2020 Venezuelan Parliamentary electoral type event

[Skye]

The date for the next Venezuelan Parliamentary Election has been set for December 6, 2020.

Yesterday, the National Electoral Council increased the number of deputies from 167 to 277.

The opposition is likely to sit out of this. If so, Maduro's party, the PSUV, will surely win in a landslide against token opposition he's been negotiating with. Questions about what will happen to Guaidó since his term expires after the election remain. He's stated he'll continue in his position.

https://apnews.com/27ba3186ea5f8cb4624057169ba5f760

[MRCVzla]

Trying to do some summary to give some life to the topic ...

Currently the scenario that everyone sees in Venezuela is everything is going in the direction in favor of the ruling party in their path of winning or staying with more power than they already have...

The majority opposition will most likely abstain as there are no conditions for a free and fair election, the electoral symbols of the main parties have been "kidnapped" by the Supreme Court and awarded to leading sectors that, or are favorable to the "electoral solution" to the country's crisis (AD, UNT) or to personal interests with dubious connections (PJ, VP). Meanwhile, the "opposition" sectors that are electorally qualified and sit in the so-called "National Dialogue Table" are highly discredited due to their proximity to the government and their search more akin to a "cohabitation" than a "real change" of the system.

Even Chavismo has seen dissent from some of its allies, who have shown intention to run with separate lists other than the PSUV-led, but already internal connections with the TSJ are working to prevent it, just yesterday the board of the party Fatherland for All (PPT) was intervened for the TSJ, which had planned to run together with the Communist Party (PCV) in a alliance after expressing criticism about the economic direction that the Maduro regime has taken, the court has appointed an "ad hoc" meeting with leaders more favorable to staying the alliance of the "Great Patriotic Pole" in order to guarantee some representation within the current electoral scenario. Also other chavismo "then"-ally, the Tupamaros has been intervened also to prevent run apart from the PSUV.

The CNE recently appointed by the TSJ has many challenges, not only to try to demonstrate its capacity as an "impartial" referee (good luck with that), but to adapt the electoral schedule in its different stages to the situation of the COVID-19 pandemic , including from the update of the Electoral Registry (with so many potential new voters emigrated abroad) to the development of the election day itself on December 6...

...Depending on the point of the pandemic situation at that date in the country, currently with cases and deaths every day on the rise, despite the fact that in the first months the situation was believed to be "controlled", then it exploded as in the rest of the region, and in Chavismo it has affected a lot, with several infected leaders and even one considered "notable" has died of complications from the virus. Currently, since June, there is a system of relaxation in which it alternates with a "radical quarantine" week yes, week no (a called "7+7" system), in the week that there is relaxation, banks, courts and other "non-essential" businesses work while in the quarantine only essential services are limited (health, food, transport, telecommunications, among others). In addition, it is already discussed how the return to classes of the students would be, Maduro has publicly stated that there may be something of a face-to-face return, alternating the groups of students between the days of the week, but nothing yet formal.

Returning to the electoral issue, the "express" modification that he made to the Electoral Law to increase the number of deputies was made with one purpose, to guarantee that the "collaborationist" opposition sectors can have a small representation through the vote for regional lists or for the quota of the "national list" that would be distributed through the lists of each state ... ah, and the 3 seats of the indigenous representatives will no longer be elected by popular vote but by a second-class election among the "indigenous communities "(possibly those pro-government), as was done in the controversial election of the National Constituent Assembly of 2017, which, by the way, supposedly would finally end its term at the end of this year, without any reforms to the current one Constitution, somehow confirming its role in removing powers and obstructing the opposition-controlled National Assembly (and which also "split" in two this year).

Democracy in Venezuela looks very dark, sadly...

PS: I recommend following the Twitter account @puzkas of a well-known local journalist from the electoral source, which may be useful for you to know the news regarding this elections, and all the issues related.

[Skye]

I haven't updated this because, frankly, it's a bit complicated to explain and the election will not be legitimate, so...

I guess the update that needed to be posted is that the opposition will indeed not participate in these elections, as a joint statement was released by all major parties a few weeks ago.

In any case, the post above mostly explained what you need to know.

There is something that needs further explanation though. It's an open secret that most inside the opposition are, to put it mildly, unhappy with Guaidó's leadership. Little to no progress has been made this year, and there is no clear route forward. Guaidó shot a video this week appealing to the opposition leaders with the highest profiles to meet and decide a "new route" in the next few days. It's not exactly a good look, to say the least, considering this (the opposition leaders not agreeing on anything) has been happening for years now, and it's August 2020.

The biggest question remains what will happen to Guaidó in January, when the next congress (likely a Chavista supermajority) will be sworn in and the legality of his position will be on even murkier ground. Furthermore, Guaidó's biggest ally so far has been the Trump administration, and well, you know how his reelection campaign is going. So far, it remains unclear how a Biden administration would deal with Guaidó.

[Velasco]

So far, it remains unclear how a Biden administration would deal with Guaidó.

In case Biden wins, he will have to deal with Maduro, too. Not an easy task.

Personally I find Capriles more palatable than Guaidó, but regardless my feelings or opinions right now I know little about the current state of affairs in the Venezuelan opposition. On the other side,  I've read in the news the Maduro regime has intervened the chavista party Tupamaro. Are there big differences or infight within the chavista alliance?

[CumbrianLefty]

An "electoral type event", surely?

[Skye]

So far, it remains unclear how a Biden administration would deal with Guaidó.

In case Biden wins, he will have to deal with Maduro, too. Not an easy task.

Personally I find Capriles more palatable than Guaidó, but regardless my feelings or opinions right now I know little about the current state of affairs in the Venezuelan opposition. On the other side,  I've read in the news the Maduro regime has intervened the chavista party Tupamaro. Are there big differences or infight within the chavista alliance?

Biden will obviously have to deal with Maduro. I'm not implying he will ignore the issue. But whether his administration will pursue appeasement with the Maduro regime or continue with a hard-line stance remains an open question (let's be honest, it'll likely be the former).

Capriles is borderline irrelevant at the moment. There are glaring signs he's not even staying in line with his own party.

Yes, the Tupamaro affair is true. The Tupamaros are a far left party with communist tendencies. There have always been differences inside the GPP (a.k.a. chavista) coalition.  Now, what you have to understand is that Venezuela isn't the US, where journalists are spilling the beans of intra-party struggles 24/7. As such, very little is made public of intra party dealings inside chavismo in general until fights go public and it becomes glaringly obvious.

As far as elections go, the PSUV always gets the bulk of the votes (The Communist party and the Tupamaros only get a sliver of it). Sometimes, both parties have gone rogue and presented separate candidates in certain elections (for example, some gubernatorial and mayoral candidates, certain lists in parliamentary elections) which can be attributed to the fact that the PSUV always gets the final word on candidates and sometimes the Communists and Tupamaros probably aren't content with the candidates the PSUV imposes. However, for the most part, the coalition mostly remains intact on a national level for big elections. It's not the case this year, since the Communists, Tupamaros, and the PPT agreed to form a different coalition for these elections. Naturally, the PSUV wasn't gonna let a big division like that happen since it wants to get the best results possible, which is what led to the Maduro-aligned Supreme Tribunal to intervene the leadership of both the Tupamaros and the PPT, just as it did with the opposition parties. It remains to be seen if the Communists will be intervened as well.

[Former President tack50]

I haven't updated this because, frankly, it's a bit complicated to explain and the election will not be legitimate, so...

I guess the update that needed to be posted is that the opposition will indeed not participate in these elections, as a joint statement was released by all major parties a few weeks ago.

In any case, the post above mostly explained what you need to know.

There is something that needs further explanation though. It's an open secret that most inside the opposition are, to put it mildly, unhappy with Guaidó's leadership. Little to no progress has been made this year, and there is no clear route forward. Guaidó shot a video this week appealing to the opposition leaders with the highest profiles to meet and decide a "new route" in the next few days. It's not exactly a good look, to say the least, considering this (the opposition leaders not agreeing on anything) has been happening for years now, and it's August 2020.

The biggest question remains what will happen to Guaidó in January, when the next congress (likely a Chavista supermajority) will be sworn in and the legality of his position will be on even murkier ground. Furthermore, Guaidó's biggest ally so far has been the Trump administration, and well, you know how his reelection campaign is going. So far, it remains unclear how a Biden administration would deal with Guaidó.

Will Maduro reward the "controlled opposition" (to call them some way) and give them a handful of seats or will the result just be 100% of seats for PSUV and their allies?

By controlled opposition I am referring to the people who ran against Maduro in 2018 (Falcon and Bertucci, and whoever their allies are)

[Skye]

I haven't updated this because, frankly, it's a bit complicated to explain and the election will not be legitimate, so...

I guess the update that needed to be posted is that the opposition will indeed not participate in these elections, as a joint statement was released by all major parties a few weeks ago.

In any case, the post above mostly explained what you need to know.

There is something that needs further explanation though. It's an open secret that most inside the opposition are, to put it mildly, unhappy with Guaidó's leadership. Little to no progress has been made this year, and there is no clear route forward. Guaidó shot a video this week appealing to the opposition leaders with the highest profiles to meet and decide a "new route" in the next few days. It's not exactly a good look, to say the least, considering this (the opposition leaders not agreeing on anything) has been happening for years now, and it's August 2020.

The biggest question remains what will happen to Guaidó in January, when the next congress (likely a Chavista supermajority) will be sworn in and the legality of his position will be on even murkier ground. Furthermore, Guaidó's biggest ally so far has been the Trump administration, and well, you know how his reelection campaign is going. So far, it remains unclear how a Biden administration would deal with Guaidó.

Will Maduro reward the "controlled opposition" (to call them some way) and give them a handful of seats or will the result just be 100% of seats for PSUV and their allies?

By controlled opposition I am referring to the people who ran against Maduro in 2018 (Falcon and Bertucci, and whoever their allies are)

The increase in the number of seats is the reward. See, with the old method of electing deputies, with a 70-30 result (or worse, which is around what I'm expecting) said opposition would have barely gotten any seats, the old system rewards big wins. Now the number of list deputies by state has drastically increased, and there's a new "national" list which got assigned 48 seats. List deputies are awarded via the D'Hondt system (which I'm sure you're familiar with ), so now, with states awarding anywhere from 3 to 10 list deputies per state (previously it was either only 2 or 3) and 48 deputies via the national list, the "opposition" will have a decent amount of seats even if they get a terrible result and lose every electoral circuit.

[Velasco]

Biden will obviously have to deal with Maduro. I'm not implying he will ignore the issue. But whether his administration will pursue appeasement with the Maduro regime or continue with a hard-line stance remains an open question (let's be honest, it'll likely be the former).

I know you didn't mean that. Rather I was implying that maybe Guaidó and his supporters were overconfident about their possibilities and that's the reason why there's a general sisappointment now. It's clear that they and their international allies undesrtimated Maduro's ability to hold on to power. I remember that pnce I believed Maduro's hours were numbered, because there was a media narrative telling us his fall was imminent. Regarding the dichotomy between appeasement and hardline stance, I think it's a bit more complicated than that. Quoting the former Spanish minister and UE's High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell about the Belarusian president today in El País: "Lukashenko is like Maduro, We don't recognize him, but we have to deal with him"

[Skye]

Biden will obviously have to deal with Maduro. I'm not implying he will ignore the issue. But whether his administration will pursue appeasement with the Maduro regime or continue with a hard-line stance remains an open question (let's be honest, it'll likely be the former).

I know you didn't mean that. Rather I was implying that maybe Guaidó and his supporters were overconfident about their possibilities and that's the reason why there's a general sisappointment now. It's clear that they and their international allies undesrtimated Maduro's ability to hold on to power. I remember that pnce I believed Maduro's hours were numbered, because there was a media narrative telling us his fall was imminent. Regarding the dichotomy between appeasement and hardline stance, I think it's a bit more complicated than that. Quoting the former Spanish minister and UE's High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell about the Belarusian president today in El País: "Lukashenko is like Maduro, We don't recognize him, but we have to deal with him"

Hmmmm I get what you are trying to say. But it's been obvious for months, in fact, for over a year, that Guaidó is simply not in a good position. The opposition was overconfident indeed, right after Guaidó assumed as interim president, and right until April 30, 2019, when it seemed Maduro's grasp over the military would break would occur, but that was not to be. After that, it's been nothing but wait-and-see, and now the opposition simply doesn't have any sort of leverage for a negotiation, and Guaidó (who has little power) grows irrelevant by the day. He might still stay in charge after January, but even then, he will be on even shakier ground.

[PSOL]

What is the opposition up to these days anyway? Establishment media in the United States hasn’t given any information on Venezuela for some time now. Are they united at least in boycotting the election?

[Skye]

What is the opposition up to these days anyway? Establishment media in the United States hasn’t given any information on Venezuela for some time now. Are they united at least in boycotting the election?

Sort of. Most of the opposition parties released a joint statement a few weeks ago saying they would not participate. However, as I said before, some "opposition" will participate, this includes the likes of Henri Falcon's party (AP), the parties of the "Mesa de Diálogo Nacional" which have been in negotiation for Maduro, and candidates of the will participate with the tickets of the big opposition parties but these are not the real ones. 2013 opposition candidate Henrique Capriles released a statement 2 days ago basically saying the opposition had to change course and implying they should participate in the election. This is out of his own party's (PJ) lines and the statement generated much controversy, including backlash from some PJ folks. I've also been told that several regional branches of the parties would have preferred to participate in the election. The "abstain" choice prevailed, but it probably wasn't the unanimous sentiment.

In short, the bulk of the opposition is not going to participate. Maduro will win in a landslide because the parties that will participate don't have the electoral strength to put a decent showing.

As far as "what they're doing", well, basically not much. As I said before, the parties aren't happy with Guaidó (from what I've heard Guaidó operates in a closed environment which doesn't help things with the other big parties that want to have a say in how things are run), but they won't/can't do anything since Guaidó is entrenched (at least for a few more months) and they've had to deal with harassment from Maduro (like the kidnapping of the party tickets). If they're "up to something", I really don't know. I don't have much inside info apart from what I've told you. But the opposition, generally speaking, is in a very tough spot.

[Kingpoleon]

Interesting name. I always call these “May Third Elections” after a certain Liberian election.

[Skye]

Remember when I said a few days ago that Capriles wan't staying in line with his own party? This happened yesterday:

https://twitter.com/PattyLaya/status/1299472953470484482

Requesens is a Deputy (a.k.a. Congressman) from Táchira's 4th Circuit, which includes parts of the San Cristóbal Metropolitan Area as well as the municipalities to the south of the state. He was jailed 2 years ago when chavismo accused him of forming part of a plot to assasinate Maduro. So what's the deal with his release, then?

It looks like it's part of a negotiation between the government and sections of the opposition, as well as some (so far undisclosed?) international mediators. What I gather is that his release preludes the release of other political prisoners in the country (and maybe some other concessions?), as sort of a show of goodwill from the Maduro regime to demonstrate he's willing to make concessions so that the opposition participates in these upcoming elections.

Now, it's sort of an open secret that Capriles, who himself was the opposition candidate against Maduro in 2013, isn't in favor of the direction Guaidó has taken, and has suggested that the opposition should participate in the upcoming elections. As I explained earlier, this is out of line with his own party's (Primero Justicia, a.k.a PJ) line, who have explicitly backed the "we're not going to participate in the election" strategy that the other big parties are following.

A Venezuelan journalist named Eugenio Martínez has been cryptically tweeting for a few days that there is a section of the opposition that was considering participating in the election, and yesterday he confirmed they had been negotiating with Maduro:

https://twitter.com/puzkas/status/1299474985032069126

The tweet says that Capriles and UNT Deputy Stalin González (who served as VP of the National Assembly the year Guaidó was proclaimed interim President) formed part of a "complicated process" that could end with the release of 100 political prisoners, and in a following tweet, he says that other negotiations could take place so that a "clearer electoral and political outlook" emerges in the next few weeks.

In short, it looks increasingly likely that Capriles will participate in the election, probably with the help of other opposition members who aren't pleased with the direction of Guaidó. We'll know soon enough, the deadline for submitting candidacies was delayed from August 26 to September 4, so this week maybe we'll get some answers.

[Velasco]

Interesting development. Even if they have been traded as a part of a complex negotiation, I think the release of prisoners is always good news

[warandwar]

How does voting work for the (now massive) diaspora population?

[Skye]

Interesting development. Even if they have been traded as a part of a complex negotiation, I think the release of prisoners is always good news

Oh don't get me wrong, we're all happy Requesens has been liberated. It's just that usually, when they release a political prisoner, they jail others afterwards. They call it a "revolving door".

How does voting work for the (now massive) diaspora population?

It doesn't.

Joking aside, in theory, you have to legally reside within the country you now live to be able to register to vote. In practice... well, I don't think Venezuelans abroad have been able to vote since 2013? By that time, only 100K Venezuelans were registered to vote abroad (just to give you an idea, the number of Venezuelans living abroad right now is over 5 million, which is over 15% of the population of the country). AFAIK, Venezuelans abroad could only vote in Presidential Elections, Referendums (though there aren't results for Venezuelans abroad for the 2007 and 2009 referendums) and for the Election to the Latin American Parliament, which goes along with the Parliamentary Election.

For the 2015 Parliamentary Elections, chavismo eliminated direct voting for the Latin American Parliament, so Venezuelans abroad couldn't vote there. For the 2018 Presidential Election only 107K (!!!) Venezuelans were registered to vote abroad, even though by that time between 3 and 4 million Venezuelans had already left the country. Even more so, I don't know if Venezuelans abroad were even able to vote (if fairness, turnout would have been minimal), since the official results don't show votes from Venezuelans abroad.

For these next elections, those of us who now reside in another country can't vote, because Venezuelans abroad can't vote in Parliamentary elections.

[Velasco]

Interesting development. Even if they have been traded as a part of a complex negotiation, I think the release of prisoners is always good news

Oh don't get me wrong, we're all happy Requesens has been liberated. It's just that usually, when they release a political prisoner, they jail others afterwards. They call it a "revolving door".

We use "revolving door" with other meaning, as you probably know. I get that it's not easy to deal with someone as dishonest as Maduro and that there are no guarantees to participate in elections. Still, I would not be contrary to engage in nnegotiations to unlock the situation. Said this, there exists a risk of being fooled. Also, without unity in the oposition it's hard to go anywhere. It's extremely complicated

[Skye]

Interesting development. Even if they have been traded as a part of a complex negotiation, I think the release of prisoners is always good news

Oh don't get me wrong, we're all happy Requesens has been liberated. It's just that usually, when they release a political prisoner, they jail others afterwards. They call it a "revolving door".

We use "revolving door" with other meaning, as you probably know. I get that it's not easy to deal with someone as dishonest as Maduro and that there are no guarantees to participate in elections. Still, I would not be contrary to engage in nnegotiations to unlock the situation. Said this, there exists a risk of being fooled. Also, without unity in the oposition it's hard to go anywhere. It's extremely complicated

I actually didn't, TBH. I just read the Wikipedia article about it, hilarious. Never heard of the term in that context in Venezuela.

Here's the thing with negotiations. The Maduro regime doesn't have any sort of goodwill, it will (and has constantly used in the past) use negotiations to 1. buy time, 2. promote splits inside the opposition. Now, I'm not saying a negotiation is either impossible or completely undesirable (if Maduro does go away, it will likely feature a negotiated transition), but the point is that the opposition doesn't have any sort of leverage at the moment (not one that's immediately obvious, at least), as it's probably in its worst position since Guaidó was proclaimed president.

The biggest problem, however, is the fact that the Maduro regime has only been negotiating with Capriles (and whoever is with him), as opposed to the rest of the opposition, and that is a huge red flag, because Capriles 1. His standing in the national scene has been greatly diminished since 2013 and he holds no elected office, and 2. is playing alone and therefore probably doesn't have much leverage for a negotiation process.

But yes, as you said, it is very complicated, and it's not made easy by the fact that there isn't unity inside the opposition. Now, I'm not in favor of the "unity for the sake of unity" mentality that has reigned inside the MUD since its inception - mostly because it can prove to be extremely harmful if you don't care about letting in a bunch of crooks and potential traitors for "muh unity" (the Luis Parra debacle should have made that much clear) - constantly going at each other throats and having a "support what I want or get bent" mentality certainly doesn't help.

[NewYorkExpress]

I'm not even sure this qualifies as an "electoral-type event". This seems even less legitimate than any election involving Putin (and that's quite an accomplishment.)

[Former President tack50]

I'm not even sure this qualifies as an "electoral-type event". This seems even less legitimate than any election involving Putin (and that's quite an accomplishment.)

Atlas has had threads for even elections in North Korea in the past (though granted the NK thread was just memeing)

https://talkelections.org/FORUM/index.php?topic=93005.0

[Velasco]

Maduro is playing well his cards

https://www.dw.com/en/venezuelas-nicolas-maduro-releases-several-opponents-from-custody/a-54775757

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro said Monday that he had pardoned more than 100 opposition politicians, including associates of opposition leader Juan Guaido.

Those pardoned by the presidential decree include legislator Freddy Guevara, who sought asylum in the Chilean diplomatic residence, as well as Roberto Marrero, who served as chief of staff to Guaido.

"We hope that these measures taken by the Bolivarian government help maintain the democratic focus of all of these political actors," said Information Minister Jorge Rodriguez at a news conference, saying the decree would take effect from publication.

"The government's intention is to deepen the process of national reconciliation for national union so that political issues are settled by peaceful means and by electoral means," added Rodriguez.

(...)

The presidential decree did not mention Leopoldo Lopez, one of the opposition's most prolific leaders, who was imprisoned in 2014 for leading protests against Maduro. Lopez currently lives in the Spanish diplomatic residence.

It also did not include military officers put away on charges of plotting to overthrow Maduro (...) 

I'm reading in La Vanguardia that Henqique Capriles has not been pardoned and is still banned from public posts.

I get the impression the sudden release of these politicians has caught Guaidó unaware, as well as contributes to deepen divisions within the opposition camp. The UN High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet stated she's pleased and appreciates the decision made by Maduro, while the EU's high Representative Josep Borrell said the release is good news and a prerequisite for free and fair elections. Leaving aside this move might be considered an attempt of legitimizing and cleaning the image of his regime, it's clear that Maduro is one step ahead of the opposition once again. In my opinion, Guaidó cannot sit around and do nothing claiming that it's a trap. When you play a chess game and the adversary moves a piece, you must make a move. The opposition needs a better contender at this moment

[Skye]

Maduro is playing well his cards

https://www.dw.com/en/venezuelas-nicolas-maduro-releases-several-opponents-from-custody/a-54775757

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro said Monday that he had pardoned more than 100 opposition politicians, including associates of opposition leader Juan Guaido.

Those pardoned by the presidential decree include legislator Freddy Guevara, who sought asylum in the Chilean diplomatic residence, as well as Roberto Marrero, who served as chief of staff to Guaido.

"We hope that these measures taken by the Bolivarian government help maintain the democratic focus of all of these political actors," said Information Minister Jorge Rodriguez at a news conference, saying the decree would take effect from publication.

"The government's intention is to deepen the process of national reconciliation for national union so that political issues are settled by peaceful means and by electoral means," added Rodriguez.

(...)

The presidential decree did not mention Leopoldo Lopez, one of the opposition's most prolific leaders, who was imprisoned in 2014 for leading protests against Maduro. Lopez currently lives in the Spanish diplomatic residence.

It also did not include military officers put away on charges of plotting to overthrow Maduro (...) 

I'm reading in La Vanguardia that Henqique Capriles has not been pardoned and is still banned from public posts.

I get the impression the sudden release of these politicians has caught Guaidó unaware, as well as contributes to deepen divisions within the opposition camp. The UN High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet stated she's pleased and appreciates the decision made by Maduro, while the EU's high Representative Josep Borrell said the release is good news and a prerequisite for free and fair elections. Leaving aside this move might be considered an attempt of legitimizing and cleaning the image of his regime, it's clear that Maduro is one step ahead of the opposition once again. In my opinion, Guaidó cannot sit around and do nothing claiming that it's a trap. When you play a chess game and the adversary moves a piece, you must make a move. The opposition needs a better contender at this moment

The opposition is currently "imploding". Like, right now. As in, Capriles is tweeting ATM his displeasure at Guaidó, who earlier today denounced Capriles's moves. The situation is rapidly unfolding. I'll wait for it to develop further before I make a judgement.

[Velasco]

That's not good news. I've read Guaido is being attacked by hardliners like Maria Corina Machado, too. It seems that Maduro has chosen an opportune moment

[CumbrianLefty]

But isn't Guadio pretty much an overhyped waste of space at the end of the day?