One question regarding NOVO, what happened to that party? I remember they were pretty popular within Faria Lima circles (a negative signal for me) but I lost track on them.
In terms of performance they picked up some city council seats and had a few good performances like the
top voted councilor in Curitiba but otherwise they didn't get into any mayoral runoffs as far as I know and generally underperformed.
The party has a lot of internal tensions. For some reason the leadership ie. Amoędo decided to heavily micromanage candidate selection, imposed arbitrarily high criteria (you had to be extremely wealthy among other things) and overruled local chapters on the issue. Maybe the goal was to avoid any bozos discrediting the party to the rich people they're so desperate to attract but instead it reduced their enthusiasm pretty drastically.
At risk of generalizing, there are three main currents within Novo. The first is the faction most dominant among the leadership and the central party and could be broadly described as "neoliberal". They talk a lot about "efficiency" and heavily emphasize how little government money they use but aren't particularly ideological. Personally I think these guys would lead Novo to a political dead end like the FDP in Germany, because once you've maxed out on the economically right leaning rich people you've got
maybe 10% of the vote and zero appeal anywhere else. They bring a lot of money and highly paid professionals to the party but not much else.
Next would be the supporters of Romeu Zema, the governor of Minas and by far the highest elected official in the party. Zema basically rode Bolsonaro's coattails into the governorship and has generally taken a much more favourable position towards him than Amoędo. He definitely still has a libertarian/economic liberal streak but he's generally been pragmatic in walking the line between supporting Bolsonaro enough to keep that base while pushing his own policies enough to define himself so his prospects aren't totally tied to him.
Last are the ideological libertarians and economic liberals who compose a measurable portion of elected officials (eg. 2 of their 8 deputies are explicit anarcho-capitalists) as well as a significant portion of the activists and local parties but who lack power within the central party. Naturally they have tension with the "neoliberals" since the latter disqualified a bunch of their candidates on the basis of "insufficient qualification" (it turns out that despite the stereotypes there isn't much correlation between ideological libertarianism and being a tycoon). If they managed to take control they'd basically be inverse-PSoL, but frankly even being inverse-PSoL has better political prospects than whatever the current leadership is aiming for since at least they could conceivably consolidate the "hardcore economic liberal" vote that's been split over a half dozen parties.
On that note, it's hard to say due to that last factor but it looks like economic liberals outside of Novo generally improved. MBL, which was supposed to collapse after going hard against Bolsonaro fairly early on but actually improved in their existing seats and picked up several new ones along the way, something that has led to
much wailing and teeth gnashing among the Bolsominions. Maybe the most surprising result of the night for me was
Mamăe Falei pulling almost 10% in SP and very nearly passing Russomano. Imagine someone like Joey Salads getting 10% of the vote to be mayor of New York and you'll understand what a surprising result this is, especially considering Russomanno had the support of the sitting president and widespread media coverage whereas Do Val's campaign basically didn't exist in any media besides the internet.
Besides that, the general trends of the election appear to be that explicitly ideological parties mostly gained at the expense of non/less ideological counterparts (eg. PSoL over PT and PAT/PSC/REP over PSDB) and the left marginally underperformed their poll numbers while the right marginally overperformed.
