Sixth Amendment, Schriro v. Summerlin

[A18]

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. ___ (2004)

Respondent was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death under Arizona's capital sentencing scheme then in effect, which authorized the trial judge, rather than the jury, to determine the presence of aggravating circumstances that make the defendant eligible for the death sentence. The State Supreme Court affirmed on direct review. While respondent's subsequent federal habeas case was pending in the Ninth Circuit, this Court decided that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 490, required the existence of an aggravating factor to be proved to a jury rather than a judge under Arizona's scheme. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584, 603-609. The Ninth Circuit invalidated respondent's death sentence, rejecting the argument that Ring did not apply because respondent's conviction and sentence had become final on direct review before Ring was decided.

Held: Ring does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review.

[Emsworth]

Under Teague v. Lane, a new procedural rule is retroactive if it "implicates fundamental fairness," or is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." What exactly these terms mean, I do not know. Phrases such as "fundamental fairness" and "ordered liberty" are vague and subjective, and should not have any role in sound jurisprudence. I have no idea as to whether the rule announced in Ring implicates "fundamental fairness" or is implicit in "ordered liberty."

[A18]

I would never make anything retroactive, so I voted 'sound,' though it's neither that, nor the opposite.