Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[pppolitics]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

[Storr]

Winter War moment.

https://twitter.com/NotWoofers/status/1506319640015904780?s=20&t=3Kj61kJXVm1...

[WMS]

Very well, I will post far fewer tweets per post (ironically, on my phone) to help those reading on their phones.

Russian Atrocities:
https://twitter.com/kyivindependent/status/1506273882088562700?s=21
Yes, I could’ve posted a tweet with pictures confirming this, but I chose not to. Be grateful.

https://twitter.com/andersostlund/status/1506310181726130178?s=21
Typical for how “undemocratic savages” wage war.

Russian War Aims:
https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1506308164966301703?s=21
The Russians themselves have made it clear they won’t stop in Ukraine.

To Keep in Mind:
https://twitter.com/djrothkopf/status/1506243054549839875?s=21
Read the whole thread.

Ok, enough tweets. Sorry, hilarious tractor ones will have to wait.

[pppolitics]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

The Russians clearly can’t hold the territory that they are occupying with the current rate of loss.

What they would need to do is retreat to a few strongholds.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

The Russians clearly can’t hold the territory that they are occupying with the current rate of loss.

What they would need to do is retreat to a few strongholds.

The current rate of loss is mostly a result of going on the offensive. If Ukraine goes on an offensive and Russia changes gears, you should expect Russian losses to decrease relative to Ukrainian ones. Ukrainian forces may outnumber Russian ones, but not by the three-or-four to one ratio preferable for urban assaults. Part of the increase in losses is just the nature of any offensive (even a successful one) where the attacker doesn't have an overwhelming advantage.

Ukraine has been resupplied with light arms and handheld weapons, not what is required to go on an offensive. They cannot match Russian mechanised units and artillery and can only contest their own airspace thanks to SAMs for the time being. Large offensives will be difficult for an army that cannot really restock what is required for large offensives or secure air superiority. Think back to the miles-long Russian convoy - that was a logistical failure, but one that they (mostly) got away with because it was crawling with SAMs and Ukraine was denied most of the airspace around it. Ukraine would have a much harder time doing that even for a series of smaller convoys. All this will make large offensives even more challenging for Ukraine.

[Torie]

Assuming the war does go into stalemate for an extended period of time, and further assuming that the sanctions hold, can Russia really sustain that, while rearming, regrouping whatever, to fight another day for more? I tend to doubt that. I also would like to think that over time the resupply into Ukraine will improve to make up for its inability to produce internally what it needs. Finally, the NYT has quite a good article that Ukraine really does need more jets, and is using what it has very effectively, and they really do serve to reduce the hostile ordinance failing from the sky onto Ukraine soil.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/22/world/europe/ukraine-air-force-russia.html

It really is just astounding just how well the Ukraine military is performing, based on results, and not just PR type.

[Helsinkian]

Russia is now bringing back the Maxim machine guns, used in both World Wars.

https://twitter.com/JimmySecUK/status/1506335453611446281

Edit: There are some videos of Ukrainians using them as well.

[Middle-aged Europe]

https://mobile.twitter.com/NatashaBertrand/status/1506278396673904645

[Person Man]

Very well, I will post far fewer tweets per post (ironically, on my phone) to help those reading on their phones.

Russian Atrocities:
https://twitter.com/kyivindependent/status/1506273882088562700?s=21
Yes, I could’ve posted a tweet with pictures confirming this, but I chose not to. Be grateful.

https://twitter.com/andersostlund/status/1506310181726130178?s=21
Typical for how “undemocratic savages” wage war.

Russian War Aims:
https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1506308164966301703?s=21
The Russians themselves have made it clear they won’t stop in Ukraine.

To Keep in Mind:
https://twitter.com/djrothkopf/status/1506243054549839875?s=21
Read the whole thread.

Ok, enough tweets. Sorry, hilarious tractor ones will have to wait.

With these barbarians, will Zelenskyy become the next Caesar?

[compucomp]

In a WSJ editorial, Walter Mead makes the point I and Red Velvet have been making for some time about China's stance and Western sanctions, namely that the non-Western world is closer to China than it is to the West on this issue. I don't know much about this author but he reviews for Foreign Affairs, which generally dislikes China, and the WSJ consistently dislikes China.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-west-vs-rest-of-the-world-russia-ukraine-dictators-south-america-asia-africa-11647894483

As the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war ricochet through global politics, the West has never been more closely aligned. It has also rarely been more alone. Allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization plus Australia and Japan are united in revulsion against Vladimir Putin’s war and are cooperating with the most sweeping sanctions since World War II. The rest of the world, not so much.

In a development that suggests trouble ahead, China’s basic approach—not endorsing Moscow’s aggression but resisting Western efforts to punish Russia—has garnered global support. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa blamed the war on NATO. Brazil’s president, Jair Bolsonaro, refused to condemn Russia. India and Vietnam, essential partners for any American strategy in the Indo-Pacific, are closer to China than the U.S. in their approach to the war.

[President Johnson]

Biden is expected to be at the NATO summit in Brussels and will also join a conference of EU leaders later this week. The Biden Administration and EU just announced a new round of sanctions. It's awesome to see the Transatlantic Alliance restored and acting in concert against a tyrant. Zelenskyy will also attend the NATO meeting virtually.

https://twitter.com/nbcsandiego/status/1506350099827503106

https://twitter.com/thehill/status/1506347751096950788

[pppolitics]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

The Russians clearly can’t hold the territory that they are occupying with the current rate of loss.

What they would need to do is retreat to a few strongholds.

The current rate of loss is mostly a result of going on the offensive. If Ukraine goes on an offensive and Russia changes gears, you should expect Russian losses to decrease relative to Ukrainian ones. Ukrainian forces may outnumber Russian ones, but not by the three-or-four to one ratio preferable for urban assaults. Part of the increase in losses is just the nature of any offensive (even a successful one) where the attacker doesn't have an overwhelming advantage.

Ukraine has been resupplied with light arms and handheld weapons, not what is required to go on an offensive. They cannot match Russian mechanised units and artillery and can only contest their own airspace thanks to SAMs for the time being. Large offensives will be difficult for an army that cannot really restock what is required for large offensives or secure air superiority. Think back to the miles-long Russian convoy - that was a logistical failure, but one that they (mostly) got away with because it was crawling with SAMs and Ukraine was denied most of the airspace around it. Ukraine would have a much harder time doing that even for a series of smaller convoys. All this will make large offensives even more challenging for Ukraine.

You forget that Russian troops can’t just sit there indefinitely without supplies.

[compucomp]

Biden is expected to be at the NATO summit in Brussels and will also join a conference of EU leaders later this week. The Biden Administration and EU just announced a new round of sanctions. It's awesome to see the Transatlantic Alliance restored and acting in concert against a tyrant. Zelenskyy will also attend the NATO meeting virtually.

It's fitting that your post is next to mine. Maybe this is the "Cold War" of the 21st Century, the West against a loose coalition of "Everyone Else", loosely led by China, and not always agreeing with each other, but generally united in their suspicion and dislike of Western imperialism and chauvinism.

[Torie]

In a WSJ editorial, Walter Mead makes the point I and Red Velvet have been making for some time about China's stance and Western sanctions, namely that the non-Western world is closer to China than it is to the West on this issue. I don't know much about this author but he reviews for Foreign Affairs, which generally dislikes China, and the WSJ consistently dislikes China.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-west-vs-rest-of-the-world-russia-ukraine-dictators-south-america-asia-africa-11647894483

  ...

Western arm-twisting and the powerful effect of bank sanctions ensure a certain degree of sanctions compliance and support for symbolic U.N. resolutions condemning Russian aggression. But the lack of non-Western enthusiasm for America’s approach to Mr. Putin’s war is a phenomenon that U.S. policy makers ignore at their peril. Just as Western policy makers, lost in fantasies about building a “posthistorical world,” failed to grasp the growing threat of great-power competition, they have failed to note the development of a gap between the West and the rest of the world that threatens to hand the revisionist powers major opportunities in coming years. The Biden administration appears not to understand the gap between Washington and what used to be called the Third World, the degree to which its own policies contribute to the divide, or the opportunities this gap creates for China.

1. I fail to really see why the policy of the West should change regarding Russia based on the hypothetical that Vietnam, Brazil, and South Africa will race into China's arms. Let them go if they have no problem enabling Russia. I don't see why India, which has fought wars with China, rushing to  become a junior partner to China, but it can go too. The excerpt  you quoted does not concretely explain the negative consequences to the West, that would seem real and plausible to me, but even if it did, count me out, and I hope the West agrees with me.

2. Your excerpt is 274 words, 74 more than  allowed here. I am not reporting that, but I suggest you cull out 74 words in respect for the forum's rules regarding copyright. If you do not, some Mod with authority over this Board might see it one way or the other, and might just delete your post in its entirety rather than bothering to trim it. It is of particularly concern here, because the WSJ is behind a rigid paywall.

[Torie]

Biden is expected to be at the NATO summit in Brussels and will also join a conference of EU leaders later this week. The Biden Administration and EU just announced a new round of sanctions. It's awesome to see the Transatlantic Alliance restored and acting in concert against a tyrant. Zelenskyy will also attend the NATO meeting virtually.

It's fitting that your post is next to mine. Maybe this is the "Cold War" of the 21st Century, the West against a loose coalition of "Everyone Else", loosely led by China, and not always agreeing with each other, but generally united in their suspicion and dislike of Western imperialism and chauvinism.

I am quite confident that Samoa will not join in the everyone not nailed down will roll into the China camp club. I had breakfast with its leader awhile back, so I know.  And China's  infrastructure projects there were of low quality. New Zealand's are much better.  You might let China know when you get a chance.

I am hoping that China converting the world into its own authoritarian image will take at least a score of years, so I will almost certainly be dead before it happens. How realistic are my hopes? I am interested in your opinion on that.

Thanks.

[Stranger in a strange land]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

The Russians clearly can’t hold the territory that they are occupying with the current rate of loss.

What they would need to do is retreat to a few strongholds.

The current rate of loss is mostly a result of going on the offensive. If Ukraine goes on an offensive and Russia changes gears, you should expect Russian losses to decrease relative to Ukrainian ones. Ukrainian forces may outnumber Russian ones, but not by the three-or-four to one ratio preferable for urban assaults. Part of the increase in losses is just the nature of any offensive (even a successful one) where the attacker doesn't have an overwhelming advantage.

Ukraine has been resupplied with light arms and handheld weapons, not what is required to go on an offensive. They cannot match Russian mechanised units and artillery and can only contest their own airspace thanks to SAMs for the time being. Large offensives will be difficult for an army that cannot really restock what is required for large offensives or secure air superiority. Think back to the miles-long Russian convoy - that was a logistical failure, but one that they (mostly) got away with because it was crawling with SAMs and Ukraine was denied most of the airspace around it. Ukraine would have a much harder time doing that even for a series of smaller convoys. All this will make large offensives even more challenging for Ukraine.

You forget that Russian troops can’t just sit there indefinitely without supplies.

And Russian forces haven't fully secured the areas behind their lines: the invading force is too small and they invaded during mud season so they're too road-bound. There are left-behind and stay-behind Ukrainian forces sheltering among a population which hates the occupiers. Russia invaded thinking the Ukrainian army would fold like the ANA and they could just drive into Kyiv the way the Taliban rolled into Kabul. But now, sitting abandoned without supplies, duped by their commanders and not even understanding why they're fighting, their expensive gear falling apart due to lack of maintenance, it's the Russians who look A LOT more like the ANA.

[Badger]

https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1506256136504184834?s=20&t=AMO2rwqUf1U2J...

Needs to be confirmed by a more unbiased source, but that fantasied pocket everyone was talking about yesterday may have actually somehow occurred.

How the hell do you spend 22 years and trillions of dollars 'modernising' your military only for this to happen?

I would not want to be a Russian senior officer right now.

Answer: Corruption, both local and higher up. No doubt the bosses are cooking the books, but then you also have examples of common soldiers taking sh**t and reselling in. There was an image back at the start of march of a several-years long multi-sale ebay listing for Russian MREs from a St. Petersburg server.

 Here is another reason. This thread was sent to me by my closest friend and I posted it earlier in this thread, but I'm sure many overlooked it as it update as this has grown to / 300 pages. It is extremely insightful indeed and absolutely worth reading through the 2020 or 30 tweets to get a picture of how The Russian government relies on the state's security service to stay in power, and explicitly nuters/dumbs down it's military leadership to avoid to avoid being taken out.

https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1502673952572854278?s=20&t=VKopazV0byqI-cLBHQoYCQ

Highlights, the notorious thieves in law criminal gang regularly extorts military army bases for cash with the tacit approval of the government, and military conscripts are frequently forced into gay prostitution to earn money for higher Ups. The list goes on

[Badger]

"It’s difficult to know exact details of Russia’s stockpile, given its lack of transparency. Larry Korb, with the Center for American Progress, says that any tactical weapon “is still pretty powerful.” One that was detonated over New York City, for example, would destroy the city, while a full strategic nuclear weapon would destroy the entire state."

Two points of note.

Even during the height of the Cold War, any nuclear strike and counter strike would more than likely have devastated select targets in Europe either side of the Iron Curtain before immediate de-escalation in response. Any European alive then would have probably agreed. The USSR and the USA weren't stupid and neither were we. The same is true today.

Secondly what I was trying to hint at is that even if Russia went completely loco and lobbed a nuke at New York for the hell of it, using missiles and guidance systems that make it and don't get intercepted, I am more...confident now than a month ago that the west could effectively atomise a dozen Russian targets before the Russian missile passes the Azores. Slight exaggeration of course.

This is in no way a situation I would ever wish to happen, but we are basing Russian ability and effectiveness and weaponry on what was, as the article hints 'unknowns', prior to the Ukraine conflict. There is less fog now.

Are Russia a nuclear power as we assumed, or do they have what is effectively a series of 'dirty bombs' with the same capabilities and limitations as other countries that try to build them? That still makes them a threat, but in growling at us, they've shown a lot of missing teeth.

 But the problem and distinction here is of course the Ukraine does not have even baby nukes to respond to such an assault. And Putin is just as blood thirsty and ruthless and desperate to take such an action potentially.

[President Johnson]

Meanwhile, Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny has been sentenced to additional nine years in jail by a Moscow "court". Actually Putin belongs where he's now, for the rest of his life.

https://twitter.com/dwnews/status/1506256212073058309

[Storr]

Look at Uzhhorod airport on google maps. One end of the runway ends 300 feet from the Slovakian border.

https://twitter.com/NotWoofers/status/1506352997059768322?s=20&t=aY-Pt2m8Vsb...

https://twitter.com/NotWoofers/status/1506353662628663306?s=20&t=aY-Pt2m8Vsb...

[Torie]

https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1506256136504184834?s=20&t=AMO2rwqUf1U2J...
Needs to be confirmed by a more unbiased source, but that fantasied pocket everyone was talking about yesterday may have actually somehow occurred.

How the hell do you spend 22 years and trillions of dollars 'modernising' your military only for this to happen?

I would not want to be a Russian senior officer right now.

Answer: Corruption, both local and higher up. No doubt the bosses are cooking the books, but then you also have examples of common soldiers taking sh**t and reselling in. There was an image back at the start of march of a several-years long multi-sale ebay listing for Russian MREs from a St. Petersburg server.

 Here is another reason. This thread was sent to me by my closest friend and I posted it earlier in this thread, but I'm sure many overlooked it as it update as this has grown to / 300 pages. It is extremely insightful indeed and absolutely worth reading through the 2020 or 30 tweets to get a picture of how The Russian government relies on the state's security service to stay in power, and explicitly nuters/dumbs down it's military leadership to avoid to avoid being taken out.

https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1502673952572854278?s=20&t=VKopazV0byqI-cLBHQoYCQ

Highlights, the notorious thieves in law criminal gang regularly extorts military army bases for cash with the tacit approval of the government, and military conscripts are frequently forced into gay prostitution to earn money for higher Ups. The list goes on

Just to pile on a bit more, the NYT is replete with articles about corruption surrounding the Russian military, including this one about the Russian military budget being looted by just about everyone in town, such that the rampant corruption is a national joke. (You can only steal so many hundreds of billions before the word leaks out, even in Russia.) So fighter planes on paper are really yachts in resort areas held by opaque entities.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/us/politics/russia-ukraine-military.html

[Torie]

"It’s difficult to know exact details of Russia’s stockpile, given its lack of transparency. Larry Korb, with the Center for American Progress, says that any tactical weapon “is still pretty powerful.” One that was detonated over New York City, for example, would destroy the city, while a full strategic nuclear weapon would destroy the entire state."

Two points of note.

Even during the height of the Cold War, any nuclear strike and counter strike would more than likely have devastated select targets in Europe either side of the Iron Curtain before immediate de-escalation in response. Any European alive then would have probably agreed. The USSR and the USA weren't stupid and neither were we. The same is true today.

Secondly what I was trying to hint at is that even if Russia went completely loco and lobbed a nuke at New York for the hell of it, using missiles and guidance systems that make it and don't get intercepted, I am more...confident now than a month ago that the west could effectively atomise a dozen Russian targets before the Russian missile passes the Azores. Slight exaggeration of course.

This is in no way a situation I would ever wish to happen, but we are basing Russian ability and effectiveness and weaponry on what was, as the article hints 'unknowns', prior to the Ukraine conflict. There is less fog now.

Are Russia a nuclear power as we assumed, or do they have what is effectively a series of 'dirty bombs' with the same capabilities and limitations as other countries that try to build them? That still makes them a threat, but in growling at us, they've shown a lot of missing teeth.

 But the problem and distinction here is of course the Ukraine does not have even baby nukes to respond to such an assault. And Putin is just as blood thirsty and ruthless and desperate to take such an action potentially.

The worse the war goes for Putin the higher the odds of WMD's. To me, the best idea posted here was the one to let Putin know privately that if he goes there, he's dead.

[Virginiá]

"It’s difficult to know exact details of Russia’s stockpile, given its lack of transparency. Larry Korb, with the Center for American Progress, says that any tactical weapon “is still pretty powerful.” One that was detonated over New York City, for example, would destroy the city, while a full strategic nuclear weapon would destroy the entire state."

I wonder if they mean with radiation and other after-effects? According to NUKEMAP, the fireball from a 9 megaton weapon, much larger than I think any strategic-level weapon in either the US or Russian arsenal, would create a fireball with a radius of 2.3 km, and knock down most buildings within 14 km, and burns within 31 km. Even Tsar Bomba, that obscene 50 megaton monstrosity they recklessly tested decades ago, would still fail to actually destroy all of Ohio (although I guess it is a big state).

[Torie]

"It’s difficult to know exact details of Russia’s stockpile, given its lack of transparency. Larry Korb, with the Center for American Progress, says that any tactical weapon “is still pretty powerful.” One that was detonated over New York City, for example, would destroy the city, while a full strategic nuclear weapon would destroy the entire state."

I wonder if they mean with radiation and other after-effects? According to NUKEMAP, the fireball from a 9 megaton weapon, much larger than I think any strategic-level weapon in either the US or Russian arsenal, would create a fireball with a radius of 2.3 km, and knock down most buildings within 14 km, and burns within 31 km. Even Tsar Bomba, that obscene 50 megaton monstrosity they recklessly tested decades ago, would still fail to actually destroy all of Ohio (although I guess it is a big state).

My guess is that the guy got outside his area of expertise. At a minimum, he was loose/imprecise  with his words. Don't hire him as your lawyer if he is one is my best advice.