries to keep defense workers in their jobs; even in World War II, the United States struggled with absenteeism and worker strikes at many major defense companies.

“Necessity is the mother of invention,” said Jeb Nadaner, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for industrial policy. “They have very active networks in Europe and even beyond to keep their workshops moving forward.”

And as retreating Russian troops have increasingly left more sophisticated weapons behind—including tanks, armored vehicles, and assault rifles—Ukraine has put in place procedures to modify these weapons and use them against their makers. A Ukrainian military official told Foreign Policy last week that Ukraine had captured more than 200 vehicles in its sweep into the Kharkiv region near the Russian border.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/19/ukraine-defense-industry-war-machine-russia/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Editors%20Picks%20OC&utm_term=49527&tpcc=Editors%20Picks%20OC

[AndyHogan14]

Is Crimea really going to be difficult to reconquer? Any other territories that could be difficult too?

The problem is getting there. If they are able to establish a "beach head" of sorts, it won't be any more difficult than anywhere else that the Russians are. This issue is establishing a defensible position on the peninsula. The small bit of land that connects Crimea with the mainland is not very wide and extremely exposed—the key is getting beyond that point.

IMO I do think there's the inconvenient truth that public opinion in Crimea is probably pretty genuinely against returning to Ukraine, unlike the Donbass. Reconquering Crimea almost certainly means partisan fighting similar to what we've seen in the rest of Ukraine, but in the pro-Russian direction.

The question of Crimea arguably gets to the fundamental questions about the nature of the conflict and the nature of peace. Yes, there is this possibility if Ukrainian soldiers struggle to advance into the region and Russia has full intention of defending the peninsula. There however is also the possibility that we see a repeat of Kharkiv and a full route here or elsewhere leads to rapid movement into the region. There is the possibility that those who identify with Russia pack their bags and flee if resistance or living under Ukraine seem like unenviable prospects - more likely if Ukraine intends to treat Crimean residents differently for their 8 years of disloyalty. There is the possibility that Moscow sees Crimea as a bridge too far and believes it can use the attacks on 'Russian Soil' as justification for mobilization or dirty bombs or something else.

But all this still depends upon how Ukrainian leaders think they can end the war. Because this question differs immensely based on whether Putin is still in power, and what his war aims at this point remain. Ukraine's war aims have not changed since day 1: this is her war of independence. Kyiv desires the freedom to move both economically and politically without interference from Russian nationals or their government, recognition of the indivisibility of their territory, the restoration of Ukrainian people to their homes, and the dignity to not be demeaned as 'Little Russians.' These goals are all somewhat intangible but also recognizable - territory is secondary and reparations or other compensation are not priorities. If, like other previous independence wars, some parts of claimed territory steadfast do not want independence, then the breakaway nation may not demand them as recognized parts of their new indivisible state. There is the question of if Moscow would still need an 'off-ramp' as justification for the war, and a process of international recognition over Crimea could be such a route.

What everyone wants to avoid is putting Russia in a position where peace is impossible. Essentially a situation where Ukraine has all her pre-2014 lands, but Russian leaders still see more value in keeping the border hot and launching missiles every now and again like some kind of oversized Hamas. This situation denies Ukraine all of her war aims. It would also likely mean that temporarily holding cities like Belgorod to force a settlement would anger the Kremlin not force her hand. Avoiding this situation is key, and it likely all depends upon who is in power and what is their policy towards Crimea and the progress of the war in the future.

My view on Crimea is that if it is possible, the peninsula should be removed from Russian sovereignty regardless of what the people there want. If being part of Ukraine is too much for the pre-2014 population of Crimea (everyone post-2014 must be deported and anyone that fled should get their property back), then it should have the option of being an independent state, but treaty-bound to never join the Russian Federation. Having Ukraine surrounded by a state that has genocidal designs cannot be allowed.

[NOVA Green]

Good angle here mainly extrapolated from a Forbes article from Yesterday...

The Ukrainians’ momentum, weighted by aggressive air and artillery support, has carried them a short distance across the Oskil and south toward Lyman. Now several of Kyiv’s brigades—a mix of paratroopers and territorials—also are closing on Lyman from a different direction.

The disposition of forces in and around Lyman favors the attackers. As recently as last week, one analyst placed just four Russian battalions in the area—motorized infantry, mostly. A battalion might have just a few hundred front-line troops. A brigade usually includes several battalions.

ISW’s own assessment is even less favorable for the Russians. “The Russian defenders in Lyman still appear to consist in large part of ... reservists and the remnants of units badly damaged in the Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive,” the think-tank stated.

Worse, “the Russians do not appear to be directing reinforcements from elsewhere in the theater to these areas,” ISW added.

That latter point should come as no surprise. The Kharkiv counteroffensive at its climax a week ago consumed a Russian battalion every day. The vaunted 1st Guard Tank Army lost at least half of its roughly 200 T-80 tanks as it pulled back across the Oskil.

Perhaps most embarrassingly for Moscow, the reserve 3rd Army Corps—which the Kremlin struggled to form this summer—rolled into Kharkiv in a desperate bid to slow the Ukrainian attack, promptly lost a few skirmishes then joined the wider Russian retreat.

That is to say, there are no reserves to reinforce the Lyman garrison because the Kremlin already spent the bulk of its reserves—the 3rd AC—in a failed effort to stop the initial Ukrainian counterattack. Russia has run out of healthy young men and spare modern equipment and no longer can stand up effective new units. At least not quickly.

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1571967627915890688?s=20&t=YPMox_2k...

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/09/18/russia-has-no-reserves-left-as-ukrainian-troops-surround-a-key-eastern-town/?sh=79db36f63126

[ꙮ]

I don't think Ukraine could ever retake Crimea. The geography of its connection to the mainland more or less makes it impossible. The only land connection is less than 6 miles wide. There are two more small straits with bridges, but that's it. It's basically the ideal defensive position for the Russians. I think the most optimistic (realistic) outcome for this war is Russia recognizing Ukraine's independence and 1991 borders minus Crimea.

[Kahane's Grave Is A Gender-Neutral Bathroom]

The clowns at the EurAsian Times are now saying that Russia's planes are better, since (F)-22 plus (F)-35 equals (SU) 57.

LINK

[Storr]

Bad luck:

https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1572032315336925184?s=20&t=eSE4VK...