I agree with others that calling this a revolution is wrong at this point, but what happens from this point will determine whether it is.
I also agree with others saying that it will be harder for the opposition to succeed than it was in the Euromaidan (which, of course, was also hard fought). Putin has already demonstrated that he prioritizes control of Belarus over control of Ukraine.
Another agreement I have - that I am surprised that this is talking place in Belarus. Russia has exercised a degree of control over the country that is almost a parody.
This isn't really about Putin, at least not at this point. As I've said elsewhere, the key factor in the success or failure of these sorts of revolutions is the dictator's relationship with his security apparatus: those who can obtain repression survive, those who can't don't. Russia's prioritization of Belarus is immediately relevant only in that Russia probably has some influence over Belarus' security apparatus.FWIW, Belarus and Russia have been drifting apart recently because Lukashenko is increasingly opposed to being integrated into the Eurasian project, but that has little to do with why this is happening in Belarus now.
The simple reason it is is because Lukashenko's Belarus operates on a classic late-Soviet social contract - acquiescence in exchange for economic security, with a focus on strong welfare support for rural citizens and pensioners. A similar thing is present in Russia and the Central Asian states, but Belarus really is the archetypal post-Soviet example. With the coronavirus and resulting economic catastrophe, Lukashenko failed to provide that security exactly when he needed it for a smooth election - which are always catalysts for activist discontent, even when the election is only symbolic. Civil society activation + popular discontent = spark + sawdust = flareup. This wouldn't have happened had there not been a faux election and it wouldn't have happened if the faux election had been a year ago.