Japan 2021 Tokyo Metropolitan assembly elections (July) and Lower House Election Oct 31st

[Logical]

How the results would've looked like if only certain groups voted.


LDP strongest with the under 40 age group, weakest with the 60+ age group and females. JRP is the party of middle aged. Of course, it's important to remember that these are only the views of Japanese youth who voted and not representative of the views of your median Japanese youth which is apathy and disenchantment.

[jaichind]

Are proportional results by single-member constituency available anywhere? I would (obviously!) be very interested in doing things with that data if it existed in a useable form for me.

I mapped out 216 out of 289 districts. There are still a few prefectures that do not post their data by township yet.  Largest of which is Tokyo. Hopefully, they do this soon. 

What I see so far is:
LDP PR and KP PR voters are defecting less to high-quality CDP candidates less than 2017, especially outside the Deep South, but are still defecting to non-CDP high-quality Opposition candidates.  A lot of the JRP PR surge came from the 2017 HP PR vote and where JRP is not running is voting for CDP at a smaller rate than 2017 HP PR votes voting for CDP where HP candidate is not in the fray.  Of course on the flip side JCP not running in a bunch of marginal seats does help CDP.

[jaichind]

Former education minister 林芳正(Hayashi Yoshimasa) has been given the key role of foreign minister.  Both Kishida and Kono have been foreign ministers in the past.  Hayashi is number 2 in the Kishida faction and ran unsuccessfully in 2009 for LDP Prez.  One of the reasons he is not taken as seriously as Kishida in the Kishida faction is that he was in the Upper House versus Lower House.  In 2021 he was determined to get into the Lower House and threatened to run as a LDP rebel against the LDP incumbent in 山口(Yamaguchi) 3rd.  In the end, the LDP high command convinced the 山口(Yamaguchi) 3rd incumbent to take power and take the top spot as a PR-only candidate in the PR slate.   Hayashi's family is actually is a local rival to Abe's family in 山口(Yamaguchi) so Abe will for sure, not like this move.

[jaichind]

Asahi poll

Approval/Disapproval at LDP-KP majority 47/34
LDP-KP majority is due to LDP-KP good performance/Disapproval at Opposition 19/65

Kishida cabinet approval/disapproval 45/27.  No large honeymoon bump for the Kishida cabinet although disapproval stays low.

As expected most think LDP-KP victory is due to voter resistance to Opposition

Party support

LDP   36 (+2)
KP       4
JCP      9 (+6)
DPP     1
CDP     9 (+2)
RS      1
SDP    1 (+1)
JCP     3

[jaichind]

https://mainichi.jp/articles/20211108/k00/00m/010/110000c

Abe soon becomes head of 細田(Hosoda) faction meaning it becomes the Abe faction.

[xelas81]

List of seats where three candidates became MPs (1 outright winning and 2 coming back from dead via PR)

Kanagawa 10th: LDP JRP DPP (DPP candidate placed 4th)
Tokyo 1st: LDP CDP JRP
Kyoto 1st: LDP JCP JRP
Nara 1st: CDP LDP JRP
Osaka 5th: KP JCP RS
Hyogo 1st: CDP LDP JRP
Hyogo 6th: JRP LDP CDP
Tokushima 1st: Ind LDP JRP

[jaichind]

JRP PR vote share in the Kinki region.  Note that the closer to Osaka the township is the higher the JRP vote share with the highest vote shares in Osaka.

[jaichind]

During the election, LDP ran on a platform of 100K Yen cash payout to everyone under 18 after means-testing.  KP ran on the same platform but without means-testing.  After some talks, LDP-KP compromised on 50K Yen cash payout to everyone under 18 without means-testing.  The cash payout will be ASAP.  There will also be vouchers for child care that will be distributed in the Spring.

[jaichind]

Nikkei map on LDP PR vote swing

Big gains are 広島(Hiroshima) due to Kishida effect and 北海道(Hokkaido) where old LDP splinter NDP is not running unlike 2017 and a bunch of their votes went to LDP (as opposed to JRP).  LDP grew a lot in rural Northeast where the return of the anti-JCP HP 2017 vote in response to CDP-JCP alliance must play a role.  Similar story for 愛知(Aichi) and prefectures near it.

LDP lost a bunch of ground 大阪(Osaka) and the Kinki area to JRP and barely made any progress in the Greater Tokyo area as most of the 2017 HP vote seems to have gone to JRP and CDP.  In the rural South outside 広島(Hiroshima) also seems flat with clear discontent with LDP there when one would expect the return of some of the 2017 HP PR vote there to push up the LDP vote more.



LDP PR vote in absolute terms

[jaichind]

Vote for PM in new Diet session



In the Lower House

LDP's Kishida got 297 which are 261 LDP votes (including 2 retroactively nominated pro-LDP independents) + 32 KP + 4 LDP rebels

CDP got 108 which are 96 CDP + 10 JCP + 1 SDP + 1 pro-CDP indepenent

JRP DPP and RS all voted for their own leader

The new caucus of 5 pro-DPP and pro-CDP independents voted for their caucus leader

It seems 2 of the 4 LDP rebels will caucus with LDP even though they are not being let into the LDP.  The 2 other LDP rebels do not seem even that interested in rejoining LDP and will not even caucus with LDP even though they did vote for Kishida for PM.

[jaichind]

Ishihara junior resigns from his role as leader of the  Ishihara faction for him losing his seat even though he was elected on the PR slate.  So after a new leader is elected it will no longer be called the  Ishihara faction.  Likewise, Ozawa resigns as leader of 岩手(Iwate) CDP for losing his seat even though he was elected on the PR slate.

[Logical]

Ishihara junior resigns from his role as leader of the  Ishihara faction for him losing his seat even though he was elected on the PR slate.  So after a new leader is elected it will no longer be called the  Ishihara faction.  Likewise, Ozawa resigns as leader of 岩手(Iwate) CDP for losing his seat even though he was elected on the PR slate.

Ishihara jr (Nobuteru) got smacked so badly he failed to be revived proportionally. It was the younger Ishihara (Hirotaka) who made it on the final LDP PR spot. The rumour mills say that the Ishihara faction will likely disband or merge with the Ishiba fation as they have lost both their chairman and vice chairman.

[jaichind]

Ishihara junior resigns from his role as leader of the  Ishihara faction for him losing his seat even though he was elected on the PR slate.  So after a new leader is elected it will no longer be called the  Ishihara faction.  Likewise, Ozawa resigns as leader of 岩手(Iwate) CDP for losing his seat even though he was elected on the PR slate.

Ishihara jr (Nobuteru) got smacked so badly he failed to be revived proportionally. It was the younger Ishihara (Hirotaka) who made it on the final LDP PR spot. The rumour mills say that the Ishihara faction will likely be dissolved or merge with the Ishiba fation.

Ah You are right !!  I just figured he would get elected on the PR slate and never bother cross-checking.  Yeah I can see how a defeat like that might mean the end of the factoin.

[jaichind]

I managed to map the PR vote to every district

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1KYyv1SDp1ROqWJ4BPOBeYSnBAFFhENxhlon1Dp-mSE4/edit#gid=0

[jaichind]

Part of the reason why LDP-KP win was the fundamentals.  Based on the PR vote per district you can calculate a PR-based seat victory in several scenarios.

1) LDP-KP vs CDP-JCP alliance with JRP running in Osaka only.  This means the PR JRP vote gets split between LDP-KP and CDP-JCP alliance while the Center-Left vote consolidates behind CDP-JCP alliance.

LDP-KP           235
CDP-JCP           35
JRP                  19 (all Osaka seats)

2) LDP-KP vs CDP-JCP alliance with JRP running nationally.  DPP PR vote tactically votes for the candidate that is stronger of the CDP-JCP alliance candidate and JRP candidate.

LDP-KP           231
CDP-JCP           35
JRP                  23 (all 19 Osaka seats and 4 of 兵庫(Hyōgo) seats)

3) LDP-KP vs CDP-JRP-DPP alliance vs JCP.  RS PR vote backs CDP-JRP-DPP while SDP splits their vote between the anti-LDP grand alliance and JCP.

LDP-KP          183
CDP-JRP-DPP  106
JCP                   0

4) KP defects to join the JRP-DPP alliance.  LDP vs JRP-KP-DPP vs CDP-JCP.  Non-DPP Center-Left vote consolidates behind CDP-JCP

LDP              132
CDP-JCP         89
JRP-KP-DPP    68

Given JRP and JCP cannot be part of the same alliance LDP will win by a landslide a PR-based result unless KP defects from the LDP-KP alliance.  And even then LDP is still the largest party even if it will lose its majority.

In reality, the Center-Left Opposition has a bunch of candidates that can capture the LDP-KP and JRP PR vote and as a result, are able to win more seats than the 35 seats scenario 1 and scenario 2 would imply.

[jaichind]

Now that I managed to get the PR vote per district I can now construct what the result would have been like if all PR voters voted purely based on what their PR vote would imply.  The "rules" for such voting would be

a) LDP PR and KP PR voters vote for LDP-KP candidates
b) CDP RS SDP JCP vote for their own candidate and if there is not one vote for the alternative Center-Left candidate
c) JRP PR voters vote for their own candidate.  If JPR is not running then split their vote between LDP-KP and Center-Left candidate unless the only alternative to LDP-KP is SDP-JCP in which case vote LDP-KP.
d) DPP PR votes vote for their own candidate.  If DPP is not running then vote for the main Center-Left anti-LDP candidate unless it is JCP.  If so then vote for JRP and if JRP is not running vote LDP-KP.
e) PNHK PR voters vote for their own candidate.  If PNHK is not running vote for JRP candidate if one is running.    If JPR is not running then split their vote between LDP-KP and Center-Left candidate unless the only alternative to LDP-KP is SDP-JCP in which case vote LDP-KP.
f) Take into account LDP, Opposition rebels, Right, and Left independents by taking their vote out of the correct camp.
g) One last rule: if CDP is not running and both DPP and JCP are running, the CDP PR and RS PR vote are split evenly between the two if the DPP candidate is not a quality candidate (current MP or ex-MP) and votes DPP if the DPP candidate is a quality candidate.  The CDP has not been clear to its voters what they should do in this situation so I simulated the most likely result.

Doing so gets this result (when compared to real result)

                        Real Seats      Real Vote share       PR-implied Seats   PR-implied vote share
LDP                        187                 48.07%                     226                       48.06%
KP                             9                  1.52%                         9                          1.54%
pro-LDP Ind               2                   0.46%                        2                          0.47%
LDP rebels                 4                   1.33%                        3                          1.09%
PNHK                        0                   0.26%                        0                           0.14%
JRP                         16                   8.36%                      18                           8.04%
DPP                          6                   2.17%                        1                           2.00%
CDP                        57                  29.96%                     27                          30.20%
RS                           0                    0.46%                       0                            0.51%
SDP                         1                    0.55%                       1                            0.68%
pro-OPPN Ind.          6                    1.47%                       1                            1.25%
JCP                          1                    4.60%                       1                            5.22%
OPPN rebel               0                    0.18%                                 (same)
Right                       0                    0.32%                                 (same)
Left                         0                    0.22%                                 (same)
Minor                      0                    0.09%                                  (same)

Main takeaways.  

1) Candidate quality makes a lot of difference.  In seats where the Center-Left Opposition candidate is high quality, they eat into a lot of LDP KP and JRP PR votes.  In seats where the Center-Left Opposition candidate is low quality or just JCP, a lot of Center-Left PR voters go to the LDP-KP or JRP candidates.  This is especially true for quality DPP and pro-Opposition independent which anti-JCP voters do not associate with the CDP-JCP alliance and as a result, ate deeply into LDP KP and JRP PR votes.

2) 1) means that the overall LDP vote share is a wash but in competitive seats, the Center-Left Opposition outperform ergo does a lot better in terms of seats won relative to a PR implied world.  The seats where LDP outperforms the PR implied world are non-competitive seats so it does not matter.

3) LDP rebels clearly eat into non-LDP-KP PR votes.

4) CDP and RS PR votes clearly defect from JCP when JCP is the main anti-LDP candidate despite what CDP tells their voters to do.  So even with the CDP base the alliance with JCP is not fully accepted.

5) Even in LDP vs CDP vs JCP seats the LDP tends to overperform the PR implied result but that is mostly due to low CDP quality candidates.  In seats where it is winnable for CDP due to district lean and CDP candidate quality, the JCP has mostly pulled out anyway.

6) JRP was supposed to win 3 兵庫(Hyōgo) seats versus 1 in the PR implied world.  But superior candidate quality for CDP in one seat and LDP in another seat helped by candidate beat back JRP.  If JRP can keep their 2021 PR support 兵庫(Hyōgo) will now move to a LDP vs JRP vs CDP prefecture with CDP most likely becoming a competitive third.

7) The LDP and JRP PR vote was structured very badly for CDP.  LDP-KP ended up with around 47% on the PR vote which is sort of what was expected.  But that 47% contained massive underperformance in the Kinki region due to JRP surge and LDP outperformance in the Northeast, Hokkaido, and the Greater Nagoya area.  This meant the fundamentals were bad for LDP in Kinki but that helped JRP while the fundamentals in other areas were better than expected for LDP.    The only place this helped the Center-Left Opposition was 京都(Kyoto) where the JRP PR vote seems to have tactically voted against the LDP.

Main lesson for Center-Left Opposition:

a) Focus on candidate quality that can eat into LDP KP and JRP PR votes as the fundamentals are likely to imply a LDP landslide for the next election as well.

b) Find a way to keep JCP away from competitive districts without a formal alliance.   This does not sound easy but the alternative is to get KP to defect from LDP to join up with CDP which seems even less likely.

[jaichind]

Similar PR-implied sheat share analysis for 2017.

Note that a PR-implied seat count for LDP in 2017 was 228 and only dropped to 226 this time.  This shows that JCP dropping out of marginal seats was made up for my increase in LDP KP and JRP PR vote share at the expense of Center-Left Opposition and JCP.  The key point here is that more of the 2017 HP vote went to JRP as opposed to CDP as well as the distribution of the LDP KP and JRP PR vote regionally also worked against CDP and its allies.

I decided to compare real results in terms of vote share and wins with hypothetical results had every PR voter voted in the districts according to my model

                                     Real                              PR  implied
                              Win       Vote share          Win       Vote share  
LDP                        215          47.82%           228          46.85%
LDP(Retroactive)         3            0.39%              3            0.33%
LDP rebel                    1           0.81%              1            0.73%
KP                              8           1.50%              8            1.80%
HRP                           0           0.29%               0            0.29%
JRP                            3           3.18%               2           3.01%
HP                            18         20.64%             19         24.26%                    
Ind(HP)                      8           1.98%               2           1.59%
Ind(LP)                      2           0.41%               2           0.40%
Ind(OPPN)                11           3.18%             12           3.13%
Ind(CDP)                   1            0.63%              0            0.70%
CDP                         17           8.53%             10            8.15%
SDP                           1           1.15%               1           1.04%
JCP                            1           9.02%               1           7.31%
Ind(Left)                    0           0.15%               0           0.10%
Ind(Minor Right)         0           0.19%               0           0.19%
Ind(MinorLeft)            0           0.12%               0           0.12%
Others                       0           0.02%              --------------------

I assume HRP, Ind(Minor Right), Ind(Minor Left) get the exact same votes as in real life and I assumes Others does not run in my PR implied world.

What this shows that the opposition actually over-performed their PR vote share results.  So if all parties ran generic candidates the LDP would have done even better.  In this case there are key districts where the opposition candidates outperform what the PR vote would imply (mostly CDP and Ind(HP)).  

So when I say that the part of the cause of opposition was  due to candidate quality I have to qualify that the average competitive opposition candidate seems to be equal in quality to the LDP candidate in my some cases superior but not achieving parity candidate quality with LDP in a bunch of district cost the opposition (mostly HP) a bunch of seats.

Overall, I found 18 seats (11 HP, 1 CDP, 2 JRP, 4 IND(OPPN)) that LDP won that the opposition could have won if their candidate quality were equal to LDP.  There are 31 (10 HP, 8 CDP,  3 JRP, 3 IND(OPPN), 6 IND(HP), 1 IND(CDP)) seats that the opposition won that they would have lost to LDP had the opposition candidate quality been the same as LDP (and perhaps lack of anti-LDP tactical voting).

[jaichind]

To demonstrate the impact of candidate quality I divided up the Center-Left candidates into candidate quality tiers

1) Ultra-high: Was elected in the district in question as a winner or the best loser on PR slate in 2014 and/or 2017 or won a very high vote share in said question in 2014 and/or 2017 (40%+).  Exclude best loser PR slate MP
2) High: Have been elected MP in this district in the past but not recently
3) Medium: Have been elected MP (Upper or Lower) but either on a pure PR slate or in another district.
4) Low: Have never been elected MP of any type nor won a good vote share in the said district in the past

Then I can divide the 289 districts into

a) Those where the main center-left candidate is an Ultra-High quality candidate: 115
b) Those where the main center-left candidate is a High quality candidate: 16
c) Those where the main center-left candidate is a Median quality candidate: 17
d) Those where the main center-left candidate is a Low quality candidate: 95
e) Those where the main center-left-JCP opposition candidate is a JCP and/or SDP candidate: 46

We can then compare the PR-based model vote share in those districts for the Center-Left-JCP candidates and what they really got to look at the median over or under-performance relative to a PR-based model.  The results were

a) Ultra-High quality candidate: +4.01%
b) High quality candidate: -0.66%
c) Median quality candidate: -5.15%
d) Low quality candidate: -2.74%
e) JCP/SDP: -5.62%
 
So the CDP DPP and pro-opposition overperformance in terms of seats is thus explained.  In the seat where they had ultra-high quality candidates, they overperformed the PR vote implied vote share and won a bunch of marginal seats.

This table also shows that parachuting former MPs from another district or those purely elected on the PR slate into districts they have no background in backfired.  They did even worse than those with Low quality candidates that have no experience of being elected a MP but most of them at least have links to the district.

Also having JCP and/or SDP as the main Center-Left-JCP candidate clearly lost a bunch of CDP and RS PR votes to LDP-KP and/or JRP candidates.  That is already taking into account that the DPP and JRP PR vote are lost in these situations yet these JCP/SDP candidates still underperformed by a good margin.

Lesson for Center-Left opposition:

a) Take down the LDP one election at a time.  Having ultra-high quality candidates pays off.  But to do that you have to win seats so you have more sitting MPs that can be considered ultra-high quality.  2021 was the year CDP was supposed to get to 130 to then take down the LDP in the next election.  Those plans will not have to wait for another election cycle.  The plan for 2025 has to be to get to 130 and not try to win outright.
b) Go for local latent rather than parachuting former MPs into districts they have no connection to.  The voters do not view them as high quality candidates.

[jaichind]

Latest JX PR vote with change from the pre-election poll.  JX was one of the few polls that caught the JRP surge right before the election.

LDP             30.2 (-1.8 )
KP                6.2 (-2.2)
PNHK            1.1 (+0.2)
JRP             18.4 (+6.1)
DPP              2.9 (+0.5)
CDP            17.3 (-4.0)
RS                1.5 (-0.1)
SDP              1.1 (-0.3)
JCP               8.6 (+1.0)
 
JRP continues to surge at the expense of both LDP-KP and CDP.  JCP recovers a bit of ground from CDP.  

I suspect that this is a post-election surge and the JRP will deflate back down to earth by the time the 2022 Upper House election takes place.

As much as I back JRP there is no real path for JRP to gain national power.  There is a limit on how much JRP can claw from the Center-Left vote bloc.  If JRP gains a lot from LDP to the point that LDP might lose a national election that will trigger marginal LDP voters to run back to LDP to prevent a CDP-JCP victory.

The only path for JRP to power is to continue to split the anti-LDP vote for a few more election cycles keeping the LDP-KP in power.  That will lead to the decline of CDP but also add to tensions within the LDP being in power for so long.  Then contradictions within the LDP that would be resolved by being out of power blow up leading to a split in the LDP into an economic Right LDP and a center-Left populist LDP.  The JRP can then form an alliance with the economic Right LDP while the center-left populist LDP forms an alliance with KP leading to a true 3 bloc party system with a weaker CDP-JCP bloc being the third pole.  In such a case Economic Right LDP-JRP can win national power.  This will of course take a long time for this scenerio to take place.

[jaichind]

Now were are able to map out the candidate quality of the Center-Left opposition candidates we can start looking at the outliers many of which were discussed before the election.

Ultra High quality candidates that have underperformance relative to PR implied vote share

岩手(Iwate) 3rd -7.84% - This is Ozawa's seat.  His defeat is still a mystery.  The PR-based fundamentals would imply he would win and that is not even taking into account his clear high quality candidate status.  It seems him runnuing as CDP has led to some of his DPP and JRP PR voters to defect to LDP.

神奈川(Kanagawa) 4th -7.32% - The CDP candidate won despite underperformance.  The underperformance is easy to explain.  This seat has a LDP rebel which an opposition background running (he was head of YP before it became defunct).  So the LDP vote was split and at the same time, some of the opposition PR vote went to the LDP rebel.

東京(Tokyo) 6th -5.49% - This underperformance which did not lead to the defeat of the CDP candidate is hard to explain.  Part of it seems to be that the CDP candidate did seek out explicit SDP and RS support and that might have turned off the DPP PR vote that went over to the JRP candidate.

東京(Tokyo) 18th  -6.62% - This is former DPJ PM Kan's district.  His underperformance is explained by the fact that LDP ran a heavyweight Opposition defector 長島 昭久(Nagashima Akihisa) who was the incumbent in 東京(Tokyo) 21st district.  長島 昭久(Nagashima Akihisa) is very right-wing on foreign policy but was able to get a bunch of opposition PR votes due to his long association with the opposition.  In the end, Kan still narrowly won despite underperformance.


三重(Mie) 1st -9.65% - This is a safe LDP seat but the CDP candidate has been elected in this district in 2014 as a PR best loser candidate and had a respectable performance here in 2017.  This time around his vote share fell a lot and is way below the PR implied vote share despite being a high quality candidate.  The reason seems to be party label.  The opposition candidate ran in 2014 as JRP and 2017 as a pro-HP independent.  Running this time as CDP seems to have turned off JRP and DPP PR voters who mostly switched over to LDP.

高知(Kōchi) 2nd -10.76% -  The CDP incumbent has been swept away in a landslide defeat.  The reason seems to be that the LDP candidate is a popular ex-governor.  Also, the CDP incumbent won in 2017 as a pro-HP independent.  Running as CDP this time seems to have also turned off JRP and DPP PR voters


High quality candidate that way overperformed

徳島(Tokushima) 1st  +20.66% - The pro-DPP independent won in an unexpected landslide.   He has run here in 2014 as DPJ and 2017 as HP with no success losing by significant margins.  This time there seems to have been a large anti-LDP turnout surge with a large amount of JRP PR voter tactical voting in favor of the pro-DPP independent over the JRP candidate in addition to large scale defections from the LDP-KP PR vote.


Median/Low-quality candidate the way overperformed

千葉(Chiba) 8th   +14.35% - The CDP candidate's only experience was as an assistant to a DPJ MP but won in a landslide way outperforming the PR implied vote share.  The reason seems to be that the LDP incumbent was for a while the Minister for the 2020 Olympic games which the local voters must have voted against him to punish him for getting the games to take place against local opposition.

神奈川(Kanagawa) 13th   +4.59% - This one got discussed before.  A CDP novice outperforming PR implied vote share in an upset victory over LDP general secretary 甘利明(Amari Akira).  Being made LDP general secretary actually hurt 甘利明(Amari Akira) since the media than just rehashed all those old corruption charges against him.

岐阜(Gifu) 5th +5.54% - This is the district where CDP ran that 25 old women.  She outperformed the PR implied vote share despite being a "Low" quality candidate. She ate into both the JRP and JCP PR vote share in a losing effort but lost by a much smaller margin than expected.  She has a future in politics.

京都(Kyoto) 5th  +8.32% - Here the CDP and pro-DPP independent in addition JCP all ran so the LDP incumbent won with ease.  But between the 3 candidates, they won a vote share well above with the PR implied vote share would imply.  This seems to be regional as in 京都(Kyoto) the JRP PR vote clearly swung against LDP unlike the rest of Japan.

福岡(Fukuoka) 5th +9.20% - Here the CDP candidate who was in the prefecture assembly pulled off an upset over the LDP incumbent by way outperforming the PR implied vote share.  The reason seems to be due to LDP factional warfare.  There was another LDP candidate from a different faction that was going to run turning the race into a 3-way race.   The LDP high command bought off this LDP rebel by giving him a top spot as a PR-only candidate on the PR slate.  It did not seem to work as the bitterness of the rival LDP factions in the district led to large-scale defections leading to a CDP victory.

[xelas81]

List of LDP PR-only MPs and where they ran for in past

Hokkaido
Takako Suzuki- ran for 7th in the past as DP candidate; Daughter of NPD leader
Koichi Watanabe- Former mayor of Iwamizawa which is part of 10th and KP seat

Tohoku
Jun Tsushima- Aomori 1st

North Kanto
Asako Omi- Gunma 1st

Tokyo
Kei Takagi- Former Tokyo Assembly member for Kita Ward which is part of 12th and KP seat

Hokuriku-Shinetsu
Eiichiro Washio- Niigata 2nd as opposition in past

Tokai
Sakon Yamamoto- Former Formula 1 Driver; listed after FTFP candidates

Kinki
Shinsuke Okuno- Old Nara 3rd
Akira Yanagimoto- given PR seat after threatening to run for KP held Osaka 3rd; ran for Osaka mayor in the past

Chugoku
Rintaro Ishibashi- Was LDP candidate for Hiroshima 3rd before it was given to KP
Mio Sugita- Ran for Hyogo 6th in the past as JRP, PFG; extremely right wing; listed after FTFP candidates
Shogo Azemoto- Doctor from Hiroshima; listed after FTFP candidates

Shikoku
Yuji Yamamoto- Kochi 2nd

Kyushu
Masahiro Imamura- Old Saga 2nd
Hirotake Yasuoka- Considered running for Kagoshima 1st before switching to PR

[jaichind]

https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/4d6c5378e05ea4432cd36bb1079271a59b2754c9

Tokyo governor Koike is in the hospital for lung disease.  It seems she is considering resigning due to health issues.  This will trigger a by-election for her position if she does resign.

The last 3 governors of Tokyo all resigned in the middle of their term.  石原慎太郎(Ishihara Shintarō) resigned in 2011 in the middle of his 4th term to enter national politics as co-leader of JRP.  猪瀬直樹,(Inose Naoki)  resigned in 2014 due to political funds-related scandal.  舛添 要一(Masuzoe Yōichi) resigned in 2016 due to travel expenses scandal.  Now Koike might have to resign in the middle of her 2nd term due to health issues.

[jaichind]

There have been some post mortems on the bit exit poll miss.    All exit polls had the median LDP seat count in the range of 230-243 and it ended up being 259.  There have not been many good theories but the most likely one seems to be that COVID-19 shifted around the profile of the type of people that are likely to speak to an exit pollster leading to an oversampling of CDP supporters.

[jaichind]

One topic that has always interested me is where KP gets its votes at the district level since it is clear that the LDP base will NOT always transfer its votes to KP.  I will be doing regression analysis of different districts that KP ran to get a sense of how the PR -> district vote broke down.

First up is 大阪(Osaka) 3rd where it was

KP              44.65%
LDP rebel    10.47%
CDP            23.44%
JCP             21.44%

And the PR vote was

LDP           18.42%   
KP             16.58%   
PNHK           0.97%   
JRP            39.61%   
DPP             1.98%   
CDP             8.79%   
RS               3.07%   
SDP             0.83%   
JCP              9.76%

Note that nearly 8% of that PR voters failed to vote the district votes which should be LDP and JRP voters that do not want to vote KP but could not vote for CDP nor JCP either.  Using regression on the subdistricts  I was able to construct the following PR -> District vote table

                   KP       LDP rebel     CDP        JCP      DNV
LDP             55%        25%           5%      10%       5%
KP               95%                         5%
PNHK             5%          5%        25%                   65%
JRP             35%         15%        30%        5%      15%
DPP             30%                       50%      10%      10%
CDP                                          50%       50%      
RS                 5%                      50%       35%       10%
SDP             10%                      30%        50%      10%
JCP                                            5%        95%
 
So the large JRP PR vote split 35-30 between KP and CDP with the rest going to the LDP rebel and Did not Vote.  Only 55% of the LDP PR vote voted for KP with a bunch going to the LDP rebel.  CDP PR vote split 50-50 between CDP and CDP.  The CDP candidate is an ex-MP parachute candidate that ran and won before from another Osaka district.  The lack of local roots meant that the defection of the CDP PR vote to JCP was high.  KP still made up some of the losses from the LDP PR vote by getting some votes from DPP RS and SDP PR votes.  With CDP and JCP splitting the anti-LDP vote and JRP vote split multiple ways the KP was destined to win even if it lost a bunch of the LDP PR vote.

[jaichind]

More PR->district vote analysis where KP is running

大阪(Osaka) 5th where it was

KP            53.14%
JCP           24.07%
RS            17.07%
Ind             5.72%

The independent is 籠池諄子 (Kagoike Ryoko) wife of owner of the 森友学園 (Moritomo Gakuen) which was center of a scandal related to Abe and his wife.  In theory this couple has Right wing nationalist views but her candidacy is a protest against Abe not taking responsibility for their leg of the scandal so one would expect them to draw support from all circles.

The PR vote was

LDP            17.96%   
KP              15.43%   
PNHK            1.19%   
JRP             40.39%   
DPP              2.54%   
CDP              7.46%   
RS                4.51%   
SDP              0.90%   
JCP               9.63%

Just like  大阪(Osaka) 3rd a bunch of PR voters failed to vote in the district election so we have to take that into account.  Using regression on the sub-districts  I was able to construct the following PR -> District vote table

                   KP       JCP       RS      Ind.      DNV
LDP             70%      5%     15%     5%       5%
KP               90%                  5%     5%
PNHK             5%                25%     5%     65%
JRP              45%    15%     15%     5%      20% 
DPP             60%                20%    10%     10%
CDP             20%     60%      5%    10%      5%
RS                            5%     95%
SDP             10%     60%     15%    5%     10%
JCP                         95%       5% 

Due to no CDP or LDP rebel in the fray KP kept 70% of the LDP PR vote.  The JPR PR vote should be distressing to both KP and RS.  20% of the JRP PR vote did not vote and 15%!! went to JCP.  This shows how negative the JRP PR vote holds KP and RS in low esteem, especially RS.  CDP PR vote also very disappointing for RS as 60% went JCP and 20% went KP while only 5% went RS.   RS clearly is the main loser here with KP doing well with LDP PR vote and making up some losses with JRP PR vote with the CDP PR vote.