Italian Elections and Politics 2022 - Our Time to Schlein

[Filuwaúrdjan]

Can we not have arguments that are actually about American political psychodramas in this thread? Thank you.

[Mike88]

Meloni refuses to give a cabinet post to Salvini:

https://twitter.com/repubblica/status/1574612181806911490

Meloni's veto on Salvini: "Matteo will have no key ministries"

Inside Lega, Salvini's leadership is also being questioned and some say that it's time for a new leader.

She may regret that as he has a huge ego and I cannot see that going over well.

It depends if Salvini remains as leader of Lega or not. Right now, several in the party want to boot him out, mainly because of the catastrophic results, but also because the party's founder, Umberto Bossi, failed to be elected to the Senate, and this is being perceived, within the party, as total humiliation of Bossi with Salvini the only responsible.

[Okay, maybe Mike Johnson is a competent parliamentarian.]

https://twitter.com/GiorgiaMeloni/status/1574862655067660295?t=9HVMAfxpORbr0D_JL...

Looks like she just lost a lot of her American online fans

Thank God for small blessings.

Hopefully the Constitutional Court will at the very least put the kibosh on any changes to family policy that involve breaking up existing same-sex-parent families.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Here's a couple quick-and-dirty maps comparing the coalitions' standings now to the EU elections 3 years ago. Back then, parties that today form the right-wing coalition got 50.2% of the vote, the left coalition got 29.8%, and M5S 17.3% (this is excluding VdA and TAA to make comparison easier). Hilariously enough, all three coalitions got lower percentages this time, even though given the majoritarian-ish voting system there was far more of an incentive to vote tactically. Maurice Duverger must be rolling in his grave.

Comparing these results to those of the Senate this year (Right 44%, Left 26%, M5S 15.6%), we get the following maps by coalitions. I had to find creative color scales for each since these maps are overwhelmingly negative for all three, but I hope this does the trick.



The right lost ground everywhere, but most dramatically in Sicily (thanks to the rando center-right independent who managed to get an impressive amount of support there) and in Lombardy, where the decline of Salvinismo probably hit it particularly hard. By contrast, it held up pretty well in Lazio (there has to be at least a bit of a home turf advantage there), and for some reason, Tuscany and Sardinia. Conversely, Tuscany is where the left lost most (perhaps due to a Renzi home turf effect? A/IV managed to get 9% there), while it otherwise held up decently in the North as well as in the central Adriatic area (hilariously improving by 4 points in Molise). Meanwhile, M5S held up well in its Southern strongholds, which is probably all that really matters for it.

Putting those three maps together, we get this one, which basically shows the "swing" among the top two (basically whether the right lost more or less than whichever, of the left or M5S, is its strongest challenger in the region). The right comes out ahead in Lazio and Tuscany (which actually probably netted them quite a few constituencies, as that region is full of marginals). M5S does remarkably well down South, which again was really the key to them. The left improved over the right in the rest of the country, but these improvements were either small or happened in very right-wing regions like Lombary and Veneto, so their actual effect is probably minimal.

[omar04]

How strong are the rural -> rightwards and urban -> leftwards trends? This seems to be a decent predictor looking at the maps for a moment.  From what I can tell Italy's population is well distributed although the north is on top in population and voter turn out.

[Antonio the Sixth]

How strong are the rural -> rightwards and urban -> leftwards trends? This seems to be a decent predictor looking at the maps for a moment.  From what I can tell Italy's population is well distributed although the north is on top in population and voter turn out.

That has been the very broad trend in Italy for the past decade or so (although "rural" is really a misnomer here - Italy has very few genuinely rural areas left), but these last results have been a bit messy in this regard, mostly because A/IV did shockingly well in the kind of large well-off cosmopolitan urban centers PD had been gaining ground in. And conversely, M5S doing so well across the poorest parts of the country shows that the right-wing vote isn't exactly working-class. At the end of the day, Italy continues to be very much its own Thing.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Oh also, we actually have the final(?) party seat breakdowns, so let's have a look at those. Using seat shares rather than raw seats to compare with 2018 for obvious reasons.

House:

FdI: 119 (29.8%, +24.7)
Lega: 66 (16.5%, -3.3)
FI: 45 (11.3%, -5.3)
NM: 7 (1.8%, +1.1)
Right: 237 (59.3%, +17.2)

PD: 69 (17.3%, -0.5)
AVS: 12 (3%, +0.8)
Others: 4 (1%, =)
Left: 85 (21.3%, +0.3)

M5S: 52 (13%, -23)

A/IV: 21 (5.3%)

Others: 5 (1.3%, +0.3)


Senate:

FdI: 65 (32.5%, +26.8)
Lega: 30 (15%, -3.4)
FI: 18 (9%, -9.1)
NM: 2 (1%, -0.3)
Right: 115 (57.5%, +14)

PD: 40 (20%, +3.2)
AVS: 4 (2%, +0.7)
Left: 44 (22%, +3)

M5S: 28 (14%, -21.6)

A/IV: 9 (4.5%)

Others: 4 (2%, +0.1)


Lega really lucked out with the distribution of FPP seats, and will end up with almost twice its PV share's worth of MPs. I guess that might put Salvini in a stronger bargaining position, but we'll see how much that actually gets him. FdI meanwhile is actually not that overrepresented, again because the FPP seats were allotted on a basis of very different numbers (did I mention how much this electoral system sucks?). PD ends up with a fairly solid caucus, especially in the Senate (those House marginals still sting huh). M5S took a beating, as expected, but in the end it has a comparable share of the parliament as in 2013, which is pretty remarkable in these circumstances. A/IV will, unfortunately, also have its voice.

The left and M5S together have enough seats to force a referendum on any constitutional reform (an important guarantee given that A/IV by contrast has shown some willingness to work with the right on these matters). Also, FdI and Lega on their own will only hold 46.3% of seats in the House and 47.5% in the Senate, so good ol' Silvio will have his voice heard. We'll see if he'll occasionally be the voice of reason, or if he's happy to give Meloni a blank check as long as she gives him some perks.

[Aurelius]

I'm pretty sure the party distribution is national for the House (they are still broken down by constituency, but only after the national party distribution).

Right. This is the part I struggle with... just... what? It seems completely nonsensical?

"New regulations for the elections of the doge [of Venice] introduced in 1268 remained in force until the end of the republic in 1797. Their intention was to minimize the influence of individual great families, and this was effected by a complex electoral machinery. Thirty members of the Great Council, chosen by lot, were reduced by lot to nine; the nine chose forty and the forty were reduced by lot to twelve, who chose twenty-five. The twenty-five were reduced by lot to nine, and the nine elected forty-five. These forty-five were once more reduced by lot to eleven, and the eleven finally chose the forty-one who elected the doge."

[Kahane's Grave Is A Gender-Neutral Bathroom]

Man between mass-cleansing Mateo and home volcano Berlusconi this new government is going to be great.

[jaichind]

I assume this is the lower house

[𝕭𝖆𝖕𝖙𝖎𝖘𝖙𝖆 𝕸𝖎𝖓𝖔𝖑𝖆]

SNIP

Great maps, thank you!

Sardinia is funny but I guess it tracks with the left already posting enormous gains there in 2019 compared to 2018. About Tuscany, you can see it had the smallest decrease for M5S outside the South, and that's probably part of what caused the left to tank (you can see the opposite effect in Liguria, where the left's loss was half the average and the M5S's loss was more than twice the average). Basilicata really stands out, and the reason for that is it has an anomalously high A/IV vote - weird and wonderful Di Maio/Calenzi swing voters...

I will likely do a swing map from 2018 soon (and then at some point in the indefinite future swing maps at a more detailed level, but that will take much more time).

[𝕭𝖆𝖕𝖙𝖎𝖘𝖙𝖆 𝕸𝖎𝖓𝖔𝖑𝖆]

The left and M5S together have enough seats to force a referendum on any constitutional reform (an important guarantee given that A/IV by contrast has shown some willingness to work with the right on these matters). Also, FdI and Lega on their own will only hold 46.3% of seats in the House and 47.5% in the Senate, so good ol' Silvio will have his voice heard. We'll see if he'll occasionally be the voice of reason, or if he's happy to give Meloni a blank check as long as she gives him some perks.

I am not sure A/IV is going to accede to Constitutional reform proposals from the Right in general, although they are even more explicitly in favour of switching from a parliamentary system, but still that's significant. And yes, I am sure Silvio will be the voice of reason... of "reasonable" immunity laws and "reasonable" non-coordinated side talks with Putin.

[Oryxslayer]

Insert comment on #Trends and the converging of western politics via globalization, yada yada yada...

[Person Man]

https://twitter.com/GiorgiaMeloni/status/1574862655067660295?t=9HVMAfxpORbr0D_JL...

Looks like she just lost a lot of her American online fans

The rest of us are taking what we can to put Putin's army in the ground.

[Mike88]

Alleged Meloni-Draghi pact: la Repubblica newspaper reports of a deal between Draghi and Meloni regarding the next government, but the PM's office denies any deal.

https://twitter.com/repubblica/status/1574969290885038082

Kiev and public accounts, Draghi’s contacts with the EU: "Meloni will stay at the pacts" [by Tommaso Ciriaco]

The premier acts as guarantor with Brussels, Paris and Berlin. The three conditions: support for Ukraine, loyalty to NATO and not to blow up the debt. Palazzo Chigi denies

ROME - A compromise to gain accreditation with Europe. A somersault to survive warlike slogans impossible to respect. A few hours after the end of the electoral campaign, Giorgia Meloni shelve the political caresses in Orbán and the promise to "break the back" of the Franco-German axis. And she relies on Mario Draghi. At its "umbrella" with the continental Chancelleries. According to diplomatic sources in Paris, Berlin and Brussels, the president of the Council in office contacted Emmanuel Macron, Olaf Scholz and Ursula von der Leyen. Guaranteeing for the leader of the Brothers of Italy. And reassuring the big names of the Union on the three pillars that will guide the action of the future government.

These are three conditions that the former banker previously submitted to the leader of the Brothers of Italy. And that Meloni has undertaken to accept. First: the new government will continue to support the commitment - including military - for Ukraine and to keep the sanctions against Moscow united. Second: the stable and indisputable anchorage to NATO, without hesitation or unmarking. Third: it will not approve new budget shifts, in order to keep public debt under control.
(...)
THE DISMISSAL OF PALAZZO CHIGI

In the late morning, the denial of Palazzo Chigi "The Prime Minister has not made any agreement or made any commitment to guarantee anything. The President of the Council maintains regular contact with international interlocutors to discuss the main dossiers on the agenda and remains committed to allowing an orderly transition, in the context of correct institutional relations ".

[Senator Incitatus]

The chart above has given me pause re: how "educational trends" may simply be downstream from age cohorts and the expanded access to/incentive for education among younger voters. Certainly there is some class aspect to educational background, but it can be overstated in a place like Italy (where education has lagged most globalized nations).

[Andrea]

Bossi is re-elected

In a news surprising few people, it turns out that Interior Ministry allocation of seats from national to multi-member constituencies was, well, not totally correct.
Other seats were wrongly allocated.  I see one Green/Left seat has gone from Piemonte 2 to Campania 1.

[omar04]

How strong are the rural -> rightwards and urban -> leftwards trends? This seems to be a decent predictor looking at the maps for a moment.  From what I can tell Italy's population is well distributed although the north is on top in population and voter turn out.

That has been the very broad trend in Italy for the past decade or so (although "rural" is really a misnomer here - Italy has very few genuinely rural areas left), but these last results have been a bit messy in this regard, mostly because A/IV did shockingly well in the kind of large well-off cosmopolitan urban centers PD had been gaining ground in. And conversely, M5S doing so well across the poorest parts of the country shows that the right-wing vote isn't exactly working-class. At the end of the day, Italy continues to be very much its own Thing.

couldn't M5S be considered "left" economically although they're ideologically a bit untethered? They set up and are trying to keep the national GMI the Brothers Of Italy apparently want to abolish: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citizens%27_income_(Italy)

Also: https://twitter.com/ClassicalSocdem/status/1575117278110154752

[Oryxslayer]

How strong are the rural -> rightwards and urban -> leftwards trends? This seems to be a decent predictor looking at the maps for a moment.  From what I can tell Italy's population is well distributed although the north is on top in population and voter turn out.

That has been the very broad trend in Italy for the past decade or so (although "rural" is really a misnomer here - Italy has very few genuinely rural areas left), but these last results have been a bit messy in this regard, mostly because A/IV did shockingly well in the kind of large well-off cosmopolitan urban centers PD had been gaining ground in. And conversely, M5S doing so well across the poorest parts of the country shows that the right-wing vote isn't exactly working-class. At the end of the day, Italy continues to be very much its own Thing.

couldn't M5S be considered "left" economically although they're ideologically a bit untethered? They set up and are trying to keep the national GMI the Brothers Of Italy apparently want to abolish: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citizens%27_income_(Italy)

Also: https://twitter.com/ClassicalSocdem/status/1575117278110154752

Yes, but no. After years in and supporting government, the parties voter base collapsed. In 2018 it was truly am amorphous anti-political movement for change. After mass defections to the right among those voters who say themselves as 'more right than left' when measured by polls, and a mass exodus via disillusionment, the resulting voter base is refined into something that clearly sees itself within the left. But the party has not fully changed yet to reflect this, because they didn't need to until election results begin to force their hand.

[𝕭𝖆𝖕𝖙𝖎𝖘𝖙𝖆 𝕸𝖎𝖓𝖔𝖑𝖆]

The chart above has given me pause re: how "educational trends" may simply be downstream from age cohorts and the expanded access to/incentive for education among younger voters. Certainly there is some class aspect to educational background, but it can be overstated in a place like Italy (where education has lagged most globalized nations).

I would be remiss not to point out that if the elementary/middle school category was broken down the trend would almost certainly be reversed with PD doing better with the former than with the latter (I believe the 2018 exit poll showed this).

[Antonio the Sixth]

The left and M5S together have enough seats to force a referendum on any constitutional reform (an important guarantee given that A/IV by contrast has shown some willingness to work with the right on these matters). Also, FdI and Lega on their own will only hold 46.3% of seats in the House and 47.5% in the Senate, so good ol' Silvio will have his voice heard. We'll see if he'll occasionally be the voice of reason, or if he's happy to give Meloni a blank check as long as she gives him some perks.

I am not sure A/IV is going to accede to Constitutional reform proposals from the Right in general, although they are even more explicitly in favour of switching from a parliamentary system, but still that's significant. And yes, I am sure Silvio will be the voice of reason... of "reasonable" immunity laws and "reasonable" non-coordinated side talks with Putin.

Yeah, I think it's unlikely that A/IV and the right end up agreeing on a constitutional reform (the latter want presidentialism but the former want "muh sindaco d'Italia" - I'll let you choose which is more cursed, but either way they're not exactly mutually compatible). Still, I don't want to underestimate Calenda and especially Renzi's ability to disappoint us.

As for Berlusconi, of course the former is a given. For the latter though? I sort of doubt he cares enough and I don't think Meloni is ready to give in.

[kaoras]

Also, didn't Italy never really have a "normal" correlation between vote and income? The Red Regions have always been richer than the South.

[Oryxslayer]

Also, didn't Italy never really have a "normal" correlation between vote and income? The Red Regions have always been richer than the South.

The north-south divide has been a thing for a long time, so on average a northern party - like PD now - is going to have a wealthier electorate than the southern-based M5S. But within these regions you still have normal income distributions between rich and poor neighborhoods, cities and countryside, workers and professionals, or other common delineators.

But that is the relative side of the equation. Overall, you would expect the Conservative parties that win northern landsides to have a large share of monied voters. In some cases they do, in others, well, you would expect graphs more resembling A-IV.

[Antonio the Sixth]

New title for a new political cycle in Italy. This coming Winter will certainly be an interesting time, as they say.

Meanwhile, government negotiations are ongoing and rumors are that Salvini is not going down without a fight. He still wants to be Minister of the Interior (although some media have reported he might accept Agriculture instead? now that would be something). Apparently he even threatened that Lega would only offer outside support to Meloni's government, which suffice to say would be a bad omen for said government's long-term stability. Salvini had to publicly deny the news, of course. We'll see what comes out of this, but it's hard to see what cards Salvini has to play here. If he refuses to support Meloni, his right-wing voters would surely desert him.

[Filuwaúrdjan]