Free Speech and Religion, Widmar v. Vincent

[A18]

Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)

A Missouri state university excluded the use of their facilities for religious worship or religious teaching. A student group brought suit against the regulation claiming that it violated their free exercise rights, free speech rights, and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

JUDGES: POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

OPINION: JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court.

This case presents the question whether a state university, which makes its facilities generally available for the activities of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.

...

Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F.Supp. 907 (1979). It found the regulation not only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution. Under Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. The District Court rejected the argument that the University could not discriminate against religious speech on the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to less protection than other types of expression.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (1980). Rejecting the analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. The court held that the Establishment Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to further the neutral purpose of developing students' "'social and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity.'"

We granted certiorari. We now affirm.

...

[Schmitz in 1972]

Constitutionally sound holding. Religious speech is not second class free speech and cannot be considered such by a public institution.

[Emsworth]

The decision was sound.

The most direct and simple argument can be made under the free speech clause. It is true that the government may restrict speech on publicly owned property. Just because there a constitutional right to do something, it does not follow that there is a right to do it on government property. That said, however, the government may not express any "content preferences" in imposing these restrictions. Rather, the restrictions must equally apply to all speech without regard to the opinions being expressed. By prohibiting only religious groups from using generally available facilities, the government is expressing a content preference, thereby violating the free speech clause.

The District Court's ruling that the establishment clause forbade religious bodies from using generally available public facilities, on an equal basis with secular organizations, is utterly ridiculous.

[Blue Rectangle]

Looks like we all agree on this one.  The key for me is the content preference, which violates the core purpose of the First Amendment rights.

[A18]

Looks like we all agree on this one.

Well, except the guy who just voted no.

[Blerpiez]

Looks like we all agree on this one.

Well, except the guy who just voted no.

I did by accident.  It looks like only Justice White disagrees.