Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[Interlocutor is just not there yet]

/snip

Just to pile on a bit more, the NYT is replete with articles about corruption surrounding the Russian military, including this one about the Russian military budget being looted by just about everyone in town, such that the rampant corruption is a national joke. (You can only steal so many hundreds of billions before the word leaks out, even in Russia.) So fighter planes on paper are really yachts in resort areas held by opaque entities.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/us/politics/russia-ukraine-military.html

My main takeaways;

- The Russian military budget is almost comically taken advantage of by higher-ups in the Russian government

- There is so much corruption in Russia, they essentially use fighter planes as private jets

[Blair]

In the Soviet war in Afghanistan antiseptics were often sold as an alcoholic substitute and drunk by officers- which meant they had to use petrol to treat wounds.

[Blair]

An interesting counterfactual is that back in 2014 the Ukrainian military was seen as not only extremely weak but also largely a paper tiger- they had a number of embarrassing defeats against the militias in the east of the country and their army was largely reliant on old Soviet era equipment.

[brucejoel99]

An interesting counterfactual is that back in 2014 the Ukrainian military was seen as not only extremely weak but also largely a paper tiger- they had a number of embarrassing defeats against the militias in the east of the country and their army was largely reliant on old Soviet era equipment.

Hence why the U.S./NATO proceeded to spend the next 8 years arming & training the Ukrainian military into a professional fighting force: for this very moment. In contrast to Afghanistan, where many of the soldiers were clearly just there for the paycheck, what helps Ukraine here is its civic pride: its actual willingness to fight & maybe even die to stop Putin's Russia.

[Storr]

An interesting counterfactual is that back in 2014 the Ukrainian military was seen as not only extremely weak but also largely a paper tiger- they had a number of embarrassing defeats against the militias in the east of the country and their army was largely reliant on old Soviet era equipment.

I watched a Ukrainian made documentary (I forgot the title, it was on youtube) about the early days of the war in Donbass and a Ukrainian commander claimed that the military was hollowed out and weakened/underfunded during Yanukovych's admin (2010-14). He claimed due to that, the military was completely unprepared for the war.

I'm sure graft and corruption played a part too. This is the pre-Maidan Ukrainian military we're talking about. In 2002 a Ukrainian ship accidentally shot down an Israeli passenger plane during joint exercises with Russia in the Black Sea, killing 78. In the same year, a Ukrainian Su-27 crashed into the crowd at an airshow in Lviv, killing 77. The armed forces weren't brought to the sorry state of 2014 in the only four years of Yanukovych.

The commander noted that Russians were appointed to the top Ministry of Defense and Intelligence posts in the years leading up to Euromaidan, which is remarkably true. The two previous SBU (state security) heads were Russians, as were the two previous Ministers of Defense. Meanwhile, the previous head of Ukrainian foreign intelligence was a former KGB agent.

[Torie]

Now you see them, now you don't. The NYT article says its Russian helos being removed from the Kherson base, but I am not sure how one could know that. But perhaps it suggests that Odessa is now off the Russian mission checklist.

[ugabug]

https://twitter.com/Biz_Ukraine_Mag/status/1506252669979136012?ref_src=twsrc%5Et...

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

The Russians clearly can’t hold the territory that they are occupying with the current rate of loss.

What they would need to do is retreat to a few strongholds.

The current rate of loss is mostly a result of going on the offensive. If Ukraine goes on an offensive and Russia changes gears, you should expect Russian losses to decrease relative to Ukrainian ones. Ukrainian forces may outnumber Russian ones, but not by the three-or-four to one ratio preferable for urban assaults. Part of the increase in losses is just the nature of any offensive (even a successful one) where the attacker doesn't have an overwhelming advantage.

Ukraine has been resupplied with light arms and handheld weapons, not what is required to go on an offensive. They cannot match Russian mechanised units and artillery and can only contest their own airspace thanks to SAMs for the time being. Large offensives will be difficult for an army that cannot really restock what is required for large offensives or secure air superiority. Think back to the miles-long Russian convoy - that was a logistical failure, but one that they (mostly) got away with because it was crawling with SAMs and Ukraine was denied most of the airspace around it. Ukraine would have a much harder time doing that even for a series of smaller convoys. All this will make large offensives even more challenging for Ukraine.

You forget that Russian troops can’t just sit there indefinitely without supplies.

Logistics will be one of their biggest challenges, but three things either have or are about to make such challenges easier:

- The establishment of a land bridge from the Donbas to Crimea (done)
- The destruction of threats to their navy (mostly done; they’re already using Berdyansk to resupply)
- The fall of Mariupol, which sits behind their land bridge (almost inevitable)

Their only supply lines near Kyiv are narrow and run through Belarus and then the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, so this is where the problems could remain most acute.  

[Torie]

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/22/opinion/russia-ukraine-putin-eurasianism.html

“One of the most alluring concepts was Eurasianism. Emerging from the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, this idea posited Russia as a Eurasian polity formed by a deep history of cultural exchanges among people of Turkic, Slavic, Mongol and other Asian origins. In 1920, the linguist Nikolai Trubetzkoy — one of several Russian émigré intellectuals who developed the concept — published “Europe and Humanity,” a trenchant critique of Western colonialism and Eurocentrism. He called on Russian intellectuals to free themselves from their fixation on Europe and to build on the “legacy of Chinggis Khan” to create a great continent-spanning Russian-Eurasian state.”

It is not about NATO, or Putin’s psychological problems, it is about the Russian elites search for meaning after finding that playing at being crony capitalists just didn’t do the trick for them, as a substitute, after prestige through Communism lost its elan.

The article goes on about shared genetics, Eastern Orthodox versus Western Christianity, and etc., to create a new holy grail about why Russia needed a lot more real estate.

Does any of this psychobabble have traction with anyone? “Chinggis Khan” stuck out to me. Ouch.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

An interesting counterfactual is that back in 2014 the Ukrainian military was seen as not only extremely weak but also largely a paper tiger- they had a number of embarrassing defeats against the militias in the east of the country and their army was largely reliant on old Soviet era equipment.

It is still largely reliant on (somewhat modernised) Soviet equipment!

[ugabug]

A CNN article about how Russia may not have a overall theater commander in charged of the invasion.

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/21/politics/us-russia-top-military-commander-ukraine-war/index.html

The US has been unable to determine if Russia has designated a military commander responsible for leading the country's war in Ukraine, according to multiple sources familiar with the matter — something that current and former defense officials say is likely a key contributor to the apparent clumsiness and disorganization of the Russian assault.
Without a top, theater-wide commander on the ground in or near Ukraine, units from different Russian military districts operating in different parts of Ukraine appear to be competing for resources rather than coordinating their efforts, according to two US defense officials.
Units participating in different Russian offensives across Ukraine have failed to connect, these sources say, and in fact, appear to be acting independently with no overarching operational design.

And a good twitter thread by Mark Hertling where he also talks about the seeming lack of a theater commander.

https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/1506258325717008395

[Torie]

"Logistics will be one of their biggest challenges, but three things either have or are about to make such challenges easier:

- The establishment of a land bridge from the Donbas to Crimea (done)
- The destruction of threats to their navy (mostly done; they’re already using Berdyansk to resupply)
- The fall of Mariupol, which sits behind their land bridge (almost inevitable)

Their only supply lines near Kyiv are narrow and run through Belarus and then the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, so this is where the problems could remain most acute."

OK, Chernobyl  is an unpleasant pit stop, and dry land might be a little short in supply (not sure the vassal state Belarus is an issue but maybe), but why is it necessary to get to Kiyv to come up from the Black Sea, when there is a another much shorter route? Who can help me with some of this?

I really do think Putin probably wants the Black Sea coast for its own sake. The weather is better, and ports and stuff. Too bad that the Black Sea is a sea rather than a lake. Plate tectonics was a fail there. You can see the problem just looking at a map. It is like a spring gun, at the front door of a shack in a neighborhood adjacent to Deliverance.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

"Logistics will be one of their biggest challenges, but three things either have or are about to make such challenges easier:

- The establishment of a land bridge from the Donbas to Crimea (done)
- The destruction of threats to their navy (mostly done; they’re already using Berdyansk to resupply)
- The fall of Mariupol, which sits behind their land bridge (almost inevitable)

Their only supply lines near Kyiv are narrow and run through Belarus and then the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, so this is where the problems could remain most acute."

OK, Chernobyl  is an unpleasant pit stop, and dry land might be a little short in supply (not sure the vassal state Belarus is an issue but maybe), but why is it necessary to get to Kiyv to come up from the Black Sea, when there is a another much shorter route? Who can help me with some of this?

I really do think Putin probably wants the Black Sea coast for its own sake. The weather is better, and ports and stuff. Too bad that the Black Sea is a sea rather than a lake. Plate tectonics was a fail there. You can see the problem just looking at a map. It is like a spring gun, at the front door of a shack in a neighborhood adjacent to Deliverance.

The Black Sea isn’t needed to get to Kyiv. It’s just helpful to have an uncontested shipping route to the various Russian-controlled parts of southern Ukraine, even where land routes also exist. Taking that land bridge allowed Russia to open the dam blocking the flow of the Dnieper to Crimea.

Russia could try to open a supply line to Kyiv from elsewhere in Belarus, but they chose the Chernobyl exclusion zone because it was the least defended approach west of the Dnieper river. Another, riskier option would be crossing the Dnieper from the eastern bank, but that would require taking lots of territory beyond what they’re already struggling to contest.

[Estrella]

A CNN article about how Russia may not have a overall theater commander in charged of the invasion.

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/21/politics/us-russia-top-military-commander-ukraine-war/index.html

It has one. It's Putin. Maybe, that is. It would for sure explain the "looks good on a map but is actually completely unfeasible" character of the invasion - the thing Al mentioned about too few soldiers for too many fronts.

[Middle-aged Europe]

A CNN article about how Russia may not have a overall theater commander in charged of the invasion.

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/21/politics/us-russia-top-military-commander-ukraine-war/index.html

The US has been unable to determine if Russia has designated a military commander responsible for leading the country's war in Ukraine, according to multiple sources familiar with the matter — something that current and former defense officials say is likely a key contributor to the apparent clumsiness and disorganization of the Russian assault.
Without a top, theater-wide commander on the ground in or near Ukraine, units from different Russian military districts operating in different parts of Ukraine appear to be competing for resources rather than coordinating their efforts, according to two US defense officials.
Units participating in different Russian offensives across Ukraine have failed to connect, these sources say, and in fact, appear to be acting independently with no overarching operational design.

And a good twitter thread by Mark Hertling where he also talks about the seeming lack of a theater commander.

https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/1506258325717008395

There can't be a single supreme commander next to Vladimir Putin. If there were and he would be successful in Ukraine he could become a serious threat to Putin's power - or at least that's what's probably going on in Putin's mind.

[pppolitics]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

The Russians clearly can’t hold the territory that they are occupying with the current rate of loss.

What they would need to do is retreat to a few strongholds.

The current rate of loss is mostly a result of going on the offensive. If Ukraine goes on an offensive and Russia changes gears, you should expect Russian losses to decrease relative to Ukrainian ones. Ukrainian forces may outnumber Russian ones, but not by the three-or-four to one ratio preferable for urban assaults. Part of the increase in losses is just the nature of any offensive (even a successful one) where the attacker doesn't have an overwhelming advantage.

Ukraine has been resupplied with light arms and handheld weapons, not what is required to go on an offensive. They cannot match Russian mechanised units and artillery and can only contest their own airspace thanks to SAMs for the time being. Large offensives will be difficult for an army that cannot really restock what is required for large offensives or secure air superiority. Think back to the miles-long Russian convoy - that was a logistical failure, but one that they (mostly) got away with because it was crawling with SAMs and Ukraine was denied most of the airspace around it. Ukraine would have a much harder time doing that even for a series of smaller convoys. All this will make large offensives even more challenging for Ukraine.

You forget that Russian troops can’t just sit there indefinitely without supplies.

Logistics will be one of their biggest challenges, but three things either have or are about to make such challenges easier:

- The establishment of a land bridge from the Donbas to Crimea (done)
- The destruction of threats to their navy (mostly done; they’re already using Berdyansk to resupply)
- The fall of Mariupol, which sits behind their land bridge (almost inevitable)

Their only supply lines near Kyiv are narrow and run through Belarus and then the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, so this is where the problems could remain most acute.  

You have to remember that Russia is being cut off from the rest of the world.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has the support of US, Canada, EU, UK, Sweden, Australia, etc.

The longer the war lasts, the more it becomes a drag on Russia.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

The Russians clearly can’t hold the territory that they are occupying with the current rate of loss.

What they would need to do is retreat to a few strongholds.

The current rate of loss is mostly a result of going on the offensive. If Ukraine goes on an offensive and Russia changes gears, you should expect Russian losses to decrease relative to Ukrainian ones. Ukrainian forces may outnumber Russian ones, but not by the three-or-four to one ratio preferable for urban assaults. Part of the increase in losses is just the nature of any offensive (even a successful one) where the attacker doesn't have an overwhelming advantage.

Ukraine has been resupplied with light arms and handheld weapons, not what is required to go on an offensive. They cannot match Russian mechanised units and artillery and can only contest their own airspace thanks to SAMs for the time being. Large offensives will be difficult for an army that cannot really restock what is required for large offensives or secure air superiority. Think back to the miles-long Russian convoy - that was a logistical failure, but one that they (mostly) got away with because it was crawling with SAMs and Ukraine was denied most of the airspace around it. Ukraine would have a much harder time doing that even for a series of smaller convoys. All this will make large offensives even more challenging for Ukraine.

You forget that Russian troops can’t just sit there indefinitely without supplies.

Logistics will be one of their biggest challenges, but three things either have or are about to make such challenges easier:

- The establishment of a land bridge from the Donbas to Crimea (done)
- The destruction of threats to their navy (mostly done; they’re already using Berdyansk to resupply)
- The fall of Mariupol, which sits behind their land bridge (almost inevitable)

Their only supply lines near Kyiv are narrow and run through Belarus and then the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, so this is where the problems could remain most acute.  

You have to remember that Russia is being cut off from the rest of the world.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has the support of US, Canada, EU, UK, Sweden, Australia, etc.

The longer the war lasts, the more it becomes a drag on Russia.

It isn’t being cut off by the world. It isn’t even being cut off by most of the West: the SWIFT bans affected a small minority of (admittedly large) Russian banks and oil/gas bans look unlikely in Europe. The sanctions mean the Russian victory is likely to be pyrrhic, but they are unlikely to prevent the Russian war machine from keeping itself afloat. The sanctions in place are much weaker than those against Iran, which (despite being much worse equipped to deal with them) still managed to maintain support for its allies in Syria and Yemen.

Ukraine has some support from the West, but the military aid is limited to smaller, cheaper weapons, and whether there will be enough humanitarian aid to fix the damaged cities is an open question. A long war could allow Ukraine to retrain their army to use complex Western systems such as Patriot missiles, but the price tag might be prohibitive for the sale of such systems in significant numbers. If cost wasn’t an issue, Slovakia would already have had its single battery of S-300s backfilled - but that’s not the case.

[pppolitics]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

The Russians clearly can’t hold the territory that they are occupying with the current rate of loss.

What they would need to do is retreat to a few strongholds.

The current rate of loss is mostly a result of going on the offensive. If Ukraine goes on an offensive and Russia changes gears, you should expect Russian losses to decrease relative to Ukrainian ones. Ukrainian forces may outnumber Russian ones, but not by the three-or-four to one ratio preferable for urban assaults. Part of the increase in losses is just the nature of any offensive (even a successful one) where the attacker doesn't have an overwhelming advantage.

Ukraine has been resupplied with light arms and handheld weapons, not what is required to go on an offensive. They cannot match Russian mechanised units and artillery and can only contest their own airspace thanks to SAMs for the time being. Large offensives will be difficult for an army that cannot really restock what is required for large offensives or secure air superiority. Think back to the miles-long Russian convoy - that was a logistical failure, but one that they (mostly) got away with because it was crawling with SAMs and Ukraine was denied most of the airspace around it. Ukraine would have a much harder time doing that even for a series of smaller convoys. All this will make large offensives even more challenging for Ukraine.

You forget that Russian troops can’t just sit there indefinitely without supplies.

Logistics will be one of their biggest challenges, but three things either have or are about to make such challenges easier:

- The establishment of a land bridge from the Donbas to Crimea (done)
- The destruction of threats to their navy (mostly done; they’re already using Berdyansk to resupply)
- The fall of Mariupol, which sits behind their land bridge (almost inevitable)

Their only supply lines near Kyiv are narrow and run through Belarus and then the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, so this is where the problems could remain most acute.  

You have to remember that Russia is being cut off from the rest of the world.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has the support of US, Canada, EU, UK, Sweden, Australia, etc.

The longer the war lasts, the more it becomes a drag on Russia.

It isn’t being cut off by the world. It isn’t even being cut off by most of the West: the SWIFT bans affected a small minority of (admittedly large) Russian banks and oil/gas bans look unlikely in Europe. The sanctions mean the Russian victory is likely to be pyrrhic, but they are unlikely to prevent the Russian war machine from keeping itself afloat. The sanctions in place are much weaker than those against Iran, which (despite being much worse equipped to deal with them) still managed to maintain support for its allies in Syria and Yemen.

Ukraine has some support from the West, but the military aid is limited to smaller, cheaper weapons, and whether there will be enough humanitarian aid to fix the damaged cities is an open question. A long war could allow Ukraine to retrain their army to use complex Western systems such as Patriot missiles, but the price tag might be prohibitive for the sale of such systems in significant numbers. If cost wasn’t an issue, Slovakia would already have had its single battery of S-300s backfilled - but that’s not the case.

Where do you think tech in new Russian military equipment comes from?

[Obama-Biden Democrat]

T-72A. They started production in 1979, was replaced by the T-72B in 1985. The Russians are really using 40 year old tanks in front line combat?

https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1506267117410267136?s=20&t=H8hOTS...

I'm not sure how much of an issue that is, as long as it works and is properly maintained. Some of the eqipment sent to Ukraine is decades old, too. Didn't Germany send stuff from former East Germany?

The US M1 Abrams tank was introduced in 1980 and is still widely in use.

[Virginiá]

Why dismiss top generals and put them on house arrest? Just send them to the front lines

[GeorgiaModerate]

Why dismiss top generals and put them on house arrest? Just send them to the front lines

To the Russian Ukrainian front?

[pppolitics]

https://twitter.com/nytimes/status/1506429277767671809

[Storr]

https://twitter.com/mdmitri91/status/1506283284397019141?s=20&t=AecrMKmrq04s...

[WMS]

Well, I see it is again time to pop the balloon of “tHe DeVeLoPiNg WoRlD iS uNiTeD aGaInSt ThE WeSt”.

First, support is being driven by a Russian misinformation campaign:
https://twitter.com/carljackmiller/status/1504896238826700800?s=21

Read the entire thread.

Amplified by governmental interference in the BRICS countries + Vietnam.

While the ruling government in Mexico - influenced by Russian money as their Tourism Minister mentioned - is rather milquetoast on Russia, the opposition is more critical. And Mexico did vote to condemn Russia.

Speaking of that, here’s the vote in question. Taking the most generous-to-Russia interpretation possible of that vote, where all non-Yes votes are counted together*, it was 141-52 against Russia. You won’t get those results with only “the West”**. Therefore, there had to be significant numbers of Developing World countries that voted for the resolution, indicating a lack of unanimity***.

A brief digression. While certain people are typing one-handed at the thought of the BRICS sweeping away all Western influence and ushering in a new era of unmitigated oligarchic autocracy freedom from Western influence, let’s look at some neighbors of the BRICS and see how they voted, shall we?
-Bhutan, Nepal, and the Maldives, all in a tug-of-war between India and China, voted Yes.
-Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, and all of Oceania’s island countries voted Yes.
-All of the Middle East except for Syria, Iraq, and Iran voted Yes, including Lebanon.
-Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia, and Malawi among South Africa’s neighbors voted Yes.
-All of the island countries around Madagascar voted Yes.
-Both Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo voted Yes, interesting considering they have, err, tensions.
-Fascinating how countries that have suffered anti-democratic coups were Abstain or Absent, same as those with a Russian military presence.
-Nigeria voted Yes. I wonder if South Africa voting Abstain had any role in that? Not like they’re the two biggest sub-Saharan African powers who each might wish to be first among equals or anything…
-And of course most of Latin America and the Caribbean voted Yes.

Hmm, it’s almost like the BRICS’ neighbors don’t want them to usher in a new multipolar age where they’d be at their bigger neighbors’ mercy. Fancy that.

Let’s move on to more concrete measures. While a smaller number of countries have sent military aid to Ukraine, if you include other forms of aid the number rises****, including non-Western countries, so again, a lack of unanimity.

Note I haven’t claimed the Developing World is united against Russia*****. I am claiming that they’re not united in favor of Russia******.  But combating the repeated misinformation being repeatedly spouted on this forum and in this thread about world opinion is, I think, a useful service.

*Not a safe assumption to make, but for our purposes usable.
**Well, duh. The West doesn’t comprise 141 countries.
***If you object that those votes in the UNGA mean nothing, then the same logic can be applied to all those Abstain and Absent votes and you still don’t have unanimity.
****Even counting token amounts of aid, there are some interesting Developing World countries that pop up.
*****Most of the parts with capital, yes. Shhhh, don’t upset certain nationalists with that fact.
******Which is what the type of neutrality being claimed by certain posters amounts to de facto.

[Hindsight was 2020]

There are more and more rumblings on social media that the Russians have been encircled at the Hostomel-Irpin-Bucha triangle 👀