Dred Scott v. Sandford

[A18]

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)

Discuss.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

It definitely has its weak points, but the core of the decision is sound in that there was nothing under the Federal Constitution at that time that would allow a slave to claim freedom because of a temporary sojurn in either a free Territory or State.  It certainly would have been within the power of Congress for the Territories and within the power of the States for themselves to place restrictions on how long a sojurn could be before it ceased to be considered temporary, but that wasn't the question raised by this case.

[J. J.]

I'm voting unsound on the reasoning that Taney gave.  Now, had Nelson's opinion been the majority, I would have voted sound.  In I understand correctly, Nelson said, "Scott should have sued when he was in a free state."

Taney went well beyond both the letter and spirit of the Constitution and rendered a fundamentally anti-states rights position. 

[Emsworth]

Unsound.

The first question involved in this case is, did the federal courts have jurisdiction? Scott's status as a slave was an issue of Missouri law, not federal law. However, Article III of the Constitution authorizes the federal courts to hear cases that arise under state law, if they are "between Citizens of different States." Scott was from Missouri, Sanford from New York. However, the Court concluded that Scott was not a "citizen" of Missouri, because blacks could supposedly never be citizens of any state. This theory, however, is contradicted by the universal practice of the thirteen original states, who agreed that free blacks were citizens. Some states even went so far as to allow blacks to vote. Taney's conclusion that free blacks were not citizens was, therefore, wholly erroneous. Thus, it follows that the federal courts did indeed have jurisdiction.

The second question is, did Scott become a free person upon entering Wisconsin? An Act of Congress passed in 1820 (the Missouri Compromise) stated that "slavery and involuntary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the parties shall have been duly convicted, shall be, and is hereby, forever prohibited: Provided always that any person escaping into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any State or Territory of the United States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed." This law establishes an absolute and positive prohibition of slavery, with an exception for fugitive slaves. The statute makes no distinction between those who enter the state for a temporary stay, and those who wish to remain there permanently; in both cases, slavery is equally forbidden. Thus, whether Scott entered Wisconsin for a temporary sojourn or not, he ceased to be a slave.

The Supreme Court questioned whether Congress could prohibit slavery in the territories. First, it ruled that the provision authorizing Congress to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States" does not amount to a general legislative power over the territories, because "Rules and Regulations" were supposedly distinct from laws. Such a conclusion, however, is not supported by the text of the Constitution. Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 allows Congress to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"; this provision clearly authorizes Congress to make laws governing the military. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 allows Congress to "regulate" certain kinds of commerce; this clearly means that Congress may establish laws relating to commerce. Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 authorizes Congress to establish "an uniform rule of naturalization"; this plainly allows Congress to establish naturalization laws. Hence, the allegation that the term "Rules and Regulations" does not encompass legislation is totally unfounded; the Missouri Compromise was a valid exercise of congressional power.

Second, the Court also suggested that the Missouri Compromise violated the due process clause. If the doctrine of substantive due process is considered valid, then this conclusion would be correct. However, this doctrine is historically unfounded, and entirely unsound.

The third and final question is, did Scott remain a free person when he returned to Missouri, or did he revert to the status of a slave? It must be remembered that, even though Scott had become free when he set foot in Wisconsin, Missouri had the power to re-enslave him when he returned. The state's statutes were silent on the subject; thus, the question can only be settled by reference to the customary or common law of Missouri. As Justice Curtis' dissent demonstrates, this customary law recognizes the validity of a change in a slave's status that occurs outside the state. A lengthy line of Missouri Supreme Court precedents support this interpretation.

Thus, it follows that under the law of Missouri, Dred Scott was a free person, not a slave.