Colombian presidential election, June 17 2018

[Hash]

Hash, I have a doubt about a hypotesis that I know that isnt't happening, but can be made. Can Petro drop out from run-off to allow Fajardo entering it or Colombia is like Argentina (Menem dropout that allowed Nestor Kirchner winning without runoff)? And if this is allowed, how would electors react?

Article 190 of the Constitution, paragraph 2: En caso de muerte o incapacidad física permanente de alguno de los dos candidatos con mayoría de votos, su partido o movimiento político podrá inscribir un nuevo candidato para la segunda vuelta. Si no lo hace o si la falta obedece a otra causa, lo reemplazará quien hubiese obtenido la tercera votación; y así en forma sucesiva y en orden descendente.

In the event of the candidate's death or permanent physical incapacity (undefined by legislation, so this could potentially mean 'I have a bad cough'), his party can register a new candidate for the runoff, or, if it doesn't do so the candidate is replaced by the candidate who placed third. So, not like Argentina, and the party has a chance to replace the candidate with another of their own first. The constitution also adds that if this absence occurs less than 2 week before the runoff, it is postponed by 15 days.

I won't even begin to speculate on how shocked and dumbfounded everyone would be if Petro dropped out.

[Hash]

As promised, a more detailed look at the results in Bogotá, which were undoubtedly one of the top stories of the first round. The maps are presented by localidad (locality), basically equivalent to boroughs or municipal districts.







As is almost always the case in every election in Bogotá - local or national - there was a very marked north-south divide and major differences between localities. This north-south divide reflects class and wealth disparities, with the north concentrating Bogotá's wealthiest and most exclusive neighbourhoods, while the south concentrates Bogotá's poorest areas, informal settlements and the like. This divide is particularly visible on Petro's map, but also with Duque and Fajardo.

Properties in Colombia are officially classified into 6 socioeconomic strati which don't measure household income, but which end up roughly corresponding to different social classes based on the type/quality of properties. Strata 1 is 'low-low' (very poor), 2 is 'low' (poor), 3 is 'middle-low' (lower middle-class), 4 is 'middle-high' (middle-class), 5 is 'high' (upper middle-class) and 6 is 'high-high' (wealthiest). Here is a map of Bogotá by strata:



Petro did very well in southern Bogotá, winning roughly 50% of the vote in the city's two poorest localities, Usme and Ciudad Bolívar, and about 45% in Bosa, also poor. On the other hand, Petro won less than 15% of the vote in Usaquén and Chapinero, Bogotá's two wealthiest localities (looking over precinct results in the most exclusive high-end neighbourhoods like Santa Barbara and Chico, Petro won less than 10% there). Petro's policies as mayor - like subsidized reduced transit fares and free 'vital minimum' of water - directly targeted and benefited the city's poorest and intended to reduce social inequalities and benefit vulnerable groups (IDPs, single mothers, recyclers etc.). Compared to 2011, his support increased very substantially in Usme (+15%), Cd. Bolívar (+12%) and Bosa (+9.7%), which is further illustration of how polarizing he was as mayor (and remains). In contrast, his support fell even lower in Usaquén (-7%) and Chapinero (-6%) - but also, perhaps most critically, in 'middle-class'/lower middle-class Engativa (-8%), Fontibón (-8.5%), Teusaquillo (-11.7%), Barrios Unidos (-9.9%) etc...

Petro narrowly lost Kennedy, Bogotá's second most populous locality (population of over 1 million), which is predominantly strata 2 and 3. A quick look at precinct results there confirms my hunch: Fajardo won the strata 3 half, Petro won the strata 2 half (roughly).

Fajardo's best localities were populous suburban middle-class (strata 3/4) Fontibón and Engativá, where he broke 40%. Elections are won and lost in these strata 3/4 localities, so Fajardo's ability to break through with lower middle-class/middle-class voters in the city and its inner residential suburbs explains his success in Bogotá. Similarly, Fajardo also did well (37-40%) in Teusaquillo, Barrios Unidos and Puente Aranda -- middle class (strata 3, or mostly 4 in Teusaquillo) areas. That being said, strata 3 areas were closely disputed, with the top 3 candidates all winning strong results.

Iván Duque won the two wealthiest localities of northern Bogotá, Usaquén and Chapinero, with over 35% with Fajardo a strong second. A quick glance at precinct results in these two localities as well as Suba and Barrios Unidos shows that Duque won the bulk of strata 5/6 (upper middle-class and the wealthiest) areas, with results in the high 30s and 40-50% range. Petro, as aforementioned, got his worst results in those same neighbourhoods. Iván Duque also narrowly won the central locality of Los Mártires (basically a 3-way tie) -- unlike the two other places he won, it is a lower middle-class area and the archetype of mass urban decay and high criminality (maybe that's why it is relatively uribista). With the exception of Usaquén and Chapinero, Duque's vote was pretty uniformly spread, in the 20-30% range -- the uribista vote tends to be fairly evenly distributed, particularly in contrast to the Petro vote. That being said, in comparison to 2014 and 2016, Duque's results were quite weak in poor southern Bogotá -- Cd. Bolívar and Usme, where Petro won about 50% this year, were the only two localities to vote for Zuluaga in the 2014 runoff and in the plebiscite.

Interestingly, Germán Vargas Lleras' support was highest in the wealthiest areas, unlike the CR vote in March, which suggests that the votes he got in Bogotá were mostly right-wing votos de opinión. The very downtown-centric distribution of de la Calle's support, highest in Chapinero and Teusaquillo, probably means that most of his voters were university students and/or young (Chapinero is one of Bogotá's main student areas, and the National University is in Teusaquillo).

Sumapaz, of which only the northern half is shown on these maps, is the largest locality by land area but has the smallest population, with just 1,300 votes cast. It covers the páramo of Sumapaz and is an old rural communist strongholds from the 1930s.

For comparison, here is the map I had made of the 11-M Senate elections:

[Velasco]

The developments in Bogotá look pretty interesting, especially the success of Fajardo among middle and lower middle class voters in contrast to the strong performance of Petro in the poorest localities to the south. In 2010 and 2014 the best localities for Antanas Mockus and Enrique Peñalosa were Teusaquillo and Barrios Unidos, then Chapinero and Usaquén. Fajardo performed strongly in those places but he made greater advances in Fontibón and Engativá. Also, the performance of Fajardo in Usme and Ciudad Bolívar was remarkable if compared with the poor result of Peñalosa in 2014 (7-8%), or the result of Mockus in 2010 (I think he got around 15%). More than ever, Bogotá looks like an island in what regards its electoral behaviour.

The results in the metropolitan municipalities of the Cundinamarca department are interesting too. Petro won in Soacha, a working-class dormitory town located next to the locality of Bosa in Bogotá. It's the most populous municipality of Cundinamarca department, with an estimated population of half a million. At the beginning of the campaign, Petro organized a big rally in the main square  of Soacha were Luis Carlos Galán was killed in 1989. Also, Soacha came to prominence because of the "false positives" scandal during the Uribe administration. Petro got 25.6%, Duque 27.2%, Fajardo 26.2%, Vargas Lleras 5.1% and De la Calle 2%.

Looking around the results of the municipalities north of Bogotá I noticed the high turnouts in places like Chía or Cajica (70-75% range). Turnout in Bogotá and Cundinamarca was 11-12% higher than national average.

Also there is the result of Zipaquirá, the town were Petro was raised. Fajardo got 36%, Oetro 32%, Duque 21%, Vargas Lleras less than 5% and De la Calle 2%. These towns in the Sabana of Bogotá make a contrast with the surrounding uribista countryside. 

Thank you for the great analysis of the results in Colombia and Bogotá. Will you post something on Medellín and Cali? Are their results by comuna available?

[Hash]

An update on the first 5 days of the second round campaign:

Politics are dynamic. Colombia, once again, proved that to be the case this week. With the widespread expectation that Iván Duque is, by far, the most likely next president of Colombia -- the first poll has him up 55-35 on Petro -- the old 'traditional' politicians, who mostly supported Vargas Lleras in the first round, are all rushing to Duque's side.

The Conservatives, who had many congressmen supporting Vargas Lleras in the first round, have officially endorsed Duque, with those who had been behind Vargas - like senator-elect David Barguil, who is respectable despite being from Córdoba, or President of the Senate Efraín Cepeda, who isn't nearly as respectable - have endorsed Duque, which makes some degree of sense and is probably more coherent with conservative ideology than backing Santos for 8 years was. Yet, the 'santista' Conservatives had abandoned and repudiated Marta Lucía Ramírez in 2014, and now they are all acclaiming her as the very symbol of integrity and political excellence and a true representative of the Conservative Party.

Cambio Radical has also endorsed Duque, trying to save face a bit by saying that they're "satisfied" by the recognition given by Duque to Vargas Lleras' platform and that they'd very much appreciate it if a Duque administration supported CR's legislative proposals. Once again, this is somewhat coherent - Vargas Lleras is a right-winger, CR is a right-wing party and it's obvious who they have more in common with between Duque and Petro. It's also unsurprising and had basically been foreseeable for months: in January (I think), Vargas Lleras' campaign trips suspiciously overlappedw with Álvaro Uribe's campaign trips on three separate occasions in the Eje Cafetero, and they 'chatter over breakfast coffee' at the hotel in Manizales, and I doubt they talked about sightseeing plans. The rumour at the time, confirmed by the facts today, was that they had agreed to support one another if only one of them made it to the runoff. Still, Vargas Lleras was pretty tough on Duque during the campaign, calling him inexperienced and going at him for his stance on the peace process. Moreover, Vargas Lleras and Uribe were, until quite recently, not on speaking terms and apparently hadn't spoken to another another since about 2009: Uribe had been furious at Vargas Lleras for not supporting the second reelection, and when Vargas was about to be appointed defence minister in Santos' first cabinet in August 2010, Uribe reportedly threatened to leave the country if that happened (Santos defused this early sign of tension with his predecessor by putting Vargas at interior and justice). Vargas Lleras has also repeatedly claimed that the DAS (intelligence service which under Uribe basically functioned as a criminal operation for hire) was behind the second terrorist attack against him in 2005.

As if anybody actually gave a sh**t, Juan Carlos Pinzón will also be voting Duque. Just in case we cared, but nobody does. Dig yourself back into your hole.

The Partido de la U will leave its members free to choose, but around 90% of its congressmen are said to be behind Duque and only a small irrelevant faction with Petro. The party had officially supported Vargas Lleras, but a few of its Caribbean congressmen had supported Duque in the first round. Not a huge surprise either: the Partido de la U was born uribista, and is a party of power now almost quasi-exclusively made up of corrupt clientelist machines and their owners, whose continued existence depends on access to bureaucratic spoils and marmalade. I have no doubt that we will see the likes of the Gnecco clan, Dilian's people or whoever else supporting Duque and singing his praises. The exception is from at least one of the two U senators which have, despite both being ex-uribistas, become the most vocal anti-uribistas and supporters of the peace process: Armando Benedetti, who will cast a blank vote, and Roy Barreras, who has said that he won't cast a blank vote but hasn't announced any formal endorsement.

Most controversially, Liberal Party boss César Gaviria, the father of the Convivir, has announced his support to Iván Duque, with the caveats that their differences on the peace agreement and judicial reform will be 'settled in Congress or the courts'. Gaviria doesn't have any votes to negotiate, given that de la Calle's few voters probably hate Gaviria as much as everyone else, but he does have a sizable caucus to negotiate away to the likely next president. This support is incoherent and controversial within the party. Gaviria had been one of Uribe's main opponents as Liberal leader from 2005-6 to 2009-10 and had been a key architect in Santos' 2014 runoff victory over Uribe's candidate Zuluaga. Over this time he had virulently criticized and attacked Uribe as, basically, a liar and totalitarian dictator. In 2010, between both rounds, Gaviria had endorsed Santos in an infamous letter which ripped into Uribe's record on major issues (and the ever hotheaded temperamental Uribe had responded in kind), in one of the first signs of tensions between Uribe and Santos. Now, however, old Gaviria is claiming that his past issues with Uribe have been miraculously settled and that he never really attacked him that harshly to begin with. It is also incoherent because the Liberals, since even before 2010, had made peace and victims one of their main banners, and now Gaviria is 'surrendering' the party to uribismo without getting anything in exchange. As a journalist on La W Radio repeatedly insisted, much to Gaviria's exasperation and anger, Gaviria endorsed Duque in exchange for 'Duque reading a paper'.

The reverse side of the coin to this controversial negotiation is that daddy is only really looking to place his son Simón Gaviria (until early 2017 head of the national planning department) somewhere (in early 2017, when Vargas was the favourite, there were several reports that Vargas had offered Simón to be his running-mate). Duque and Gaviria have both denied that Simón will be in Duque's cabinet, but I don't think they've said anything about one of the hundreds of plum posts you can give to the friends. This negotiation was somewhat foreseeable, since while Gaviria was keeping de la Calle's dead candidacy on life support and preventing any alliance with Fajardo, in an interview he was already singing Duque's praises.

Gaviria's move has been very controversial, even if claims the support of all but a handful (about ten or so out of 40ish?) red congressmen, with Juan Fernando Cristo (leader of an internal dissidence against Gaviria since Cristo lost that Liberal primary in November) going after him every chance he gets and, more relevantly, retiring Liberal senator Juan Manuel Galán saying that Gaviria has 'sold out' and 'betrayed' the Liberal Party and liberal values to the 'far-right' and making further signs that he is re-founding his late father's Nuevo Liberalismo movement (likely with his brother, retiring CR senator Carlos Fernando Galán, who is also against his own party's decision to support Uribe). Ironically, it was a young Juan Manuel Galán who had, very symbolically, 'handed over' Luis Carlos Galán's torch to Gaviria at his father's funeral in 1989... and now Gaviria is handing over the pathetic remnants of the Liberal Party to Uribismo 2.0.

In short, Duque, without even doing anything, has inherited Santos' old Unidad Nacional coalition, which, fuelled by the corruption of bureaucratic spoils, quotas, marmalade and illegal contributions, had guaranteed Santos' 'governability' for 7 years. Duque is claiming that endorsements don't imply political or bureaucratic agreements, and that there will be no more marmalade or quotas in his government... but you're hopelessly naive if you think Duque won't govern the same way as everyone else has governed for centuries. As I could have predicted months ago, Duque will govern, at least for the first 1-2 years, with an obedient Congress where he will have large majorities... just like Uribe and Santos... largely filled with the same bottom-feeding gutter rats who voted with both Uribe and Santos' administrations. As senator Jorge Enrique Robledo tweeted:

-What is a santista?
-An ex-uribista.

-What is an uribista?
-An ex-santista.

As always, los mismos con las mismas. So much for the 'Colombian Macron' (as TIME magazine has called him, undoubtedly in one of the countless uninformed and sh**tty foreign media articles on the election which I can't be bothered to read).

On the other side, Petro's attempts to replicate Santos' 2014 runoff 'war v. peace' dichotomy has been made more difficult by Sergio Fajardo and Humberto de la Calle both announcing they will cast a blank vote. The Polo Democrático has, by a large majority, endorsed Petro -- but several of its leaders, like Iván Cepeda, Alexander López, Alirio Uribe and Wilson Borja, were already with Petro. Jorge Enrique Robledo, who is still holding on to old grudges against Petro, will cast a blank vote. Petro's cultists are angrily attacking Robledo and Fajardo and calling them all sorts of things, but back in 2010 Petro had also voted 'en blanco' between Santos and Mockus. The Green Alliance yesterday instructed its members and leaders to 'vote against Duque' - leaving them free to choose between Petro and the blank vote, but banning them from supporting Duque. Antonio Navarro Wolff and other Greens who came from Petro's old Progresistas in 2013 (Angélica Lozano, Jorge Guevara, Inti Asprilla) and others on the left (Antonio Sanguino) have endorsed Petro.

Meanwhile, Uribe avoided saying the words 'gay' or 'lesbian' in a video and re-branded them "non-heterosexuals".

[Hash]

In 2010 and 2014 the best localities for Antanas Mockus and Enrique Peñalosa were Teusaquillo and Barrios Unidos, then Chapinero and Usaquén. Fajardo performed strongly in those places but he made greater advances in Fontibón and Engativá. Also, the performance of Fajardo in Usme and Ciudad Bolívar was remarkable if compared with the poor result of Peñalosa in 2014 (7-8%), or the result of Mockus in 2010 (I think he got around 15%). More than ever, Bogotá looks like an island in what regards its electoral behaviour.

My guess would be that Fajardo carries no baggage in Bogotá, particularly with the key strata 3 demographic, unlike Peñalosa - who has, for years, been branded as a 'pro-rich' centre-right politician who is unpopular with poorer voters and the left - and even Mockus - who, despite being a great mayor, didn't really challenge 'neoliberal' urban development policies or target his policies at matters like inequality. That being said, in 2015, when Peñalosa finally won, he won in Fontibón and Engativa (which had voted Petro in 2011), although he did very poorly in Cd. Bolívar, Usme and Bosa (he may have come third in at least one of those boroughs).

It is worth noting that, from my look at precinct numbers, Petro's support holds up in strata 1-2 low-income neighbourhoods and informal settlements even in wealthier Suba, Usaquén and Chapinero, so there was a very clear class vote, even stronger than in the 2011 mayoral race.

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Unlike Bogotá, I need to match precincts and zones to their corresponding comunas in every other city, so it takes more busywork and is a bit tedious, but I will have similar maps for Medellín, Cali and perhaps other cities.

[Hash]

Medellín isn't all that interesting: as always, uribista candidate Duque won by a very large margin, 53.3% to 30.9% over Fajardo, with Petro a very weak third with 7.8%. Duque won every comuna and corregimiento (rural administrative divisions). With the exception of Comuna 14 (El Poblado), Duque and the other candidates' numbers were pretty similar throughout the city - Duque never under 45%, for example.







Here is an old map (2010) of largest strati by barrio: here

While there were no massive differences between comunas, some patterns do stand out - and they're sometimes quite interesting. Duque's best result was in Comuna 14 (El Poblado), Medellín's wealthiest high-end comuna which is predominantly upper-class strata 6. It has usually been the most uribista comuna, and he won 72% of the vote there -- while Petro finished fourth, behind de la Calle! His second best result was in Comuna 11 (Laureles-Estadio), Medellín's second wealthiest comuna, predominantly strata 4 and 5. He was over 55% in Comuna 15 (Guayabal) and Comuna 16 (Belén) which have many strata 4 and 5 neighbourhoods, particularly the latter, and are broadly middle-class.

He was held under 50%, and Fajardo won his best results (35%ish) in Comunas 1 through 7 in northern Medellín, which are, broadly speaking, the poorest parts of the city -- particularly the very poor (strata 1) mountain-flanked barrios and informal settlements in Comunas 1 (Popular), 3 (Manrique) and 6 (12 de Octubre). Comuna 5 (Castilla), the only one where Duque's majority was less than 10%, is largely strata 3. So, once again, it seems as if Fajardo broke through with this big middle-class demographic, both in Bogotá and Medellín (although still behind uribismo). What is more interesting is that Fajardo also did well in the very poor (and rough) Comuna 1 (Popular), taking over 36%: given Petro's weakness in the poorest parts of the city (unlike in Bogotá), perhaps the non-uribista vote went to Fajardo instead? It is unusual because, in 2011 (mayoral) and 2015 (gubernatorial), fajardismo did best in wealthier middle-class comunas in the south, while losing in the north. This time, he did quite poorly in the middle-class south (only 19% in El Poblado, 24% in Laureles-Estadio). The exception to this is Comuna 13 (San Javier), a poor and very violent comuna which was the site of the infamous Operación Orion in 2003 and has, despite a lot being written about its fabulous 'reinvention', remained violent and was recently in the news again with a new spate of violent gang warfare (and the accompanying humanitarian impact: homicide and displacement). Perhaps the violence explains why it is more uribista (55%) than other poor comunas, although the other ones aren't all that peaceful either.

Gustavo Petro's two best comunas - where he broke 10% - were downtown Comuna 10 (La Candelaria) and Comuna 4 (Aranjuez), just north of downtown. The University of Antioquia is located in Comuna 4, and the National University is across the river in Comuna 7. The student population may explain both Petro and de la Calle's good results in La Candelaria, which is also the traditional 'heart' of the city (it is quite rough and violent too).

Cali should be more interesting.

[Dr. MB]

I always assumed Medellín was a fairly left-wing city – although I admit I have limited knowledge.

[Hash]

I always assumed Medellín was a fairly left-wing city – although I admit I have limited knowledge.

No major Colombian city is traditionally 'left-wing' (with the possible, questionable, exception of Bogotá since 2003), but Medellín has always been reputed as one of the most conservative cities in one of the most traditionally conservative (and Catholic) regions of Colombia, the paisa heartland. The old textile industrialists of Medellín were paternalistic, hiring a largely female workforce in their factories and promoting 'good anti-communist' Catholic trade unionism (what later became the UTC union confederation). Paisas also have a stereotypical reputation as proud, verraco, stubborn, frugal, hardworking and good businessmen who are fiercely regionalist, conservative and devout Catholics. Álvaro Uribe is basically a walking stereotype of the rural paisa landowner on horseback. As always, these stereotypes are a bit exaggerated, but they're pretty common and they're reinforced by traditional historical myths and symbols (like 'the paisa colonization'). 

https://www.revistaarcadia.com/noticias/articulo/origen-de-la-tension-entre-antioquia-y-bogota/56988

[Velasco]

perhaps the non-uribista vote went to Fajardo instead?

Maybe there's a combination of several factors. On the one hand, Fajardo is a well-known local candidate. Even though he is a centrist, as Mayor of Medellín and later as Governor of Antioquía he tried to implement policies that tackle poverty and inequality. However, you say his performance was not that good in the poorest comunas when he ran for Governor, so that point is not clear... On the other hand, Medellín and the whole Antioquía department are Uribe's land. Also, there's a strong social conservatism linked to the paisa identity and the Catholic faith. Maybe the system of values and beliefs linked to uribismo and paisa traditionalism permeate all levels of society. Even non-uribista voters could see Petro as a radical castrochavista, so they pick the candidate who is more moderate and plays with home advantage.
 
Clara López performed much better than Petro in the 2014 election, but I don't know if she did better among the middle-class or the poor strata. I wonder if Clara López is perceived as a less dangerous kind of leftist than Petro, either by political stances or by social background.

On a side note. it's worth noting that the same localities in Bogotá that voted strongly for  Petro (Usme, Ciudad Bolívar and Bosa) voted for Santos in 2010, when the latter ran as the Uribe's candidate.

[Starry Eyed Jagaloon]

I'm interested in Fajardo's seeming underperformance with the upper-middle+ classes. While Duque taking Poblado, for example, makes sense, I would have thought Fajardo could give him a run for his money in Laurales, and perform generally better in the southern half of Medellin than he did.

[Hash]

Cali was an intriguing three-way race: Fajardo won 32.5%, Duque 28.3% and Petro 26.4%. Petro's followers were disappointed and surprised by their third-place finish, apparently having expected to finish on top. Duque won a solid result for uribismo in a city where Zuluaga won only 18% in 2014, confirming uribismo's growing strength in Cali since 2015, seen both in the 2015 gubernatorial race and the 2016 plebiscite (the Sí only narrowly won in Cali).

 

Interactive map of socioeconomic strati: http://www.cali.gov.co/planeacion/publicaciones/130401/mapa_estratificacion/





Sergio Fajardo's support did not vary substantially between the 22 comunas of the urban areas, ranging from a low of 24% to a high of 40% with most results between 30% and 35%. As in Bogotá, Fajardo's best results came from 'middle-class' areas broadly defined - from strata 3 (lower middle) to 5 (upper middle). His top result (40.5%) was in Comuna 17 in southern Cali, which is predominantly strata 5, and he won other good results in Comuna 5 (38.8%), which is basically all strata 3 and Comuna 10 (35.2%), also predominantly strata 3. He also did quite well in the city's wealthiest comunas, namely Comuna 2 -- the well-off leafy strata 4-6 neighbourhoods and high-end shops and nightlife north of the Cali river (34.8%), aforementioned Comuna 17 and Comuna 19 (34.5%). Interestingly, Fajardo also held his own in some of the poorest comunas, like Comuna 1 (30%), Comuna 6 (34%) and Comuna 18 (30.3%).

Iván Duque's best comuna was Comuna 22, the city's wealthiest (strata 6) mostly consisting of gated villas and compounds in the southern end of the city, where he won 50%. It was the only comuna to vote for Zuluaga in the runoff in 2014, but it voted Sí in 2016. As in the other cities I've looked at, Duque's other top results followed wealth rankings: Comuna 2 (35.7%) and Comuna 19 (34.5%). But not exclusively so: Duque also did well in downtown Comuna 3 (32.2%), which includes Cali's fairly seedy and dangerous downtown district but also some more pleasant areas in the Barrio San Antonio. In Comuna 9, which includes strata 1-3 areas south of downtown, including some very run-down and dangerous areas, Duque won over 30%.

Gustavo Petro narrowly won the district of Aguablanca (Comunas 13, 14, 15 and 21), a large low-income area on the periphery of the city with a large Afro-Colombian populations and internally displaced people who fled the violence on the Pacific coast, in Cauca, in the Chocó etc. It is the city's poorest and also most dangerous (violent) part, plagued by gang/criminal warfare and very high homicide rates (Cali's homicide rate, near 50, makes it one of the 'most violent' big cities in Colombia). Petro won over 30% in all comunas of Aguablanca, he also broke 30% in Comuna 7 and Comuna 12, and did relatively well in Comunas 1, 6, 18 and 20 which are also poorer. His worst result was, predictably, upper-class Comuna 22 and he was below 20% in Comunas 2, 17 and 19.

Duque did relatively well in Aguablanca as well, with over 30% in Comuna 14 and 27% in Comunas 13 and 15. In 2016, Comunas 1, 13, 14, 20 and 21 voted No in the plebiscite (and Comuna 15 voted Sí with 50.02%), although turnout was very low.

[Hash]

I understand that as I get deeper into my analysis, I may lose my few readers, but I will continue for at least 2-3 more cities of interest.

Manizales, a city of around 400,000, is the capital of Caldas in the Eje Cafetero. It is often ranked as one of the 'best cities to live in', it is relatively affluent, prosperous and safe compared to many other cities, it is located in a beautiful natural environment (if you like mountains, temperate climates and not freaked out by living close to an active volcano) and it is a relatively young and vibrant city home to five major public and private universities (and it is now aggressively marketing itself as a 'college town'). I lived and work there for nearly a year, so I have a far more thorough understanding of the city.

It was one of Fajardo's top local victories last Sunday: 49.8% against 29.6% for Duque and 8.5% for Petro. Fajardo also won in neighbouring suburban Villamaria (47-32.5). It is a fairly surprising result since in 2014, Manizales voted for Zuluaga with 31% in the first round and 54% in the runoff, but Zuluaga was a caldense and he had a favourite son bonus. In the plebiscite, Manizales only narrowly (50%) voted No.







Fajardo won every comuna, although he lost the corregimientos (rural parts of the municipality) to Duque. His weakest result was Comuna 8 (Palogrande), which he won by less than 1% over Duque, who won his best result in the city with 39.1% -- unsurprisingly, it is Manizales' wealthiest comuna, including its most affluent (strata 5/6) neighbourhoods (Palermo, Milan, Sancancio etc.) and premier nightlife, entertainment and shopping areas (El Cable). Unlike in other cities, Petro didn't do too badly (relatively) in that comuna (9.4%), likely because it includes some university campuses and has a large student/young population (notably, de la Calle won 5.8% there). Fajardo did win nearly 55% in Comuna 6 (Cerro del Oro), which includes the other most affluent neighbourhoods (Suiza) but also newer outlying lower middle-class residential areas. He also won 51% in Comuna 1 (Atardeceres), which has a few upper middle-class areas but is far less 'high-end' than the Cable etc. area.

Fajardo won over 50% in every other comuna except for Comuna 2 (San José), the poorest area in the city, Comuna 3 (Cumanday), which includes the historic centre and is much like other historic centres of other Colombian cities (pretty, but also run-down in parts and fairly sketchy at night) and Comuna 11 (La Macarena), largely poorer older neighbourhoods south of downtown. As in other cities, Fajardo did remarkably well in strata 3 lower middle-class neighbourhoods, even in Comuna 5 (Ciudadela del Norte), which covers newer outlying low-income suburban neighbourhoods on 'the other side of town' (53%). His best results, at over 55%, were in Comuna 9 (Universitaria) and 10 (La Fuente), both largely strata 2-3 lower-income areas (Comuna 9 does have a large student population).

Petro and de la Calle's results seem to reflect the main distribution of students/young adults near the major university campuses, in Comuna 8, 4 (La Estación) and 7 (Tesorito).

Iván Duque's results, while unimpressive, reflect like in Medellín and elsewhere that his support cut across classes, doing best - obviously - in the most affluent areas, but also quite well (33.7%) in poor Comuna 2 and Comuna 11 (31%). Excluding his best result, his support in the city ranged from 24% to 31%, so a fairly evenly spread support. Petro's numbers, while far lower, were also rather evenly distributed, varying only from 7.5% to 10%.

If you're left wondering why Manizales' urban area seems to have the boundaries of an American municipality, it is because Manizales is built on very hilly mountainous terrain and is notorious for its steep streets.

[WMS]

You may like him or dislike him, but regardless of what Uribe and his supporters say Petro isn't a Chavista. He has tried to explain during the campaign that his model has little to do with Venezuela. Also, he has condemned the "democratic involution" (or something in the like) triggered by Maduro in the neighbouring country. You can argue that he was a bit too late in making such statements. Anyway no: Gustavo Petro is a leftist but he's not "castrochavista" (translation: diehard supporter of Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro).  

Regarding Venezuela: is there a correlation between the strong performance in the city of Cúcuta and Norte de Santander department with the refugee flood?

Actually, I'd say it's not what the Uribists think of Petro that is going to sink him like the Titanic, it's what the Colombians between Uribe and Petro politically think of him that is going to sink him. Judging from what Hash has written since this post, Petro is going to have a hard enough time getting the left to all vote for him, much less the center. And that is because Petro, and his supporters like you, can't *convince* all those between Petro and Uribe that Petro isn't a castrochavista because Petro's background on that isn't the most convincing. Or in other words, too many voters have doubts about him.

Hash answered your question about how the Venezuelan refugee flood likely affected the vote there - as you suspected it made them more open to the Uribists. Which makes me wonder:

How much, if at all, is the violent Sandinista suppression of opposition in Nicaragua affecting things in Colombia? I figure it might be just yet another example that can be used against Petro and company on top of Venezuela and Cuba...

[Hash]

Before continuing with more local analysis, I wanted to jump back to discuss voter turnout. Turnout, as I previously noted, was 53.4% - the highest presidential turnout since 1998 and, before that, since 1974, which qualifies as remarkably high turnout in a politically apathetic country. It was only 40% in 2014 (R1), although it increased to 48% in the runoff four years ago.

The map below is a simple map of turnout by department.



The highest turnout was Casanare (65.5%), a department which usually tends to have the highest turnout in most elections, followed by Bogotá which had a remarkable 65% turnout and surrounding Cundinamarca at 64%. Meta (61.7%) and Santander (60%) also had turnout over 60%, while Boyacá (59.4%), Caldas (58.1%), Quindío (56.7%), Risaralda (56.7%), Huila (55.9%), Antioquia (55.4%), Tolima (55.2%) and Nte. de Santander (54.2%) were higher than the national average. With the possible exception of Casanare, these are all relatively prosperous and well-developed departments with major cities and economic centres. Infrastructure in these departments is acceptable, by Colombian standards, so they are not particularly hard to access and accessibility of voting locations is less of a problem (i.e. the physical act of voting doesn't require a whole expedition).

Indeed, turnout in presidential elections generally tends to be higher in major urban centres and other well-off towns, while it is lower in more remote, isolated and/or forgotten regions. In Norte de Santander, for example, turnout was high in Cúcuta (58.1%) and Pamplona (62.6%), but much lower in the very violent and forgotten Catatumbo (41% in Tibú, 30-40% in the other municipalities).

In Antioquia, turnout was very high in the urban Valle de Aburrá (Medellín) - over 60% in Medellín, Envigado, over 55% in La Estrella, Itagui, Bello - and other major cities like Uribe's homebase of Rionegro (68.9%); but much lower in Urabá, an historically 'forgotten' peripheral region with a very violent recent past (46% in Apartadó, 40% in Turbo, 43% in Carepa and Chigorodó), as well as in other peripheral regions like the Lower Cauca (Caucasia 45.8%, El Bagre 32%, Zaragoza 28.3%, 21.7% in Tarazá) or the Northeast (28-33% in Segovia and Remedios, 35% in Amalfi). The Lower Cauca and the Northeast remain violent regions, which depresses turnout, and some smaller villages and towns are poorly connected by roads; moreover, the Hidroituango crisis may have even further depressed turnout in Ituango, Valdivia and other towns along the Cauca river, although turnout is very low regardless in those municipalities. The most remote municipalities of Antioquia (Murindó and Vigía del Fuerte, which are basically Chocó) had turnout below 35%; Dabeiba, Frontino and Urrao also had low turnout.

Turnout was lowest with expats (20.3%, despite extended voting over an entire week), and in Colombia itself in San Andrés and Providencia (26.4%), Vaupés (31.5%), Vichada (33%), La Guajira (34.6%), Guainía (35.8%), Chocó (38.8%) and Amazonas (39.6%). Insular San Andrés is distant, geographically and politically, from the mainland and is not very interested by national politics, which largely ignores its interests besides jingoism about territorial waters and Nicaragua. The other departments are all peripheral border departments (either national boundaries or coastlines) with extreme accessibility problems, very bad or non-existant infrastructure, high poverty, large ethnic populations (Afro or indigenous) and largely forgotten by Bogotá and the national elites. Accessibility of voting stations is one thing, but these departments are quite capable of relatively decent turnout in local and congressional elections, when stakes are far more local and close to home.

Turnout was still relatively low across the Caribbean, even if significantly higher from the horrendously low levels of 2014 (R1) and 2016. Bolívar had just 41.2% turnout; Magdalena, Atlántico and Córdoba had turnout below 50% and just Sucre and Cesar had turnout marginally above 50%. While not a forgotten or remote region, the Caribbean is peripheral in national politics and hasn't "elected a president" (i.e. a local boy) since the 19th century, and has traditionally been used as a reservoir of votes for outside presidential candidates who take advantage of the region's stereotypical proclivity towards machine politics (at least until this year). In congressional and local elections, when these machines are on the line and issues more local and close to home, Caribbean turnout is over the national average. It is stereotypically 'parochial' turnout.

The map below compares turnout on May 27 to congressional (Senate) turnout on March 11. Nationally, turnout increased by 4.6% from 48.8% to 53.4%, but, as is usually the case, the correlation (at the departmental level) between both turnouts was weak (RSQ value of 0.14; the RSQ value comparing 2018-R1 and 2014-R1 turnout is 0.88). This means that turnout patterns vary substantially from congressional to presidential elections, which is one of the key features of Colombian politics and voter turnout.



The biggest turnout increase was in Bogotá (+16.2%), followed by Cundinamarca (+12.9%), expats (+10.5%) and Antioquia (+10.2%). Turnout also increased by over 5% in Casanare (+9.6%), Santander (+8.9%), Meta (+8.7%), Boyacá (+7.6%), Tolima (+7.4%), Risaralda (+6.8%), Caquetá (+6.7%), Caldas (+5.8%) and Valle (+5.7%). With the exception of Caquetá and Casanare, these are, again, all fairly prosperous and well-developed departments home to many large cities and other economic centres. This shows that, compared to congressional elections, voto de opinión turnout is much higher in presidential elections.

Turnout fell by over 10% in Guaviare, Magdalena, Atlántico, Sucre, Chocó, La Guajira, Amazonas and Vichada and by over 20% in Vaupés, San Andrés and Guainía. The Caribbean, save Cesar (basically the exact same turnout both elections), stands out, as does the Amazon. This shows how machines operate full-speed in congressional elections, which are a sordid festival of vote buying, fraud and other electoral law violations in Atlántico and elsewhere (the attorney general has announced 'sickening' revelations about fraud and other illegalities in Atlántico in the recent congressional elections, but is very helpfully being coy and saying he won't give details until after the runoff). In the remote border regions, turnout decrease shows how these regions are forgotten in presidential campaigns while congressional elections feature local candidates and more visible campaigns.

[Tender Branson]

FWIW, Duque leads Petro by 20% in a new runoff poll (the pollster was one of the more accurate in the 1st round).

55% Duque
35% Petro

[Hash]

Final wave of polls. Take your bets.

Pollster: Duque / Petro / Voto en blanco
YanHaas (RCN/La FM/regional media): 52 / 34 / 14 (Duque +18)
Invamer (Semana/Caracol TV/Blu Radio): 57.2 / 37.3 / 5.5 (Duque +20)
Datexco (W Radio): 46.2 / 40.2 / 13.6 (Duque +6)
Cifras & Conceptos (Caracol Radio/RED+): 45.3 / 36.4 / 18.3 (Duque +9)
CNC (CM&): 51 / 38 / 11 (Duque +13)
Guarumo (El Tiempo): 52.5 / 36 / 11.5 (Duque +16.5)

[BundouYMB]

One last poll:

Centro Estratégico Latinoamericano de Geopolítica: Duque 45.5, Petro 40 (Duque +5.5)

I want to believe the polls showing Petro close, but the more accurate pollsters from the first round are showing bigger leads for Duque. The closest poll from a pollster that was successful in round 1 is Cifras & Conceptos with Duque +9.

Notably however Centro Nacional de Consultoría showed Duque's lead shrinking from 20 points the previous week to 13 points this week. Taking this evidence collectively I'm inclined to simultaneously believe that Duque has a bigger lead but also that he's losing ground. I think Duque wins by around 8-10 points in the end.

[Hash]

I did not include that last poll, because 'Celag' is practically a Petro internal: it is a left-wing think tank tied to Rafael Correa and Podemos -- which isn't to say that their work is without value, but their polls are definitely a bit loaded. Their last poll, a month before the first round, had Duque leading Petro by only 4%.

In the next few days, as I get back into my routine, I'll discuss the latest developments in the campaign and hopefully talk about the 'voto en blanco' and the main ideological/policy differences in this election.

[BundouYMB]

I did not include that last poll, because 'Celag' is practically a Petro internal: it is a left-wing think tank tied to Rafael Correa and Podemos -- which isn't to say that their work is without value, but their polls are definitely a bit loaded. Their last poll, a month before the first round, had Duque leading Petro by only 4%.

In the next few days, as I get back into my routine, I'll discuss the latest developments in the campaign and hopefully talk about the 'voto en blanco' and the main ideological/policy differences in this election.

Same story with Datexo, unfortunately. They also had Duque leading by only 4 before the first round.

[Velasco]

My bet right now would be that Duque wins by a margin around 10%. The endorsement of Claudia López and Antanas Mockus and the compromise made by Petro of not becoming a new Chávez won't be enough. Anyway, I hope the gap shrinks a little bit in the following days.

(...) because Petro, and his supporters like you, can't *convince* all those between Petro and Uribe that Petro isn't a castrochavista because Petro's background on that isn't the most convincing. Or in other words, too many voters have doubts about him (...)

I prefer Petro over Duque/Uribe for obvious reasons. Ideological affinity is an important reason, but not the only one. Uribe and the coalition backing Duque represent reactionary, traditionalist and male chauvinist values that I dislike. I've never been a fan of Chávez, on the other hand. Petro admired him in the past, but distanced later. He has condemned Maduro, maybe too late. I know that Petro awakes fears and concerns among some people who voted for Fajardo in the first round. I know something about his career, virtues and flaws. Just to be clear: preferring Petro does not imply that I'm a big fan or a diehard supporter. I think that Petro is far from being perfect, but he has the support of large social sectors (the young, the poor, Amerindian, Afro-Colombian, etc) and is the undisputed leader of the Colombian left (despite senator Robledo). I don't think that Petro is chavista nowadays and neither is his platform. On the other hand, I never saw Petro as a viable candidate to defeat uribismo in the second round. If Ir was eligible to vote in Colombia, I would have a hard time in the first round choosing between him and Fajardo. I think the latter would have had more chances in the runoff and certainly he was good mayor of Medellín and is a decent person. Tactical vote would have been a possibility.

[Hash]

As alluded to, Petro scored two major endorsements -- Claudia López (Fajardo's running-mate and outgoing Green senator) and Antanas Mockus (Green senator-elect, and 2010 presidential candidate), who were basically the last two major figures with a genuine popular following who hadn't made public their endorsement. When push comes to shove, Claudia and Antanas choosing Petro over Duque isn't surprising, particularly for Claudia López who has always been very vocal in her anti-uribismo and her entire career both in politics and academia/research has been devoted to denouncing the sort of corruption and criminality which has now found a new common home in Duque's Uribismo 2.0. She had been pretty critical of Petro in the past, and Uribe has taken the opportunity to remind us all of that. Their public endorsement does boost Petro's momentum somewhat, weakening the 'neither-nor' blank vote by reinforcing Petro's anti-uribista/war v. peace message. Although it probably doesn't bring any votes, Petro was also endorsed by Ingrid Betancourt, which has some symbolic importance because of how she is remembered (uribistas wasted no time in calling her ungrateful). Since she was rescued in 2008, she has spent most of her time abroad and rarely opined on Colombian politics, except to support the peace process and now to endorse Petro. She isn't particularly left-wing, but in endorsing Petro she kind of recovers the youthful radicalism and unorthodoxy she was known for as a maverick politician before 2002.

In exchange for Claudia and Antanas' endorsement, Petro publicly committed himself to a list of '12 commandments', written on some sort of marble slab. The irony here is that, back in 2010, Santos publicly said that he could sign on marble that he wouldn't raise taxes (which he later did, of course). The '12 commandments' are a mix of Antanas and Claudia's pet causes and reassurances to centre-leftists worried about Petro:

1. I will not expropriate (i.e. no Chávez)
2. I will not call a constituent assembly (i.e. no Chávez/Maduro, walking back a controversial pledge he made late last year to call for a constituent assembly from day 1)
3. I will manage public resources as sacred resources ('public resources as sacred resources' is Mockus' famous cause)
4. I will promote private initiative, entrepreneurship and formalization (i.e. no Chávez)
5. I will guarantee pluralist democracy and respect for diversity
6. I will respect the 'Estado Social de Derecho' (social state of law - the definition of the Colombian state under the 1991 Constitution)
7. I will respect the peace agreement
8. I will appoint the most capable
9. I will guarantee gender equality
10. I will promote the orderly transition to clean energies (i.e. won't kill oil and coal immediately)
11. I will promote free and quality public education for all Colombians
12. I will guarantee the fulfillment of the results of the anti-corruption referendum (more later)


On June 5, the Senate agreed with 84 votes in favour to support the 'anti-corruption referendum', meaning that it will now go to the polls within 3 months (the President will set the date). In 2017, a promoting committee spearheaded by Claudia López and Angelica Lozano submitted 4.3 million signatures (of which 3 million were validated) to hold a 'consulta popular' (sort of citizen-initiated referendum). The Senate's approval was held up and delayed by the CNE's incompetence and politicking, and again delayed in April 2018 with an agreement between Claudia López and the uribistas to postpone consideration of the issue until June so as to not coincide with the first round (in exchange, uribistas agreed to support it). Because it is election time and no politician wants to be seen voting against 'anti-corruption', even if they don't like it, senators kept their word and voted by an overwhelming majority to support it. Even the crooks, criminals, heirs and thieves who aren't generally associated with 'anti-corruption' supported it! The list of those who voted in favour include all four Opción Ciudadana senators (lol), Conservatives like Hernán Andrade, Juan Manuel Corzo, Olga Suárez, Nadia Blel, Yamina Pestana and Samy Merheg, Liberals like Arleth Casado and Mario Fernández, CR folks like Antonio Guerra, Daira Galvis, Bernabé Celis, Arturo Char, Partido de la U people like Eduardo Pulgar, Andrés García, José Name, Mauricio Lizcano and of course the near-entirety of the CD bench (led by Álvaro "mientras no estén en la cárcel" Uribe).

I'm a cynic, so I think they don't have all that much to lose by voting in favour anyway: approval will require turnout over a third of the electorate (12 million), which isn't a slam dunk in Colombia (consider Uribe's 2003 referendum), particularly as it will be the fourth time voters need to go to the polls in like 6 months, even if it is for a popular topic which has excited many, and it is pretty obvious to me that the machines won't be doing anything to favour higher turnout. As for the actual contents, I am not entirely convinced this will do all that much to 'end corruption', although it could be a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, nobody really seems to care about the actual contents and proposals made by this 'consulta', except a few like Roy Barreras - whose quite reasonable and valid criticisms of this were drowned out and lack some credibility because he's known as a wheeler-and-dealer master at politicking. The 7 actual questions/proposals are:

1. Reduce congressmen and senior public officials' salaries.
2. Jail for everyone convicted of corruption (no possibility for house arrest or other special forms of incarceration) and banning them from ever entering into contracts with the state.
3. Transparent public contracts/bids.
4. Participatory budgeting (popular consultations in budget processes).
5. Mandatory, public annual accountability for congressmen (attendance, votes, lobbying/private interests, public investments etc.)
6. Public tax returns (income, assets, taxes paid, conflicts of interest).
7. Three term limit for Senate, House, assemblies, municipal councils and JALs.

If adopted, the results would be binding and the Congress would need to translate these popular 'commands' into laws or constitutional reforms, and, if they did not do so, the President could adopt these changes by decree. However, there are already legal questions being raised about all 7 questions - some are already covered by law, others would require a constitutional amendment, others may be unconstitutional and others may not be within the legal scope of a 'consulta popular'.


In less relevant footnote stuff, CR senator Carlos Fernando Galán - Juan Manuel Galán's brother and one of Luis Carlos Galán's other sons - has left CR and resigned his seat in the Senate (he didn't seek reelection, so he had just a few days left in it anyway), opposed to the party's decision to endorse Duque. He was one of the few people in that party with any principles, although he didn't leave the party when it endorsed Oneida Pinto or Kiko Gómez. Luis Felipe Henao, one of Vargas Lleras' closest advisers and former housing minister, has also broken with the party line and will go for a blank vote -- can't vote for Duque because of the peace process, can't vote for Petro because he is an authoritarian caudillo.

El Tiempo, Colombia's traditional newspaper of record and still the leading national newspaper (second highest circulation behind the Q'Hubo tabloids), has endorsed Iván Duque in an editorial. El Tiempo was owned by the Santos family until recently (the paper's director, Roberto Pombo, is married to Juan Manuel Santos' cousin), but since 2012 it has been owned by Luis Carlos Sarmiento, Colombia's richest man. It was, historically, a Liberal newspaper and still prides itself for being a liberal paper -- although, in reality, El Tiempo was the voicepiece of Bogotá's urbane Liberal (but not necessarily liberal) political-economic elite, a newspaper of power which supported successive presidents since the fall of Rojas Pinilla. It has lost much of its power and influence as a newspaper, the quality of its columnists and journalists has declined significantly as has the quality of its overall contents. Its editorial still makes mention of its ostensible liberal values, but Colombian liberalism isn't the liberalism we may be used to. It supported the Sí in the 2016 plebiscite, and reiterated its continued support for the peace process in its editorial, but as a pro-establishment newspaper owned by Colombia's richest man, who has made friends with every politician, Duque is the obvious choice.

El Espectador, historically Bogotá's competing Liberal newspaper but now owned by another major business conglomerate (the Santo Domingo group, which also owns Caracol TV, the leading private TV channel), had an editorial praising the blank vote but without it being a formal endorsement. Semana, Colombia's high-quality and esteemed weekly news magazine, has several columnists which have endorsed Petro (like María Jimena Duzán).

[Hash]

I wanted to discuss a potentially important issue ahead of Sunday's runoff which many foreign observers may not quite realize: the voto en blanco, or blank vote. The 'blank vote' is constitutionally recognized as a valid vote, alongside votes for candidates, and counted as such with the total votes (art. 258 of the 1991 Constitution) and appears as an option of the ballot paper (as a separate box alongside the boxes with the candidates' names, pictures and logos).

According to art. 258 of the Constitution, if the blank vote wins a 'majority' (a 2009 amendment removed 'absolute majority' but there remains legal debate on what majority means) of the vote in elections for a public corporation (congress or local deliberative body), governor, mayor or the first round of the presidential elections, the elections must be repeated with new candidates. While there will be a 'blank vote' option on Sunday's ballots, in the very unlikely event that the blank vote wins more votes than the two candidates, the second round would not be repeated and whichever of the two candidates had the most votes would be elected. In other words, a blank vote in the runoff is entirely symbolic and, basically, a 'wasted vote' since, unlike on May 27, it will have no legal consequences. In the 2016 plebiscite, which was a binary yes/no choice without actual candidates, there was no blank vote option. The MOE, Colombia's leading election monitoring NGO, has recommended that the blank vote option be abolished for runoffs given that it is legally useless.

However, given that many people refuse to choose between 'two evils' (uribismo and petrismo/castrochavismo) or want to protest such a polarized choice, it is likely that many voters will still go for a blank vote. Leading politicians, including Fajardo, de la Calle, Robledo, Carlos Fernando and Juan Manuel Galán, Juan Fernando Cristo and others, have publicly announced they will cast a blank vote -- decisions which, in every case, have been castigated by Petro and his fans on social media, who claim that a blank vote is a vote for Duquribe.

The blank vote has, with the exception of the Invamer-Gallup poll, gotten over 10% in all second round polls released. It would be an historic record for the blank vote in a presidential election. It remains to be seen if, in a country with historically low turnout and high political apathy, people who don't want to vote for either Duque or Petro will bother going to the polls just to cast a useless blank vote.

The blank vote is, in reality, primarily designed for local elections -- and it has, on repeated but still isolated occasions, been successful in defeating all candidates and forcing new elections. The most famous case is likely the 2011 mayoral election in Bello (Antioquia), the second-largest city in the Medellín metro area with a population of over 460,000, in which the blank vote won 56.7% of the vote in an election with only a single candidate. It was an organized protest vote against the corrupt/criminal Suárez Mira clan, dominant in Bello for over 15 years (led by former senator Óscar Suárez Mira, convicted for parapolítica and currently on the run facing more charges). The Suárez Mira clan ended up winning the December 2011 by-election which followed, and retained power in 2015 (through César Augusto, Óscar's brother, currently on trial for... falsifying his high school diploma!). In the 2015 local elections, the blank vote won over 50% in Tinjacá (Boyacá), a small town of 3,000 people where there was again only a single candidate after a popular candidate's registration got revoked on a legal technicality.

Here are the stats on blank votes in the last presidential elections.

2014 (R2): 618,759 (4.02%)
2014 (R1): 770,543 (5.98%)
2010 (R2): 444,274 (3.4%)
2010 (R1): 223,977 (1.53%)
2006: 226,297 (1.91%)
2002: 196,116 (1.77%)
1998 (R2): 372,749 (3.09%)
1998 (R1): 122,439 (1.16%)
1994 (R2): 72,536 (0.98%)
1994 (R1): 65,116 (1.12%)

The record stands at over 770,000 votes and 6%. Will it be broken?

[Hash]

A look at the differences between both candidates on the issues, based on a revision of both of their platforms.

ECONOMY AND TAXATION

Duque: Neoliberalism; pro-business 'trickle down' economics. His economic views have been compared in the Colombian media to Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan or, more recently, Donald Trump. Duque wants to simplify and reduce corporate taxes to 'competitive rates' to promote private investments and job creation, while wishing to expand the number who pay individual income taxes (without saying how). Duque would not lower the VAT, but would create '6 days without VAT' a year, what he calls 'Colombian Black Fridays'.

To fill what would probably be a bigger fiscal hole, Duque wants to significantly reduce tax evasion, 'rationalize public spending' to prevent 'wasteful spending'. Uribismo has built a narrative of Santos' irresponsible "wasteful state" (estado derrochón), as opposed to Uribe's responsible "austere state", even if neither of those things are true. Duque supports a "deep reorganization of public administration" to "do more with less", taking advantage of the savings opportunities created by new technologies and online government, but also by abolishing and merging public agencies (notably in the agricultural sector) and maybe ministries (like Uribe did) because 'there are too many of them'.

His other economic proposals reflect a clear pro-business neoliberal outlook, of economic growth and poverty reduction through the private sector and limited state intervention. He wants to democratize and expand capital markets, reduce operation and transaction costs in financial markets, comprehensively support entrepreneurship, support micro-loans for those currently outside financial markets, simplify and reduce regulations, expand and open new global trading markets, and reduce the costs of foreign investment through deregulation. Like Uribe and Santos have done, notably with the mining sector, Duque supports generous tax benefits for specific economic sectors like SMEs, benefit corporations and agro-industry. His gimmick is the 'orange economy' and 'new technologies', so his platform talks a lot about those things and stuff like electronic billing, e-government and other new IT solutions until you go crazy in the head. Just like the commies think everything can be solved by abolishing capitalism, Duque thinks everything can be solved if we used the internet more.

In a rare departure from neoliberal orthodoxy, Duque - unlike Petro - wants to adjust the budgetary 'golden rule' to allow for counter-cyclical fiscal policy, saving in good times and deficit spending in recessions. However, in sum, Duque's economic policies are aimed at facilitating private sector-led growth and job creation, trusting the free market to create more formal jobs and increase personal incomes, thereby reducing income inequalities and other gaps between classes.

Petro: Social democracy or modern democratic socialism, the international comparison isn't Hugo Chávez or Fidel Castro, but perhaps more Rafael Correa (or Bernie Sanders, Jeremy Corbyn or Jean-Luc Mélenchon). The main axes of his economic program are anti-extractivism, inequalities and 'democratization' of the economy. All these points directly challenge the predominant economic model in Colombia since the 1990s (sorry Santos, you were no FDR). It also implies a much broader and interventionist role for the state and the public sector than Duque's platform.

Petro wants to reindustrialize strategic sectors like textiles, metalworking, construction materials, IT and waste management, protect the internal market, diversify exports away from oil, renegotiate FTAs particularly clauses affecting national sovereignty and strengthen clean agricultural production to ensure food sovereignty. While supporting labour market formalization, he warns that the priority must be workers' rights and escaping from poverty. He too wants to stimulate SMEs, but under his vision the state must take a much more active and interventionist role in economic growth and job creation, beginning with the 'democratization' of the economy (democratization of knowledge, health, lands, water, energies and credit) - which means having the public sector, and publicly-owned companies and agencies (rather than private concessions) control public services like trash collection or public transit (like he tried to do in Bogotá). He wants to credit a public bank which would provide credit to those without access to private banks. As he tried to do in Bogotá, Petro wants to 'democratize' cities, with more social housing, higher taxes on 'abandoned' lots, a national fund to improve informal/legalized settlements and reducing urban social segregation and inequalities.

Petro promises that he would not expropriate companies, productive land or private properties and only use those existing legal and constitutional mechanisms. He wants a more progressive tax system, with the rich paying more, but for 'Venezuelan reasons', he has stopped short of the western left's big splashy 'tax the rich!' and he wouldn't raise corporate taxes (but he'd create a profit remittances tax). There are no Flanby-ian '75% tax rates!', but rather cutting the difference between nominal and effective tax rates by eliminating tax loopholes and benefits and tax capital gains more effectively. Petro wants to increase taxes on unproductive latifundios. On the other hand, he proposes to reduce the VAT back down to 16% and reimburse VAT for the poor.

Petro pledges not to touch central bank autonomy and respect the budgetary 'golden rule' but would increase spending on education, science and technology.

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

Duque: Pretty clearly pro-oil/mining, but since his thing is to be the hip, young, cool, trendy, post-modern right-winger, he is concealing that under layers of feigned environmentalism. For example, he has framed his pro-war on drugs stance in 'green' terms, linking coca cultivation to deforestation. His platform includes vague 'proposals' like mining development with "the highest standards of responsibility" or "all productive activities will need to commit themselves with water protection, conservation of páramos, reducing the impact on climate change, air quality and clean soil management" which has the benefit of sounding greenish but without actually meaning anything. In the same vein, he also has a proposal about increasing "awareness on the richness of Colombia's biodiversity" which would include campaigns to strengthen the 'environmental culture', annual sowings and 'days of participation in the protection and clean-up of the natural environment', which also doesn't mean anything. In somewhat more substantive proposals, Duque does support expanding the use of clean energies in the energy grid, clean public transportation with 'alternative energies' (he mentions 'bicycles', which sounds great but is also nonsense) and carbon emissions trading. But he also wants to create a capital market for the mining sector. Duque used to support fracking, but he has been pushed in the other direction, and now says that he supports the moratorium on fracking.

Duque wants to regulate and, in effect, curtail the extent of local referendums (consultas populares) organized by local communities to block mining or oil projects. He would pass a statutory law to regulate them, and define (after 'dialogue' with Congress and the high courts) local governments' powers over subsoil resources and hydrocarbons and the legal effects of local referendums. He also mentions a constitutional amendment which would increase the signatures and approval thresholds for recalls and consultas (which are already too high, but whatever rocks your boat).

Petro: Opposition to the extractivist economic model (i.e. economic dependence on extraction of primary resources like minerals or fossil fuels) is the core of Petro's economic agenda, clearly indicating a 'red-green' or ecosocialist vision which differs substantially from Chávez, Correa and even Evo Morales. His platform is a searing indictment of the extractive economic model and, more generally, the dependence on oil and other minerals as the foundations of the Colombian economy since the 1990s (the effects of which have been, rather unquestionably, negative). Instead, he proposes - without detailing how - diversifying the economy through re-industrialization and sustainable agricultural production, which has led critics to mock his program as 'avocados vs. petroleum'. He is proposing a fairly radical and presumably rapid 'energy transition' away from oil, gas and coal towards clean energies, with water to be at the centre of spatial planning and economic development policies. Petro is strongly opposed to fracking and open-pit gold mining, both would be banned, and he also vows not to renew coal mining contracts while supporting clean, small-scale hydroelectricity (no dams or reservoirs) and artisanal mining in a framework of greater local autonomy (and respecting indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians' rights over their territories). The last point is also very important, in current debates: Petro's program would imply far greater participatory consultations and deliberations between the government and local communities, particularly ethnic minorities, something which worries investors and big corporations. Petro strongly defends the right of local communities to hold consultas populares, without additional legal regulations.

His platform also proposes to strengthen environmental regulatory agencies, protect access to clean water/water conservation, restore damaged ecosystems and contaminated rivers, reduce and prevent current and future risks from climate change, protect populations at risk from natural disasters and climate change, support clean public transit in cities (but also in the regions with rail or fluvial navigation), control urban sprawl and reduce deforestation.

His whole energy policy, runs the major risk of scaring away foreign investors (over 40% of foreign investment in Colombia is in the mining-energy sector).

AGRICULTURE
Colombia has one of the most unequal land ownership structures in the world (behind like Paraguay), rural poverty remains alarmingly high, many peasants in remote regions are not only besieged by violence and the drug trade but they lack access to markets or infrastructure (of any kind).

Duque: Modern private agro-industry, "articulating small producers with agro-industry". Duque opposes the 'rural reform' section of the peace agreement, and would instead promote agricultural production and rural development by betting on big, modern private agro-industry. The state will provide and finance infrastructure (roads etc.) and public goods, and provide legal security for agro-industry and landowners. Duque's policies would favour and greatly benefit modern agroindustry and (large) landowners: he would offer tax benefits for 10 years for 'productive investments' which generate jobs in the countryside, he opposes the multipurpose cadastre of the peace agreement and opposes property tax increases for large landholdings. He would, in effect, come back on some points of the 2011 land restitution law since he would protect private property and provide legal security, recognizing 'landholdings in good faith', something which greatly reassures large landowners and agro-industry who are afraid of a 'witch hunt' because of land restitution sentences since the 2011 law.

There would be no agrarian reform or redistribution of land, and his platform just vaguely mentions "inclusive access to land through the definition, regulation of land, its use and benefits". Instead, following trickle down logic, small producers and poor peasants would benefit from their 'integration' with agro-industrial schemes (he also talks a lot about Big Data and new technologies, which would be nice if poor peasants actually had internet). Finally, he would reform, simplify and modernize the agriculture ministry (which would regain a leading role on the matter) and the plethora of new agencies created with the peace agreement and 2011 law (likely get rid of a few of them), but is vague about what that'd do in practice. In the first round, de la Calle said his agricultural policy was 'Agro Ingreso Seguro', referring to the Uribe administration's rural subsidies program which ended up in the hands of big landowners, narcos and the very rich and landed Andrés Felipe Arias in jail (or would have, if he hadn't fled the law to Florida).

Petro: A peasant (campesino) economy, building on the 'rural reform' of the peace agreement. Petro wants to democratize access to land to reduce rural inequalities and concentration of land ownership, redistributing land to victims of the conflict, peasants and respect the land rights of indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians. Petro would increase rural property taxes on large, unproductive latifundios (incentives to sell and increase the offer of land) and urgently modernize and update the multipurpose cadastre, with revenues being used to provide public goods, social programs and infrastructure. He would use the land fund created by the peace agreement, recognizing de facto ownership, granting land titles and protecting against violent dispossession of land. Petro would revitalize and strengthen the peasant reserve zones (ZRC), peasant landholding structures created in 1994 but extensively villainized by the right, while alliances with agro-industry would be permitted only under 'strong regulations'. He would also expand infrastructure and market access for peasants.

HEALTHCARE, EDUCATION AND PENSIONS

Duque: The status-quo, with a few tweaks. Unlike Petro, Duque wouldn't reinvent Colombia's education, healthcare and pensions system. While Uribe said that the only thing professors have is the 'power of slander' and they only teach to yell and insult, Duque says that teachers deserve respect and recognition. He'd create 1000 public or public-private preschools, expand full-day schooling, provide technical qualifications in high school tailored to the economic vocation of each region, partially condone student loans for those graduating with honours, promote saving plans to allow more students to go to university and establish a "financial vehicle to strengthen public universities". Post-secondary education would be more in tune with the productive economic needs of the country: for example, the SENA (vocational training colleges)'s relations with the private sector would be strengthened so that its programs are more aligned with economic needs. Universities would also be tied to the private sector's needs.

Without changing the healthcare system, he'd make tweaks like focusing on prevention, using more new technologies, acting to prevent corruption in private insurance funds (EPS) and introducing accountability systems for the EPS so that they are remunerated based on quality of care and not only quantity of patients. The explicitly stated end goal here is also that, with labour market formalization, less and less people are insured through the subsidized system and more people pay for their insurance out of pocket through the contributory system.

Duque has repeatedly denied 'fake news' claims that he'd abolish the public pension system (Colpensiones), although he'd seek a 'convergence' between the public and private schemes. He is very vague about his pension reform, saying he wouldn't raise the retirement age and seek to adjust the most inequitable aspects of the current system (like a new fund to provide pensions to the most vulnerable).

Duque promises 1.5 million housing solutions - 900,000 new houses and 600,000 renovated houses, achieved through the private sector and banks (extending mortgage loans to 35 yrs, allow financial entities to loan more to builders and buyers with less regulations to lower costs).

His government would keep existing subsidies to low-income people but refocused to avoid poverty traps, promote social mobility and be 'more effective' (avoiding dependency).

Petro: Free public education, universal healthcare and a basic public pension. To improve education, Petro wants full-day schooling (8 hours), expanded public preschool and daycare and a new focus on rural education. Petro wants to expand public post-secondary education, with new public universities in the regions and up to 1 million new students accessing post-secondary education with priority for peasants, ethnic minorities, victims and the urban poor. He'd increase funding for sciences & technologies, 'democratize' research and reform the current government institutions for science and research. Petro sees education as emancipatory (freeing the youth from violence) with a comprehensive, critical and democratic curriculum based on the diversity of knowledge, inclusiveness, civic education, arts, sports, healthy well-being and love.

Petro wants a single, public universal healthcare system ('single-payer') managed by national and territorial health councils and a single health fund which would collect, administer and pay healthcare fees. Private insurers (EPS) would be liquidated, but private hospitals would remain but only for more complex medical procedures (primary care would be in the hands of public providers). The healthcare model would be based on promotion of healthy 'good living', prevention and surpassing inequalities. Petro supports a tax on soft drinks, which was not included in the 2016 tax reform because of the sugar lobby (which included Duque).

For pensions, all workers would contribute to the public defined-benefit social insurance scheme (Colpensiones) to ensure that everyone has a basic pension (with a top-up subsidized grant to the poor) -- currently, workers have the choice between contributing to the public plan or the private defined-contribution retirement savings plans (administered by private pension funds). Under Petro's idea, workers earning 4x the minimum wage would also obligatorily contribute to a public or private capitalization pension fund, in addition to contributions for a basic pension. Those who would want to complement their pension would still be able to contribute to a individual account savings plan.

DRUGS
Colombia has more coca cultivation than any other country in the world (up to 180,000 ha., an all-time high, this year) and remains the leading cocaine producing-country in the world.

Duque: The traditional 'War on Drugs'. Illicit crop substitution would be mandatory, not voluntary: sounds tough, but this is already the case, because while the peace agreement allows coca-producing families to sign voluntary crop substitution programs with the state in exchange for technical assistance for productive projects, crop substitution (forced eradication) remains the law for those who refuse to sign on. However, Duque reopens the door for aerial fumigation/aspersion, suspended in 2015, ostensibly with new healthier, cleaner and greener herbicides (I too believe in fluffy bunnies). Never mind that aerial fumigation, even ignoring the disastrous health and environmental effects of glyphosate, is very extensive but also extremely ineffective. Although maybe Trump will pay for it. Duque seems to have said that he wouldn't abandon the current crop substitution programs with coca-producing families, but with his policies of forced eradication, aerial fumigation and mandatory substitution he would lose the trust and confidence of the nearly 70,000 families which have signed crop substitution programs. He would also revise or drop the 'penal alternative' bill (part of the peace agreement) which suspends criminal prosecutions against small coca producers who grow it for self-subsistence if they commit to stop cultivating.

Duque would step up military operations against drug trafficking, with reinforced satellite and electronic monitoring of borders and critical zones, and step up international actions against money laundering operations in Colombia and abroad.

For drug users, Duque promises to ban the 'personal dose' (a small amount of drugs - 20 grams of marijuana, 1 gram of cocaine - decriminalized for personal, recreational use by the ConCourt in 1994). A 2009 constitutional amendment banned carrying and using drugs, but hasn't been regulated by law yet. Duque says that drug dealers are hiding behind the 'personal dose', and that going after them is his priority. He wouldn't arrest users, but the police would confiscate the drugs and impose a fine (I find this to be ridiculous and stupid, as well as a waste of police resources).

Petro: Drug use as a public health issue, and participatory crop substitution. As mayor of Bogotá, Petro created mobile attention centres for addicts (CAMAD) which were very successful, and promotes the same idea - a public health, rather than criminal, angle on drug usage and addiction. Petro supports the peace agreement on crop substitution and would maintain the current programs, including 'penal alternative', but wants the program to be more participatory and take into account the voices of coca cultivators and communities and have them participate in the design, execution and evaluation of programs. This is part of his vision of bottom-up democratization and may yield positive outcomes, but would also be slow and create more opportunities for deadlock and disagreements.

To be continued.

[Hash]

Pt. 2

THE PEACE AGREEMENT

Duque: Structural modifications, without ripping it to shreds. His structural modifications, however, would modify the essence of it all. His proposals on agriculture and drugs are already significant departures from the peace agreement. Duque wants a constitutional reform stating the drug trafficking can not, under any circumstance, be considered as a 'connected' political offence and eligible for amnesty. This, however, would probably not be retroactive and legal principles mean that it would not apply to the FARC, who have already received or can receive an amnesty under more favourable preexisting laws. But it would be a major blockage point in negotiations with the ELN (which he wants to suspend) or criminal organizations (Bacrim). Duque wants the FARC's top commanders who committed serious crimes against humanity to serve prison terms in some kind of permanent reclusion centre, even if not in an actual jail, and that they be ineligible for political participation until they've served their time. This may be difficult in practice, again because of the principle of more favourable preexisting laws and the rules for the FARC's political participation in Congress can only be changed with a constitutional reform, although he could force the FARC's top commanders to resign their seats once sentenced by transitional justice (JEP) via the courts' interpretation and/or the JEP's procedures (which are still being debated in Congress). This could further destroy mid-level commanders' trust in the peace process, and send them running to the dissidences.

Duque claims that the FARC hasn't given up all it knows on drug trafficking routes, its hidden assets and money laundering networks (which he's probably right about), and wants them to give up this information.

Duque wants the military and state agents excluded from the JEP, which would effectively turn what should have been an inclusive and comprehensive transitional justice system aimed at establishing the truth on the conflict with restorative justice into a trial court only for the FARC with an incomplete or biased truth which would confirm uribismo's traditional claim that there is no armed conflict but rather a terrorist threat.

Uribismo's vision of peace isn't as consistent as it seems, but it essentially boils down to the idea that, since there is/was no armed conflict, a peace process is merely the demobilization and reintegration of a 'defeated' criminal group on the terms of the victor and without 'negotiating the national agenda'. That is basically what Duque would do: he says he will protect and defend individual demobilized and reintegrated fighters, and be generous with them, but his policies on agriculture and drugs would go against the direction of the peace agreement and, in the end, the peace agreement will just have been like the 2003-06 AUC demobilization (which was a disaster and a farce) rather than a profound transformation of the country.

Petro: The peace agreement as a starting point. On the other hand, Petro's vision is that the peace agreement is a road map or starting point for the profound transformation of the country, along the lines I've explained in the previous post. He would push for the approval of laws implementing it currently held up in Congress, deepen the peace agreement's ideas of bottom-up democratization (currently forgotten and already watered down by the 2016 renegotiation). He says that victims and society will learn the full truth about the conflict, with justice for the perpetrators and land restitution for victims. His entire platform is entitled 'Colombia Humana towards an era of peace', and his runoff campaign, as I've said, is built around a war vs. peace dichotomy.

SECURITY AND CRIME

Duque: A traditional right-wing 'law and order' and 'tough on crime' approach. Duque sees security as one of the major priorities, and proposes in general terms to strengthen the military and law enforcement and toughen sanctions on criminals. Against 'major threats', Duque would modernize and strengthen the military's capacities against the ELN, FARC dissidents, Bacrim and drug traffickers. With uribismo's claim that Santos and the peace agreement have demotivated the military and destroyed military honour, Duque proposes to restore military honour and morale with a veterans' law and legal security. In the cities, Duque would eradicate 'areas of fear' (dangerous areas, 'no-go zones'). In rural areas, he would strengthen military and police presence and build/rebuild infrastructure. Against criminals, Duque has the attractive slogan of 'el que la hace, la paga' (he who does it, pays for it).

Petro: 'Humane security'. Security and criminality isn't a major priority for Petro, and while he'd also go after big criminal threats like FARC dissidents or Bacrim, his focus would be reducing fears and insecurities imposed by social inequalities and ensuring the full enjoyment of individual and collective freedoms. His approach to crime is based on prevention, dissuasion, social intervention, efficient use of law enforcement powers, speedy and effective proportional judicial sanctions. He wants to reform the prison system, so that prisons become dignified areas for the rehabilitation of detainees. Peace, he says, implies new roles for the military and police, reoriented towards defending national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and protecting the civilian population under a human rights and rule of law focus. Compulsory military service would be abolished.

Petro also promises guarantees for social protests and mobilizations. Dialogue, rather than repression, with protesters.

JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL REFORM
The recent scandals, failed reforms and major problems make a major judicial reform an urgent necessity. Colombia has three major high courts (constitutional jurisdiction - ConCourt; criminal, civil etc. top appeals jurisdiction - Supreme Court; and an administrative jurisdiction - Council of State), based on the French or other Western European models, as well as a new transitional justice system (JEP), a quasi-judicial administrative and disciplinary body (Superior Council of the Judiciary).

Duque: A single, unified supreme court? Maybe. Duque's platform talks in inoffensive terms about attracting the best talents to the judiciary, judicial independence, meritocracy, elevating the quality of judges, transparency, ending the corruption in the judiciary, digitalization and simplification of judicial procedures to decongest the judiciary, strengthening alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (conciliation, arbitration), strengthening local courts, decision-making based on statistics and unified open information systems on access to justice. All good ideas. He also wants justice which protects investors and businessmen, which might not be the best idea. Duque wants the remove the high courts' powers in the election of the Inspector General, AG and registrar - probably a good idea, but the real question is how these independent officials will be selected instead. The risk, for example, is that the president directly appoints the AG (now he sends a list of three names to the Supreme Court which elects one).

But the real controversy with Duque's proposal is what is not explicitly stated, or just hinted at: a big proposal to merge all the high courts into just a single, supreme 'super-court' like in the US or Canada (which he is citing as examples to follow), to simplify justice, end bottlenecks and have 'less magistrates'. There would still be judicial review and a constitutional jurisdiction, but as a specialized chamber of the single super-court (like it was before 1991). He has sought to calm nerves by saying there would be no 'revocation of magistrates' or that he wouldn't do this through a constituent assembly, and has downplayed the idea by saying it is just a proposal for open debate and that he wants a consensus with the judiciary. In any case, all this is easier said than done, and he has already been giving hints that this 'super-court' idea will be quietly left out to die. The other major suspicion with all this is that Uribe is facing over two dozen open investigations in the Supreme Court, including one for crimes against humanity, and there is a sense that "they're closing in on him"... so is the uribista 'super-court' a convenient way to ensure impunity for Uribe?

The acción de tutela is the most popular and widespread legal recourse open to the general public, allowing them to ensure protection of their fundamental constitutional rights through a speedy judicial mechanism. But the thousands of tutelas have created backlogs and conflicts between jurisdictions, and the private sector is weary of tutelas because they feel that the mechanism is being abused (and they, especially private insurers, are often on the receiving end of judicial orders stemming from tutelas). Getting rid of it would be suicidal, but Duque wants to 'strengthen' the tutela... by limiting or rationalizing its extent, focusing on what it should be doing and getting rid of abuses. The devil will be in the details.

Petro: A structural reform similar to that of 2015, later dismantled. The goals are the same as with Duque: independence, meritocracy, effective, transparent, decongested and depoliticized. His reform would take many of the same ideas as the 2015 reform, which were later struck down by the ConCourt, like abolishing the Superior Council of the Judiciary (replaced with a new, more efficient administrative body) and a 'tribunal de aforados' to investigate and sanction magistrates and other top public officials like the AG.

GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY

Duque: The austere state (small government). Duque wants to get rid of unnecessary wasteful spending, reduce the size of government and limit the powers of government. He supports publicly financed electoral campaigns, closed lists, a three-term limit for those in legislative collegiate bodies (like congressmen) and transparent political parties. He has mentioned the idea, like Uribe in 2002, of reducing the number of congressmen from about 270 to 100/150 (unclear if this would mean unicameralism). He would strictly limit public bids with a single bidder or directly awarded contracts. Promising zero tolerance against corruption, he vows strict sanctions against public officials and companies giving or receiving bribes, the creation of a registry of lobbyists, transparent online budgeting (with follow-up evaluation of efficient use of public money) and, above all, he would (or so he claims) eliminate the infamous marmalade in the budget (easier said than done, particularly given the rats following you!). He'd expand the use of new technologies and online platforms to denounce corruption, simplify and eliminate bureaucratic red-tape.

Duque promises to protect the separation of powers and independent institutions. He proposes to have ministers, magistrates and other senior public officials confirmed through public hearings in senatorial commissions. He speaks of a 'Chinese wall' between public powers, limiting nepotism, influence peddling or exchange of favours between different branches.

Petro: Fight the mafias and the establishment with bottom-up participatory democracy. The biggest change he could have done, a constituent assembly, has been ruled out, which will greatly limit his possibilities to dramatically change the political system, culture and even the power of the establishment in Congress. Petro's vision, as I have said, is of bottom-up participatory democracy with civic organizations, NGOs, social movements, unions, employers and local communities, all involved in decision-making and agenda-setting, including budgets. He wants further decentralization and de-concentration of power, strengthening local governments' autonomy and deepening local democracy. He would protect the political rights of the opposition. He proposes an electoral reform to guarantee a more independent and autonomous electoral system. He doesn't have particularly detailed proposals on corruption, besides saying that the corrupt will be sent to jail and reimburse stolen money to the public.

MORAL (SOCIAL) ISSUES
Same-sex marriage and adoption is legal in Colombia, by decision of the Constitutional Court in 2016 and 2015 respectively. Abortion is banned, with exceptions for risks to a woman's mental or physical health, rape or foetal malformations (since a 2006 decision of the Constitutional Court).

Duque: Pro-traditional family social conservatism. While I have good reason to believe that Duque personally doesn't care or is actually pretty liberal, he has adopted a socially conservative discourse by association with virulent homophobes like Ordóñez the book burner or Viviane Morales. He says that he supports the traditional definition of the family (a man and a woman), which is in the constitution, and opposes same-sex marriage and adoption rights but supports civil unions and equal inheritance rights for same-sex couples (but his platform has no mention of LGBT rights). He says that he's pro-life, while supporting the three exceptions. But he has made clear that he won't personally be leading the fight against gay marriage or other socially conservative causes, but he'll be on the conservative side when moral issues come up and he won't do anything to further advance socially liberal ideas. His platform talks about preventing teenage pregnancy with reproductive and sexual health campaigns (but in a debate he sparked controversy by basically saying that teenage pregnancy happens because teenage girls are just bored), zero tolerance for domestic violence or gender-based violence and promoting women's rights (correcting discrimination, job opportunities, women's health; he also promises a 50-50 gender balanced cabinet like Petro). He also supports life sentences for child rapists, an old pet cause of a small but vocal political sector for nearly a decade.

Petro: 'Diverse, multi-coloured' social liberalism. Petro promotes the vision of a diverse, multi-colour country with ideas like 'new citizenships' (nuevas ciudadanías) and his movement has been strongly identified with feminism, LGBT rights, animal rights, alternative cultural identities (graffiti artists, hip hop), indigenous rights and Afro-Colombian rights. The relevant chapter of his platform doesn't primarily talk about families, like Duque, but rather specific groups and issues - women (full gender equality, eradicating workplace discrimination and wage gaps, extended maternity leave, zero tolerance against gender violence), child poverty, youth (restorative justice and non-prison sanctions for young offenders, youth participation, strengthened 'first job' policies like internships, financial and technical support for young entrepreneurs etc.), seniors, people with disabilities, indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians (recognition of their territorial autonomy, right to be consulted, protection of their self-government, strengthening indigenous guards, fighting structural racism, human-nature balance as the foundations of the national model), LGBTI community, the homeless.

Petro supports same-sex marriage and adoption, but evaded a question about whether he would do anything to decriminalize abortion beyond the three exceptions.

FOREIGN RELATIONS AND MIGRATION

Duque: A tough line against Venezuela. Duque already denounced, with other Colombian and Chilean congressmen, Nicolás Maduro before the ICC. He also promises to withdraw from UNASUR. Duque has mentioned the idea of regional quotas between countries for Venezuelan migrants, or the idea of a TPS for Venezuelan migrants. He supports express homologation of degrees to allow new Venezuelan migrants to work legally in Colombia. It remains unclear how specifically how would deal with Maduro's regime, besides grandstanding and yelling louder than Santos has been doing (because neither of those things have worked). He supports a more professional diplomatic service and strengthened consular services. His foreign policy, he says, would be 'constructive' but wouldn't hesitate to denounce abuses (i.e. Venezuela). He'd emphasize the Pacific Alliance, take advantage of existing FTAs, more aggressively promote Colombia's economic, trade and tourism opportunities abroad and he would most likely be on friendly terms with Trump (but Trump doesn't give a crap).
 
Petro: South-south cooperation and don't talk to me about Maduro. Petro's foreign policy agenda is much vaguer, particularly on the most important issue (Venezuela) which he has deliberately avoided. He says Maduro is a dictator, and said he'd bring Venezuela to respect the IACHR... but Venezuela denounced the IACHR in 2013 so this idea is inviable and useless. He has no specific proposals on the migrant crisis. Petro promotes a foreign policy based more on south-south cooperation, and ambitions to make Colombia a leading global voice on climate change and energy transition. Petro has made it pretty clear that he has a bad opinion of Trump, so relations with the US might be tougher and lead to confrontations on the issue of drugs.

That's it. I hope these two effortposts are useful to some of you in figuring out where you may stand, learning more about the candidates or just learning about the BIG ISSUES.

[Tender Branson]

My prediction for the runoff today:

55.2% Duque
44.8% Petro

Turnout: 56% (high ... for Colombian standards)