Malian Presidential Election, July 29, 2018

[Sir John Johns]

A presidential election will be held in Mali on July 29. If no candidate manages to receive over 50% of the valid votes, a runoff will be held on August 12.



There are however many doubts about the ability of the Malian government to organize a national election on time and, above all, in every part of the country as Mali is currently experiencing a deterioration of the security situation.

Firstly, the Malian government is still fighting, with the support of French army, the Islamist insurgency in the northern/eastern (regions of Kidal, Tombouctou and Gao) and central (Mopti Region) parts of the country. Five years after their expulsion from Gao and Tombouctou, Islamist armed groups remain a serious threat to national security as they are still able to carry out spectacular attacks. In recent months, they have continued to be very active in their strongholds of the northern regions, notably in Ménaka Circle (Gao Region) where at least 50 persons were killed by Islamist armed groups during the period from 26 April to May 1 alone, and in the Tombouctou area where a suicide attack was carried out against a camp of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on April 14. Even more worrying is the recent escalation of Islamist armed group activity in the center of the country to the point that the area has overtake the northern/eastern region as the major hotbed of Islamist guerrilla in Mali. This is especially true for the Mopti Region where, in recent weeks, a hotel was attacked in Bandiagara – a touristic town – on March 28, the town of Boni was strike by Jihadists on June 9, and the headquarters of the counter-insurgency G5 Sahel (regrouping Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania and Chad) joint force was hit by a suicide attack on June 29.

Secondly, largely linked to the emergence of radical armed Islamism, Mali is experiencing an increase of ethnic tensions, particularly in Mopti Region and in Ménaka Circle. In Mopti, the traditional rivalry between cattle raiser peoples (Peul or Fula) and farmer peoples (Dogon and Bambara) has exacerbated in recent months as Peul have been accused of secretly supported the Islamist insurgency. Ethnic clashes between Peul and Dogon/Bambara has led to the death of several hundreds of persons and has fostered the formation of paramilitary groups. In early May 2018, clashes between Bambara and Peul in Ténenkou (Mopti Region) led to the death of over 15 persons; the following month, an attack of Peul civilians in Koumaga (Mopti Region) by a Dogon militia led to the death of at least 37 persons. In addition, the Malian army has been repeatedly accused of committing human rights abuses against the Peul community: on May 19, during a fair in Boulkessy, Mopti Region, 12 Peul civilians were summarily executed by Malian soldiers; last month, mass graves containing the bodies of 25 Peul civilians probably killed by the Malian army were discovered in Nantaka and Kobaka. Meanwhile, in Ménaka Circle, the war between Islamist insurgents and Azawad nationalist armed groups roughly followed ethnic lines leading to repeated deadly clashes between Peul (which constitute the majority of the recruits of the Islamist groups) and Tuareg.

Additionally, the government is facing growing a growing social and political protest. On June 2, an illegal demonstration organized by opposition parties was brutally broken up by security forces leading to condemnation from France and the UN. On 10 and 11 June, demonstrators burnt down the prefecture building and clashed with the police in the town of Kéniéba (Kayes) to protest against the recruitment by a gold mining company of people coming from Bamako over local youth unemployed.

Mali is also facing an increase in criminality (hold-ups, armed robberies, drug trafficking and abduction of local dignitaries), especially in Tombouctou and in Mopti, committed by guerrilla/paramilitary groups and/or bandits.

Finally, Mali is the center of a massive refugee crisis with thousands of displaced having fled from northern part of the country or Mopti and Ségou Regions to seek refuge in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania. The country itself is also facing influx of internal refugees – who often live in dire conditions – but also, since recently, of migrants from Burkina Faso.

Unfortunately, the Malian political class seems largely unprepared and unable to take up the considerable challenge of restoring security in the country.

There are 24 candidates running from president (down from 28 in 2013). Several minor opposition candidates set up a so-called Convention of Builders to reduce the number of opposition candidacies but it failed spectacularly as no one was willing to withdraw his candidacy.

The two main candidates

Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (‘IBK’). Aged of 73 and born in Koutiala (Sikasso Region), the incumbent president is running for reelection despite a rather mixed record in office: while he has presided over the successful restoration of democratic institutions after a brief period (2012-2013) of military dictatorship and political transition and has managed to negotiate a peace agreement (far for being fully implemented however) with the northern Tuareg rebels, he had failed, despite his reputation of being a ‘strongman’, to fully restore order in Mali and to prevent the central part of the country to slip into instability. Also, massive opposition protests forced him, in August 2017, to drop out a plan to hold a referendum and change the constitution to decentralize the country, introduce a Court of Account and a Senate (of which a third of its members would have been appointed by the president) and, more controversially, to enable the head of state to appoint the president of the Constitutional Court (he is currently selected by members of the said court). His achievements in the fight against corruption and cronyism are also widely considered as disappointing.

The election of IBK as president of Mali in 2013 was the crowning event of his long political career. After having served as foreign minister (1993-1994) and prime minister (1994-2000) under president Alpha Oumar Konaré (‘AOK’), he presided over the National Assembly between 2002 and 2007. In the meantime he made three attempts to be elected president of Mali and succeeded at the third one: in 2002, he placed third with 21.1% of the vote; in 2007, he placed second with 19.1% of the vote but couldn’t prevent reelection of incumbent president Amadou Toumani Touré (‘ATT’) in a landslide in the first round; finally, in 2013, he came well ahead of other candidates with 39.8% of the vote and was elected in a landslide (77.6%) in the runoff.

The candidacy of IBK is supported by Together for Mali (EPM), a broad political alliance composed of no less than 68 parties, the most important of which being IBK’s own Rally for Mali (RPM). An observer member of the Socialist International (but, like in many African countries, ideological labels are meaningless in Mali), the RPM was founded by IBK in 2001 after he failed to be nominate presidential candidate of his former party, the then-ruling Alliance for Democracy in Mali-Pan African Party for Liberty, Solidarity and Justice (ADEMA-PASJ). The RPM is currently the largest political in the National Assembly, holding 66 seats out of 147.

In an ironic twist of events, IBK has been endorsed by the largest faction of what remains of the once powerful ADEMA-PASJ, whose influence has been considerably weakened by a series of splits and internal divisions. Currently, the ADEMA-PASJ is the third largest party in the National Assembly with 16 seats.

Half-relevant parties also members of the EPM alliance include:
- Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga’s Alliance for Solidarity of Mali (ASMA), which won three seats in the National Assembly in the 2013 legislative election
- a dissident faction of the Party for Economic Development and Solidarity (PDES) under Mamadou Dibassy, which, until recently, sat in the ranks of the opposition; founded in 2010 by supporters of ATT, the PDES candidate did poorly in the 2013 presidential election, receiving only 1.7% of the vote and elected three deputies in the subsequent legislative elections.
- the Malian Union-African Democratic Rally (UM-RDA) which elected two deputies in 2013 and is the successor of the historical Sudanese Union-African Democratic Rally, the political organization which led the fight for independence under Modibo Keïta and became the only legal party between 1960 and 1968.
- the Movement for the Independence, Renaissance and Integration of Africa (MIRIA), a split from the ADEMA-PASJ led by Mamadou Kassa Traoré which elected two deputies in 2013
- the Union for Democracy and Development (UDD) led by IBK’s former defense minister Tiéman Hubert Coulibaly which currently holds a single seat in the National Assembly.
- the Alliance for the Republic (APR) whose leader, Oumar Ibrahim Touré, currently serves as commissioner-minister for food safety and ran in 2013 for president winning 0.8% of the vote.
- the Citizen’s Party for Revival (PCR) whose leader, Ousmane Ben Fana Traoré, ran for president in 2013 and received 0.5%

Soumaïla Cissé. The 68-year old leader of the opposition is considered as the most serious challenger to IBK’s reelection bid. A native of Tombouctou, Cissé served as finance minister (1993-2000) under AOK before being nominated over IBK by the ADEMA-PASJ as its presidential candidate in 2002. He then placed second with 21.3% of the vote in the first round and was crushed by ATT in the runoff, receiving only 35.0% of the vote. By then at odds with AOK, he left the ADEMA-PASJ and supported ATT’s reelection in 2007. In 2013, he ran again for president, placing a distant second with 19.7% in the first round; he barely improved this result in the runoff, receiving 22.4% of the vote and being defeated by his arch-nemesis IBK. Elected deputy from Niafunké (Toumbouctou Region) in November 2013, Cissé, as leader of the second largest caucus in parliament, was selected as leader of opposition, a post in which he systematically criticized the policies of IBK and led the charge against the 2017 foiled constitutional review.

Cissé is running as the candidate of the Coalition for Alternative and Change whose main component is his own party, the liberal (in the European sense) Union for Republic and Democracy (URD), founded in 2003 as a split of the ADEMA-PASJ. In the 2013 legislative elections, the URD won 17 seats becoming the second largest party in parliament.

Other members of the Coalition for Alternative and Change include the leftist Party for National Rebirth (PARENA) whose leader, Tiébilé Dramané, had previously ran for president in 2002, 2007 and 2013, receiving respectively 4.0%, 3.0% and 0.2% (but in the latter case, Dramané had withdrawn his candidacy few weeks before the election) of the vote. In the 2013 legislative election, the PARENA won three seats. Hilariously, before allying with the rather pro-business Cisssé, the PARENA had staunchly opposed privatization of state-owned companies and introduction of GMOs in Mali. The ‘legitimate’ faction of the above mentioned PDES, led by its interim chairman Djibril Tall, is also part of the pro-Cissé coalition.

Cissé has recently received the support of five former prime ministers and of influential radio host and Rastafari activist Ras Bath (whose real name is Mohamed Youssouf Bathily) who has became famous for the free critical tone of his political radio show and his staunch opposition to the 2017 failed constitutional revision. Internationally famous singer and albino activist Salif Keïta has also publicly endorsed Cissé.

The outsiders

Aliou Boubacar Diallo. One of the richest men in Mali, the Kayes-born Diallo, 58, made a fortune in gold mining and oil extraction. He was the founder in 2012 of the philanthropic Maliba (‘Great Mali’) Foundation which helped Malian populations living under the Jihadist yoke by sending them pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. The following year, Diallo officially entered politics (he actually had played an important political role since the late 1990s when he funded AOK’s presidential campaign) and established the Democratic Alliance for Peace-Maliba (ADP-Maliba), whose name suggests that Diallo is possibly using his philanthropic activities as a cover for establishment of clientelist networks. In any case, he endorsed IBK in the 2013 presidential election and heavily funded his presidential campaign, notably lending him his white Porsche. In the subsequent legislative election, the ADP-Maliba entered parliament, having elected two deputies who sat in the presidential majority. At odds with IBK since 2015, Diallo has heavily criticized the incumbent president in recent months. He is campaigning on a platform promising the creation by 2023 of 20,000 new businesses, a 2,000 billion CFA francs plan to restore peace in the north and central parts of Mali, the end of corruption and a 2,000 billion CFA francs infrastructure program. Diallo’s promises would cost, according to his own propaganda, 15,000 billion CFA francs but it’s very unclear where he intends to find the money. Some pundits have compared Diallo to the incumbent president of Benin, Patrice Talon, also a rich businessman turned politician.

Diallo is supported by the ‘Together for Renewal’ coalition made up of 21 totally irrelevant parties with the most insignificant being the Emerging Mali Movement of young businessman and former deputy Moussa Oumar Diawara – who tried to run for president his year as the candidate of the Genuine People’s Initiative (VIP) movement – and the Democratic Party for Alternative and Renewal (PDAR) of Mamadou Djigué, also a young businessman who unsuccessfully tried to run for president in 2013. Way more important is the endorsement of the sharif of Nioro du Sahel (Kayes Region), one of the most influential religious leader in Mali who supported IBK’s candidacy in 2013 but is by now at odds with the incumbent president.

Cheikh Modibo Diarra (‘CMD’). A native from Nioro du Sahel, the 66-year old Diarra is a former astrophysicist who notably worked for the NASA before serving as chairman of Microsoft Africa in the 2000s. The son-in-law of former dictator (1968-1991) Moussa Traoré, he entered politics in 2011 when he started his own political party, the Rally for the Development of Mali (RPDM). His career received a huge boost in 2012 when he was appointed prime minister; he then led during nine months a transitional government of national unity before being forced to resign by the military. In 2013, he ran for president and was touted as the surprise candidate who will make a major breakthrough only to receive a disappointing 2.1% of the vote. In the subsequent legislative election, the RPDM failed to won a single seat.

This year, Diarra is once again touted as a strong contender for the presidency of Mali, this time possibly with better chances of (relative) success. A quite fresh clean face in Malian politics and a clean politician with a clear and honest discourse, he is the ideal candidate for the business and educated elite but could be fall victim of strategic voting in favor of Cissé. Also, his party seriously lacks local implantation, especially in rural areas and Diarra is currently facing difficulties to fund his campaign.

Diarra is supported by the Emergence for a New Mali coalition which includes notably the Yelema (‘Change’ in Bambara) party, whose young (43) and ambitious leader, Moussa Mara, unexpectedly renounced to run for president. A former mayor of Bamako Commune IV, Mara previously ran for president in 2013, gathering 1.5% of the vote; in the subsequent legislative election, Yelema won a single seat. These modest results enabled nonetheless the appointment of Mara as prime minister under IBK (2014-2015) but Mara is now in bad terms with the head of state.

Also part of Diarra’s presidential coalition are the newly established Convention of Reformers for Alternative and Justice (CRAJ Faso Gnèta) of youth leader Mahamane Mariko, and the Movement for a Common Destiny (Modec), a split from the Parema whose leader, Konimba Sidibé, ran for president in 2013 (winning 0.5% of the vote) and later served as minister under IBK.

Modibo Sidibé. Born in Bamako, Sidibé, 66, is a veteran politician who successively served as health minister and foreign minister under AOK and as secretary general of the presidency (2002-2007) and prime minister (2007-2011) under ATT. In 2013, he already ran for president and placed fourth with 4.9% of the vote.

Sidibé is the candidate of the New Political Pole (NPP), an alliance of self-described ‘democratic, republican and left-wing’ parties whose only relevant component is Sidibé’s personal vehicle, the Alternative Forces for Renewal and Emergence (FARE), which get six deputies elected in 2013 thus becoming the fourth largest parliamentary force in Mali.

Kalfa Sanogo. A native of Sikasso, this 69-year old senior official has held a series of posts in the Ministry of Agriculture in the 1980s and the 1990s (being notably in charge of the forest policy) before being appointed head of the Niger Office, a government agency administering a large irrigation scheme in the Ségou Region and playing a crucial role in the production of rice. Between 2013 and 2015, Sanogo served as the CEO of the state-owned Mali Company for Textile Development (CMDT), one of the largest companies in Mali, and he is credited for having improved the company’s accounts. He jumped into politics in 2016 when he was elected mayor of Sikasso under the banner of the ADEMA-PASJ.

Sanogo is the candidate of the Kalfa 2018 Coalition he originally set up to support his presidential bid as the candidate of the ADEMA-PASJ. After he failed to get the nomination, he left the party. Sanogo has received the support of several prominent politicians including notably former president of the National Assembly and Peul leader Ali Nouhoum Diallo.

[Sir John Johns]

Other relevant candidates

Dramane Dembélé. A native of Ségou, Dembélé, 51, is the candidate of the newly established Alliance for Recovery of Democracy in Mali (ARDEMA), a dissident faction of the ADEMA-PASJ, the party under which Dembélé already ran for president in 2013. A relatively unknown politician then, he placed third with 9.6%, a result many considered as disappointing considering the political influence previously held by the ADEMA-PASJ. Breaking a deal made with Soumaïla Cissé before the election, Dembélé endorsed IBK in the runoff and was rewarded with the post of minister for urban planning and housing. He resigned in 2016 while involved in a money laundering case and had since took his distances with IBK.

Housseini Amion Guindo (‘Poulo’). Born in Bandiagara (Mopti Region), in the heartland of the Dogon country, the 48-year old Guindo was the owner of the Sikasso’s Stade Malien soccer club and used to hold the position of vice president of the National Soccer Federation. In 2006, he was elected deputy from Sikasso as an independent and in 2013 he ran for president, receiving a strong 4.7% of the vote. After having endorsed IBK in the runoff, he was appointed minister of sports in 2014, a post he held until January 2018 when he was moved to the ministry of National Education. In May 2018, having apparently fallen out with IBK, he left the government and launched his second presidential bid. He is running as the candidate of his own Convergence for Development of Mali (CODEM), which elected five deputies in 2013.

Moussa Sinko Coulibaly. A native of Bamako (other sources indicate Ségou), Coulibaly, 45, is a retired one-star general who had served as chief of staff of military ruler Amadou Sanogo (in office during several weeks in 2012) before being appointed minister of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Territorial Planning in the transition government (2012-2013). Until recently the general director of the Bamako peacekeeping school, he resigned from the army to run for president. He claims he is neither part of the presidential majority nor the opposition but is instead on the side of ‘change’. So logically, he called his personal vehicle the Platform for Change.

Oumar Mariko. The ‘enfant terrible’ of Malian politics and a perennial opponent, Mariko, 59, is a native of Bafoulabé (Kayes). A former student leader who took part in the protests that led to the downfall of Moussa Traoré, he founded in 1996 the far-left African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence (SADI) under which banner he ran in every presidential election since 2002, winning 0.9% of the vote in 2002, 2.7% in 2007 and 2.6% in 2013. One of the few politicians to openly supported the 2012 military coup, Mariko is currently a deputy from Kolondiéba (Sikasso Region). Despite having endorsed IBK in the runoff in 2013, he is now one of the staunchest opponent to the incumbent president calling his record in office as ‘catastrophic’.

Mountaga Tall. A direct descendent of Toucouleur ruler Umar Tall and a veteran politician, Mountaga Tall is a historic opponent to the dictatorship of Moussa Traoré, having founded a pro-democracy organization and having participate in the first protests that would led to the downfall of the dictator in 1991. A presidential candidate in 1992, he won 11.4% of the vote and was de facto the leader of the opposition in the 1990s. By 2002, his political star was already fading as he received only 3.8% of the vote in the presidential election held that year. Once again a presidential candidate in 2013, he only got 1.5% of the vote but became minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research and later minister of Communication under IBK before leaving the government in December 2017. Tall is running as the candidate of United for Mali (UMA) whose only relevant component is his own National Congress of Democratic Initiative (CNID), a party which elected four deputies in 2013.

Choguel Kokalla Maïga. A native of Tabango (Gao Region), the 60-year old Maïga is the leader of the Patriotic Movement for Renewal (MPR), a party which openly claims the legacy of former dictator Moussa Traoré. After having ran for president in 2002 and having received 2.7% of the vote, he became minister of Industry and Trade under ATT from 2002 to 2007. Again a presidential candidate in 2013, he won 2.4% of the vote and joined the IBK administration in 2015 as minister for Digital Economy, Information and Communication, a post he held until 2016.

Daba Diawara. Born in Bamako, the 66-year old Diawara is the son of a prominent Malian politician who served as minister under Modibo Keïta. After having served as secretary general of the government under Moussa Traoré, he became minister of public service and labor in the cabinet constituted just after the fall of the dictator. After having been a member of the US-RDA, he left this party and founded in 2001 the Party for Independence, Democracy and Solidarity (PIDS). A presidential candidate in 2002, he received only 1.1% of the vote but became later minister for state reform under ATT. Earlier this year, he was a member of Modibo Sidibé’s NPP but, after having promised to support the presidential candidacy of the latter, decided after all to run himself for president.

Mamadou Igor Diarra. The son of a Malian father from Markala (Ségou Region) and a Ukrainian mother, Diarra was born in Kryvyi Rih, Ukraine, in 1966. A commercial engineer by training, he has followed a double career as a successful banker and as a politician, having been notably minister for Energy and Water during the second term of ATT and finance minister (2015-2016) under IBK. Diarra is the candidate of the Mali in Action movement (MEA).

Mohamed Ali Bathily. The candidate of the Association for Mali (APM), Bathily, 66, was born in Bamako. A lawyer and a former ambassador to Senegal, he served as justice minister (2013-2015) and minister of state properties, land affairs and assets (2015-2017) in the successive governments of IBK. By now at odds with the president, the self-proclaimed candidate of the peasants is running on a platform promising access to land ownership for peasants and fight against corruption. Bathily’s son is the influential radio host Ras Bath who is supporting Soumaïla Cissé.

Mamadou Oumar Sidibé. A computer scientist by training, the Bamako-born Sidibé, 51, was a high official of the Malian customs administration. In 2013, he launched the Party for the Restoration of Malian Values (PRVM-Fasoko) which scored relatively good results in the legislative election held that year (electing one deputy) and in the 2016 municipal elections when it became the country’s eighth largest political force.

Also-ran

Cheikh Harouna Sankaré. A Peul marabout aged around 40, he is the candidate of the Harouna 2018 Movement and is said to have the support of the Sufi (Maliki) Ançar Dine movement (not to be confused with the homonymous Malian radical Islamist armed group). A former member of the tiny Party for Solidarity and Progress (PSP), Sankaré was elected mayor of Ouenkoro (Mopti Region) under the banner of the opposition URD but left later this party to sit as an independent. He is the founder of the Movement for the Union of Malians (MUM), an organization involved in charity work.

Hamadoun Touré. A 64 year old former international civil servant, Touré hold notably the position of secretary general of the International Telecommunication Union. He also is the founder and executive director of Smart Africa, an international organization dedicated to ICT development in Africa. A native of Goudoun (Tombouctou Region), he is the candidate of the Kayira Alliance.

Niankoro Yeah Samaké. A former mayor of Ouélessébougou (Koulikoro), his native town, Samaké, 49, is the candidate of the Party for Civic and Patriotic Action (PACP). Running for president in 2013, he achieved some sort of international fame because of his Mormon faith which didn’t prevent him from receiving a pitiful 0.6% of the vote. After having served as ambassador to India in the IBK administration, he is again a presidential candidate.

Modibo Koné. A native of Markala (Ségou Region), this 59-year old technocrat is a former CEO of the Mali Company for Textile Development (CMDT) a post he held for only several months as he was accused of mismanagement and corruption. He is running under the banner of his own Mali Kanu Movement (MMK).

Modibo Kadjoké. A native of Ségou, the 56 year old Kadjoké is a former director of the Agency for Youth Employment Promotion. A member of Mountaga Tall’s CNID, he became minister of employment and vocational training in the administration of ATT. In 2013, he left the CNID and launched his own party, the Alliance for Mali-Maliko (APM-Maliko).

Adama Kané. Also from Ségou, Kané, 53, was elected deputy from Barouéli (Ségou) under the banner of the PRVM-Fasoko, a party he left to found Faso Kèwalé – All for Mali. Like Harouna Sankaré, he is a follower of the Ançar Dine Sufi movement.

Djénéba N’Diaye. A tradeswoman who did business in Central African Republic, she is the only female presidential candidate, running as an independent. Her slogan is “Men have failed, vote for a woman”.

Mamadou ‘Mohamed Y’ Traoré. The youngest of the candidates, Traoré, 37, was born in Côte-d’Ivoire in a family of poor Malian immigrants. A self-made man, he made a fortune in the building sector. He is running for the An Ka Bolo Di Gnongon Ma Union.

[Sir John Johns]

May as well repost maps of the last presidential election:





A map of ethnic groups:



For what it’s worth, a statistician conducted a public opinion survey about the upcoming presidential election. It is, of course, to be taken with a pinch of salt. The telephone survey was conducted by telephone between 20 and 28 June among 5,525 persons.

Over 20.5% of the voters haven’t yet chosen for who they will vote; the share of undecided is 27.8% in rural areas.

Among those who have made up their minds (beware, it is both incredibly precise – decimals ! – and incredibly vague)

IBK would received between 28.29% and 38.26% of the vote with stronger results in rural areas
Soumaïla Cissé would received between 16.07% and 25.14% of the vote with stronger results in rural areas
CMD would received between 15.91% and 27.06% of the vote with stronger results in urban areas
all other candidates under 4.5%

I’m still very skeptical over such a strong result for CMD and the possibility he could go to the runoff.

[Antonio the Sixth]

So Cissé is the lesser evil, isn't he?

[Sir John Johns]

I don’t know. Of course, the IBK administration has been a huge disappointment as it was unable to restore internal security, to fight corruption and to improve the governance of the country but I have my doubts about whether, if elected, Cissé would be a better president. He is actually very similar to IBK: both men belong to the generation of politicians who took power in the 1990s and has kept it since then and both were originally members of the same party. Like IBK, Cissé is a political dinosaur whose record is far from being free of corruption. He seems more interested into power for the sake of power than to actually elaborate effective and realistic policies to address the many challenges faced by Mali. As leader of the opposition, he has displayed a systemic obstructionist stance against IBK without really offering a convincing alternative. In addition, the heteroclite coalition he has built is only united by the desire to defeat IBK and will probably quickly collapsed and needed to be ‘patched’ with bribes.

There is an area where Cissé could possibly be an improvement over IBK: as a man coming from the North, he has repeatedly denounced the abandonment by the state of the northern and central parts of the country, deploring for example the lack of physicians in these areas. As such, he seems to be willing to address the social and economic roots of the Islamist insurgency problem over the purely military answer followed by IBK. However, such measures would require extra funding and, even if tax collection has significantly improved under IBK, the foreign financial aid will be crucial; in that way, Cissé has called for further involvement of the international community in Mali.

Note that, while I’m not convinced by Cissé, I don’t considered other presidential candidates any better: the vast majority of them are only running for self-promotion, to trade their support in the runoff against a ministerial portfolio or just to carry out a personal vendetta against a rival. The opposition as a whole has proved to be pathetic, being unable to unite behind a single candidacy due to personal disputes or to provide voters a credible and serious election platform. Maybe among first-rate candidates, Cheick Modibo Diarra sounds a bit different with a somewhat honest discourse but 1/ I doubt he could win the election without adopting a more demagogic and populist tone (a newspaper called him, if he wants to win, to stop ‘acting like an American’ (CMD is also a US citizen) and to accept to get his hands dirty, i.e. buying votes like the other main candidates do) 2/ even if he somehow win, I don’t see how he could implement even a small part of his agenda without negotiating with the old corrupt political class as his party seems too weak to win a majority in the legislative elections that will be held later this year.

So, yeah, I don’t held the political class of Mali in high regard and I’m pretty pessimistic about the foreseeable future of that country (and global warming, whose effects are already perceptible in Mali will not make things easier). I somehow hope I’m wrong.

[Famous Mortimer]

So Cissé is the lesser evil, isn't he?

Cisse is the candidate of appeasing the Islamists and doing whatever the IMF says.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Ugh, wonderful.

[WMS]

For some time, Mali was quite a success story in Africa. The downfall has been really sad to watch.

[Sir John Johns]

The polling, which happened yesterday, has been disturbed by violence and incidents in 4,632 out of 23,041 poll stations, the vast majority of them being located in the northern and central part of the country. Voting didn’t take place at all in 716 poll stations because of violence or because the rule of the central government isn’t recognized. In the places where votes took nonetheless place, there were notably a shelling attack by an Islamist group in Aguelhok (Kidal Region), armed attacks in Gandamia (Mopti Region) and Mariko (Ségou Region) and ballot boxes were burnt down in Lafia (Tombouctou Region). Still, no death has been reported so far. This is a slight improvement compared to the 2016 municipal elections during which the voting hadn’t take place in large parts of the country and during which six people had been killed.

Many reported incidents seem to concern the inability of voters to cast their ballots due to problems in the distribution of voter registration cards, in the identity check of voters or disputes between polling station’s assessors. Cécile Kyenge, the head of the EU observation mission, has expressed her displeasure over the non publication of the list of poll stations where the voting hadn’t take place and over the excessively fast-paced centralization of the results. This could led the opposition, which has previously denounced the existence of a parallel election list and of fake polling stations, to challenge the results of the election.

[Sir John Johns]

The ministry of territorial administration and decentralization finally proclaimed the results:

Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta 41.4%
Soumaïla Cissé 17.8%
Aliou Boubacar Diallo 7.9%
Cheikh Modibo Diarra 7.5%
Housseini Hamion Guindo 3.9%
Oumar Mariko 2.3%
Modibo Koné 2.3%
Chogel Kokalla Maïga 2.1%
Cheikh Harouna Sankaré 1.8%
Mamadou Oumar Sidibé 1.6%
Modibo Sidibé 1.4%
Kalfa Sanogo 1.2%
Mamadou Igor Diarra 1.1%
Modibo Kadjoké 0.9%
Adama Kané 0.8%
Daba Diawara 0.7%
Mountaga Tall 0.6%
Dramane Dembélé 0.6%
Mohamed Ali Bathily 0.5%
Hamadoun Touré 0.5%
Niankoro Yeah Samaké 0.5%
Mamadou Traoré 0.5%
Djénéba N’Diaye 0.4%

Turnout: 43.1%

A runoff will be held on August 12 between IBK and Cissé. Supporters of Cissé emphasize the fact that this is the first time in Mali’s history than an incumbent president faces a runoff; still there is a long way before a potential victory of Cissé. All will depend of upcoming alliances with minor candidates and how votes will transfer. Also, 18 candidates out of 24 (including Soumaïla Cissé and Aliou Boubacar Dallio) have shortly before the proclamation of the results called fraud.

[Sir John Johns]

The secretary general of the Ministry of the Territorial Administration and Decentralization has announced detailed results will NOT be published (not even on circle level, so I could not make maps). That seems more than suspect and confirms doubts of the opposition about potential frauds. More worryingly, the governor of Bamako district has closed down the Renouveau FM radio station, whose star radio host is Ras Bath (who has endorsed Cissé in the first round) to 'preserve public order and peace' in Bamako. Cissé has called to the constitution of a wide opposition front to defeat IBK in the runoff but one candidate has already endorsed the outgoing president: Djénéba N'Diaye, the only female candidate.

[Sir John Johns]

Soumaïla Cissé, Aliou Boubacar Diallo and Cheikh Modibo Diarra are all three challenging the results of the presidential first round before the Constitutional Court. The campaign team of the sole Cissé have officially filed about twenty appeals for ‘vote stuffing, violation of the electoral law and irregularities’ while also asking for the recusal of six of the nine judges of the Constitutional Court (including its president) for suspicion of partiality; the request for recusal is also supported by sixteen other presidential candidates.

Concomitantly, eighteen presidential candidates (including Cissé, Diallo and CMD) have jointly called for the resignation of the minister in charge of the organization of the election and called their supporters to take the streets tomorrow to protest against what they label as ‘an electoral hold-up’. The eighteen candidates are also all demanding the publication of the full results by the ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization.

The Constitutional Court is due to proclaim the definitive results Wednesday. If the court would reject the appeal from the opposition (the most probable outcome), I’m not excluding the possibility that Cissé ultimately decides to boycott the runoff.

[Sir John Johns]

So, as expected the Constitutional Court rejected the appeals of the opposition and proclaimed the definitive results which aren't very different from the provisional ones. Also, the Ministry of Internal Administration and Decentralization finally released the results on polling station level... but these morons forgot to post the results of at least one circle (Nara, which ISN'T a 'problematic' circle) and, even worse, the results are compiled in totally user-unfriendly PDF files with the results on commune and circle level not even calculated. So, as I have other things to do than manually entering the results of over 20,000 polling stations in an Excel file to simply get the results by circle, there will be no maps of the first round 

Otherwise, Aliou Boubacar Diallo and Cheikh Modibo Diarra decided to not endorse a candidate in the runoff while Modibo Koné (2.3% in the first round) has urged his voters to vote for IBK. So, the last slim hopes of Cissé for a victory are now gone and there is no doubt that IBK will be reelected.

[Sir John Johns]

Runoff was today. There were several but apparently marginal incidents in the northern and central parts of the country: apart from reports of theft and destruction of electoral materials in various locations, paramilitary groups prevented the voting to take place or interrupt it in several rural localities, notably in Tombouctou, Mopti and Niafunké circles (all in central Mali); in the latter circle, in Arkodia village, a jihadist group murdered the president of a voting station then burnt the voting station down. Yesterday, three Islamist activists were arrested in Bamako; according to the Malian intelligence services, they were planning terrorist attacks for the polling day in the Malian capital. So not the best secure environment but this could have been worse.

Turnout is expected to be low, even lower than in the first round, due to the fact there is not much suspense about the outcome of the election. Additionally, heavy rains may have also discouraged voters to go to polls. The supporters of Cissé hadn’t wait until the beginning of the polling to claim fraud: the campaign manager of Cissé has claimed yesterday that he managed to acquire a ballot book, a proof, according to him, that the ballots haven’t been correctly sealed as required by the law.

[Sir John Johns]

Provisional results have been proclaimed by the ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization:

IBK 67.2%
Cissé 32.8%

Turnout: 34.5%

So, as expected a landslide for the incumbent president who however lost more than ten percent points compared to the 2013 presidential runoff when he also faced Cissé. This latter has been unable to overcome the division of the opposition nor to convince the important number of voters dissatisfied with IBK to turn out in masse. Turnout was indeed very low, 34.5% down from 43.1% in the first round and the lowest turnout in a presidential poll since the 2002 runoff. According to the Malian government, the vote didn’t take place in 490 polling stations (440 of them being located in Mopti circle) against 871 in the first round.

Predictably, Cissé is rejecting the results and claiming fraud. According to his staff, he was winning the election with 51.9% against 47.5% when his computer system was hacked. While in 2013, Cissé had conceded defeat even before the proclamation of the results, this time he is intending to challenge the results by every legal mean possible. Notably, during a press conference, Cissé’s campaign manager showed a video proving, according to him, fraud in Kidal (northern part of the country). It’s true that first round results were very suspicious in the northern parts of Mali, which are controlled by former Tuareg rebels, but this region of the country only accounts for a small part of the total voters. International observers dispatched in the southern Mali haven’t reported electoral fraud only minor irregularities.