Brazilian presidential and general elections 2022 (1st round: October 2nd, 2nd round: October 30th)

[Red Velvet]

And even in the US case, a country with a much bigger tradition of economic right-wing stuff, it’s clear that if Trump had done minimal economic populist stuff during the chaos of the COVID crisis when people were in most need of, he would’ve likely been re-elected too.

US, ironically, was lucky that the republicans hate the poor so much. Otherwise they would’ve grown a better margin, especially between Hispanic voters.

[buritobr]

Sum of the vote in the 26 state capitals and Brasília

Bolsonaro- 13,999,657 (50.31%)
Lula- 13,829,890 (49.69%)

Very close to the national result. There is "only" one difference: the candidate who had the majority.

The capitals voted on the right of the country in 1955, 1960 (I don't have data for 1945, 1950), on the left if the country in 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, slightly on the right in 2006, 2010, a lot on the right in 2014, 2018, and slightly on the right in 2022.

The rich districts in the capitals voted on the left of the rich small towns. But the poor districts, in the periphery of the capitals, voted on the right of the poor small towns. The evangelic population is concentrated in the big cities.

[buritobr]

I mentioned here how the city of Rio de Janeiro-RJ changed.

Now, let put it in a single map. Only Barra da Tijuca and some districts with high military population are always blue. Some favelas are always red. The districts we see in Rio de Janeiro postcards voted for Aécio Neves in 2014 and for Lula in 2022. The lower/ lower middle class suburds did the opposite

[Red Velvet]

This is a really cool map of Rio. It’s fun how it evidences the drastic shifts since 2014 specifically in Rio de Janeiro area only.

Basically the poorest neighborhoods (not counting the favelas because they’re spread out geographically) are in Green (Dilma 2014 - Bolsonaro 2022) and evidence the shift that happened in the city - only in Rio, important to stress so that people don’t think we’re talking about national trends - away from a class driven logic and closer to a social issues logic. The Bolsonaro type of populism was particularly strong in those green areas which  previously had always refused the PSDB establishment types.

One thing that I notice about these green areas is that people tend to like more aggressive anti-system rhetoric more because of the feeling of abandonment they have. Add to that militia paramilitary police groups having more power in the West Zone as a whole + Rise of evangelicalism reach to power and that really consolidated the hard shift to the right in such short period you see in those areas.

The Blue areas (Aécio 2014 - Bolsonaro 2022) are basically the Barra da Tijuca - Recreio dos Bandeirantes - Jacarepaguá Region + Ilha do Governador Island. Which can be generally explained as places that are either very rich or somewhat upper class compared to the city average and kept voting based on class interests. There isn’t a particular “social progressive concern” about the elites on these areas like you can say there is to some degree in the South Zone.

The Yellow areas (Aécio 2014 - Lula 2022) and Red Areas (Dilma 2014 - Lula 2022) is basically the South Zone + Southern part of North Zone. Most of the upper classes in South Zone voted Aécio in 2014 but shifted to Lula in 2022 out of strong anti-Bolsonarist sentiment due to all the stuff he did. Meanwhile some few other parts of south zone, the city center and also the southern tip of north zone (not really wealthy like south zone, but more culturally open and without the level of religious/militia influence you see in the green areas) kept voting for PT in both years.

[2952-0-0]

What was responsible for this shift that is particular to Rio, though? If Bolsonaro won re-election, this local shift would have been decisive.

[buritobr]

What was responsible for this shift that is particular to Rio, though? If Bolsonaro won re-election, this local shift would have been decisive.

Yes, if he won, this local shift would have been decisive.

Some people in the urban peripheries used to vote for PT, but they were hurt by the 2014-16 economic crisis and Bolsonaro has an appel to evangelic voters. Many people who live in peripheries are evangelic.
On the other hand, some educated middle class people used to vote for PSDB, but now they consider that Bolsonaro is more evil than the PT.

This shift was stronger in Rio de Janeiro, but we could see it in other cities. The PT won some electoral zones in the center of São Paulo for the first time in 2022.
Lula lost Brasília but he had a narrow win the Northern Wing, a middle class neighborhood in the planned city.

[No War, but the War on Christmas]

Having grown up in a very evangelical family environment, and witnessing the spiritual and many times mental and physical abuse these people exert under the guise of "God" it makes me sick to my stomach to see charlatan pastors bringing this same toxic "Christianity" (a cult is really what it is, without exaggeration, cause they don't even remotely resemble to Christ of the Bible) to Brazil. Absolutely horrific... I'm so sorry to the Brazilians who have to suffer cause of this US import but I hope we can successfully push these con artists back in both our countries and indeed the world.

[CumbrianLefty]

Yes, the "Prosperity Gospel" is truly one of the most repellent things ever devised.

[buritobr]

The abstention rate in the Brazilian presidential election was not so high. Other countries which have mandatory voting and fine for non-voters don't have 100% turnout.

This table shows some countries, according to mandatory voting, turnout and value of the fines

[All Along The Watchtower]

Which for me always raises the question: why? Why does the left in country after country keep doing this? What on earth makes left-wingers in places like Brazil think that it's a model that will succeed there when it's toxic even in the societies for which it was designed?

You know the saying “all Chiefs and no Indians?” Sometimes I think that aptly describes a lot of what passes for the Left: all intellectuals/highly motivated activists and no (or rather, not nearly enough of a) working class base. Of course, this has always been a major issue with the Hard Left in advanced, politically stable industrial democracies; in those countries, extremism under most circumstances is by definition a fringe position.

Really though, it’s the failures and/or political defeat of the center left and a loss of historical memory, I suspect, that alienates (heh) a lot of disillusioned, often highly educated but also economically and socially precarious young people from the political center. You can see this in the US where the one politician who seemed to “get it” from the perspective of many younger people was born in 1941 and has been committed to left-wing politics for over half a century. That goes back to what you said about the Reagan-Bush-Clinton-Greenspan consensus which, needless to say, Obama and Biden subscribe to (even though the latter has turned out better than expected on that front as President, to some extent). This is a lost generation in terms of left politics—and in the US (I can’t speak to other countries) robust center-left politics, and I haven’t even touched on deindustrialization and the evisceration of organized labor…

Finally, as far as a lot of more progressive and left-leaning younger people are concerned, the feeling of being burned by Barack Obama’s Presidency and the Democratic Party broadly, in the face of endless wars, the Great Recession, and an increasingly mask-off far-right Republican Party, has had a radicalizing effect—radicalized by events. “Scratch a cynic, find a disappointed idealist.”

[buritobr]

In previous replies, we said that the city of São Paulo voted on the right of the city of Rio de Janeiro in 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and on the left of the city of Rio de Janeiro in 2018, 2022.
We didn't know about the older elections because we had available only data of the states. We knew the results of the city of Rio de Janeiro because Rio de Janeiro used to be a city state in the past, but we didn't know the results in the city of São Paulo, only the results in the state of São Paulo.
Now, I finally found the results in the municipalities in the older elections, in the pdf book of statistical data published in the TSE website.

The results are the following:
In the 1st democratic period, the elections for president and vice president were independent. People casted one vote for president and one vote for vice president.

1955

São Paulo
President
Ademar de Barros 328411 (49.5%)
Juarez Távora 221686 (33.4%)
Juscelino Kubitschek 83483 (12.6%)
Plínio Salgado 29660 (4.5%)
Vice President
Milton Campos 252223 (42.3%)
Danton Coelho 222762 (37.4%)
João Goulart 121255 (20.3%)

Rio de Janeiro
President
Ademar de Barros 266289 (39.4%)
Juscelino Kubitschek 199520 (29.5%)
Juarez Távora 174804 (25.9%)
Plínio Salgado 35495 (5.2%)
Vice President
Milton Campos 303405 (45.4%)
João Goulart 282335 (42.3%)
Danton Coelho 81943 (12.3%)

National
President
Juscelino Kubitschek 3077411 (35.7%)
Juarez Távora 2610462 (30.3%)
Ademar de Barros 2222725 (25.8%)
Plínio Salgado 714379 (8.3%)
Vice President
João Goulart 3591409 (44.2%)
Milton Campos 3384739 (41.7%)
Danton Coelho 1140261 (14.1%)

1960

São Paulo
president
Jânio Quadros 590703 (56.6%)
Ademar de Barros 283920 (27.2%)
Marshall Henrique Lott 169157 (16.2%)
vice president
Milton Campos 515994 (52.0%)
João Goulart 335000 (33.7%)
Fernando Ferrari 142055 (14.3%)

Rio de Janeiro
president
Jânio Quadros 418813 (43.8%)
Marshall Henrique Lott 287836 (30.1%)
Ademar de Barros 250117 (26.1%)
vice president
Milton Campos 307057 (40.3%)
João Goulart 243044 (31.9%)
Fernando Ferrari 211710 (27.8%)

National
president
Jânio Quadros 5636623 (48.3%)
Marshall Henrique Lott 3846825 (32.9%)
Ademar de Barros 2195709 (18.8%)
vice president
João Goulart 4547010 (36.1%)
Milton Campos 4237719 (33.7%)
Fernando Ferrari 2137382 (17%)

Juscelino Kubitschek and Marshall Henrique Lott were centrists supported by the left
Juarez Távora was a standard conservative
Ademar de Barros and Jânio Quadros were populist conservatives
Plínio Salgado was a fascist
João Goulart was a leftist
Milton Campos was a standard conservative
Fernando Ferrari was a moderate leftist

We can see that both cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro voted on the right of the country, and that São Paulo voted on the right of Rio de Janeiro

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

In previous replies, we said that the city of São Paulo voted on the right of the city of Rio de Janeiro in 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and on the left of the city of Rio de Janeiro in 2018, 2022.
We didn't know about the older elections because we had available only data of the states. We knew the results of the city of Rio de Janeiro because Rio de Janeiro used to be a city state in the past, but we didn't know the results in the city of São Paulo, only the results in the state of São Paulo.
Now, I finally found the results in the municipalities in the older elections, in the pdf book of statistical data published in the TSE website.

The results are the following:
In the 1st democratic period, the elections for president and vice president were independent. People casted one vote for president and one vote for vice president.

1955

São Paulo
President
Ademar de Barros 328411 (49.5%)
Juarez Távora 221686 (33.4%)
Juscelino Kubitschek 83483 (12.6%)
Plínio Salgado 29660 (4.5%)
Vice President
Milton Campos 252223 (42.3%)
Danton Coelho 222762 (37.4%)
João Goulart 121255 (20.3%)

Rio de Janeiro
President
Ademar de Barros 266289 (39.4%)
Juscelino Kubitschek 199520 (29.5%)
Juarez Távora 174804 (25.9%)
Plínio Salgado 35495 (5.2%)
Vice President
Milton Campos 303405 (45.4%)
João Goulart 282335 (42.3%)
Danton Coelho 81943 (12.3%)

National
President
Juscelino Kubitschek 3077411 (35.7%)
Juarez Távora 2610462 (30.3%)
Ademar de Barros 2222725 (25.8%)
Plínio Salgado 714379 (8.3%)
Vice President
João Goulart 3591409 (44.2%)
Milton Campos 3384739 (41.7%)
Danton Coelho 1140261 (14.1%)

1960

São Paulo
president
Jânio Quadros 590703 (56.6%)
Ademar de Barros 283920 (27.2%)
Marshall Henrique Lott 169157 (16.2%)
vice president
Milton Campos 515994 (52.0%)
João Goulart 335000 (33.7%)
Fernando Ferrari 142055 (14.3%)

Rio de Janeiro
president
Jânio Quadros 418813 (43.8%)
Marshall Henrique Lott 287836 (30.1%)
Ademar de Barros 250117 (26.1%)
vice president
Milton Campos 307057 (40.3%)
João Goulart 243044 (31.9%)
Fernando Ferrari 211710 (27.8%)

National
president
Jânio Quadros 5636623 (48.3%)
Marshall Henrique Lott 3846825 (32.9%)
Ademar de Barros 2195709 (18.8%)
vice president
João Goulart 4547010 (36.1%)
Milton Campos 4237719 (33.7%)
Fernando Ferrari 2137382 (17%)

Juscelino Kubitschek and Marshall Henrique Lott were centrists supported by the left
Juarez Távora was a standard conservative
Ademar de Barros and Jânio Quadros were populist conservatives
Plínio Salgado was a fascist
João Goulart was a leftist
Milton Campos was a standard conservative
Fernando Ferrari was a moderate leftist

We can see that both cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro voted on the right of the country, and that São Paulo voted on the right of Rio de Janeiro

Thanks for finding this and sharing it. I appreciate it.

[buritobr]

German president Frank Walter Steinmeier confirmed he will attend Lula's innauguration on January 1st 2003.

US government reserved a large number of rooms in an hotel in Brasília. We still don't know which American authority will come to Lula's innauguration.

[buritobr]

Barack Obama confirmed: he will attend Lula's inauguration cerimony in Brasília on January 1st 2023

[buritobr]

Lula finally decided some names of his cabinet

Minister of Finance: Fernando Haddad
Former Minister of Education (2005-2011), former mayor of São Paulo-SP (2013-2016), losing candidate for president in 2018 and for governor of São Paulo in 2022. He has a BA in Law, MA in Economics and PhD in Philosophy at the University of São Paulo. Despite the MA in Economics, he was appointed because he is a politician and not because he is an economist. He will have a staff of economists working with him.
There used to be three different departments related to the economy in Brazil: Finance (Fazenda), Planning (Planejamento), Industry and Commerce (Indústria e Comércio). Presidents Fernando Collor (1990-1992) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) merged these departments into a single one, the Department of Economy (Ministério da Economia). Lula will split again.

Minister of Foreign Relations: Mauro Vieira
A career diplomat of the Itamaraty (the Brazilian "Department of State"). Nowadays, he is the Brazilian ambassador in Croatia. His name was announced few minutes before the game against Croatia.

"Civil House" (Casa Civil): Rui Costa
Former governor of Bahia (2015-2022), member of PT for a long time. This office is a kind of chief of other ministers.

Defense: José Múcio
A conservative politician, Lula doesn't want trouble with military officers. At least this new minister will be a civilian, unlike the ministers of defence during Bolsonaro's administration, who were military.

Justice: Flávio Dino
Formor governor of Maranhão (2015-2022).

[President Johnson]

Lula finally decided some names of his cabinet

Minister of Finance: Fernando Haddad
Former Minister of Education (2005-2011), former mayor of São Paulo-SP (2013-2016), losing candidate for president in 2018 and for governor of São Paulo in 2022. He has a BA in Law, MA in Economics and PhD in Philosophy at the University of São Paulo. Despite the MA in Economics, he was appointed because he is a politician and not because he is an economist. He will have a staff of economists working with him.
There used to be three different departments related to the economy in Brazil: Finance (Fazenda), Planning (Planejamento), Industry and Commerce (Indústria e Comércio). Presidents Fernando Collor (1990-1992) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) merged these departments into a single one, the Department of Economy (Ministério da Economia). Lula will split again.

Minister of Foreign Relations: Mauro Vieira
A career diplomat of the Itamaraty (the Brazilian "Department of State"). Nowadays, he is the Brazilian ambassador in Croatia. His name was announced few minutes before the game against Croatia.

"Civil House" (Casa Civil): Rui Costa
Former governor of Bahia (2015-2022), member of PT for a long time. This office is a kind of chief of other ministers.

Defense: José Múcio
A conservative politician, Lula doesn't want trouble with military officers. At least this new minister will be a civilian, unlike the ministers of defence during Bolsonaro's administration, who were military.

Justice: Flávio Dino
Formor governor of Maranhão (2015-2022).

Do you cabinet members need any confirmation by the legislature or can the president just make these appointments independently?

[buritobr]

Lula finally decided some names of his cabinet

Minister of Finance: Fernando Haddad
Former Minister of Education (2005-2011), former mayor of São Paulo-SP (2013-2016), losing candidate for president in 2018 and for governor of São Paulo in 2022. He has a BA in Law, MA in Economics and PhD in Philosophy at the University of São Paulo. Despite the MA in Economics, he was appointed because he is a politician and not because he is an economist. He will have a staff of economists working with him.
There used to be three different departments related to the economy in Brazil: Finance (Fazenda), Planning (Planejamento), Industry and Commerce (Indústria e Comércio). Presidents Fernando Collor (1990-1992) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) merged these departments into a single one, the Department of Economy (Ministério da Economia). Lula will split again.

Minister of Foreign Relations: Mauro Vieira
A career diplomat of the Itamaraty (the Brazilian "Department of State"). Nowadays, he is the Brazilian ambassador in Croatia. His name was announced few minutes before the game against Croatia.

"Civil House" (Casa Civil): Rui Costa
Former governor of Bahia (2015-2022), member of PT for a long time. This office is a kind of chief of other ministers.

Defense: José Múcio
A conservative politician, Lula doesn't want trouble with military officers. At least this new minister will be a civilian, unlike the ministers of defence during Bolsonaro's administration, who were military.

Justice: Flávio Dino
Formor governor of Maranhão (2015-2022).

Do you cabinet members need any confirmation by the legislature or can the president just make these appointments independently?

Appointments of ministers don't need confirmation by the legislature, since ministers are government authorities.
Appointments of state authorities need confirmation by the Senate. These appointments include the president of the Central Bank, the judges of the Supreme Court, the general attorney, the president of regulation agencies. But these appointments take place only when the term of these officers end, and the term of these officers isn't similar to the term of the president of the republic. The term of the general attorney will go until late 2023. The term of the president of the Central Bank will go until early 2025. An appointment of judge for the Supreme Court takes place only if one of the judges die or retire.

[Red Velvet]

Worth saying that retirement for Supreme Court is compulsive once you reach the age of 75.

So Lula will make two Supreme Court appointments already now in 2023 based on that retirement rule since Ricardo Lewandowski and Rosa Weber are reaching that age next year.

[Red Velvet]

Anyway, a bunch of PT and friends biggest names (Haddad, Dino and Costa) in this first announcement.

For Itamaraty, I wanted a more reliably progressive name to deal with Foreign Relations, but I understand that this guy is well-experienced while also maintaining good relations with Lula and the PT during their most difficult time. He has lots of history, was given more prestige during PT years before being put in Croatia by Bolsonaro, not to mention he already occupied this same position, even if briefly, before Dilma was impeached:

- Brazil ambassador in Argentina (2004-2010) - put in there by Lula
- Brazil ambassador in USA (2010-2015) - put in there by Lula
- Leader of the Itamaraty (2015-2016) - put in there by Dilma
- Brazil representative in the UN (2016-2020) - put in there by Michel Temer
- Brazil ambassador in Croatia (2020-2023) - put in there by Bolsonaro
- Leader of Itamaraty (2023-2027??) - put in there by Lula

Feels like someone PT trusts and backs, since his more prestige positions were given by PT governments. Ambassador to countries we hold more strategic relations like Argentina and USA + Leader of the country foreign relations twice.

For defense, there was really no other way to go without buying a fight with the military and we know Lula would rather be a conciliatory type, so the Múcio guy seems okay even if someone who Bolsonarists like. Just the fact it’s a civilian as the Defense minister is a progress from previous administrations from Temer and Bolsonaro.

[SInNYC]

Minister of Finance: Fernando Haddad
Former Minister of Education (2005-2011), former mayor of São Paulo-SP (2013-2016), losing candidate for president in 2018 and for governor of São Paulo in 2022. He has a BA in Law, MA in Economics and PhD in Philosophy at the University of São Paulo. Despite the MA in Economics, he was appointed because he is a politician and not because he is an economist. He will have a staff of economists working with him.
There used to be three different departments related to the economy in Brazil: Finance (Fazenda), Planning (Planejamento), Industry and Commerce (Indústria e Comércio). Presidents Fernando Collor (1990-1992) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) merged these departments into a single one, the Department of Economy (Ministério da Economia). Lula will split again.

Is there some ideological reason for the decision between three and one economy-related department?

[Cassius]

Minister of Finance: Fernando Haddad
Former Minister of Education (2005-2011), former mayor of São Paulo-SP (2013-2016), losing candidate for president in 2018 and for governor of São Paulo in 2022. He has a BA in Law, MA in Economics and PhD in Philosophy at the University of São Paulo. Despite the MA in Economics, he was appointed because he is a politician and not because he is an economist. He will have a staff of economists working with him.
There used to be three different departments related to the economy in Brazil: Finance (Fazenda), Planning (Planejamento), Industry and Commerce (Indústria e Comércio). Presidents Fernando Collor (1990-1992) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) merged these departments into a single one, the Department of Economy (Ministério da Economia). Lula will split again.

Is there some ideological reason for the decision between three and one economy-related department?

I’m not sure about the specifics of the Brazilian set up, but it’s often perceived to be the case that when both financial and broader economic policy matters are controlled by one government department then the priorities of the former will always trump those of the latter (ie, the department will prioritise fiscal discipline and balanced budgets over government spending designed to produce economic growth).

[Red Velvet]

Yeah and it’s also just a return to the way it was also was. Bolsonaro changed it from all past governments and combined it into one economy ministry only. Now reach of these three economic departments will be a ministry of their own again, like it had always been since 1992 until 2018.

And that’s because Collor, like Bolsonaro, also combined these in only one ministry between his small term in 1990-1992. Before 1990 it was always the norm for those departments to be separated too, even during the military dictatorship! So it was only Collor and Bolsonaro who did something different in their terms with this.

Both were naturally the most conservative presidents in power post-dictatorship, reaching power with an anti-corruption/anti-politics speech, which also relates to diminishing spending and cutting costs with what they call “unnecessary ministries”.

[buritobr]

Yes, as Red Velvet said, this decision is very ideological

Administrations of Fernando Collor (1990-1992) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) had a "small government" ideology, so they decided to unify all departments related to the economy into a single one. It creates an impression that some costs are cut, but actually the reduction of costs has no significance, since merged departments don't mean a very lower number of pernsonel.
Besides, the departments abolished by the administrations that created the "Ministério da Economia" were the department of Planning (Ministério do Planejamento) and of industry and commerce (Ministério da Indústria e Comércio). The ideology of Collor and Bolsonaro's administrations don't like the word "planning" very much (it remembers something soviet) and don't consider the role of the public sector to run policies for industry and commerce.

[buritobr]

The truck already arived to take Bolsonaro's personal objetcts from the Palácio da Alvorada

[Peeperkorn]

Minister of Finance: Fernando Haddad
Former Minister of Education (2005-2011), former mayor of São Paulo-SP (2013-2016), losing candidate for president in 2018 and for governor of São Paulo in 2022. He has a BA in Law, MA in Economics and PhD in Philosophy at the University of São Paulo. Despite the MA in Economics, he was appointed because he is a politician and not because he is an economist. He will have a staff of economists working with him.
There used to be three different departments related to the economy in Brazil: Finance (Fazenda), Planning (Planejamento), Industry and Commerce (Indústria e Comércio). Presidents Fernando Collor (1990-1992) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) merged these departments into a single one, the Department of Economy (Ministério da Economia). Lula will split again.

Is there some ideological reason for the decision between three and one economy-related department?

"Government as employer" is the main ideology of the Latin American left.