Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[President Johnson]

Uncle Joe did it again, he used the w-word.

https://twitter.com/Quicktake/status/1507452317783969792

[The Ex-Factor]

Wow the winter war parallels continue.

It does strike me that Putin, fittingly, made the same mistakes Stalin did. In the words of Sabaton:

"He thought of the might he possessed,
And not of his foe"

This is what happens when presumed strongmen only surround themselves with a bunch of yes-men rather than people who are smarter then them, are allowed to disagree and give certain truths straight to them. To make rational decisions, political leaders need a competent team in place, giving honest opinions, maybe argue which each other behind closed doors and not tell the guy at the top what he wants to hear.

The truth is that these so-called strongmen are in fact weak characters because they can't handle different opinions and sometimes adjust their decisions when evidence points in a certain direction. They live in their own world, at least until the reality can do longer be denied. And even then, they usually look for scapegoats and find phony excuses instead of taking actual responsibility.

For anyone who's interested, there was an article in Foreign Affairs that predicted this exact phenomenon of Putin being completely out of touch prior to the war:

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-02-04/bully-bubble

Perhaps no leader of a major power illustrates these patterns better than Putin. His advisers once held a range of perspectives, especially early during the first decade of this century, when he attempted to position the Kremlin as a partner to the United States and Europe. But over time, his security agencies came to dominate Putin’s attention, especially as he grew disappointed with the West. Now, Putin’s inner circle is almost entirely made up of the siloviki—members of his loyalist, hawkish security services. The FSB, Russia’s successor to the KGB, is playing an increasingly visible role in foreign relations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by contrast, is now sometimes left out of decisions altogether.

The result is a dangerous feedback loop. By most accounts, the president’s advisers uniformly see the West as a grave security threat to Russia, which encourages Putin to adopt an increasingly hostile stance. This in turn provokes the United States and Europe to confront Russia, which only increases the influence of Putin’s hawks by justifying their pessimistic and often paranoid outlook. Partly as a result, Russian foreign policy has grown more belligerent over time.

This aggression has yielded territorial victories, most famously the annexation of Crimea in 2014. But it has also left Putin significantly more isolated. Russian cooperation with the United States and Europe has, of course, stalled, but its work with India and Japan has similarly stagnated. Moscow has forged a growing partnership with China, but this relationship is likely to make Putin uneasy. Rather than bringing central and eastern Europe back under Moscow’s sway, the president’s gambit in Ukraine has breathed new life into NATO. If Putin’s ultimate goal is to transform the global order to fit Russia’s ambitions, he appears to have failed.

In more rigorously institutionalized states, there would be separate groups or agencies powerful enough to tell leaders when their aggression is backfiring. Yet like many personalized regimes, the Russian government lacks any real checks and balances- or even a way to thoroughly assess the data it gathers. As the Putin expert Brian Taylor has noted, Russia has no system to create “collective judgments” from its multiple intelligence services, as is done with the National Intelligence Estimates in the United States.

Personalism may give Putin extraordinary latitude within Russia. But if he does decide to invade Ukraine, this mode of governance will ultimately hold him back. Research shows that the information problems created by personalism can hamper a country’s performance on the battlefield and distort its leader’s perception of foreign threats. The security threats Putin sees in Ukraine, for instance, are shaped by his inner circle’s pervasive belief that the West lurks behind every Color Revolution. As a result, the president may discount the degree of genuine opposition to Moscow’s actions in former Soviet states. In fact, at the end of January, U.S. spy agencies said that Putin is underestimating the costs of invading Ukraine because his advisers are withholding information about the depth of local Ukrainian opposition to Russia and, relatedly, the strength of Ukraine’s resistance. They alleged that the president “is being misinformed by his own circle of advisers, who appear unwilling to confront him with the full consequences of military action.” Although it is hard to separate fact from speculation in intelligence reports, this problem is a common feature of personalist systems.

For Putin, the consequences of miscalculating in Ukraine could be grim. Although the president’s regime can shelter him from the repercussions of mistakes, if the Kremlin launches a major invasion and the war goes south, it will be hard for him to avoid feeling the impact. Putin will not only be more isolated and dependent on Beijing; he will also face a festering insurgency that will grow unpopular at home. He would not be the first Russian leader damaged by such a quagmire. During the 1980s, the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan to try to keep Kabul firmly in its camp, and its eventual failure played a key role in undermining public trust in the system.

[compucomp]

Uncle Joe did it again, he used the w-word.

I wonder when Putin will retaliate by declaring publicly that Joe is an illegitimate president because he stole the 2020 election from Trump. This could quite possibly cause Trump to jump to Putin's side again.

[The Ex-Factor]

Was reading the Donbas Wikipedia entry earlier and was wondering if anyone could tell me how accurate it is. Certainly makes Donbas sound like a grim place and would be extremely costly to rebuild/reform for whomever is in charge of it in the near future:

By 1993, industrial production had collapsed, and average wages had fallen by 80% since 1990. Donbas fell into crisis, with many accusing the new central government in Kyiv of mismanagement and neglect. Donbas coal miners went on strike in 1993, causing a conflict that was described by historian Lewis Siegelbaum as "a struggle between the Donbas region and the rest of the country". One strike leader said that Donbas people had voted for independence because they wanted "power to be given to the localities, enterprises, cities", not because they wanted heavily centralised power moved from "Moscow to Kyiv".[37]

This strike was followed by a 1994 consultative referendum on various constitutional questions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, held concurrently with the first parliamentary elections in independent Ukraine.[38] These questions included whether Russian should be declared an official language of Ukraine, whether Russian should be the language of administration in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, whether Ukraine should federalise, and whether Ukraine should have closer ties with the Commonwealth of Independent States.[39]

Close to 90% of voters voted in favour of these propositions.[40] None of them were adopted: Ukraine remained a unitary state, Ukrainian was retained as the sole official language, and the Donbas gained no autonomy.[36] Nevertheless, the Donbas strikers gained many economic concessions from Kyiv, allowing for an alleviation of the economic crisis in the region.[37]

Power in the Donbas became concentrated in a regional political elite, known as oligarchs, during the early 2000s. Privatisation of state industries led to rampant corruption. Regional historian Hiroaki Kuromiya described this elite as the "Donbas clan", a group of people that controlled economic and political power in the region.[37] Prominent members of the "clan" included Viktor Yanukovych and Rinat Akhmetov. The formation of the oligarchy, combined with corruption, led to perceptions of the Donbas as "the least democratic and the most sinister region in Ukraine".[37]

In other parts of Ukraine during the 2000s, the Donbas was often perceived as having a "thug culture", as being a "Soviet cesspool", and as "backward". Writing in the Narodne slovo newspaper in 2005, commentator Viktor Tkachenko said that the Donbas was home to "fifth columns", and that speaking Ukrainian in the region was "not safe for one's health and life".[45] It was also portrayed as being home to pro-Russian separatism. The Donbas is home to a significantly higher number of cities and villages that were named after Communist figures compared to the rest of Ukraine.[46] Despite this portrayal, surveys taken across that decade and during the 1990s showed strong support for remaining within Ukraine and insignificant support for separatism.[47] 

[Storr]

Wow the winter war parallels continue.

It does strike me that Putin, fittingly, made the same mistakes Stalin did. In the words of Sabaton:

"He thought of the might he possessed,
And not of his foe"

This is what happens when presumed strongmen only surround themselves with a bunch of yes-men rather than people who are smarter then them, are allowed to disagree and give certain truths straight to them. To make rational decisions, political leaders need a competent team in place, giving honest opinions, maybe argue which each other behind closed doors and not tell the guy at the top what he wants to hear.

The truth is that these so-called strongmen are in fact weak characters because they can't handle different opinions and sometimes adjust their decisions when evidence points in a certain direction. They live in their own world, at least until the reality can do longer be denied. And even then, they usually look for scapegoats and find phony excuses instead of taking actual responsibility.

Yep. I can understand why Putin made the mistakes he did. For example, it's easy to overestimate you military strength and underestimate your opponent's when they are a significantly smaller nation. This is especially so in a autocracy where subordinate will always try to give the most optimistic assessments to please the all powerful leader. Similar to the Winter War, like many other aspects of the current conflict.

The one thing I don't understand is why Putin didn't attempt a full invasion (or at least full occupation of the Donbass and/or Crimean land bridge) in 2014. There's no way someone like Putin truly thought diplomacy would solve the Donbass situation, or at least how Russia wanted it solved. I felt negotiations were only meant to prolong the war into a frozen conflict, like those in Georgia.

Ukraine's military had been neglected and underfunded since independence and mainly consisted of newly organized militias. It had little to no NATO training or western technology/advanced weapons. Russia's military probably could have taken Kyiv, installed a pro-Russian government, and occupied the east of Ukraine in 2014. It's obvious in the following 8 years that Russia's military didn't spend the time improving, while Ukraine certainly did.

The only solid reason I can think of as to why Putin didn't go "all in" in 2014, is the concern of how the west would respond. After gambling that there'd be no military response in Crimea, Putin learned the west wouldn't actually get involved unless it had to. The sanctions given in 2014 weren't even all that strong. He could pretty confidently assume the west wouldn't directly intervene next time, as long as he didn't touch a NATO member.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

The latest ISW report repeatedly stresses their opinion that the Russian claims about their objectives in the Donbas are lies for domestic consumption. They assess that Russia has probably not abandoned its aims of eventually taking the whole country (or, at least, the capital).

It is fair to mention that, in Syria, they sometimes declared their main objectives achieved and then supported new campaigns against the remaining Syrian rebel strongholds.

[I spent the winter writing songs about getting better]

Ukraine has actually gained tanks since the war began as its captured more Russian tanks than they have lost: https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-has-actually-gained-tanks-during-war-while-russia-has-lost-hundreds-1691745

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Ukraine has actually gained tanks since the war began as its captured more Russian tanks than they have lost: https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-has-actually-gained-tanks-during-war-while-russia-has-lost-hundreds-1691745

Probably not. The report relies on Oryx, which only reports visual confirmations.

Most of the Russian tanks captured by Ukraine will be useful for parts at the very least, but some are bound to be defective in some way (hence their abandonment).

A captured vehicle is more likely to be recorded (by soldiers showing off "war booty") than a tank getting destroyed from a distance without visual confirmation.

You also have to consider the vehicles so comprehensively destroyed that it isn't clear to which side they belonged or whether they were not previously recorded vehicles. These are not added to Oryx's list.

That blog provides a decent guideline for the ratio of one side's losses to the others, but I suspect it undercounts all destructions relative to captures. Ukraine is trying to press more tanks into service and is asking its allies for tanks, so I'm guessing they are (slowly) losing them in net terms.

[Logical]

Ukraine has actually gained tanks since the war began as its captured more Russian tanks than they have lost: https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-has-actually-gained-tanks-during-war-while-russia-has-lost-hundreds-1691745

The number of tanks does not matter so much as the crew required to man them. Soviet designed tanks are notoriously unsurvivable when hit so it is very likely that destroyed UA tanks took its crew with it when destroyed. The time required to train a new crew to man the captured tanks is time Ukraine might not have.
Modern warfare is highly specialized which is why the large offensives we saw on the first week of the war is unlikely to be repeated as attrition bleeds the most capable units from both sides.

[Storr]

Was reading the Donbas Wikipedia entry earlier and was wondering if anyone could tell me how accurate it is. Certainly makes Donbas sound like a grim place and would be extremely costly to rebuild/reform for whomever is in charge of it in the near future:

By 1993, industrial production had collapsed, and average wages had fallen by 80% since 1990. Donbas fell into crisis, with many accusing the new central government in Kyiv of mismanagement and neglect. Donbas coal miners went on strike in 1993, causing a conflict that was described by historian Lewis Siegelbaum as "a struggle between the Donbas region and the rest of the country". One strike leader said that Donbas people had voted for independence because they wanted "power to be given to the localities, enterprises, cities", not because they wanted heavily centralised power moved from "Moscow to Kyiv".[37]

This strike was followed by a 1994 consultative referendum on various constitutional questions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, held concurrently with the first parliamentary elections in independent Ukraine.[38] These questions included whether Russian should be declared an official language of Ukraine, whether Russian should be the language of administration in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, whether Ukraine should federalise, and whether Ukraine should have closer ties with the Commonwealth of Independent States.[39]

Close to 90% of voters voted in favour of these propositions.[40] None of them were adopted: Ukraine remained a unitary state, Ukrainian was retained as the sole official language, and the Donbas gained no autonomy.[36] Nevertheless, the Donbas strikers gained many economic concessions from Kyiv, allowing for an alleviation of the economic crisis in the region.[37]

Power in the Donbas became concentrated in a regional political elite, known as oligarchs, during the early 2000s. Privatisation of state industries led to rampant corruption. Regional historian Hiroaki Kuromiya described this elite as the "Donbas clan", a group of people that controlled economic and political power in the region.[37] Prominent members of the "clan" included Viktor Yanukovych and Rinat Akhmetov. The formation of the oligarchy, combined with corruption, led to perceptions of the Donbas as "the least democratic and the most sinister region in Ukraine".[37]

In other parts of Ukraine during the 2000s, the Donbas was often perceived as having a "thug culture", as being a "Soviet cesspool", and as "backward". Writing in the Narodne slovo newspaper in 2005, commentator Viktor Tkachenko said that the Donbas was home to "fifth columns", and that speaking Ukrainian in the region was "not safe for one's health and life".[45] It was also portrayed as being home to pro-Russian separatism. The Donbas is home to a significantly higher number of cities and villages that were named after Communist figures compared to the rest of Ukraine.[46] Despite this portrayal, surveys taken across that decade and during the 1990s showed strong support for remaining within Ukraine and insignificant support for separatism.[47]  

A youtuber I enjoy watching took a trip to the Donbass last year from Dnipro to Lysychansk in search of a massive soviet era cosmonaut tile mural (spoiler: he finds it). It's striking just how bleak it looks. The roads are terrible, and there is a general sense of emptiness. The bus stations he uses have only two berths in use, there are plenty of abandoned buildings, and most of the people he interacts with appear middle aged or older. The old soviet "House of Culture" which has the mural on it, is closed and there's no one else around. Basically the Donbass has all of the issues faced everywhere in former Soviet Union (aging population, increased poverty, corruption, crime), but amplified because the region's major industry is/was mining coal. They're now made even worse by war.

[Storr]

Chornobaivka is town where Kherson air base is located. lmao

https://twitter.com/Liveuamap/status/1507446298642989058?s=20&t=8kTwQFbWWAaj...

[Frodo]

_{(If you get the reference, you get the reference. I'm not going to explain).}

Al won't, but inasmuch as  the Oracle of Delphi never impressed me, I will thanks to the internets (a tool that can help make more level the playing field with amazing efficiency when used properly)  enlightening me. Not everyone is a specialist in these things. Just how apt the analogy actually proves to be is a work in progress.


https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/ramses-ii

Battle of Kadesh

I am going to assume that Al is substituting Vladimir Putin for Pharaoh Rameses II (with the Russians in place of the Egyptians), and we of the West (with the Ukrainians as our proxies) as the Hittites.  The battle began with what looked like a certain Hittite victory before the Egyptians rallied, sent up reinforcements, and eventually fought their foes to a draw (more or less).  It was the last battle ever fought between these two late Bronze Age superpowers, as a peace treaty was negotiated, borders were decided between these two empires, and diplomatic marriages were made to further ratify the peace treaty.   Rameses II went back home and propagandized the battle of Kadesh to his people as a hard-fought Egyptian victory with himself as the hero who saved the day.  

A century later, the Bronze Age came to an abrupt and catastrophic end.  Of all the superpowers of the day, only Egypt survived, but it never again had the power and influence it once enjoyed.
-------------

I really hope I misunderstood Al, for this is a dark analogy.  

[It’s so Joever]

_{(If you get the reference, you get the reference. I'm not going to explain).}

Al won't, but inasmuch as  the Oracle of Delphi never impressed me, I will thanks to the internets (a tool that can help make more level the playing field with amazing efficiency when used properly)  enlightening me. Not everyone is a specialist in these things. Just how apt the analogy actually proves to be is a work in progress.


https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/ramses-ii

Battle of Kadesh

I am going to assume that Al is substituting Vladimir Putin for Pharaoh Rameses II (with the Russians in place of the Egyptians), and we of the West (with the Ukrainians as our proxies) as the Hittites.  The battle began with what looked like a certain Hittite victory before the Egyptians rallied, sent up reinforcements, and eventually fought their foes to a draw (more or less).  It was the last battle ever fought between these two late Bronze Age superpowers, as a peace treaty was negotiated, borders were decided between these two empires, and diplomatic marriages were made to further ratify the peace treaty.   Rameses II went back home and propagandized the battle of Kadesh to his people as a hard-fought Egyptian victory with himself as the hero who saved the day.  

A century later, the Bronze Age came to an abrupt and catastrophic end.  Of all the superpowers of the day, only Egypt survived, but it never again had the power and influence it once enjoyed.
-------------

I really hope I misunderstood Al, for this is a dark analogy.  

Great Oil Age collapse in 2122?

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

_{(If you get the reference, you get the reference. I'm not going to explain).}

Al won't, but inasmuch as  the Oracle of Delphi never impressed me, I will thanks to the internets (a tool that can help make more level the playing field with amazing efficiency when used properly)  enlightening me. Not everyone is a specialist in these things. Just how apt the analogy actually proves to be is a work in progress.


https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/ramses-ii

Battle of Kadesh

I am going to assume that Al is substituting Vladimir Putin for Pharaoh Rameses II (with the Russians in place of the Egyptians), and we of the West (with the Ukrainians as our proxies) as the Hittites.  The battle began with what looked like a certain Hittite victory before the Egyptians rallied, sent up reinforcements, and eventually fought their foes to a draw (more or less).  It was the last battle ever fought between these two late Bronze Age superpowers, as a peace treaty was negotiated, borders were decided between these two empires, and diplomatic marriages were made to further ratify the peace treaty.   Rameses II went back home and propagandized the battle of Kadesh to his people as a hard-fought Egyptian victory with himself as the hero who saved the day.  

A century later, the Bronze Age came to an abrupt and catastrophic end.  Of all the superpowers of the day, only Egypt survived, but it never again had the power and influence it once enjoyed.
-------------

I really hope I misunderstood Al, for this is a dark analogy.  

It's related, but I think it's a little simpler than that. Ramses II is the basis for Shelley's Ozymandias. Putin is on course to meet his fate.

[WMS]

Was reading the Donbas Wikipedia entry earlier and was wondering if anyone could tell me how accurate it is. Certainly makes Donbas sound like a grim place and would be extremely costly to rebuild/reform for whomever is in charge of it in the near future:

By 1993, industrial production had collapsed, and average wages had fallen by 80% since 1990. Donbas fell into crisis, with many accusing the new central government in Kyiv of mismanagement and neglect. Donbas coal miners went on strike in 1993, causing a conflict that was described by historian Lewis Siegelbaum as "a struggle between the Donbas region and the rest of the country". One strike leader said that Donbas people had voted for independence because they wanted "power to be given to the localities, enterprises, cities", not because they wanted heavily centralised power moved from "Moscow to Kyiv".[37]

This strike was followed by a 1994 consultative referendum on various constitutional questions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, held concurrently with the first parliamentary elections in independent Ukraine.[38] These questions included whether Russian should be declared an official language of Ukraine, whether Russian should be the language of administration in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, whether Ukraine should federalise, and whether Ukraine should have closer ties with the Commonwealth of Independent States.[39]

Close to 90% of voters voted in favour of these propositions.[40] None of them were adopted: Ukraine remained a unitary state, Ukrainian was retained as the sole official language, and the Donbas gained no autonomy.[36] Nevertheless, the Donbas strikers gained many economic concessions from Kyiv, allowing for an alleviation of the economic crisis in the region.[37]

Power in the Donbas became concentrated in a regional political elite, known as oligarchs, during the early 2000s. Privatisation of state industries led to rampant corruption. Regional historian Hiroaki Kuromiya described this elite as the "Donbas clan", a group of people that controlled economic and political power in the region.[37] Prominent members of the "clan" included Viktor Yanukovych and Rinat Akhmetov. The formation of the oligarchy, combined with corruption, led to perceptions of the Donbas as "the least democratic and the most sinister region in Ukraine".[37]

In other parts of Ukraine during the 2000s, the Donbas was often perceived as having a "thug culture", as being a "Soviet cesspool", and as "backward". Writing in the Narodne slovo newspaper in 2005, commentator Viktor Tkachenko said that the Donbas was home to "fifth columns", and that speaking Ukrainian in the region was "not safe for one's health and life".[45] It was also portrayed as being home to pro-Russian separatism. The Donbas is home to a significantly higher number of cities and villages that were named after Communist figures compared to the rest of Ukraine.[46] Despite this portrayal, surveys taken across that decade and during the 1990s showed strong support for remaining within Ukraine and insignificant support for separatism.[47] 

And look what Putin has done to the place!

That’s 4 points out of 100, by the way. Complete with some ethnic cleansing!

Plus what Storr posted above. The Glorious Rebirth of the Russian Empire sure is dystopian.

[Storr]

I appreciate the shade:

https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1507502555865169927?s=20&t=bgodSq...

[NOVA Green]

Chornobaivka is town where Kherson air base is located. lmao

https://twitter.com/Liveuamap/status/1507446298642989058?s=20&t=8kTwQFbWWAaj...

Nice Trolling from Pres Z !!!

[lfromnj]

Post deleted. Compucomp do not derail this thread.

BS, everything compucomp has said is relevant to this thread and he should be allowed to say it.

[Omega21]

I appreciate the shade:

https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1507502555865169927?s=20&t=bgodSq...

I dont really get the big deal about Hungary, AFAIK, they both implemented the EU sanctions & voted to condemn the war in the UN.

Only thing they are not doing is sending & facilitating the transfer of lethal equipment, but there might be something I am missing.

[MaxQue]

I appreciate the shade:

https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1507502555865169927?s=20&t=bgodSq...

I dont really get the big deal about Hungary, AFAIK, they both implemented the EU sanctions & voted to condemn the war in the UN.

Only thing they are not doing is sending & facilitating the transfer of lethal equipment, but there might be something I am missing.

They are doing that because an election, there is speculation they will go back to their pro-Putin position as soon they are reelected.

[Omega21]

I appreciate the shade:

https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1507502555865169927?s=20&t=bgodSq...

I dont really get the big deal about Hungary, AFAIK, they both implemented the EU sanctions & voted to condemn the war in the UN.

Only thing they are not doing is sending & facilitating the transfer of lethal equipment, but there might be something I am missing.

They are doing that because an election, there is speculation they will go back to their pro-Putin position as soon they are reelected.

Of course, that very well may be true, but that doesnt really allow for other nations to call them out, unless they actually backpedal on the sanctions & condemnation.

[NOVA Green]

If Kherson City was being contested we would have visual evidence. I believe they are still out in the surrounding areas of Kherson Oblast.

^^^ THIS ^^^

Plus recent reporting from CNN casts doubt on Ukrainian gains within the City Proper.

The city of Kherson remains under total Russian control, four residents of the city told CNN, contrary to number of reports from other media outlets, citing a senior US defense official.

"Today saw them with their guns at the market, possibly searching vegetables for buying," one resident said to CNN on Friday evening. "They lose only couple of villages, not towns."

https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-25-22/h_e5becce33053f3be8f8a27b8bf718f15

Looks like the Pentagon Officials were perhaps advancing wishful thinking in might well be a potential outcome within the next week if a combination of conventional UKR units + Civilian Uprising combine to push the Occupiers out of the City as part of a broader expansion of ongoing counter-attacks within a key area in the Southern Front?

[NOVA Green]

If Kherson City was being contested we would have visual evidence. I believe they are still out in the surrounding areas of Kherson Oblast.

^^^ THIS ^^^

Plus recent reporting from CNN casts doubt on Ukrainian gains within the City Proper.

The city of Kherson remains under total Russian control, four residents of the city told CNN, contrary to number of reports from other media outlets, citing a senior US defense official.

"Today saw them with their guns at the market, possibly searching vegetables for buying," one resident said to CNN on Friday evening. "They lose only couple of villages, not towns."

https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-25-22/h_e5becce33053f3be8f8a27b8bf718f15

Looks like the Pentagon Officials were perhaps advancing wishful thinking in might well be a potential outcome within the next week if a combination of conventional UKR units + Civilian Uprising combine to push the Occupiers out of the City as part of a broader expansion of ongoing counter-attacks within a key area in the Southern Front?

NYT just dumped on Kherson...

Conflicting reports emerge on whether Russia is still in full control of Kherson.

WASHINGTON — Russian forces no longer have full control of Kherson, the first major Ukrainian city that President Vladimir V. Putin’s forces managed to capture as part of his invasion, a senior Pentagon official said on Friday.

But Ukrainians in Kherson and Ukrainian officials questioned the Pentagon’s assessment, saying that the city remained in Russian hands, while Ukrainian forces are fighting across the broader Kherson region.

The Pentagon official told reporters during a telephone briefing that Ukrainian forces are now fighting fiercely in the city and pushing back Russian gains there, again making the strategically important port city “contested territory.”

That contradicts a statement released on Friday by Col. Gen. Sergei Rudskoi, the chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Russian military’s General Staff, who claimed that the Kherson region was “under full control.”

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/03/25/world/ukraine-russia-war/russia-kherson

[NOVA Green]

Ukrainian gvt disputes progress which Turkey is claiming to have made on diplomatic negotiations.

Needless to say much more to the article, but unless you are paying for it or somehow get behind the paywall in Russia / Ukraine this is all you are going to get from me.

Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s minister of foreign affairs, on Friday rejected the notion that there had been a breakthrough in negotiations with Russia after comments by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey that there had been progress in four contentious areas.

In an interview released Friday, President Erdogan said Russia and Ukraine appeared to have made progress in several key areas, including President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine indicating that he could give up his NATO membership bid. Mr. Erdogan also told Turkish reporters on Thursday that the Ukrainian president was ready to accept Russian as an official language, make “certain concessions” about the disarmament of Ukraine and agree on “collective security.”

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/03/25/world/ukraine-russia-war/ukraines-foreign-minister-rejects-turkeys-contention-of-major-progress-in-russia-talks

[NOVA Green]

Not quite sure the overall impact in the short term, but still newsworthy regardless:

Still, not sure what this would look like considering America is already close to 100% of Natural Gas exports.

The deal he announced, in Brussels earlier on Friday, lacked many details but contained some big goals: The United States would send an additional 15 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas to Europe this year — roughly 10 to 12 percent of current annual U.S. exports to all countries. By 2030, the president said, the United States will aim to increase supplies by as much as 50 billion cubic meters a year.

The moves caught many in the U.S. energy industry by surprise. Oil and gas executives who have become accustomed to being pilloried for their contributions to climate change were suddenly being called up to help liberate European allies from Russian energy. While the industry was not certain how Europe would make such a giant pivot, executives clearly relished their new casting as saviors rather than villains.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/25/business/energy-environment/biden-eu-liquefied-natural-gas-deal-russia.html