China's Authoritarianism Will Ensure It Won't Rise Any Further as a World Superpower

[Frodo]

That is the crux of the message from this essay originally written in Foreign Affairs, and reposted in Majalla, a Saudi-owned magazine:

Without Democracy, China Will Rise No Farther
Beijing Can’t Compete With Washington Until It Reckons With Its People

I'd like to hear everyone's thoughts. 

[Antonio the Sixth]

This is a deeply naive view. I wish it was true but the evidence is just not there for it.

[Lumine]

I find it more wishful thinking than anything. Not saying some predictions are impossible - it may well be that the next generation of Chinese leadership isn't up to the task of running the surveillance state -, but as Antonio noted it's not like there's any evidence there.

There's also some very questionable notions regarding how foreign countries should react. There clearly is a - depressing - limit as to far much democratic nations can go in offering support (even moral support) to places like Hong Kong, but the idea that future democratization will be made easier by giving more "gentle" treatment to the CCP (based on the idea that it is the entity that could enact democracy) is, shall we say, a bit too naive when it comes to historical evidence and/or valuable examples.

I distinctly recall reading somewhere that the present Chinese leadership spent significant time analyzing and debating the fall of the Soviet Union, and the conclusion they apparently drew was that being "soft" on a number of political issues allowed the USSR to collapse and the country to lose its international power and influence. And that's perfectly consistent with the CCP's successful attempts at tightening their grip, made easier by the disturbing possibilities created by technology. They're not even the only ones who have "learnt" that lesson, particularly if you consider the amount of current autocratic leaders who seem to have survived against the odds by virtue of never yielding an inch and resisting to the bitter end (Assad, Maduro, etc.).

It may well be that totalitarian or authoritarian regimes with an expansive surveillance state prove impossible to sustain in the long term beyond a number of decades (an optimistic view of contemporary and near-future history), but it may well be that the "new", technological versions of them prove impossible to dislodge barring seismic events as opposed to gradual societal change. On the whole, I don't see reasons to be optimistic about the present course of events in China or hopeful about eventual democratic change (much less through the willing acceptance of the CCP), though I'm willing to admit it could be a hell of a lot worse. In a way, it is fortunate that China's current pragmatism and particular interests don't lend themselves well to an ideological concept of hegemony as opposed to a practical one.

[Blue3]

That is the crux of the message from this essay originally written in Foreign Affairs, and reposted in Majalla, a Saudi-owned magazine:

Without Democracy, China Will Rise No Farther
Beijing Can’t Compete With Washington Until It Reckons With Its People

I'd like to hear everyone's thoughts. 

Very "end of history" vibe to it, very foolish. It's not as almighty as some think, but this is very flawed. In some ways, the US fails or will fail to compete with China.

[Brother Jonathan]

I don't know that I'd say that continued authoritarianism will be China's greatest problem, but I do think its basic structure of government is unsustainable on its current trajectory. As Xi continues to make himself more and more central in the government, he could very well create serious problems for the party and government moving forward. When the party had fairly flexible leaders who served for long periods but generally gave up power after a time, it enjoyed a sort of flexibility that you don't find in regimes dominated by single personalities. With Xi, it seems like he is interested in governing for quite a while, and though he has been fairly competent, I would say he has reduced the government's flexibility by making himself so central, and thus has created potential problems if his successors aren't as competent and their powers are similar to those of Xi. Maybe the party will return to form, and Xi will retire gracefully and help set up a successor, but stripping term limits for high office in the party do not seem to suggest such a move is likely in the near future. Maybe after he leaves the party will revert back more to form, and I certainly think no person with Xi's personal ability will come along immediately after he is gone, but the concern for China now has to be that Xi will create a party structure reliant on such a strong figure at the head to an extent that we haven't really seen since Mao. Such reliance on an increasingly small circle of figures will likely damage the party moving forward.

Again, China has had it's fair share of very strong leaders, but Xi seems to be going farther than most of his predecessors when it comes to changing party structures to ensure his continued influence. Reverting to a Maoist personality cult (which, I would note, Xi likely does not want) will inevitably hamper China's geopolitical aspirations in the long term, even if they serve to somehow bolster them in the short term. I think Russia should be concerned for roughly the same reason, as Putin makes himself ever more central to the Russian government. Put simply, weakening governing and administrative institutions to embolden an effective leader general weakens the ability of the government as a whole to identify and address developing problems as time progresses. "Xi Jinping Thought" could quite quickly develop into a groupthink that saps China's policy making apparatus. Then again, maybe I am overestimating the degree to which Xi want's to change China, but I do think some damage has already been done that will hamper (though not necessarily impede) China moving forward.

[Beet]

China follows the trend of the world. During the 1970s and 1980s, when liberalization and democratization was ascendant, liberalization at least was also ascendant in China. During the 2000s and 2010s, with these in retreat, it was also in retreat in China. As some have pointed out, the same trends occur in other countries. China is just the most extreme example.

Therefore in order for China to democratize, the worldwide trend would have to reverse itself. A strong liberalizing wave would have to occur all over the world until it crashes onto China's shores with unstoppable force. It is impossible to see China liberalizing if Russia, the West & other countries find liberal democracy in abeyance and strongman style party rule on the ascendant. That is why I said earlier, the work begins at home. There is no better place where the revitalization of liberal democracy must occur than in the United States.

distinctly recall reading somewhere that the present Chinese leadership spent significant time analyzing and debating the fall of the Soviet Union, and the conclusion they apparently drew was that being "soft" on a number of political issues allowed the USSR to collapse and the country to lose its international power and influence.

It was not only being soft, but failing to develop the ideology of the USSR. If you notice, the late leaders, Khrushchev and Brezhnev in particular, are not associated with the ideological development of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. Whereas each of China's leaders are associated with the CPC's ideological development, Deng ("socialism with Chinese characteristics"), Jiang (the "three represents"), Hu (the "scientific development concept"), and Xi (the "Xi Jinping Thought"). Critically, each step is not abandoned after the associated leader steps down, but rather each build on those before.

Xi Jinping in his speeches is very careful to pay tribute to each of his predecessors' "contributions", (including those of Mao; whereas Khruschev's denunciation of Stalin was in some ways the spiritual death of the Soviet Union. Mao heavily disagreed with this and it was the first precipitating cause of the split with the USSR; thus in some ways Mao considered himself the true heir of Stalin and Xi an heir of Mao. During the "reform era" of the 80s, it was claimed that Mao was 70 percent right, 30 percent wrong ) It is as if Trump in his speeches paid tribute to "Hope and Change", "Compassionate conservatism" and the "third way" and claimed, with sincere belief, that MAGA was only an addition and improvement upon these, not a repudiation. The CPC leaders really believe in their ideology and see it as real communism, and attempt to get all Party members onto the same page. Thus they have managed to keep communist ideology relevant to the 21st century whereas otherwise it would have been lost in the mists of the 20th.

The United States on the other hand did not study the fall of the USSR because we felt we had nothing to study. Our system won and theirs lost. But this misses the fact that liberal democracy, too, needs apologetics and needs constantly to be improved upon to meet the needs of an ever changing present. Dropping this banner in the misty marshes of Jean Jacques Rousseau and J.S. Mill forever isn't a good idea.

[Amanda Huggenkiss]

The west has always expected that China's economic growth will lead to a liberalization and a democratization of the country. It has not happened, and even the last of those optimists have already admitted that China has proven that there is no link between economic success and the grade of democratization within the country.

[Grassroots]

The USSR just is forgotten now?

[Please delete this account. :)]

What do you mean? Clearly the USSR never existed in the first place. It's all in your head!

[The Simpsons Cinematic Universe]

Some serious cope there.

I do honestly predict China will "democratize" in some respects, but the West will never be content with it. It won't look like a liberal democracy.

[It’s so Joever]

Yes, because clearly all the historical empires/juggernauts in the past were bastions of enlightened Democracy...
Seriously this is the exact kind of thinking that will hurt our ability to compete with PRC in the future. We should never underestimate an opponent, and I don’t see why we should underestimate one which has already established its influence across the World in just a few decades.

[MASHED POTATOES. VOTE!]

This thesis is an example of historical illiteracy.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

China's major structural problem is that it can be slow in dealing with problems because its system tends to shoot the messengers who point out problems. Democracies aren't immune to the problem as Trump himself so clearly demonstrates, albeit with figurative rather than literal shooting. (Many of the problems the Trump Administration have had are due to a perpetual insistence on positive thinking rather than rational thinking.) Authoritarianism tends to be more susceptible to such weaknesses. Any hope for future democratization in China must await whoever follows Xi, as Xi himself has placed himself at a point where even if he wanted to, he can't afford to democratize. Any chance for long term democratization in China probably rests on the CCP becoming more democratic internally, not setting up external democratic forms in the titular government that theoretically would allow for a competing party to develop.